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1 Introduction 
 
 
 
―Nous sommes tous américains!‖ Such ran the headline of Le Monde‘s famous editorial 
(Colombani 2001) following the attacks of September 11
th
, 2001. Not much more than a year 
later, political relations between France and the United States were fraught with tension, and 
France was depicted as the vanguard of Old Europe, leading the political opposition against 
the American led invasion of Iraq. To many observers, the Franco-American fall out over the 
Iraq War seemed to validate the impression that France harbors a disproportionate political 
resentment vis-à-vis the United States (Wall, in O‘Connor and Griffiths (eds) 2007:19). 
Regardless of the fact that France was but one of several major countries to voice its 
opposition to the war, it was singled out as the primary opponent to the American lead 
intervention and portrayed as the embodiment par excellence of European anti-Americanism 
(Adams 2007, Hoffmann 2004). In certain respects, this was a both unfair and untrue 
generalization, which showed ignorance as to the level of anti-Americanism in other 
European countries as well as to the heterogeneity of French displays of anti-Americanism. 
Yet, like many such generalizations, it contained an element of truth. French anti-
Americanism often resonates louder and at times more strident than that of other European 
nations. In 2005, the Economist could in a decidedly unflattering portrait of then President 
Jacques Chirac safely write that the ―French president has no rivals as global spokesman on 
anti-Americanism‖ (2005:35). This verdict was not just a repetition of the widely held beliefs 
concerning the supposedly anti-American policies of Chirac. The statement could equally be 
interpreted almost as a truism, confirming a relatively ingrained perception that French 
presidents are, more or less per definition, guided by a deep reluctance towards all things 
American. The fact that the current French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, has been presented as 
an exception to this rule, and his rapprochement with Washington as a break with French 
traditions in this respect, is essentially a validation of the Economist‘s claim that French 
presidents are, by and large, expected to be standard-bearers of European anti-Americanism. 
It is an impression that is not just confined to the political world; indeed it is a common 
impression that anti-Americanism runs deep in the French society at large. Neither is it an 
impression, which is confined to observers outside France, as it is shared by many influential 
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French commentators. Jean-François Revel, one of the most passionate critics of the French 
tradition of denigrating America, has described his native country as ―le laboratoire privilégié 
où se rencontrent à l‘état le plus poussé et le plus tranché des idées sur les États-Unis qui sont 
répandues sous une forme plus atténuée un peu partout en Europe et aussi ailleurs‖ (Revel 
2002:164). Are we to believe Revel, France is the breeding house of European anti-
Americanism, a prime mover in all things anti-American. Whether this is an exaggeration or 
not, it mirrors common verdicts on French-American relations such as those depicted in the 
Economist‟s article.  
As could be expected, the Franco-American controversy over the invasion of 
Iraq sparked a renewed interest in analyzing French anti-Americanism. In America, books 
were published with telltale titles such as The French Betrayal of America (Timmerman 
2004) or Our Oldest Enemy – A History of America‟s Disastrous Relationship with France 
(Miller and Molesky 2004). These works can be read mainly as examples of partisan 
demagoguery against an ally, who was scorned for not standing up for America in her hour of 
need. While they provide good insights into some of the grievances that the fall-out over the 
Iraq war gave rise to in America, they add little of substance to the analysis of French anti-
Americanism. Of more interest were some of the books published in France when the 
transatlantic tensions were at their highest. Jean-François Revel‘s L‟obsession anti-
américaine (2002) and Philippe Roger‘s The American Enemy, A Story of French Anti-
Americanism ([2002] 2005), both published before the fall out over the course to follow in 
Iraq led Franco-American relations to reach a new all-time low, were evidence of a renewed 
critical attempt to evaluate why anti-Americanism remains such a strong feature in France. 
Just as the particular French variety of anti-Americanism came in renewed focus at the dawn 
of the new millennium, so has the subject of anti-Americanism as a general phenomenon 
received accrued attention. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 ―expressed nothing if not hatred of 
America‖ (Crockatt 2003:43), and this sparked a wave of interest in anti-Americanism 
throughout the world, leading some to argue that 9/11 ―sharply punctuated the end of the 
American century‖, heralding instead what ―may well come to be recalled as the ‗anti-
American century‘‖ (Krastev 2004:5). Surveys revealing growing anti-Americanism in most 
of the countries polled gave rise to a substantial increase in the number of works and articles 
published on the phenomenon (Higgott and Malbašić, in Higgott and Malbašić (eds) 2008). 
Whether these works had anti-Americanism featuring prominently in the title, or contained 
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chapters or subchapters, in which anti-Americanism was depicted as a natural part of analyses 
of especially the deteriorating transatlantic relationship or the political turmoil in the Middle 
East, it has seemed as if in the first decade of the new millennium, no serious study of 
America was complete without some form of treatment of the phenomenon. Clearly, anti-
Americanism is (or was until recently) a very timely subject. The reasons for this have largely 
been attributed to the global disaffection with America that was registered by pollsters under 
the presidencies of George W. Bush. The presidential candidate, who in his 2000 election 
campaign promised not to be the ―ugly American‖, ended up as president being ―viewed 
globally as exactly that‖ (O‘Connor, in O‘Connor and Griffiths (eds) 2007:1). Yet since 
January 2009, George W. Bush has left the White House and America‘s allies have largely 
surrendered to ‗Obama-mania‘ (Pew 2009). Surely then, the topic of anti-Americanism, at 
least in Europe, is today as interesting as yesterday‘s newspaper? Not quite. First, though the 
election of Barack Obama as the 44
th
 President of the United States seems to have sparked a 
new wave of Americanophilia throughout most of Europe, anti-Americanism predates the 
election of the 43
rd
 President by centuries. While the former president‘s style and policies 
contributed toward galvanizing large segments of the global public opinion against official 
America, the contemporary factors promoting anti-American sentiments were present well 
before his election and are bound to linger on well after his departure from office. Second, 
while there is little doubt that the political actions of successive American administrations 
partake in shaping world opinion of the United States, anti-Americanism feeds on other 
sources beyond the practice of American foreign policy. Indeed, as will be shown in this 
study, anti-Americanism is as much if not more about a rejection of the perceived 
Americanization of the world as it is about opposition to specific American policies.  
 
1.1 Main Objectives of the Study 
This study will attempt to present an analysis of French anti-Americanism, which departs 
significantly from most of the accounts of the phenomenon to have been elaborated so far: 
The aim is to present a structural analysis of a cultural phenomenon. The main objective is to 
explore the constitutive factors most likely to prompt anti-American predispositions in France 
and to study how these predispositions influence the actions and policies of contemporary 
France. The overall research question to guide the thesis is: What elements of the French 
national identity are particularly conducive toward promoting anti-American sentiments 
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among the French elites, and to what extent can Franco-American relations under the Fifth 
Republic be regarded as influenced by these elements? Starting from the (rather contested) 
assumption that there is a structural dimension underlying the most common aspects of anti-
Americanism, a further objective will be to develop a framework, within which anti-
Americanism can be studied as a cultural phenomenon in international relations.  
Anti-Americanism comes in many varieties depending on the countries 
observed. In this study, the primary focus will be on the particular French variety, which to 
this author‘s mind presents some unique and fascinating aspects. Yet it would be incomplete 
to analyze the French variety of anti-Americanism without presenting an attempt at exploring 
its universal dimension. The problem in this respect is naturally that some of the most virulent 
aspects of anti-Americanism are to be found especially in the Middle East (Akbarzadeh and 
Baxter, in O‘Connor (ed.) 2007c), where the United States is frequently denounced as ‗the 
Great Satan‘. Many observers will probably share Abdallab‘s assessment that ―One of the 
foreign policies of the United States that is a constant source of anti-Americanism in many 
parts of the world and especially in the Arab world is the U.S. economical, political and 
military support for Israel‖ (Abdallab 2003). A study of the most extreme varieties of anti-
Americanism, including those potent enough to provoke acts of terrorism against the United 
States or U.S. interests abroad is, however, not the objective of this study. Therefore, this 
study will not attempt to answer Fareed Zakaria‘s question ―Why Do They Hate Us?‖ 
(Zakaria 2001), as anti-Americanism henceforth will be analyzed in terms of rejection rather 
than hatred. One of the most intriguing features of anti-Americanism is not the hatred that 
America can attract in parts of the world, where the United States is seen as an almost 
unmitigated evil, but the rejection that it can fuel in segments around the world relatively 
sympathetic to the values and frequently also to a large number of the policies of the United 
States. Sylvia Ullmo has noted that it is doubtful whether anybody is interested in anti-
Americanism in the regions of the world where hatred toward America is more or less a 
consensual affair (in Mathé (ed.) 2000:9). That might be something of an overstatement, yet 
though Americans may have woken up after 9/11 wondering why America‘s enemies hate it 
so much, they might find it even more bewildering to wonder ―Why have we become so 
unpopular even among our friends?‖ (Moïsi 2009:121). This thesis will attempt to provide 
some answers to this last question. It will probe into the general manifestations of anti-
Americanism and more specifically its particular French variety. It will on the one hand seek 
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to present an investigation into the causes of anti-Americanism, arguing that these can largely 
be analyzed in terms of a rejection of American power. On the other hand, it will analyze the 
French rejection of America, arguing that France and America are, due to the fact that both 
nations are deeply imbued with universalist aspirations, in fact ‗divided by common values‘. 
First, analyzing the most prominent theories on anti-Americanism, this study 
will propose an alternative model of interpretation building on the assumption that most 
displays of anti-Americanism can also be regarded structurally, namely in terms of a rejection 
of American power. Denis Lacorne and Tony Judt have rightly argued that anti-Americanism 
is an extremely broad concept, which ―in its mildest form [..] is merely criticism of some 
American policies or social characteristics‖, while ―At the other extreme, it expresses a real 
clash of civilizations, the complete rejection of anything and everything ‗American‘‖ (in Judt 
and Lacorne (eds) 2005:2). The present study will not, however, focus particularly on the 
intensity of the rejection, but rather on the more fundamental attributes of this rejection. As 
such, it is the ambition to present an alternative model of interpretation, which can explain the 
basic sources of anti-Americanism as a universal phenomenon rather than to present a 
typology of its more particularistic features within different societies. This study will argue 
that the standard definitions proposed so far fail to account for the more structural causes of 
anti-Americanism. Instead, it will propose the following definition, which will be developed 
in greater detail in chapter 2: Anti-Americanism is a global phenomenon and the most 
universal of all nation-specific anti-isms. It reflects a general predisposition against the 
United States, its society and its policies. It is a complex phenomenon with many different 
attributes reflecting the beholders‟ values and perceptions. To a large extent, these attributes 
are due to or enhanced by the perception that the United States wields disproportionate 
power over other nations and their inhabitants. As such, anti-Americanism can largely be 
interpreted as a reaction against the perceived threat of Americanization of other societies, 
both on a local and on a global level. 
Second, a general framework for understanding the structural forces that 
promote anti-Americanism on a universal level will only permit us to gain a deeper 
understanding of why America is rejected by segments of the global population. In order to 
address the main objective of the study, i.e. to analyze the forces that are particularly 
conducive toward promoting anti-Americanism in France, the study will explore the notion of 
national identity constructs with a view to presenting an analysis of the particular variety of 
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French anti-Americanism. Working on a set of assumptions regarding the central tenets of 
France‘s national identity, it will be argued that the French political and cultural elites, who 
are the primary agents of anti-Americanism in France, have predispositions toward the United 
States, which build largely on these tenets. These predispositions partake in coloring a 
significant proportion of the collective French mind, thus, it will be argued, influencing the 
behavior of the elites. A final objective will be to assess to what extent this behavior can be 
regarded in terms of anti-Americanism. While it will be argued that the actions and policies of 
the French elites vis-à-vis the United States can to a large extent be traced to the central tenets 
of France‘s national identity, it is much more difficult to determine whether they can be 
regarded as evidence of anti-Americanism among these elites. This will be no easy task, given 
that there exists no blueprint for how to differentiate adequately between displays of anti-
Americanism, and actions and statements, which by some may be perceived as blatant 
examples of anti-Americanism, without that necessarily being neither the intent, nor the 
motive behind. Unable to develop some kind of litmus test with which to separate the two, 
this study will more modestly attempt to analyze to what extent such actions and policies can 
be said in all probability to be based on some form of rejection of America.  
The study spans anti-Americanism over a large historic spectrum, from its 
beginnings prior to the establishment of the United States till the present day. Yet, as anti-
Americanism has witnessed a spectacular rise in recent years (Higgott and Malbašić, in 
Higgott and Malbašić (eds) 2008), it is natural to focus particularly on the developments that 
seem to have strengthened the phenomenon recently. There is no doubt that the ―Bush 
administration‘s unilateralist assertion of American power‖ has prompted ―a growing 
international resentment of American policy‖ (David and Grondin, in David and Grondin 
(eds) 2006:xiii), and as such, the policies and actions of the United States under the Bush 
years will receive particular attention in the first part of this study, which analyzes anti-
Americanism as a rejection of American power. This does not mean that the rejection of 
America will be described primarily with reference to the policies followed by the Bush 
administration. Rather, it will be argued that the rise of anti-American sentiments has gone 
hand in hand with the rise of American power, culminating with the rejection of the perceived 
unilateralist use of this power under especially George W. Bush. Conversely, though the latest 
displays of France‘s rejection of American power are especially associated with the Chirac 
presidency, the study will focus on the constitutive origins of this rejection; origins which 
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with respect to the central tenets of the French national identity can largely be traced back to 
the French Revolution of 1789. In terms of the displays of political anti-Americanism under 
the Fifth Republic, there is no avoiding the foreign policy legacy, which General de Gaulle 
bequeathed to his successors, and this will feature prominently as a further reminder of the 
ideational structuring forces within contemporary French politics. Following the terminology 
developed by Joseph S. Nye (1990), this study will examine anti-Americanism both in terms 
of a rejection of America‘s hard power and its soft power. This terminology seems 
particularly appropriate when used in relation to the study of the causes of anti-Americanism, 
and perhaps even more so when the French variety of the phenomenon becomes the focus of 
attention. Here, it might even be the case that the French elites reject America‘s soft power 
more forcefully than its hard power. There is certainly no escaping that a prominent feature of 
French anti-Americanism is its cultural dimension, and it will be argued that the cultural 
rejection of America might prove even more structurally entrenched than the political ditto. 
It was noted above that the aim of this study is to present a structural analysis of 
a cultural phenomenon. This might lead some readers to expect an almost mathematically 
stringent causal analysis of all the different factors weighing in on the phenomenon of anti-
Americanism, processed in a complex methodological framework, which can measure the 
impact of these factors. Those readers will most likely be disappointed, and I am doubtful as 
to whether such an analysis would provide the necessary insight into what is after all 
primarily a cultural phenomenon. Instead, I propose an analysis, which is ideationally 
structural, i.e. one which, inspired by the constructivist approach in International Relations 
theory (see below), seeks to identify the structural elements that are the most pervasive in 
association with anti-Americanism, both as a general phenomenon and as a particular French 
predisposition. This does not mean that the study should be regarded as a quintessentially 
theoretical study, nor as a study carried out primarily within the tradition of international 
relations. Rather, the study is carried out in the more eclectic tradition of Area Studies and 
more specifically European Studies; a cross-disciplinary tradition, which while focusing on a 
particular geographical area, draws inspiration from a number of scientific disciplines, most 
notably international relations, political science, sociology, history, philosophy, and cultural 
studies. This approach seems particularly appropriate for the analysis of a phenomenon such 
as French anti-Americanism, and I believe that the shortcomings associated with adopting a 
cross-disciplinary approach, namely that it necessarily entails a somewhat less rigorous 
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application of the multiple methodological tools offered by the different disciplines, are 
outweighed by the benefits it presents, namely that it allows to present a more complete and 
comprehensive analysis of a phenomenon, which if analyzed purely within one scientific 
discipline might only shed a partial light on its causes and attributes. This approach is 
furthermore in line with the one most commonly adopted by the many scholars, who have 
studied anti-Americanism in greater detail over the last decades.  
 
1.2 Place of the Study in Relation to Mainstream Research on Anti-
Americanism  
In 1992, Paul Hollander, long the scholar most associated with the subject of anti-
Americanism, remarked that ―Although the foreign critiques of the United States have been 
with us for a long time and in great abundance surprisingly little has been written about them‖ 
(1992:7). This situation has clearly changed over the past decade. Anti-Americanism is a 
theme that has been explored in a vast number of works over the last years and especially 
since the election of George W. Bush to the U.S. presidency (Higgott and Malbašić, in 
Higgott and Malbašić (eds) 2008). Also related subjects, such as the relationship between 
Europe and America, now routinely contain one or several chapters on European anti-
Americanism. And while anti-Americanism has for obvious reasons primarily been a focus of 
study in America, it has increasingly found favor as a research topic in Europe, where a long 
history of anti-Americanism is now being unfolded by scholars keen to come to terms with a 
feature of European identity that has long been neglected.  
Studies on anti-Americanism are carried out within a number of disciplines. 
Over the last decade, a substantive amount of literature on anti-Americanism has been 
presented by political scientists, scholars of international relations, historians, sociologists, 
and scholars in the tradition of cultural studies. The many different scientific approaches to 
the subject are naturally bound to influence the different studies, yet an interesting feature of 
most literature on the subject, and especially of the more particularistic analyses of anti-
Americanism within specific societies, is that one can typically trace a relatively eclectic 
approach toward the subject, drawing inspiration from several academic fields. Surprisingly 
few of the many studies on anti-Americanism published over the last decade, however, offer 
any proper definitions of the phenomenon, and fewer still any kind of substantial theory 
related to anti-Americanism. This contributes to give the impression that as a research area, 
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anti-Americanism can still be said to be in its infancy
1
. Given that it is on the one hand not a 
particularly well established research area yet on the other hand a subject, which has found 
increasing favor over the last decade, anti-Americanism is often treated either as an 
‗appendix-phenomenon‘ when analyzing the effects of American foreign policies, or, when 
analyzed more systematically, as a mega-concept exhibiting so many different country-
specific features that studies of the phenomenon have typically taken the form of anthologies 
devoted to the subject (e.g. O‘Connor (ed.) 2007a-c, O‘Connor and Griffiths (eds) 2007, 
Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007, Higgott and Malbašić (eds) 2008). Here, the causes and 
attributes of anti-Americanism have been parceled up in numerous subcomponents depending 
on the societies considered; an approach, which contributes to give the impression that anti-
Americanism should be regarded not so much as one phenomenon, but rather as a wide range 
of related, yet distinct phenomena. Finally, while most studies of anti-Americanism treat the 
topic as a complex phenomenon (or several related phenomena), it is not uncommon even in 
serious studies to detect a tendency toward reducing it to largely irrational sentiments and 
prejudices (e.g. Hollander 1992 and 1995, Joffe 2001, 2006a and 2006b). This study will 
depart from these traditions by arguing that as a general, indeed universal phenomenon, anti-
Americanism can be analyzed in terms of rejection of American power, the assumption being 
that among all the features of anti-Americanism, it is the power dimension, which best 
explains the structural forces that are at play regarding the rejection of America.  
 
On anti-Americanism in France as a research topic 
Whereas the study of anti-Americanism as a general phenomenon is characterized by a 
relative absence of common themes and methodologies, most mainstream accounts of anti-
Americanism in France display a certain similarity as to the themes explored, offering roughly 
similar inventories of French displays of anti-Americanism. It is rare to encounter manifestly 
diverging views regarding the attributes of French anti-Americanism, although there are of 
course nuances of interpretation, for example regarding the degree to which de Gaulle can be 
said to have been motivated by anti-Americanism in his handling of Franco-American 
relations. This testifies to the fact that there exists among the scholars who have treated the 
subject a certain consensus regarding some of the most prominent attributes of French anti-
Americanism; a consensus to which this author largely subscribes
2
. Nevertheless, I do agree 
with Denis Lacorne and Tony Judt when they note that ―What is often disappointing about the 
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existing literature on anti-Americanism is its repetitive nature: old stereotypes are endlessly 
reproducedm as if nothing had changed for years, if not centuries, between the United States 
and its critics‖ (in Judt and Lacorne (eds) 2005:2). It is certainly a fact that though the 
numerous works devoted to the topic over the last decade offer valuable accounts of the many 
varied displays of French anti-Americanism or of the mechanisms shaping Franco-American 
relations, they rarely offer a more structural analysis of the ground forces shaping French anti-
Americanism, leaving the reader with impressive overviews of some of its manifestations, but 
often rather clueless as to the deeper causes likely to prompt such manifestations. The reason 
why there has been no real attempt at presenting a more structural study of the phenomenon is 
probably due to the fact that most works on French anti-Americanism have a tendency to 
focus mostly on either its political dimension or its cultural manifestations. The latter is 
particularly evident in works focusing exclusively on France (Roger 2005, Strauss 1978). 
Those focusing on its political manifestations often highlight specific dimensions, such as 
foreign and defense policies (Harrison 1981, Hoffmann 1974, Grosser 1980 and 1989). Ariane 
Chebel d‘Appollonia has noted that an evaluation of what Sophie Meunier has termed the 
―sedimented reservoir of anti-American arguments‖ requires  
a distinction between two related but nonetheless distinct registers. The first one 
is cultural and relates to negative images of American values, negative 
stereotypes about personal characteristics of American, and contempt for 
American civilization. The second one is political and refers to the recurrent 
crisis between the US and French governments. (d‘Appollonia, in Higgott and 
Malbašić (eds) 2008:202)  
 
The present study, however, contends that far from being distinct, the two dimensions are 
linked, indeed intertwined, and that a proper understanding of the structural nature of anti-
Americanism as a phenomenon requires both dimensions not only to be included, but also 
regarded as building on the same origins. Though this study will for practical purposes 
present subchapters devoted to each dimension, a central argument will be that the two 
dimensions represent two sides of the same coin and as such cannot be dissociated if we want 
to achieve a proper understanding of anti-Americanism in France. Sophie Meunier is one of 
the few scholars to efficiently incorporate both dimensions in her analyses (2000 and in 
Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007), yet as these have mostly been of a relatively succinct 
nature, I still believe that there is a need for a more comprehensive analysis coupling both 
dimensions. Rather than presenting another inventory of French displays of anti-
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Americanism, I find it more fruitful to engage in an analysis of some of the ideational causes, 
which partake in predisposing the French national habitus against America. This approach 
sets the present study fundamentally apart from most mainstream analyses of anti-
Americanism in France, which typically focus mostly on either the cultural or the political 
dimensions. In the present study, it will be argued that both dimensions can in fact be better 
understood as originating in the values and beliefs inherent in the French national identity and 
that in order to properly understand anti-Americanism in France, there is a need to probe 
deeper into the French national identity in order to expose why some of its central tenets 
appear particularly conducive toward promoting anti-American predispositions. Several 
scholars studying French anti-Americanism relate the phenomenon to matters of national 
identity (Kuisel 1993, Meunier 2000 and 2007), yet not all appear convinced that this is the 
case. Nettelbeck for example notes that ―anti-Americanism should not be considered in any 
way a constitutive part of French identity [given] that the French people as a whole, over 
time, have perceived America as a different, but essentially benevolent, society‖ (in O‘Connor 
2007c:153). However, French anti-Americanism cannot be analyzed in terms of the 
perceptions and actions of ―the French people as a whole‖. Anti-Americanism in France is 
very much the project of the elites, a point frequently stressed by observers such as Alfred 
Grosser (Grosser 1978:403) and Sophie Meunier (in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007), 
and it is largely the cultural and political elites, who have fashioned much of French national 
identity, sometimes even willfully, as can be seen not least through the construction of French 
history. One feature of French anti-Americanism, which is frequently overlooked (or seldom 
mentioned), is the dimension of how anti-Americanism feeds on centuries of Anglophobia. 
This is a dimension which is self-evident for many scholars studying France and the French 
(e.g. Theodore Zeldin and Jack Hayward), yet rarely mentioned by scholars studying French 
anti-Americanism. A second feature, rarely overlooked, but seldom treated in any great detail, 
is the extent to which France and America can trace their modern national identities as 
originating both from the same historical period and building on shared philosophical values. 
While numerous scholars make brief references to the universalist aspirations of both nations 
(e.g. Bourdieu 1998, Meunier 2000, Roger 2005, Hoffmann 2004, d‘Appollonia, in Higgott 
and Malbašić (eds) 2008, Nettelbeck, in O‘Connor (ed.) 2007c), mostly mentioning this as a 
further characteristic, which distinguishes anti-Americanism in France from the other 
varieties, I believe that it should be regarded as the central defining characteristic, through 
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which the Franco-American relationship must be viewed. Starting from the assumption that 
the core of anti-American predispositions in France can be identified as originating from 
within the central tenets of French national identity, this study will therefore present the 
hypothesis that a) anti-Americanism in France feeds on centuries of Anglophobia, and that as 
such anti-Americanism can (also) be described as a successor phobia, and b) that at the heart 
of more than two centuries of anti-American traditions in France (Roger 2005:449) is the fact 
that both France and America have offered the world each their universalist model. As such, 
French anti-Americanism can be regarded as the case of competing universalisms. While 
numerous studies on French anti-Americanism offer valuable descriptions of the 
contemporary examples of political and cultural anti-Americanism, this study will argue that 
a) these can largely be traced to the tenets of national identity, and b) that some of the 
supposed manifestations of anti-Americanism should be regarded not necessarily as dictated 
by a conscious wish to reject American power, but rather as an almost natural expression of 
the French national habitus, which c) contributes to the impression that America has come to 
be progressively regarded as France‘s significant ‗other‘, i.e. a counter-image of what France 
is, and what it both wishes to distance itself from and in some respects emulate. 
 
1.3 Theorizing on Anti-Americanism as a Cultural Phenomenon in 
International Relations 
 
There is among scholars a certain consensus on treating anti-Americanism primarily as a 
‗cultural‘ phenomenon, albeit one which can influence the (political) behavior of nations 
toward the United States (Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007, Meunier 2000, Mathé (ed.) 
2000). The cultural nature of anti-Americanism is not so much linked to its manifestations, as 
to the perception that anti-Americanism can typically be regarded as a ―prejudice‖ (O‘Connor, 
in O‘Connor (ed.) 2007a, Katzenstein and Keohane, in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007) 
or a ―predisposition‖ (Hollander 1992, 1995 and 2004) among the detractors of the United 
States, and one which has at its origins a plethora of causes, most of which can be 
characterized as more or less related to matters of identity (Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 
2007), or ―culture, religion, ideology or psychology‖ (Ward, in O‘Connor (ed.) 2007b:231); 
all eminently ‗cultural‘ notions. While there is a general consensus on the cultural nature of 
the phenomenon, there is, however, a virtual absence of agreed methodology regarding anti-
Americanism as a research object. There have been several attempts at presenting theories 
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related to anti-Americanism, and the most prominent (Hollander 1992 and 1995, Katzenstein 
and Keohane, in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007, O‘Connor, in O‘Connor (ed.) 2007a) 
will be presented and discussed in the following chapter. Yet though the subject of anti-
Americanism has found increasing favor among students of international relations, it is rarely 
treated in relation to mainstream International Relations theory. The result is that as an 
academic topic, anti-Americanism is characterized by much research, but little theory. This is 
probably due precisely to the ‗cultural‘ nature of the phenomenon, which renders it 
methodologically difficult to analyze on a more structural level.  
First, as we shall see below, culture is a particularly murky concept, both vague 
and virtually all-encompassing, as it carries with it many different connotations. It is used 
within many different social sciences and accordingly defined in many different and not 
always altogether compatible ways (Hudson, in Hudson (ed.) 1997:2-4). Second, it is a 
concept, which is difficult to render operational given the enormous scope of attributes, which 
can be attached to it. This explains why, within the tradition of International Relations theory, 
the term typically ―performs a largely catch-all function, its multiple meanings providing a 
convenient label by which to identify a variety of themes left over after all the other 
explanatory variables [..] have been dealt with‖ (Walker, in Chay (ed.) 1990:8). Thus all too 
often, culture becomes ―the explanation of last resort‖ (Pye 1991:504). Third, even allowing 
for the necessary definitions and an adequate operationalization of culture as a factor in 
international relations, it has due to its very nature mostly been regarded as an eminently 
particularistic concept (Huntington, in Huntington and Weiner (eds) 1987), exposing the 
scholar who seeks to engage in a culturally based analysis to the supposed pitfalls inherent in 
a ―reductionist‖ approach (Waltz 1979). In spite of these obstacles, culture has staged ―a 
dramatic comeback‖ in IR theory since the end of the Cold War (Lapid, in Lapid and 
Kratochwil (eds) 1996:3) and new theories of International Relations have been put forward, 
which place culture at the forefront of the study of international relations. 
 
On culture as a concept in International Relations theory 
Culture has been characterized as ―one of the two or three most complicated words in the 
English language‖ (Williams 1983:87), a ―hyper-complex‖ concept (Fink, quoted by Hauge 
and Horstbøll 1988:21), which defies precise definition (Duffield 1999:769, Iriye, in Hogan 
and Paterson (eds) 2004:242). It is certainly true, as Valerie Hudson reminds us, that the 
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elusiveness of the concept renders it difficult to define in a theoretical sense, the difficulty 
being ―not so much centered on what to include in such a definition, but rather what to 
exclude‖ (in Hudson (ed.) 1997:2). John Duffield nevertheless finds that  
Despite the absence of a definitional consensus, however, most of the cultural 
approaches put forward by students of international relations have a number of 
features in common. Above all, they treat culture primarily, if not exclusively, as 
an ideational phenomenon. Whether culture is described in terms of 
assumptions, attitudes, beliefs, concepts, conceptual models, feelings, ideas, 
images, knowledge, meanings, mind-sets, norms, orientations, sentiments, 
symbols, patterns of mental activity, or the habits of thought, perception, and 
feeling, that are common to members of a particular group. (1999:769) 
 
It is the ideational dimension of the concept, which makes it particularly relevant for the study 
of anti-Americanism. Vertzberger describes culture as representing a ―unified set of ideas that 
are shared by the members of a society and that establish a set of shared premises, values, 
expectations, and action predispositions among the members of the nation that as a whole 
constitute the national style‖ (Vertzberger 1990:267). He further notes that 
At the core of a culture, in most cases, are broad and general beliefs and attitudes 
about one‘s own nation, about other nations, and about the relationships that 
actually obtain or that should obtain between the self and other actors in the 
international arena. Very often the beliefs and attitudes take the form of 
nationally shared stereotypes (ibid:268). 
 
It is evident that such nationally shared stereotypes regarding other actors are at the core of 
most anti-Americanism. Yet equally important is Vertzberger‘s emphasis on beliefs and 
attitudes regarding one‘s own nation, as these are constitutive of the nationally held 
stereotypes. To the extent that anti-Americanism should be regarded as a cultural 
phenomenon, it is thus essentially in relation to the equally problematic notion of national 
identity. As such, culture can be regarded in the sense invoked originally by Herder
3
: to 
designate the customs and values that have shaped a nation‘s sense of identity, usually to such 
an extent that they are seen as natural, or given elements embodied in the nation‘s Volkgeist or 
Nationalgeist, two words Herder used indiscriminately (Østergård 1992:88). In his trajectory 
of European societies, the sociologist Göran Therborn lists what he perceives as the most 
important aspects or dimensions of culture: 
1. a sense of identity, a notion of an ‗I‘ and of a ‗we‘, which implies a boundary 
to the Other(s); 
2. a kind of cognition or cognitive competence, a language in which to think and 
to communicate with the world, a vista, and a knowledge of the world; 
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3. a pattern of evaluations consisting of a set of values and norms, defining good 
or bad, what is and what is not to be done, and of a register of emotions 
expressing a specific mode of reactions to events in the world. (1995:10) 
 
Although Therborn modestly notes that his view of culture is ―not quite the textbook 
standard‖ (ibid.), his definition of culture is in reality very similar to Herders. Like Herder, he 
places much emphasis on the concept of identity as an important aspect of culture. And while 
he in 1995 can lament that the identity concept has often been neglected in handbooks on 
sociology (ibid:11), there is no doubt that some ten to fifteen years later, culture and identity 
have become key concepts in what he calls ―the sciences of humankind‖ (ibid.), central to the 
study of the social psychology of groups. 
 
Operationalizing culture as an analytical concept 
Though the concept of culture, as defined above, is a promising point of departure for an 
analysis of anti-Americanism, it remains difficult to employ operationally in an analysis. 
Defining the concept in terms of (national) identity does not render the task any easier. As 
opposed to the traditional centers of attention among IR-theorists such as balance of power 
considerations, security dilemmas, the role of international institutions etc., culture and 
identity remain difficult concepts to pin down and elusive as objects of analysis. Within the 
tradition of foreign policy analysis, culture (and/or identity) has long been regarded as an 
essential, indeed indispensable, variable. Most foreign policy practitioners and theorists seem 
to agree that perceptions of identity are of importance as a psychological frame of reference in 
international relations (Prizel 1998:2). Already half a century ago, Ole R. Holsti remarked 
how the culturally based belief systems contribute in shaping national images:  
A number of studies have shown that the relationship between ―belief system,‖ 
perceptions, and decision-making is a vital one. [..] A decision-maker acts upon 
his ―image‖ of the situation rather than upon ―objective‖ reality, and it has been 
demonstrated that the belief system – its structure as well as its content – plays 
an integral role in the cognitive process. [..] Within the broader scope of the 
belief-system-perception-decision-making relationship there has been a 
heightened concern for the problem of stereotyped national images as a 
significant factor in the dynamics of the international system. (1962:244) 
  
This view has led generations of foreign policy analysts to explore the role of culture as a 
factor in foreign policy formulation and implementation. The bounded rationality approach 
has investigated the limitations facing policy makers due to misperceptions or wishful 
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thinking (Jervis, Lebow and Stein 1985) and their effects on bureaucratic politics (Snyder, 
Bruck and Sapin (eds) 1962, Allison and Halperin, in Tanter and Ullman (eds) 1972, Tanter 
1990), while the conceptual frameworks approach has suggested a number of variables 
relevant to the explanation of foreign policy decision-making, an eminently important 
variable being culture (Rosenau, in Farrell (ed.) 1966). In his text-book classic on the sources 
of foreign policy, The Study of Foreign Policy, Rosenau described cultural factors and 
historical experience as ―among the most enduring sources of foreign policy‖ (in Rosenau, 
Thompson, and Boyd (eds) 1976:22). According to Rosenau, ―virtually every aspect of a 
society – its traditions, institutions and capabilities – becomes relevant [..] to explain its 
orientations and actions toward the world beyond its borders‖ (ibid:17). Michael Brecher has 
improved on the Rosenau framework by distinguishing between the operational and 
psychological environment of decision-makers, the latter consisting primarily of ideology, 
historical legacy, personality, and predispositions (1972:3), an environment which he finds of 
paramount importance given that decision-makers tend to fit incoming information into their 
existing images. Within the foreign policy analysis tradition, it has been a commonly held 
belief that 
Effective foreign policy rests upon a shared sense of national identity, of a 
nation-state‘s ―place in the world‖, its friends and enemies, its interests and 
aspirations. These underlying assumptions are embedded in national history and 
myth, changing slowly over time as political leaders reinterpret them and 
external and internal developments reshape them. (Hill and Wallace, in Hill (ed.) 
1996:8) 
 
Over the years, the concept of culture has been decomposed, recomposed, renamed, and 
reframed, yet although is has proved its usefulness in a great number of foreign policy 
analyses, it continues to be viewed with a certain apprehension among IR theorists, especially 
outside the tradition of foreign policy analysis. There are two main reasons for this. First, 
there does not seem to be a consensus on the relationship between culture and behavior. 
While some regard culture as ―a set of values and norms of behavior‖ (Der Derian 1987:33), 
others find that we need to distinguish culture from behavior (Duffield 1999:769). Duffield 
nevertheless proceeds to remark that in order to ―be useful for purposes of explanation, a 
cultural theory must postulate causal mechanisms through which culture has an impact on 
behavior‖ (ibid:771), concluding that the ―overall effect of culture is to predispose 
collectivities toward certain actions and policies rather than others‖ (ibid:772). Sampson 
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similarly notes that ―culture can be appropriately regarded as incentives which have the effect 
of organizing the structuring behavior‖ (in Hermann, Kegley and Rosenau (eds) 1987:386). It 
may be argued that the dichotomy between culture and behavior is largely artificial, given that 
to the extent that culture did not have a significant impact on behavior, it would hardly be of 
interest as a factor in international relations. Nevertheless, Duffield is right in reminding us 
that culture is only useful as an analytic concept to the extent that it can be related in some 
ways to behavior. This, however, does not mitigate the second reason why culture is still 
regarded with apprehension by some: how does one measure the influence of culture on 
behavior? The problem here is that the methodologies used when applying the concept of 
culture can, as Valerie Hudson rightly warns us, predispose ―one toward potentially 
tautological inferences‖ (in Hudson (ed.) 1997). Samuel Huntington, although himself a long-
time proponent of culturalist theories, has similarly admitted that ―cultural explanations are 
[..] often imprecise or tautological or both, at the extreme coming down to a more 
sophisticated rendering of ‗the French are like that‘‖ (in Huntington and Weiner (eds) 
1987:23). This is a conundrum, which is not easily overcome. Duffield describes the effects of 
culture in terms of predispositions, which underlines the usefulness of the concept for a study 
of anti-Americanism such as the present. Yet in order to overcome possible tautological 
inferences, any analysis must attempt to present a comprehensive and balanced approach 
toward its subject. This entails that in order to present a convincing account of the causes and 
effects of a phenomenon such as anti-Americanism within one national culture, a 
quintessentially particularistic approach is difficult to avoid. This, however, does not 
necessarily mean that such an analysis cannot be presented also as part of a more general 
study of a global phenomenon. 
 
The return of culture in International Relations theory 
Within IR theory, there has been a tendency among many scholars to regard cultural 
explanations as ―unsatisfying [..] because they run counter to the social scientist‘s proclivity 
to generalize‖ (Huntington, in Huntington and Weiner (eds) 1987:23). This has especially 
been the case within the realist tradition, which for long was the predominant school within 
the discipline of International Relations theory (Viotti and Kauppi 1990, Walt 1998, Snyder 
2004). Realists – and even more so neorealists – have consistently argued that the actions of 
states are primarily subject to the defining (anarchic) characteristic of the international 
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system, which has traditionally led them to focus on balance of power considerations, levels 
of aggregate power, power projection capabilities etc. Yet within the early realist tradition, 
there was a marked culturalist tendency, as can be witnessed not least in Morgenthau‘s 
Politics Among Nations. Quoting Coleridge ―that there is an invisible spirit that breathes 
through a whole people‖ ([1948] 1973:129), Morgenthau asserted that it was ―incontestable 
[..] that certain qualities of intellect and character occur more frequently and are more highly 
valued in one nation than in another‖ (ibid.). He furthermore stressed that ―National character 
cannot fail to influence national power‖ and that ―The observer of the international scene [..] 
must take national character into account, however difficult it may be to assess correctly so 
elusive and intangible a factor‖ (ibid:132-134); a recommendation, which has followed by 
later prominent realists such as Kissinger (1994). Given that most IR-theorists have as an 
ambition to present if not ―grand theories‖, then at least more systemic explanations 
transposable on the international system or parts thereof (Walt 1998, Snyder 2004), there has 
nevertheless been a notable reluctance toward engaging in the analysis of cultural phenomena, 
which are mostly regarded as eminently particularistic. Some (neo)realists have (following 
Waltz 1979) consequently characterized the approach employed by especially foreign policy 
analysts as ―reductionist‖, and therefore not suited to present more general explanations of 
causality. The problems associated with a ‗reductionist‘ approach are obvious: While it serves 
to explain a particular set of foreign policy actions, the number of variables that would have to 
be included to determine the foundations of a nation‘s foreign policy is legion, and several of 
them are bound to be particular to the nation in question, making generalizations difficult. The 
result has long been to render the ―cultural dimension of international relations [..] one of the 
most neglected topics in the field‖ (Chay, in Chay (ed.) 1990:xi).   
At least three important changes have taken place that give the study of culture 
in international relations renewed interest. First, the ending of the Cold War and the 
dismembering of the bipolar system have engendered new patterns of conflict and 
cooperation. Nations and peoples hitherto subjected to the bipolar logic have found new 
possibilities to affirm their identities. Liberated from the constraints of strict alliance 
adherence, they have rediscovered foreign policy as a vehicle for value promotion and for the 
remanifestation of national identities and policies. Ideological differences have largely given 
way to new forms of cleavages, some of them cultural in appearance and often also in nature 
(Hudson, in Hudson (ed.) 1997). Second, this development has forced a reappraisal of the 
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importance of culture among international relations scholars, leading among other to new 
disciplines of international relations theory that do not easily fall into the broad categories of 
realist or liberal/idealist thought (Wendt, in Lapid and Kratochwil (eds) 1996). As new fault 
lines have emerged between nations or civilizations, these have become the subject of 
academic interest, sparking new theories based on cultural considerations. Samuel P. 
Huntington‘s The Clash of Civilizations (1993 and 1996) is but one, albeit probably the best 
known of them
4
. Third, the concept of globalization has received renewed impetus since the 
1990s and has had the reverse effect of strengthening the attention brought upon domestic 
affairs and questions of national identity in a globalizing world (Eriksen 1993, Moïsi 2009). 
Though many of the characteristics of globalization are not as recent as they are often 
portrayed to be (Held (ed.) 2000, Hirst and Thompson 2002, Baylis and Smith (eds) 2006), 
the focus on globalization has had the effect of galvanizing interest in the national ―self‖ 
(Smith 2003). Unsure of what will become of national cultures and identities in an 
increasingly globalized world, there has been a rush to reaffirm values and buttress identities.  
During the 1990s, culturalist explanations have found favor even within the 
more ‗hardcore‘ area of security studies, where much of the recent literature dealing with 
culture in international relations has attempted to ―take the realist edifice as a target, and focus 
on cases where structural material notions of interest cannot explain a particular strategic 
choice‖ (Johnston 1995:41), maintaining that ―cultural variables are more than epiphenomena 
to material factors and often explain outcomes for which realism cannot account‖ (Desch 
1998:144, see also Katzenstein 1996, and Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, in Katzenstein 
(ed.) 1996). This has led some to argue that it is in fact the realist tradition with its emphasis 
on the territorial state and interstate relations, which is ―reductionist‖, albeit ―in a somewhat 
different fashion‖ than what is usually implied by the term (Ferguson and Mansbach 1999:1). 
The latest newcomer to IR theory, constructivism, has attempted to overcome the supposed 
dichotomy between systemic and particularistic traditions. This approach, which draws 
heavily from sociology and social psychology (Thies 2002:149), emphasizes the importance 
of identity in understanding international relations. The approach has also been termed 
―reflectivist‖ (Keohane 1988) or ―culturalist‖ (Farrell 2002), but the most widely used label is, 
following Nicholas Onuf, constructivism (Onuf 1989). Alexander Wendt, whose 1992 article 
Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics, ―firmly and 
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unequivocally transposed the question of collective identity away from the margins and into 
the mainstream of the discipline‖ (Neumann 1995:25), has defined constructivism as  
a structural theory of the international system that makes the following core 
claims: (1) states are the principal units of analysis for international political 
theory; (2) the key structures in the states system are intersubjective, rather than 
material; and (3) state identities and interests are in important part constructed 
by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human 
nature or domestic politics. (1994:85) 
 
It is the structural dimension, which sets constructivism apart from earlier approaches to have 
incorporated culture as an important dimension in their analysis. Farrell describes how for 
constructivists, culturally based ideas ―operate ‗all the way down‘ to actually shape actors and 
action in world politics‖ and that as such, they ―constitute actors and enable action‖ 
(2002:50). Ted Hopf similarly notes that ―A state understands others according to the identity 
it attributes to them, while simultaneously reproducing its own identity through daily social 
practice‖ (1998:175). To constructivists, identities are ―inherently relational‖ (Wendt 
1992:397), and by placing culture and identity at the center of attention as a defining factor 
shaping international relations, they claim that constructivist theory is in fact a ―form of 
structural idealism‖ (Wendt 1994:385). The structural dimension lies in the fact that according 
to constructivists, ―any social system‖ – and they characterize the international system as an 
eminently social system – contains three elements: ―material conditions, interests, and ideas‖ 
(Wendt 1999:139). Arguing that realists have long focused primarily on the material 
conditions while ignoring especially the ideational factors, Alexander Wendt claims that in 
essence, it is the constructivist approach, which most effectively can present a structural 
methodology (1999), thus apparently evading the pitfalls of particularism inherent in a 
culturalist approach. This line of reasoning is compelling, but not altogether convincing. 
Though Wendt forcefully makes the case that ―Anarchy is what states make of it‖ (Wendt 
1992:395), tearing down the realist edifice is not sufficient to impose culture as the basis of a 
new systemic narrative within IR theory. Even when described as a systemic feature shaping 
the international system, culture (or identity) remains difficult to generalize about. As such, 
constructivism suffers from the same limitations as those characterizing foreign policy 
analysis: By adopting the concepts of culture and identity, eventually coupled with material 
components borrowed from the realist tradition, constructivists can, given enough time and 
space, account for virtually every aspect of international relations, but the result is bound to 
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end up so particularistic that its general power of explanation suffers as a result. Nevertheless, 
constructivists have convincingly presented the argument for the importance of culture as a 
central concept within International Relations theory, and though the constructivist approach 
seems better at making the case for the importance of culture than at providing us with the 
necessary analytical tools for culturally based analyses, it has contributed to lifting cultural 
explanations out of the purely particularistic realm. As such, there is no doubt that 
constructivism can contribute to the formulation of a theoretical framework for the analysis of 
a global phenomenon such as anti-Americanism, even if it can not altogether eradicate the 
shortcomings inherent in adopting a culturalist approach.  
 
1.3.1 Propositions toward a theoretical framework for the study of anti-Americanism  
This study contends that in order to achieve a proper understanding of the phenomenon of 
anti-Americanism, both a general and a particularistic approach is needed. A general approach 
is needed in order to analyze the forces that contribute to make anti-Americanism a universal 
phenomenon. A particularistic approach is needed in order to address the forces that 
predispose a nation or its inhabitants toward displays of anti-Americanism. In other words, we 
need to look at the object of rejection (i.e. the United States) as well as the subjects rejecting 
(in this case France). This also entails that we should strive toward presenting a theoretical 
framework able to encompass both, or, alternatively, supplementary frameworks, which in 
conjunction can provide us with the necessary conceptual tools, with which we can formulate 
an analysis of a phenomenon which, while being necessarily particularistic in its focus on 
anti-Americanism in one society, nevertheless can provide the basis for some general 
assumptions regarding the nature of anti-Americanism. It was noted above that anti-
Americanism could in theoretical terms be regarded as an essentially cultural phenomenon in 
international relations. The two theoretical traditions to have most convincingly incorporated 
the concepts of culture and identity in their methodologies are the foreign policy analysis 
approach and constructivism, and they both offer valuable guidelines to how the concepts can 
be employed analytically. Yet none of them seems able to overcome the problems associated 
with a culturalist approach, namely the relationship between culture and behavior, the risk of 
tautological inferences, and the essentially particularistic nature of a proper analysis of 
cultural determinants. The present study will not postulate that this can be done, but it will 
attempt to minimize the shortcomings associated with studying a cultural phenomenon such 
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as anti-Americanism. This study will depart from the pattern of most studies of anti-
Americanism by arguing 1) that anti-Americanism can in fact be regarded as an almost 
systemic characteristic of the contemporary international system, and 2) that an in-depth 
analysis of the phenomenon in a given country requires a much broader agenda than the one 
typically offered by the tradition of foreign policy analysis. In essence this approach is in line 
with constructivism, yet it will adopt other methodological tools than the ones usually 
proposed by constructivists in order to analyze the phenomenon.  
First of all, it will attempt to present a relatively structural view of anti-
Americanism as an inherent feature of the international system, arguing that anti-
Americanism as a universal phenomenon can largely be analyzed in terms of rejection of 
American power. Given that many features of both historical and contemporary anti-
Americanism fall outside the traditional definitions of power, it will use Joseph S. Nye‘s 
notions of hard power and soft power to demonstrate that even some of the rather disparate 
manifestations of anti-Americanism can in fact be regarded in terms of a rejection of 
American power. This will be the focus of chapters 2 and 3. It should be noted that such an 
attempt at presenting a general theory of anti-Americanism can only represent one side of the 
coin. It can contribute to suggest a relatively systemic framework, within which anti-
Americanism can be analyzed, as well as to present a general explanation for why America 
has become the object of a universal anti-ism. It cannot, however, explain why anti-
Americanism is more virulent in some societies than in others. In order to do so, a more 
particularistic analysis is needed. Here again, the constructivist emphasis on culture and 
identity as shapers of collective behavior (Wendt 1992, Farrell 2002, Hopf 1998) will prove 
useful, but in order to carry out such an analysis, it needs to be supplemented by other 
methodological tools, principally borrowed from the tradition of sociology. Chapter 4 will 
therefore present a more specific theoretical framework for the analysis of the interplay 
between national identity and anti-American prejudice, arguing that this can best be analyzed 
using the concepts of shared doxa, othering, and national habitus, the intention being to 
provide an alternative methodological perspective, which can bridge the supposed dichotomy 
between culture/identity and behavior. In dealing with anti-Americanism in one country – in 
this case France – it is necessary to go beyond the study of foreign policy attributes. As will 
be demonstrated in chapters 5 and 6, though anti-American predispositions clearly partake in 
shaping foreign policy narratives and actions in France, the main impact of the phenomenon 
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may not be so easily confined to the realm of foreign policy. As such, anti-Americanism will 
not be systematically analyzed in relation to other variables of foreign policy in order to 
present an assessment of the degree to which it influences the outputs of foreign policy, but 
rather presented as a more or less isolated phenomenon, which partakes in shaping French 
actions and narratives. Digging into the confines of the French doxa, the study will explore 
the extent to which anti-Americanism can be regarded as a permanent (if fluctuating) 
component of the French national habitus, and as such as a silent partner in Franco-American 
relations throughout the times. Clearly, this approach exposes us to the dangers of tautological 
inferences. Paraphrasing Huntington, how do we avoid presenting just another ―sophisticated 
rendering of ‗the French are like that‘‖ (op. cit.)? The risk of tautological inferences is 
certainly present, and it might not be altogether possible to evade it. What is striking in most 
accounts of French anti-Americanism is that they virtually all present the same recurrent 
themes: the diatribes against the mythical Anglo-Saxon; the quest for political independence; 
the rejection of globalization (typically described in terms of Americanization, 
Hollywoodization, McDonaldization etc.); the zealous defense of the French language; the 
promotion of cultural diversity etc. (e.g. Nettelbeck, in O‘Connor (ed.) 2007c, d‘Appolonia, 
in Higgot and Malbašić (eds) 2008). The same themes can be readily found in the present 
study, but as opposed to most other studies, this study will attempt to present a detailed 
account of not just the displays of anti-Americanism in France, but also of the elements of the 
French national identity, which can be considered particularly prone to give rise to reactions 
of rejection or denigration vis-à-vis the American other. In other words, this study will 
attempt to look beyond the standard narratives in order to expose their origins. In line with 
Norbert Elias, who introduced the concept of national habitus well before Bourdieu made 
habitus a household term within sociology, I do not profess to present a detailed analysis of 
whether all the elements of French anti-Americanism that I will subsequently discuss can 
indeed be claimed as being embodied in the French national habitus. Rather, I will present a 
general analysis of the most important factors in French society and national consciousness, 
which to me seem particularly conducive toward forming some kind of anti-American 
predisposition among the most important segments of French society. I rely on the hope that 
through presenting these factors in association with the long historical ―tradition‖ of anti-
Americanism (Roger 2005:449), I can illustrate that there is within the French national 
habitus a persistent element, which can be regarded as particularly conducive toward 
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promoting anti-American predispositions. Finally, I believe, as the doyen of Danish political 
science, Erling Bjøl, that there is no clear and definitive boundary between political science 
and history, although there is a difference in objectives and thus in method (Bjøl 1966:11-12). 
Like Bjøl did in his doctoral study on the European policies of the French Fourth Republic, I 
will in the present study attempt to analyze the significant elements of French anti-
Americanism rather than to present a history of French anti-Americanism, conscious of the 
fact that I risk falling into the same methodological dilemma as Bjøl: 
Il entre dans la recherche de l‘élément significatif, sans doute, un élément 
subjectif et même arbitraire. En perd-elle sa valeur scientifique ? Cela dépend de 
la prétention que l‘on y met. Si l‘on prétend à une science qui se propose de 
formuler des lois, la méthode est critiquable. Si, avec M. Duroselle, on pense 
que, pour l‘instant, au moins, la science politique ne peut que chercher plus 
modestement à découvrir quelques données fondamentales, avec M. Manning 
qu‘elle n‘a pas à s‘excuser si elle n‘atteint que le plausible, la technique 
employée doit être permise. (Bjøl 1966:16) 
 
Naturally, political science has developed considerably in the four decades since Bjøl laid out 
his methodology. Yet it still strikes me as a fundamentally sound approach to a study such as 
the present, and given the existing lack of more rigorous methodological frameworks for the 
analysis of a phenomenon such as anti-Americanism, it is my hope that by applying this 
methodology, I may at least contribute with another piece to the puzzle of French anti-
Americanism.  
 
1.4 Structure of the Study 
This study falls mainly in two parts: part one will attempt to present a general analysis of anti-
Americanism focusing on the dimension of power, while part two will be devoted to a 
particularistic analysis of anti-Americanism in France focusing on the constitutive parts of 
France‘s national habitus, which are deemed particularly conducive toward engendering anti-
American predispositions. The structure is chosen in order to reflect the fact that anti-
Americanism can be analyzed in two different ways: a general and a particularistic. Therefore, 
chapters 2 and 3 will, building in part on the theoretical framework presented above, present a 
general explanation of anti-Americanism as a universal phenomenon. More specifically, 
chapter 2 will probe into some of the most widespread definitions attached to the phenomenon 
of anti-Americanism, arguing that as a general phenomenon, anti-Americanism should, 
contrary to what is frequently the case, neither be seen as just any other anti-ism, nor as an 
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inherently irrational phenomenon, nor as so complex that a primary source of rejection cannot 
be identified. Instead, the chapter will attempt to demonstrate that as a unique and universal 
phenomenon, anti-Americanism can in general terms be explained in terms of rejection of 
American power. Chapter 3 will proceed to demonstrate how this can be done, first by 
referring to different surveys in order to illustrate that much of the popular rejection of 
America can indeed be regarded in terms of power, second by adopting Joseph S. Nye‘s 
notions of hard power and soft power (1990) to illustrate why the many different forms of 
anti-Americanism typically identified by scholars such as Hollander (1992, 1995) or 
Katzenstein and Keohane (in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007) can in fact be regarded 
also as largely originating from the rejection of the two forms of power identified by Nye. The 
fact that anti-Americanism can be presented also in general terms as a rejection of American 
power does not, however, mean that the different forms of anti-Americanism identified by 
various scholars are erroneous or irrelevant. Far from it, they contribute with excellent 
frameworks for understanding many of the different varieties of anti-Americanism, and as 
such provide a good basis for more particularistic analyses of anti-Americanism in specific 
countries or regions. And though there is a case for also presenting anti-Americanism in a 
more general perspective, there is no doubt that it is the particularistic analysis, which 
provides the deepest insights into why some nations are more prone to harboring anti-
American predispositions than others.  
The second part of the study will present such a particularistic analysis, taking 
the French variety of anti-Americanism under scrutiny. Building on and expanding the 
culturalist approach to the study of national identity presented above, chapter 4 will briefly 
attempt to formulate a framework for understanding the ―othering‖ forces inherent in national 
identities and will further argue that these can best be understood as deeply embedded in the 
national habitus. The remainder of the study will be devoted to presenting a particularistic 
analysis of anti-Americanism in one society, an analysis which, while particular to France, 
may hopefully also contribute to the understanding of some of the forces that can generate 
anti-Americanism in different societies. As such, chapter 5 will, building on the assumptions 
laid out in chapter 4, attempt to thoroughly investigate the deeply rooted factors in French 
national identity, which can be considered as particularly constitutive toward shaping anti-
American predispositions in France, while chapter 6 will present an analysis of the more 
contemporary and much more familiar theme of anti-Americanism under the French Fifth 
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Republic, focusing both on its political dimension and cultural manifestations. In short, the 
United States becomes the object of study and analysis in part one (chapters 2 and 3), while 
France becomes the object of study in part two (chapters 5 and 6). Hopefully, the conclusion 
will succeed in demonstrating that French anti-Americanism can indeed be explained as a 
rejection of American power, although it is a rejection that is based as much on forces 
inherent in the French national identity as it is based on the attributes of American power as 
such. 
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2 Anti-Americanism: An Alternative Perspective  
 
The first part of this study will attempt to demonstrate that anti-Americanism is a unique and 
complex phenomenon unlike any other anti-ism; where it differs from other prejudices is in its 
universal character and on the dimension of power. This has important consequences for any 
attempt to define the term properly, as many scholars have hitherto had a tendency to regard it 
as comparable to other anti-isms, focusing on the irrational aspects of the phenomenon and 
thus neglecting its more ‗explicable‘ nature. This will be the focus of the present chapter. 
Chapter 3 will explore the perceptions abroad towards the United States, not least through the 
use of surveys, which indicate that there is indeed a strong rejection of American power and 
American policies in great parts of the world. Though polls can only present a partial picture 
of contemporary grievances towards the United States, they can furnish us with some clues as 
to the probable causes of much modern anti-Americanism. Based on the discussion in the 
present chapter and the findings of the surveys, an attempt will then be made to regard anti-
Americanism in terms of rejection of, on the one hand, America‘s hard power and, on the 
other, the attributes of its soft power. It is the contention of this study that far better than the 
often rather artificial attempts to differentiate anti-Americanism in terms of what America is 
as opposed to what America does, the distinction between the dimensions of hard power and 
soft power offers useful insights into the more structural causes of much anti-Americanism. 
 
2.1 Anti-Americanism: A Universal Phenomenon 
Although anti-Americanism has become a household term, it is typically used rather 
indiscriminately. Sylvia Ullmo rightly points out that the term ―présente tout à la fois une 
évidence aveuglante, et un indiscutable flou conceptuel‖ (in Mathé (ed.) 2000:9). The term 
anti-Americanism itself may at first seem relatively straightforward to most users. In reality, 
the term covers a range of emotions and actions, which may have in common the object of 
their dissatisfaction – America – but which have a multitude of origins and expressions. It is 
doubtful whether most users ever pause to ponder on its meaning(s). A linguist might point to 
three different possible interpretations of the term anti-Americanism:  
1. Animosity towards America, i.e. anti-Americanism = rejection of America or 
2. Animosity towards Americans, i.e. anti-Americanism = rejection of Americans or 
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3. Fear of Americanization5, i.e. anti-Americanism = rejection of Americanization 
 
If we follow this logic, we should be asking ourselves whether it is the country, i.e. the United 
States
6
 that is rejected, its inhabitants, or the influence that this country has on other societies, 
which is deplored. To many of what could be called (for want of a more adequate word) anti-
Americans, this is probably an utterly meaningless distinction. While only the harshest of 
critics would admit that they loathe Americans per se, rejection of America and of 
Americanization will by many be considered as two sides of the same coin. But in essence, 
the two kinds of anti-Americanism are very different. Whereas typical French anti-
Americanism is, as will be subsequently demonstrated, primarily, but not exclusively, a 
rejection of a perceived Americanization of other societies, and especially the French society, 
fundamentalist Islamic anti-Americanism is both that and more. It is first and foremost a 
rejection of America as the primary representative of the Western World and thereby the 
political epitomization of everything that is contrary to the politico-religious values that a 
fundamentalist Islamic party would want to promote. But it is also a rejection of America on 
the grounds that the United States is seen not just in opposition to the values of other nations, 
but also as a formidable enemy capable of projecting its power to all parts of the globe. In this 
respect, size matters. The rejection of Americanization might very well still be of relevance, 
even if the United States was a medium large nation among many others. But in that case it 
would arguably have much less impact. What has made anti-Americanism a universal 
phenomenon is precisely what has characterized the United States for more than a century: its 
continuing rise to preeminence among the nations of the world. And there is little doubt that 
the rise of the United States to the position of the world‘s most powerful nation has been 
paralleled by a rise in anti-Americanism throughout the world (Crockatt 2003:46). 
The universality of anti-Americanism is perhaps its most interesting feature. 
Sardar and Davies have noted that in a postmodern world with hardly any universals left, 
―loathing for America is about as close as we can get to a universal sentiment‖ (2002:195). 
That might be overstating the case, but the argument has its merits. Anti-Americanism is not 
only universal, but unique by its universality. While some people, usually in neighboring 
countries, might harbor resentment towards for example historical enemies, nothing suggests 
that any other country is capable of attracting such widespread rejection on a global scale. 
This is of course not to say that the United States is universally disliked, as Sardar and 
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Davies‘ statement could be interpreted, merely that it is extremely unlikely that there should 
be a complete absence of anti-Americanism in any part of the world. Conversely, it is 
improbable that one could say the same for any other country than the United States. During 
the Cold war, one could arguably find anti-communism in most corners of the world. But 
anti-communism was a rejection of a political system perceived to be oppressive, not rejection 
as such of the nationalities associated with communism. Anti-communism did never really 
develop into anti-Russianism or Sinophobia. Likewise, the excesses of the Nazi regime during 
World War II are bound to have caused widespread Germanophobia in many of the countries 
that suffered as a result of the atrocities committed. Yet, though the acts committed in the 
name of the Third Reich are still in vivid memory in many parts of the globe, Germanophobia 
cannot be detected as a universal phenomenon. As for anti-Semitism, xenophobia and other 
forms of racism, they are, as opposed to anti-Americanism, based on the rejection of a race or 
religion not as such associated with a particular nation
7
. Compared with the animosity that 
other national anti-isms can give rise to, anti-Americanism clearly stands out as the only truly 
universal anti-ism, and as such as ―a phenomenon that has no counterpart in other similar 
societies‖ (Guerlain, in Fender (ed.) 1996:127). It is furthermore an anti-ism, which as noted 
above has found particular favor as a research discipline over the past decades. 
 
2.2 Three False Discourses on Anti-Americanism? 
The current focus on anti-Americanism is illustrated not only by its prominence as a media 
topic, but also in the recent rise in scholarly works trying to analyze or even ‗dissect‘ the 
phenomenon. Not all scholars make the attempt to define the term properly, probably relying 
on the assumption that anti-Americanism is a self-evident concept that needs analyzing, but 
not explaining
8
. Others define it in a more or less off-hand way, with the entailing risks of 
oversimplification. More comprehensive studies usually present a definition, or sometimes 
even several definitions (Hollander 1995), of the term. Though these definitions vary, they are 
typically built around the following three discourses: 
1) Anti-Americanism depicted as a phenomenon that can be regarded (and analyzed) as 
other anti-isms. Writers who analyze anti-Americanism in relation to other anti-isms 
will frequently attempt to analyze anti-Americanism by decomposing it according to 
its psychological elements such as hatred, envy, rivalry, mistrust etc. This is a 
discourse used by only a small minority of scholars, and mostly in works that are of a 
32 
 
relatively polemical nature. Most research on anti-Americanism asserts that though 
some of the mechanisms and attributes of anti-Americanism can be compared to other 
anti-isms (anti-Semitism is the most frequently used comparison), the phenomenon 
presents some unique features that set it apart from other anti-isms. 
2) Anti-Americanism viewed as a largely unique and mostly also largely irrational 
phenomenon. Scholars depicting anti-Americanism as largely irrational often 
dissociate criticism of what the United States does from what America is, claiming 
that only the latter can truly be qualified as anti-Americanism. This dissociation is 
based on two accounts. First, they argue that criticism against specific U.S. policies 
does not reflect anti-ism, but rather a difference of opinion, which hardly constitutes a 
deep-set predisposition against America or Americans. Second, some claim that 
references to critiques of what America does are in reality attempts to legitimize anti-
American discourses as more rational than they truly are. Discourses falling into this 
broad category have previously dominated the field and are still frequently found in 
works on the subject. 
3) Anti-Americanism viewed as a unique and complex phenomenon that comes in many 
guises and variations and that should be analyzed not just as one concept, but as a 
meta-concept covering a wide range of emotions that have specific origins depending 
on the beholder‘s political, historic, societal and cultural relations with the United 
States. Most scholars using this more comprehensive approach try to balance the 
elements of irrationality inherent in some manifestations of anti-Americanism with an 
assessment of the more or less legitimate grievances that nations or people might hold 
against the United States. Works following this type of discourse typically conclude 
that there are no identifiable common factors, which promote anti-Americanism, and 
that a deconstruction of the phenomenon into different types of anti-Americanism is 
necessary in order to proceed with a proper analysis of these. This line of reasoning 
has become prominent over the last decade, as the topic has come into renewed focus.  
 
The categorization of the three sets of discourses on anti-Americanism does not necessarily 
cover all kinds of definitions given, but still highlights the more or less typical sets of 
definitions usually presented. In addition to studies on global anti-Americanism, numerous 
works have been published concerning anti-Americanism within specific societies or regions. 
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To the extent that they define the term, it is either done using broadly the same kind of 
discourses as those outlined above or by presenting definitions that focus on factors inherent 
in societies covering their specific area of interest.  
This categorization of the typical types of discourses on anti-Americanism is of 
course merely an approximation. Few scholars would deny that anti-Americanism presents 
some unique features, or that anti-Americanism is a rather complex phenomenon, or that it 
cannot be attributed at least partly to real or perceived grievances towards the United States. 
As such, these sets of discourses should be regarded as very broad delimitations in a research 
area where definitions typically overlap. However, each of them portrays different faces of 
anti-Americanism, and each can contribute with clues to understanding many attributes of the 
phenomenon. As will be discussed below, they also each have their limitations. Some of these 
limitations are inherent in the definitions applied; others appear to be mainly limitations by 
omission. While the discourses are found in numerous studies (and in some cases several 
discourses appear to be present in the same analysis), they do not necessarily convey the 
essence of anti-Americanism. While providing good examples of the different attributes of 
anti-Americanism, and, though less frequently, also with the basis for an analytical 
framework, they often leave us wondering about the deeper causes of anti-Americanism. As 
such, these discourses are if not false, then at least likely to lead us partly astray. The first 
discourse is plainly guilty of oversimplifying the phenomenon of anti-Americanism. The 
second discourse reduces anti-Americanism to a mainly irrational phenomenon and thereby 
‗demonizes the demonizers‘. The third discourse, while providing good typologies of the 
different forms of anti-Americanism and often also presenting a coherent framework for 
analysis, paradoxically risks overcomplicating the phenomenon by rejecting the existence of 
common root causes to the various types of anti-Americanism.  
 
2.2.1 Just another anti-ism? 
Few writers seriously attempt to present anti-Americanism as ‗just another anti-ism‘ like 
racism, anti-Semitism etc. Most concede that the nature and scope of anti-Americanism sets it 
apart from other anti-isms. Yet the temptation to analyze it analogically with other anti-isms 
seems hard to resist. Josef Joffe, otherwise a keen and provocative observer of especially 
European facets of anti-Americanism, has presented what he terms a ―dissection of anti-isms‖ 
(2006a). He asserts that anti-ism consist of five elements: 
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1. Hostile stereotypization, a set of general statements attributing certain negative 
qualities to the target groups. 
2. Denigration, the ascription of moral inferiority all the way to an irreducibly evil 
nature. 
3. Demonization, moving from what the target group is to what it does or intends to do. 
4. Obsession, the idée fixe that America (or ―x‖) is omnipresent and omnicausal, and 
hence the invisible force that explains all misery. 
5. Elimination, be it by exclusion or extrusion. This is, writes Joffe, ―where anti-ism 
assumes a quasi-religious quality, as in the ‗Great Satan‘ motif of the Iranian regime‖ 
(2006a:4). 
 
Joffe furthermore claims that these five elements are present ―at all times and in all places‖ 
(ibid.). While Joffe has a keen eye for some of the psychological features that can be 
attributed to displays of anti-Americanism, or any anti-ism, this dissection must be rejected as 
an analytical tool on three accounts. First, it is highly doubtful whether it makes any sense at 
all to present an analysis of ‗all anti-isms‘ with such sweeping generalizations. While it is 
probably true that all anti-ism can be characterized by stereotypization and denigration, the 
latter three points are more open to discussion: If for example racism is an anti-ism, it would 
not be wrong to regard it as discrimination based on misconstrued notions of superiority 
rather than on demonization. And racism would likewise not necessarily entail an obsession 
with omnipresence, but rather an obsession with racial notions of superiority versus 
inferiority. Second, Joffe risks ‗demonizing the demonizers‘ by failing to acknowledge that 
anti-isms can be present on different levels and in different contexts. If for example the wish 
for elimination, whether by exclusion or extrusion, were an integral part of all anti-ism, surely 
most European anti-Americanism would fall short of such a definition. This will be discussed 
in greater detail below. Third, treating all anti-isms as characterized by the same elements, 
whether psychological or social, blurs the differences between phenomena, which have very 
different characteristics. It was discussed above that anti-Americanism was unique by its 
universality. Another aspect of anti-Americanism sets it apart from other anti-isms: the 
dimension of power. As will be argued subsequently, the power dimension not only gives 
anti-Americanism a certain ‗explicability‘, but also almost systemic features in the 
international society. Joffe is far better at exemplifying aspects of anti-isms than at defining 
them, especially when considering European anti-Americanism: 
On the level of stereotypization and denigration, three basic themes obey a 
single common denominator: Yahoo America vs. Superior Europe. [..] The first 
of these themes is that America is morally deficient. It executes its own people, 
which Europe does not, and it likes to bomb others, which Europe does only 
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when dragged along by the United States. [..] The United States also is a nation 
that will not submit to the dictates of global goodness; hence it will not respect 
climate conventions, or ratify the International Criminal Court treaty, the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban treaty or the Land Mine Convention. 
Internationally, it is ―Dirty Harry‖ and ―Globocop‖ rolled into one – an 
irresponsible and arrogant citizen of the global community. America, in short, is 
―the world‘s biggest rogue state‖ [..] The second theme is that America is 
socially retrograde. It is the land of ―predatory capitalism‖ [..], a country that 
denies critical social services, like welfare and health insurance, to those who 
need it most. [..] The standard lore continues along these lines: Instead of 
bettering the lot of the poor and unskilled, the United States shunts millions of 
them, mainly dark-skinned minorities, off to prison. Europe, on the other hand, 
metes out rehabilitation, not retribution. America accepts – nay, admires – gross 
income inequalities, whereas Europe cherishes redistribution in the name of 
social justice. [..] The third theme is that America is culturally retrograde. [..] 
America gorges itself on fatty fast food, wallows in tawdry mass entertainment, 
starves the arts and prays only to one God: Mammon. Instead of subsidizing 
what is serious and high-minded, as do the Europeans, the United States 
ruthlessly sacrifices the best of culture to pap and pop [..]. (ibid:5-8). 
 
This is clearly the voice of the editorial journalist rather than the detached analyst. Yet the 
themes he advances can readily be found, albeit in different guises, in academic literature as 
well. The problem is of course, that such ‗snap-shots‘ from the transatlantic cultural front only 
conjure familiar images without offering much in way of explanation. Indeed, he identifies a 
set of themes typical of the denigration that America is frequently subjected to in Europe, and 
as we will see, these themes are advanced by more serious scholars as well. Paul Hollander 
readily asserts that he regards anti-Americanism ―as an attitude similar to its far more 
thoroughly explored counterparts, hostile predispositions such as racism, sexism, or 
antisemitism‖ (1995:lxxviii). He finds support for it in selected texts by authors apparently all 
too willing to voice their dissatisfaction with the United States (1995). A further theme that 
Joffe introduces is the description of anti-Americanism as an altogether irrational sentiment: 
Anti-Americanism [..] is not criticism of American policies, nor is it even an 
expression of dislike for particular American leaders or features of American 
life, such as gas-guzzling SUVs or five hundred television channels. It is the 
obsessive stereotypization, denigration and demonization of the country and the 
culture as a whole (2006a:4). 
 
As we shall see below, this is a theme that resonates well among scholars of anti-
Americanism. On the whole, however, Joffe‘s definition of anti-Americanism and his 
exemplification of its attributes do not provide us with a proper framework for analysis. 
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Attempts to define anti-Americanism as any other anti-ism do not do justice to the specificity 
of a phenomenon that is first and foremost unique by its universality. An inventory of popular 
examples of anti-Americanism hardly provides a deeper understanding of its attributes and 
much less of its causes. And, as we shall see below, the emphasis on the irrationality of the 
phenomenon risks blurring some of its more fundamental causes. 
 
2.2.2 A unique and largely irrational phenomenon? 
The second type of discourse, much more prominent within the field, views anti-Americanism 
as a largely unique and mostly also largely irrational phenomenon. This depiction of anti-
Americanism often dissociates criticism of what the United States does from what America is, 
claiming that since anti-Americanism constitutes an inherent predisposition against America 
or Americans, it is only the latter form of criticism, which can be regarded as anti-American. 
As will be shown below, this dissociation is highly problematic. Furthermore, the insistence 
on portraying anti-Americanism as primarily or at least largely irrational risks oversimplifying 
a global phenomenon, which certainly can present irrational attributes, but which nevertheless 
has such a magnitude that it becomes difficult to completely reject it as purely or mostly 
irrational. Whether anti-Americanism should be seen primarily as animosity towards America 
or rejection of Americanization is probably very much in the eye of the beholder. It is obvious 
that intense anti-Americanism, for example among the most fundamentalist Muslim 
extremists who see the United States as the ‗Great Satan‘, can be regarded as hatred of not 
only everything that America stands for, but the very nation itself. This raises the question of 
whether anti-Americanism is about what America does or what America is. Paul Hollander 
has noted that: 
[..] a proper understanding of anti-Americanism can only be achieved by 
balancing two apparently incompatible perspectives or propositions. The first 
avers that anti-Americanism is a direct and rational response to the evident 
misdeeds of the United States abroad and its shortcomings and inequities at 
home. In other words, it is a set of attitudes created and stimulated by U.S. 
actions and policies and by the character of American social institutions, 
policies, and the defects and injustices thereof, even by the behavior of 
individual Americans [..] In the second and conflicting view, anti-Americanism 
is a largely groundless, irrational predisposition (similar to racism, sexism, or 
anti-Semitism), an expression of a deeply rooted scape-goating impulse, a 
disposition more closely related to the problems, frustrations, and deficiencies of 
those entertaining and articulating it – be they individuals, groups, nations, 
political parties, or movements – than to the real attributes of American foreign 
policy, society, or culture. (2004:7-9).  
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While these two views of anti-Americanism certainly do exist, they are hardly exclusive. 
More likely, they represent two poles on a wide spectrum, in which anti-Americanism can be 
observed and analyzed. While Hollander is right in assessing that a proper understanding of 
anti-Americanism can only be achieved by balancing the two propositions, it seems that he 
casts his weights rather solidly in the scale of the second view. In his concluding remarks on 
anti-Americanism as a phenomenon, he emphasizes that: 
The two views of anti-Americanism cannot be easily reconciled. It bears 
repeating that anti-Americanism is a deep-seated, emotional predisposition that 
perceives the United States as an unmitigated and uniquely evil entity and the 
source of all, or most, other evils in the world. Being critical of specific 
American institutions, policies, leaders, or cultural trends does not constitute the 
same mind-set (ibid:12). 
 
If this is the yardstick by which anti-Americanism should be measured, most of the alleged 
charges of anti-Americanism would surely fall short of such a categorical definition. Only the 
harshest haters of America would acknowledge that the United States is ―an unmitigated and 
uniquely evil entity‖, and they probably could not be found on a global scale, at least not in 
large numbers. There is another problem with a definition of anti-Americanism that narrows it 
down to being effectively a demonization of those who demonize America. By reducing anti-
Americanism to its most perverse manifestations, critics of the United States can provide 
themselves with an alibi intended to protect them against accusations of anti-Americanism. 
The French sociologist Emmanuel Todd is a good example of this. In the introduction to his 
After the Empire, he supposedly rejects the arguments of what he terms the ―structural anti-
Americans‖ who claim that ―America is naughty by nature, the incarnation at the level of the 
state of the evils of the capitalist system‖ (2003:6). By dismissing anti-Americanism as solely 
the project of anti-Americans, he is free to establish his own credentials as a much more 
subtle, rational critic of America: 
Before proceeding with our elaboration of a rigorous explanatory model of 
America‘s international behavior, we ought to set aside the standard image of a 
musclebound America whose only problem would be its excessive power. The 
usual anti-American chorus will therefore be of no use to us, whereas 
Establishment thinkers will be our surest guides. (ibid.) 
 
Yet Emmanuel Todd apparently finds it hard himself to set aside the image of an America 
―whose only problem would be its excessive power‖. His book, far from being ―a rigorous 
explanatory model of America‘s international behavior‖, is more akin to a vigorous attack on 
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the United States. In his conclusion, he remarks that: ―Only one threat to global stability 
hangs over the world today – the United States itself, which was once a protector and is now a 
predator‖ (ibid:191). It may very well be that Todd does not see himself as anti-American but 
rather as the rational critic of an empire ―engaged in a process of decomposition‖ (ibid:192). 
His words nonetheless should make us cautious of the uses of the label anti-American or anti-
Americanism. And while many American readers will probably read Todd‘s book as proof of 
a certain French intellectual animosity towards the United States, his views can be found 
readily on the other side of the Atlantic, not least in the writings of American intellectuals 
such as Gore Vidal and Noam Chomsky (see for example Vidal 2002, and Chomsky 2001). It 
may be that it is writers such as these that Hollander has in mind, when he asserts that: 
anti-Americanism is a metaphor that stands for alienation, estrangement, radical 
social criticism, or an adversarial view of American society and culture; it 
usually entails the misperception and exaggeration of the flaws and failings of 
American institutions and values; it also leads or amounts to an unrealistic and 
inflated view of the responsibility that the (American) social system has for the 
problems and difficulties of particular groups and individuals (1995:xiii-xiv). 
 
Though Hollander acknowledges that ―Some of the discontents and criticisms stimulated by 
American cultural influences [..] are well founded‖ and as such ―reflect legitimate 
apprehensions‖ (ibid:xii), he maintains that ―I still believe that anti-Americanism, more often 
than not, is irrational and misdirected; it consists of attitudes and sentiments that reveal more 
about those displaying them than about the target of the hostile critiques‖ (ibid:xiii). The 
present study contends that anti-Americanism is much more substantial than what can be 
attributed to hardcore anti-Americans, whether they would accept such a label or not (and 
most probably would not). Anti-Americanism moreover cannot be reduced to its most 
extreme manifestations, and Hollander‘s definitions of anti-Americanism seem in this respect 
almost akin to a hostile predisposition toward those who criticize America and its institutions. 
Therefore, if Hollander‘s above mentioned two conflicting views on anti-Americanism are to 
be properly balanced, a first step would be to acknowledge that anti-Americanism is not 
necessarily just a groundless fancy that has no or little relation to the actions or perceived 
actions of the United States. If that were the case, surely anti-Americanism would have a 
much more reduced impact in societies that traditionally have close bonds with the United 
States. This is not to say that anti-Americanism is necessarily a ―rational response to the 
evident misdeeds of the United States abroad‖ (op. cit.). That would be a reduction of anti-
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Americanism to an absurd level whereby any articulation of opposition to specific U.S. 
policies could be dismissed as anti-Americanism. However, it would probably not be unfair to 
state that anti-Americanism is nourished by for example the actions carried out by U.S. 
governments. Shlapentokh, Woods and Shiraev have rightly pointed out that there is a 
tendency amongst those who write on anti-Americanism to focus rather exclusively on either 
the external or internal causes of the phenomenon: 
Most discussions of anti-Americanism focus on two main topics: either the 
―nature‖ of the United States and its policies or on the particular political and 
cultural aspects of other nations. Authors who refer to the United States suggest 
that the causes of anti-Americanism are external and brought on by America 
itself. The authors highlight the deleterious effects of the U.S. foreign policy, 
military actions, and cultural expansion. [..] Other external factors such as the 
role of the United States in globalization and the expansion of capitalism have 
also been cited as a basis or root of anti-Americanism. [..] On the other side of 
the debate, many authors stress the internal, domestic factors underpinning 
attitudes toward the United States. In general, the strength of anti-Americanism 
depends less on U.S. actions than on the particular internal features of foreign 
countries. Three types of internal factors, namely, political, psychological, and 
cultural, are prominent in the debates. Addressing psychological reasons, some 
authors insist that certain critiques of the U.S. are irrational and even 
pathological. [..] This position is not new and a somewhat similar stance is found 
in an earlier collection of articles on anti-Americanism in which attitudes toward 
the United States were said to be based more on imagination and perception than 
on the actual experiences of most people. (2005:5-6). 
 
Such conflicting views on the nature of anti-Americanism are due to the fact that many 
scholars have a tendency to focus on the critiques of what America is, dismissing critiques of 
what America does as attempts to legitimize anti-American discourses. Yet there are good 
reasons to reject the dissociation of the two. As Markovits notes, ―anti-Americanism is a 
particularly murky concept because it invariably merges antipathy toward what America does 
with what America is – or rather is projected to be in the eyes of its beholders‖ (2007:11). As 
a consequence, ―the separation of what America is – i.e., its way of life, its symbols, products, 
people – and what America does – its foreign policy writ large – will forever be jumbled and 
impossible to disentangle‖ (ibid:13). In order to get a proper understanding of the term, we 
must therefore look more closely at its different aspects. Though Hollander can be criticized 
for presenting much too narrow a definition of anti-Americanism, focusing primarily on the 
rejection of what America is, he is right in characterizing it as a ―deep-seated, emotional 
predisposition‖ (op. cit.). He furthermore is right in pointing to the frustrations and 
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deficiencies of those who entertain anti-Americanism. But these frustrations have a cause, 
whether founded in realities or in misperceptions. Hollander implicitly acknowledges this 
when he remarks that: 
The United States is likely to remain a symbolic scapegoat both for trends and 
developments which can be associated with it, and for which it bears 
responsibility as the major force for modernity in recent history, and also for the 
kind of alienation that emerges from the murkier depth of personal discontents 
and the refusal to come to terms with the imperfections and conflicts of the 
world, human nature, and social existence. (1992:xiii). 
 
If anti-Americanism is indeed a ―deep-seated, emotional predisposition‖ as Hollander has 
termed it, it obviously cannot be reduced to a catalogue of the perceived wrongs that can be 
attributed to the United States. Unless such an emotional predisposition is based on verifiable 
facts – and that would be a contradiction in terms – it seems impossible to present a set of 
rational factors that would tend to be inductive towards generating anti-Americanism. Yet it 
would be erroneous to perceive anti-Americanism as a totally irrational sentiment that has 
little or no relation to the realities of U.S. policies. Anybody attempting to discard anti-
Americanism as a mere irrational phenomenon will be faced with the rather challenging task 
of explaining, why then anti-Americanism is so widespread. Short of arguing that anti-
Americanism is the effect of some global bout of mental deficiency resulting in a xenophobic 
hatred of America; it will be very difficult indeed. Furthermore, this tendency to portray anti-
Americanism as inherently irrational is likely to be found primarily in the works of American 
or pro-American authors, and sometimes gives the impression of an inability to accept that 
there might be ‗rational‘ factors that can induce people into harboring anti-American 
sentiments. Some might even argue that this manifest preoccupation with branding anti-
Americanism as irrational is related to national psychology. Already Tocqueville, who can 
hardly be accused of anti-Americanism, remarked how 
In their relations with foreigners, Americans seem irritated by the slightest 
criticism and appear greedy for praise. The flimsiest compliment pleases them 
and the most fulsome rarely manages to satisfy them; they plague you constantly 
to make you praise them and, if you show yourself reluctant, they praise 
themselves. Doubting their own worth, they could be said to need a constant 
illustration of it before their eyes. Their vanity is not only greedy, it is also 
restless and jealous. ([1835-1840] 2003:710). 
 
Could it be, following Tocqueville‘s cue, that allegations of anti-Americanism are used to 
brand criticism of the United States as an irrational gut-reaction in order to denigrate the 
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critics themselves? Labeling them as ‗irrational‘ certainly has that effect, and in those cases 
the notion of anti-Americanism becomes, as Pierre Guerlain has noted, ―only an accusation 
directed at those who refuse to admire the American way‖ (in Fender (ed.) 1996:130). As 
Sylvia Ullmo notes, ―Un des moyens les plus efficaces pour fuir un débat gênant a toujours 
été de faire passer l‘adversaire pour plus ou moins fou‖ (in Mathé (ed.) 2000:19). Finally, the 
dismissal of anti-Americanism as an altogether irrational sentiment is akin to intellectual 
surrender: it may play well in politics and polemics, but it imposes serious limits on any 
attempt to analyze the phenomenon. The Pulitzer Prize-winning columnist Charles 
Krauthammer undoubtedly scores some points with his audiences when he declares that:  
The fact is that the world hates us for our wealth, our success, our power. They 
hate us into incoherence. [..] The search for logic in anti-Americanism is 
fruitless. It is in the air the world breathes. Its roots are envy and self-loathing – 
by people who, yearning for modernity but having failed at it, find their one 
satisfaction in despising modernity‘s great exemplar (2003:156). 
 
Yet by rejecting any kind of rationality in anti-Americanism, Krauthammer willfully rejects 
any attempt to address the problems associated with the phenomenon: ―To Hell With 
Sympathy‖ is the telling title of his essay (ibid:155). Krauthammer‘s reaction seems to 
validate Higgott and Malbašić‘s claim that the American ―political right tends to see every 
criticism of the US as anti-Americanism‖ (in Higgott and Malbašić (eds) 2008:3). Were we to 
follow Krauthammer‘s lead, it would clearly lead us into a dead-end. Searching for the root 
causes of anti-Americanism does of course not imply that anti-Americanism does not contain 
elements of irrationality. But it does imply that at least some of the root causes can probably 
be identified as originating in the actions of the United States. In other words: what America 
does reflects what America is – and vice versa.  
One should of course be careful not to fall in the opposite ditch, i.e. to accept 
critiques of what America does or has done as evidence of sinister intentions. No nation can 
convincingly present a history that exonerates it from guilt towards others (although the 
attempt is frequently made). Though past misdeeds and current mistakes contribute to the 
historical fabric of a nation, a nation cannot and should not be judged indiscriminately by 
such actions. Judging America – negatively – by what it does, or has done, is all too often an 
example of looking only at one side of the coin. Although I am not convinced by Hollander‘s 
and Joffe‘s attempts to pin the label of irrationality on all or most displays of anti-
Americanism, they are not wrong in underlining that perceived wrongs are often elevated to 
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absurd stereotypization. The following assessment by Hollander may be somewhat lacking in 
nuances, but nevertheless acknowledges the link between anti-Americanism and both the 
actions and the nature of the United States: 
The concept of anti-Americanism implies more than a critical disposition: it 
refers to critiques which are less than fully rational and not necessarily well 
founded. It usually alludes to a predisposition, a free-floating hostility or 
aversion, that feeds on many sources besides the discernible shortcomings of the 
United States. In the words of two commentators on the phenomenon, anti-
Americanism ―involves perceptual distortion such that a caricature of some 
aspect of behavior or attitude is raised to the level of general belief‖ [Doran and 
Sewell in Thornton ed. 1988:106]. Among the major sources of such anti-
Americanism we find nationalism (political or cultural), the rejection of (or 
ambivalence toward) modernization and anti-capitalism (1992:7). 
 
Though the definitions presented above have dominated the field for years, they seem to 
suffer from some of the same shortcomings as those presented by Joffe. The dissociation 
between opposition toward what America is and what America does is problematic. The 
tendency to define and describe anti-Americanism as largely irrational is highly dubious, as it 
risks obstructing attempts to look beyond the irrational. Anti-Americanism is indeed a 
phenomenon that presents worrying excesses, yet demonizing the demonizers is missing the 
point: around the globe, there are large numbers of people who reject the United States and its 
policies. Though this rejection at times appears either ridiculous or extreme (or both), it can 
hardly be experienced as irrational by its beholders. In the conclusion to his thorough analysis 
of French anti-Americanism in the interwar years, David Strauss makes it ―clear that anti-
Americanism is not necessarily an irrational position. It is an ideology, sometimes articulated 
with passion; but, given the values which the anti-American wishes to defend, it may be an 
entirely appropriate strategy‖ (1978:278). This alone should induce us not to be too flippant 
about its attributes or its possible causes. 
 
2.2.3 A unique and complex anti-ism? 
A third category of analysis presents a discourse, which typically is more nuanced, 
emphasizing the complexity of the phenomenon and its attributes, and offering a more 
comprehensive framework for analysis. To a large extent, such analyses draw on some of the 
elements presented above, not least the dissociation between opposition toward what America 
is and does. They do, however, present us with a set of very useful typologies that cover 
different forms of anti-Americanism. As noted above, irrespective of his charges of 
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irrationality, Hollander has identified three major types of anti-Americanism abroad, which he 
terms nationalistic, anticapitalistic, and antimodernist (1992:7 and 1995:xxxvii). Moisés Naím 
has identified five ―pure‖ types of anti-Americanism, namely politico-economic, historical, 
religious, cultural, and psychological (2002:104-105). More recently, Brendon O‘Connor has 
identified five conceptions of how the term is mostly used, which he resumes to be ―firstly, as 
one side of a dichotomised worldview; secondly, as a tendency; thirdly, as a pathology; 
fourthly, as a prejudice; and fifthly, as an ideology‖ (in O‘Connor (ed.) 2007a:8). Analyzing 
these five conceptions in turn, he concludes that anti-Americanism can best be regarded as a 
prejudice (ibid:8-21), although one, which at times has ―ideological overtones‖ (ibid:xiii). In 
reality, this differs little from Hollander‘s characteristic of anti-Americanism as a 
―predisposition‖ (1992:7); if anything, predisposition seems a more fitting and certainly more 
neutral characteristic than prejudice. Among the recent studies on the phenomenon, Peter 
Katzenstein and Robert Keohane have probably offered the most comprehensive definition of 
anti-Americanism to date. Starting from a distinction between unfavorable attitudes towards 
America that reflect opinion, i.e. unfavorable judgments about U.S. policies, and those that 
reflect bias, i.e. a predisposition to deeply distrust American intentions, they define anti-
Americanism as ―a psychological tendency to hold negative views of the United States and of 
American society in general. Such views draw on cognitive, emotional, and normative 
elements. Using the language of psychology, anti-Americanism could be viewed as an 
attitude‖ (2007:12). Yet, having presented this definition, they concede that: 
On further examination, anti-Americanism becomes much more complex than 
this broad definition suggests. We distinguish below among opinion, bias, and 
distrust, any of which could be reflected in poll results showing ―unfavorable‖ 
attitudes toward the United States. Bias is the most fundamental form of anti-
Americanism, which can be seen as a form of prejudice. (ibid.) 
 
Their main purpose, however, is not to analyze the strength of the different forms of anti-
American feeling, but rather to present a typology of different types of anti-Americanism. 
They basically identify four major types of anti-Americanism. Ranging from least to most 
intense, these are: 
 Liberal anti-Americanism, where the United States is criticized for not living up to its 
own ideals, which leads to charges of hypocrisy from people who share its professed 
ideals but lament its actions. 
 Social anti-Americanism, based on value conflicts that reflect relevant socio-political 
differences and lead to a rejection of the American combination of respect for 
individual liberty, reliance on personal responsibility, and distrust of government. 
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 Sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism, whose proponents focus on the importance of 
not losing control over the terms by which polities are inserted in world politics and 
the inherent importance of collective national identities. 
 Radical anti-Americanism, built around the belief that America‘s identity ensures that 
its actions will be hostile to the furtherance of values, practices and institutions 
elsewhere in the world (2006:28-31, 2007:28-34). 
 
This typology permits to distinguish between different types of anti-Americanism that appear 
rooted in different causes or political mind-sets. It is thus a useful categorization of a complex 
phenomenon that allows the authors to gauge anti-Americanism at different levels in different 
societies. Stating that the ―fundamental dimension along which these four types of anti-
Americanism vary is the normative one of identification‖ (2007:28), Katzenstein and 
Keohane employ their typology to identify different forms of anti-Americanism. They add 
that whether ―these identifications translate into anti-Americanism, or into very active anti-
Americanism, depends, we conjecture, on an emotional dimension: the extent to which the 
United States is feared‖ (ibid:34). Coupling their typology with the level of identification with 
the United States and the amount of fear that America inspires, they obtain the matrix 
reproduced below in table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Identification, fear, and anti-Americanism 
                                  Degree of fear that the United States will adversely affect one‟s own society 
                                   Low                         High 
Identification with  
the United States 
 
Positive: subject          I.   Pro-Americanism               II.   Critique of hypocrisy 
associates herself   liberal anti-Americanism  
with what she  
considers U.S.           III.   Ambivalence                 IV.   Severe criticism 
practices                  latent social anti-Americanism         intense social anti-          
                       Americanism 
 
                     V.   Negative feelings, but not intense;  VI.   Intense negative feelings; 
                        unlikely to lead to action             more likely to lead to action 
                        latent sovereign-nationalist           intense sovereign-nationalist 
                        anti-Americanism                  anti-Americanism 
 
Negative: subject         VII.  Negative and more intense      VIII.  Very negative and intense; 
opposes what she            than V but less than VI and           likely to lead to action, 
considers U.S.              VIII due to lack of fear              violent or nonviolent 
practices   latent radical anti-Americanism        mobilized radical anti-Americanism 
 
Source: Reproduced from Katzenstein and Keohane, 2007:29. 
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They note that the ―schemas, emotions, and norms that provide the basis for anti-American 
attitudes are as varied as the different types of anti-Americanism‖ and that as such, table 2.1 is 
―cast in terms of the attitudes of individuals‖ (ibid:35). What the table does not take into 
account is ―the particular experience of a society with the United States, which may condition 
the attitudes of its people‖ (ibid.). Acknowledging that not all forms of anti-Americanism fit 
neatly into their four major types, Katzenstein and Keohane introduce two more specific 
forms of anti-Americanism, which they find ―are both historically sensitive and 
particularistic‖ (2006:32): 
 Elitist anti-Americanism, which arises in countries in which the elite has a long history 
of denigrating American culture. France is mentioned here as an example – indeed as 
the only example. 
 Legacy anti-Americanism, which stems from resentment of past wrongs and misdeeds 
committed by the U.S. towards another society. (2007:35-37, 2006:32-33). 
 
These four (or six) different types of anti-Americanism may at first seem a fitting description 
of the different forms of anti-Americanism that can be encountered around the globe. Under 
their overall very broad definitional heading, Katzenstein and Keohane present a nuanced and 
yet succinct conceptual framework for analysis. They have employed this framework to 
present a thorough analysis of anti-Americanism in different societies (2007) that seems to 
broadly validate their main arguments. Their focus on the different varieties of anti-
Americanism entails, if we accept the premises of their arguments, that there can hardly be a 
core factor that is conducive to the rejection of America. Indeed, according to Katzenstein and 
Keohane, ―The beginning of wisdom is to recognize that what is called anti-Americanism 
varies, depending on who is reacting to America [..] The variety of anti-Americanism helps us 
to see [..] the futility of grand explanations for anti-Americanism‖ (2006:26). This is a view, 
which is widely shared among scholars who have studied the phenomenon. Crockatt notes 
that since ―anti-Americanism assumes many forms and has many different roots‖, he finds it 
―more useful to think of it as a family of related attitudes rather than as a single entity‖ 
(Crockatt 2003:44). Higgott and Malbašić take as the starting point of their analysis the 
assumption that ―anti-Americanism cannot be defined using simple, overarching explanations, 
which would indeed fail utterly to grasp the complexity of the phenomenon‖ (in Higgott and 
Malbašić (eds) 2008:5). Hollander agrees: ―Since anti-Americanism has many forms and 
originates in many disparate conditions and parts of the world it would be unrealistic to 
attempt to propose a single theory or explanation‖ (1995:389).  
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Yet can it really be so? Is it possible that a global phenomenon, albeit presenting 
different varieties from society to society, does not have some common root cause? 
According to Katzenstein and Keohane, there is no ―grand explanation‖, but does this exclude 
the possibility of at least a ground explanation? One dimension is oddly downplayed in their 
conceptual framework: the power dimension. It is a dimension on which Katzenstein and 
Keohane seem strangely hesitant. While analyzing individual attitudes toward the United 
States using the dimension of fear, which must presuppose some kind of power dimension, 
they view the extent to which the United States is feared as an ―emotional dimension‖ 
(2007:34). This emotional dimension seems to borrow more from social psychology than 
from political science. As such, it conjures images of irrationality resembling those used by 
among others Paul Hollander. Yet far from being just an emotional dimension, surely fear 
must be rooted also in perceptions of power and powerlessness. In this case, American power, 
and the relative powerlessness of other societies, their military, economies, cultures, traditions 
etc. Katzenstein and Keohane do note that the ―different types of anti-Americanism can, 
however, also be manifested at the level of the polity in the form of collective beliefs, 
reflected, for example, in appropriate discourses, tropes, and acceptable rhetorical moves‖ 
(ibid:35). This is undoubtedly true and readily observable, and as such one would expect 
some more solid arguments relating to the amount of fear that the United States can inspire at 
the level of the polity. On this level, fear cannot simply be reduced to an emotional 
dimension. Yet the global dimension of U.S. power only gets a passing comment. At the 
onset, Katzenstein and Keohane declare that ―If anti-American expressions were simply ways 
to protest policies of the hegemonic power, only the label would be new‖ (2006:26). They 
justify the exclusion of the power dimension by reasserting the difference between rejection 
of what America does and what America is, concluding that anti-Americanism is largely a 
reaction to what America is (ibid.). But what is America, if not powerful? The most important 
feature of the United States, indeed the feature that sets the American nation apart from all 
other nations in the world is precisely power. American power looms large and probably 
larger than that of any power in history. Surely, it can hardly be a coincidence that global anti-
Americanism has been a steady companion of rising American power throughout the 
twentieth century. Though Katzenstein and Keohane present us with a relevant typology to 
identify different forms of anti-Americanism, this typology alone is not enough to explain 
neither the global dimension of anti-Americanism nor its embedment in world politics. There 
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is little doubt that this third type of definition or definitional framework for analysis is much 
more comprehensive than the previous two, yet it too suffers from some shortcomings. 
Though it offers a useful typology, it nevertheless fails to explain adequately some of the root 
causes of anti-Americanism, focusing instead on its attributes in different societies and social 
strata. As such, there might be good cause to supplement these definitions with regard to the 
power dimension, which appears to have been downplayed in most previous definitions. 
 
2.3 Anti-Americanism and the Power Dimension 
The United States has been termed the first ―universal nation‖ (Joffe 2006b:110). As we shall 
see in chapter 5, France might also feel it natural to compete for the title. Nevertheless, the 
impression of America as a universal nation is widely shared today, and it logically entails 
that it should not be surprising that anti-Americanism has become a universal anti-ism. There 
is another reason however, which is both related and relatively straightforward. According to 
Markovits, where anti-Americanism differs from other prejudices is on the dimension of 
power (Markovits 2007:13). This observation might seem a truism, yet it is a fact, which 
inexplicably is often overlooked, especially by scholars who seek to analyze anti-
Americanism in relation to other anti-isms, as was discussed above. The power dimension and 
the universality dimension are twin brothers: the power dimension feeds the universality 
dimension (could anti-Americanism conceivably be analyzed as a global phenomenon if the 
United States was not a superpower capable of global power projection? Most likely not.), 
and the universality dimension mirrors the power dimension (surveys indicating rising anti-
Americanism often correspond with an identifiable rejection of the use of American power in 
specific conflicts). Both the power dimension (which will be analyzed in greater detail in 
chapter 3) and the universality dimension set anti-Americanism solidly apart from other anti-
isms. There is, however, a widespread reluctance to accept the power dimension as 
constitutive in relation to anti-Americanism. Katzenstein and Keohane reject what they term 
the ―Mr. Big‖ hypothesis as they find no positive correlation between levels of anti-
Americanism and levels of American power: 
Resentment at the negative effects of others‘ exercise of power is hardly 
surprising. Yet this explanation runs up against some inconvenient facts. If it 
were correct, anti-Americanism would have increased sharply during the 1990s; 
but we have seen that outside the Middle East, the United States was almost 
universally popular as late as 2002. The Mr. Big hypothesis could help account 
for certain forms of liberal and sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism [..] But it 
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could hardly account for social, radical, elitist, or legacy anti-Americanism, each 
of which reacts to features of American society, or its behavior in the past, that 
are quite distinct from contemporary hegemony. (2006:33) 
 
Their opposition toward the Mr. Big hypothesis rests mainly on the observation that American 
power was rejected less vehemently in the 1990s than before (and after!). At closer scrutiny, 
this argument does not hold quite as tight as Katzenstein and Keohane would have it. First, it 
is not reasonable to expect a clear correlation between levels of anti-Americanism and levels 
of American power. The actual level of military or economic power may be calculated at any 
given time using a number of indicators; the perception of power, however, is not as easily 
calculated. Second, the 1990s were for large parts of the world a decade of upheaval, but also 
hope following the end of the Cold War. American leadership of the Free World was not 
regarded in terms of oppression or potential oppression, but largely in terms of liberation, at 
least in Europe. The promise of a ―new world order‖, to use George H.W. Bush‘s term, was 
perceived by many as the promise of a new international system, in which bipolarity was 
replaced not by unipolarity or American tutelage, but by multilateral cooperation, although it 
soon came to be associated more with ―unilateral American leadership‖ (Hippler 1994:89) in 
a post-Cold War era characterized by first and foremost by a globalization process 
spearheaded by the United States (Falk 1999:11-12, Hanahoe 2003:9-11). The Clinton 
administration‘s initial reluctance to engage militarily in the Balkan crisis of the 1990s was 
seen as a confirmation, however welcome or unwelcome it may have been in European 
capitals, of Washington‘s refusal to wield its power and act as a global policeman (Hirsh 
2003). Third, though there is no doubt that anti-Americanism reached an all-time high under 
the presidency of George W. Bush, surveys conclusively show that it was on the rise even 
before his election (Higgott and Malbašić, in Higgott and Malbašić (eds) 2008, Moïsi 2009), 
undermining the argument that the United States was ―almost universally popular‖ until 2002, 
though it is true that the personae and politics of Bush played well into the anti-American 
narratives (O‘Connor, in O‘Connor and Griffiths (eds) 2007:1-18), widening the transatlantic 
―chasm that had begun to open with the collapse of the Soviet empire‖ (Moïsi 2009:119). 
Fourth, and perhaps most surprising given especially Robert Keohane‘s close partnership with 
Joseph S. Nye
9
, the notion of power around which they build their argument, is precisely the 
notion of power primarily used by realists and neorealists, i.e. power measured purely or 
mainly in terms of military or economic power. Yet there are other notions of power, much 
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more relevant in this respect. Joseph S. Nye has presented a useful distinction between hard 
power and soft power (1990), which, as will be explored further below, provides an 
interesting framework for analyzing anti-Americanism in relation to various dimensions of 
power. It is thus not just in terms of military force or economic might that the United States 
can be perceived as Mr. Big. In their critical study of anti-Americanism, Sardar and Davies 
have noted that: 
America is not just the lone hyperpower – it has become the defining power of 
the world. America defines what is democracy, justice, freedom; what are 
human rights and what is multiculturalism; who is a ‗fundamentalist‘, a 
‗terrorist‘, or simply ‗evil‘. In short, what it means to be human. The rest of the 
world, including Europe, must simply accept these definitions and follow the 
American lead [..]. But America defines all these things in singular terms – in 
terms of American self-identity, history, experience and culture, and, more often 
than not, in terms of American self-interest (Sardar and Davies 2002:201).  
 
As opposed to what Katzenstein and Keohane state, this perception of power should be able to 
account for the social, radical, elitist, and legacy anti-Americanism that they have identified, 
as well as for the liberal and sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism that they concede may 
feed on the dimension of power.  A final argument should be put forward: surveys gauging 
the level of anti-Americanism in different societies present overwhelming arguments for a 
correlation between levels of anti-Americanism and perceptions of U.S. power. Some of these 
surveys will be presented and analyzed below. By and large, they validate the claim that anti-
Americanism can be regarded also in terms of a rejection of U.S. power. This is the case 
especially as regards the attributes of hard power, but to a large extent also as regards 
elements of soft power. On both accounts, these surveys give the impression that there is both 
opposition toward American power and the way in which it is wielded – a further testimony to 
the fact that perceptions of power cannot be dissociated from the use of power. 
Katzenstein and Keohane‘s refusal to accept ―grand arguments‖ such as the 
power dimension should not be interpreted as a complete rejection on their behalf of the 
power dimension as a source of explanation. They concede that such explanations contain a 
―grain of truth‖, but they deny that they can form the basis for a ―general explanation of anti-
Americanism‖ (2006:34). To a large extent, this is due to their adopting a notion of power, 
which is probably too narrow. As a curiosity, it should be noted that others, using basically 
the same notion of power as Katzenstein and Keohane, see power not as a source of anti-
Americanism, but rather prescribe power as a remedy against the spread of anti-Americanism. 
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Charles Krauthammer, as always ready to deliver a refreshingly politically incorrect 
commentary, offers this assessment:  
The elementary truth that seems to elude the experts again and again – Gulf war, 
Afghan war, next war – is that power is its own reward. Victory changes 
everything, psychology above all. The psychology in the region [Middle East] is 
now one of fear and deep respect for American power. Now is the time to use it 
to deter, defeat, or destroy the other regimes in the area that are host to radical 
Islamic terrorism. (2001b)  
 
The power that inspires fear (or admiration, depending on the point of view) is certainly 
available to the United States, but equally important is the potential for soft power that the 
United States disposes of. Power can be portrayed as ―the ability to produce the outcome you 
want‖ (Nye 2003:74). According to Nye, typical hard power instruments imply the use of 
―sticks and carrots‖, whereas soft power is ―the ability to secure those outcomes through 
attraction rather than coercion‖ (ibid.). These dimensions of power will be discussed in 
greater detail in the next chapter. It does, however, seem clear that if one applies a broader 
definition of power such as the one proposed by Nye, a logical observation could be to 
wonder on the relationship between the two dimensions of power. If soft power is primarily 
about attraction, it would be tempting to regard anti-Americanism as to a large degree being a 
case of dis-attraction. Furthermore, it is interesting to wonder, whether attributes of hard 
power become more repellent as a nation‘s soft power (i.e. the ability to attract) decreases. 
Nye‘s broader definition of power allows us to escape the Mr. Big stereotypes when analyzing 
anti-Americanism in relation to American power. In his path-breaking work, Man, the State 
and War, Kenneth N. Waltz concluded that the permissive cause of war is the condition of 
anarchy characterizing the international political system of states. The efficient causes of any 
given war could, however, be found at other levels, individual or what he termed state and 
societal levels (1959). It might be overstating the case to regard American power as the 
permissive cause of anti-Americanism. Yet it could be argued that American power is the 
most structural of the different causes of anti-Americanism. 
This chapter has argued that some of the most common definitions of anti-
Americanism are flawed, as they are constructed around discourses, which either oversimplify 
the phenomenon, exaggerates its attributes of irrationality, or rejects the possibility of 
fundamental causes that are conducive to anti-Americanism. It has furthermore been argued 
that the dimension of power is central to the understanding of anti-Americanism abroad and 
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that much anti-Americanism can be analyzed using a broad concept of power such as the one 
suggested by Joseph S. Nye. That will be the endeavor set forth in the next chapter. Before 
turning to an analysis of anti-Americanism as a rejection of American power, it is time to 
present the definition of global (i.e. non-domestic)
10
 anti-Americanism that will be used 
throughout the rest of this study:  
Anti-Americanism is a global phenomenon and the most universal of all nation-
specific anti-isms. It reflects a general predisposition against the United States, 
its society and its policies. It is a complex phenomenon with many different 
attributes reflecting the beholder‟s values and perceptions. To a large extent, 
however, these attributes are due to or enhanced by the perception that the 
United States wields disproportionate power over other nations and their 
inhabitants. As such, anti-Americanism can largely be interpreted as a reaction 
against the perceived threat of Americanization of other societies, both on a 
local and on a global level. 
 
This definition is rather broad. It does not attempt to differentiate between rational or 
irrational attributes of anti-Americanism, neither does it attempt to delineate the different 
varieties of anti-Americanism, which one might to a certain degree identify, depending on the 
societies examined. Rather, it attempts to offer a single model of explanation, the power 
dimension, which can be used to analyze elements of anti-Americanism. Though some 
readers may at this stage be ready to accept the contention that the power dimension can 
explain, at least partially, several varieties of modern anti-Americanism, it takes more 
imagination to accept that it can explain the historical anti-Americanism that predates the 
superpower status of the United States. Yet power can be defined not just in terms of hard 
power versus soft power, but also in terms of actual power versus potential power. It has been 
amply documented that anti-Americanism in certain societies predates not only America‘s rise 
to superpower status, but even the creation of the United States (Roger 2005). Yet, as Rubin 
and Rubin have noted, anti-Americans have thought that ―the United States would become the 
main force to shape the human civilization [..] back as far as 1750‖ (2004:221). Though early 
anti-Americanism had other causes besides the power dimension, the promise of American 
power has been present since the nation‘s creation. Here, the French example is particularly 
appropriate, as will be discussed in chapter 5. But first, in order to properly gauge the 
importance of the power dimension, and thereby to assess whether the above definition holds 
up to closer scrutiny, it is necessary to turn our attention more closely to the relation between 
anti-Americanism and the power dimension. 
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3 The Rejection of American Power 
 
It was argued in chapter 2 that it is first and foremost the power dimension that sets anti-
Americanism apart from other prejudices. While to some, it might seem a banal observation, 
it is a contention, which is discarded by the majority of prominent writers on anti-
Americanism. This chapter will attempt to demonstrate first that there are fact-based grounds 
to assume that there is a correlation between contemporary opposition toward the United 
States and perceptions abroad of disproportionate or even excessive American power. This 
will be demonstrated by analyzing some of the many surveys gauging the level of opposition 
toward America that may be regarded as evidence, however partial, of anti-Americanism. 
These surveys can clearly only provide us with an impression of some of the causes of anti-
Americanism today. An obvious criticism of the use of such surveys is that they only record 
an image of possible anti-Americanism as presented to them by interviewees who react to 
their perception of current affairs. Though the surveys can thus only give an indication of the 
impressions of individuals, however large in numbers, they nonetheless give valuable 
indications as to the perceptions of the populations of large parts of the world. The vox populi, 
however, does not differentiate between different notions of power, and as such, a more 
thorough analysis of the different attributes of power is needed. This brings us to the main 
part of this chapter, namely the part that analyzes the rejection of the United States based on 
the elements of power associated with it. This will be analyzed by decomposing the notion of 
power into its dimensions and subdimensions as introduced by Joseph S. Nye. This 
decomposition will address the two dimensions of hard power versus soft power as well as 
their resources and attributes. It will be argued that the various notions of power can explain 
the most common examples of anti-Americanism, including the major types identified by 
Hollander (nationalistic, anticapitalistic, and antimodernist) or by Katzenstein and Keohane 
(liberal, social, sovereign-nationalist, and radical, as well as the more particularistic varieties 
such as elitist and legacy anti-Americanism). Furthermore, an attempt will be made to 
demonstrate that the power dimension is as relevant as regards the promise of American 
power as regarding the actual existence of American power.  
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3.1 Perceptions Abroad Towards the United States  
There is no shortage of polls to illustrate the perceptions towards the United States abroad
11
. 
Though these polls do not in all cases inform us about causes of anti-Americanism, the 
surveys show a remarkable consistency in the view of inhabitants of different countries 
towards the United States over the last decade. The U.S. ‗fact tank‘ Pew Research Center 
regularly issues worldwide public opinion surveys as part of the Pew Global Attitudes 
Project
12
. The Pew Global Attitudes Project is the largest ever series of multinational surveys 
focusing on global attitudes toward the United States (Kohut 2007) and provider of the most 
comprehensive quantitative data on the subject. Their surveys make interesting reading: First, 
the reports allow us to broadly gauge the level of opposition towards the United States in 
selected countries. Second, the reports use a number of parameters to qualify some of the 
reasons for the dissatisfaction with the United States over the years. In his March 2007 
testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives‘ Subcommittee on International 
Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight Committee on Foreign Affairs, Andrew Kohut, 
the President of the Pew Research Center, presented the findings of the Pew Global Attitudes 
Project since 2002 concerning the perception of America abroad. In his presentation, he 
enumerated a number of factors driving anti-Americanism around the world. Considering that 
the polling started following September 11
th
 2001, it is not surprising that some of the factors 
identified by the surveys as driving anti-Americanism, especially among Muslims, were 
related to specific issues such as American policy towards Israel (seen as too supportive), the 
U.S.-led war on terrorism (seen as an American campaign targeted specifically at Muslim 
governments), and the widespread opposition to the war in Iraq (seen by many as an 
American attempt to control Middle Eastern oil and/or to impose its military and political 
domination of the region) (Kohut 2007:4-5). Though the polls confirm that the image of 
America deteriorated particularly in the Muslim world in the first decade of the new 
millennium, the Pew Global Attitudes Project documented that this was part of a global 
tendency. In his testimony, Kohut highlighted four aspects of American power and American 
policy, which he reckoned were central to the rising anti-Americanism that could be 
witnessed (Kohut 2007:5-7): 
 A general perception that the U.S. acts unilaterally in the international arena, failing to 
take into account the interests of other countries when it makes foreign policy 
decisions. 
 A broad discomfort with unrivaled American power. 
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 A perceived disproportionate willingness to use military force, and especially 
preemptive force. 
 A rejection of ―Americanization‖ – the wide diffusion of American ideas and customs 
fueled by globalization. 
 
The surveys provide some interesting clues as to the magnitude and nature of the recent 
deterioration of America‘s image in the world. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the developments in 
favorability ratings of respectively the United States and of Americans as reported by the Pew 
Global Attitudes Project in 2009.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The tables show that though there was a steady decline in the image of both the United States 
and Americans in the countries polled especially throughout the period from 2002 to 2006 or 
2007, the respondents have broadly been more positive towards Americans than towards the 
United States. To the extent that the polls can be taken as an indication of anti-Americanism, 
it would seem that though there is a clear correlation between the fluctuating levels of 
animosity towards the United States and towards Americans in the various countries, anti-
Americanism still has more to do with animosity towards America than towards Americans. 
Nevertheless, the fact that negative perceptions regarding the United States are reflected also 
Table 3.1: U.S. Favorability Rating (in %) 
1999/ 
2000 2002 2003 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
U.S.  --  --  --  83  76  80  84  88 
Canada  71  72  63  59  --  55  --  68 
Britain  83  75  70  55  56  51  53  69 
France  62  62 42  43  39  39  42  75 
Germany  78  60  45  42  37  30  31  64 
Spain  50  --  38  41  23  34  33  58 
Poland  86  79  --  62  --  61  68  67 
Russia  37  61  37  52  43  41  46  44 
Turkey  52  30  15  23  12   9  12  14 
Egypt  --  --  --  --  30  21  22  27 
Jordan  --  25   1  21  15  20  19  25 
Lebanon  --  36  27  42  --  47  51  55 
Pal. ter.  --  --   --  --  --  13  --  15 
Israel  --  --  78  --  --  78  --  71 
China  --  --  --  42  47  34  41  47 
India  --  66  --  71  56  59  66  76 
Indonesia  75  61  15  38  30  29  37  63 
Japan  77  72  --  --  63  61  50  59 
Pakistan  23  10  13  23  27  15  19  16 
S. Korea  58  52  46  --  --  58  70  78 
Argentina  50  34  --  --  --  16  22  38 
Brazil  56  51  35  --  --  44  47  61 
Mexico  68  64  --  --  --  56  47  69 
Kenya  94  80  --  --  --  87  --  90 
Nigeria  46  76  61  --  62  70  64  79 
Source: Pew 2009:1. 
 
Table 3.2: Favorable Views of the American 
People (in %) 
 
2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
 
Canada    77   75   --    66   --    76   --    74 
Britain    82   80   72   70   69   70   70   73 
France    71   58   53   64   65   61   64   75 
Germany  70   67   68   66   66   63   55   64 
Spain     --    47   --    56   37   46   41   52 
Poland    77   --    --    68   --    63   70   72 
Russia    67   65   64   61   57   54   57   57 
Turkey    32   32   32   23   17   13   13   14 
Egypt     --    --    --    --    36   31   31   40 
Jordan    54   18   21   34   39   36   36   39 
Lebanon   47   62   --    66   --    69   74   69 
Pal. ter.   --     6    --     --   --    21    --   20 
Israel     --    78   --     --   --    75    --   74 
China     --    --    --    43   50   38   38   42 
India     72   --    --    70   67   58   63   73 
Indonesia  65   56   --    46   36   42   45   54 
Japan     73   --    --    --    82   75   65   70 
Pakistan   17   38   25   22   27   19   20   20 
S. Korea   60   74   --    --    --    70   77   83 
Argentina  32   --    --    --    --    26   24   38 
Brazil     54   44   --    --    --    45   51   62 
Mexico    56   --    --    --    --    52   44   57 
Kenya     79   --    --    --    --    86   --    87 
Nigeria    72   67   --    --    56   66   62   76 
Source: Pew 2009:17. 
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on the perception of Americans, led Kohut to emphasize in his 2007 testimony to the U.S. 
House of Representatives, that ―it is no longer just the U.S. as a country that is perceived 
negatively, but increasingly the American people as well, a sign that anti-American opinions 
are deepening and becoming more entrenched‖ (Kohut 2007:3). This interpretation of the 
polling data, seemingly valid in 2007, was seriously challenged just two years later. Whereas 
the image of America had been deteriorating rapidly during the presidency of George W. 
Bush, it is clear that election of Barack Obama as the 44
th
 President of the United States 
coincided with a massive increase in the favorability ratings of America. Judging by the latest 
surveys produced by Pew, this was in fact anything but coincidental. Table 3.3 shows that 
there is a spectacular difference regarding the confidence expressed abroad toward President 
George W. Bush in 2008 and his successor in 2009. Table 3.4 furthermore demonstrates that 
the high level of confidence in President Obama contributed to give populations around the 
world a more positive impression of the United States. The figures are noteworthy, both 
because they are so unambiguous and because they reflect a near-universal tendency. Yet they 
are hardly surprising. Throughout the presidency of George W. Bush, polls confirmed that the 
43
rd
 President was viewed 
rather unfavorably by the 
rest of the world. In a 2005 
Pew survey with the sub-
title ―American Character 
Gets Mixed Reviews‖, 
European respondents mas-
sively replied ―that the 
Problem With the U.S.‖ 
was ―mostly Bush‖ (Pew 
2005:16). This was the case 
in France, where 63 pct re-
garded Bush as the problem 
and ‗only‘ 32 pct America 
in general. The assessment 
in France, however, did not 
differ from that of the other 
Table 3.3: A (Nearly) 
Worldwide Gap (% confident) 
 
Bush   Obama 
2008    2009    Diff 
Germany     14     93    +79 
France       13     91    +78 
Britain       16     86    +70 
Spain         8      72    +64 
Canada*       28     88    +60 
Japan        25     85    +60 
Brazil        17     76    +59 
Argentina      7      61    +54 
S. Korea      30     81    +51 
Indonesia     23     71    +48 
Mexico       16     55    +39 
U.S.         37     74    +37 
Nigeria       55     88    +33 
China        30     62    +32 
Egypt        11     42    +31 
Turkey        2      33    +31 
Jordan        7      31    +24 
India        55     77    +22 
Kenya*       72     94    +22 
Poland       41     62    +21 
Palest. ter.*     8      23    +15 
Russia       22     37    +15 
Lebanon      33     46    +13 
Pakistan       7      13     +6 
Israel*       57     56     -1 
*Bush confidence from 2007. 
Source: Pew 2009:31. 
Table 3.4: Did Obama’s 
Election Change Your 
Opinion of the U.S.? 
             No 
More   Less  change 
  fav     fav    (Vol) 
          %    %    % 
Canada     84     6      6 
France     93     3      4 
Germany   91     1      7 
Britain     77     6      14 
Spain      75     5      16 
Poland     48     11     33 
Russia     40     10     44 
Turkey     38     25      25 
Israel      40     40     17 
Egypt      38     23     34 
Pal. ter.    37     30     32 
Lebanon    34     25     34 
Jordan     29     18     44 
Japan      77      6      14 
Indonesia   73   12     8 
S. Korea    67     3     24 
India      60   21     5 
China      47   10     26 
Pakistan     9    23     26 
Brazil      77     6     14 
Argentina   61     5     26 
Mexico     51   15     25 
Kenya      84     7      8 
Nigeria     81   11     5 
Source: Pew 2009:35. 
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polled European countries; if anything, France could be said in this respect to represent an 
almost median position. Outside of Europe it seemed that the blame was cast more or less 
equally on the Bush administration and America in general (ibid.). In his testimony to the 
U.S. House of Representatives, Andrew Kohut nevertheless found that one should not over-
emphasize the Bush-factor: ―Clearly, President Bush and his administration‘s policies have 
been lightning rods for U.S. criticism. At the same time, however, it is clear that this problem 
seems bigger than the feelings people may have about President Bush and his administration‖ 
(Kohut 2007:6). While the 2009 survey might appear to challenge this assessment, it also 
indicates that there remains a substantial global reservation regarding the amount of power 
and influence wielded by the United States. Table 3.5 shows that even at a time when U.S. 
favorability ratings have increased dramatically, there remains a persistent impression that the 
United States influences other countries, and a substantial proportion of those polled 
characterizes this influence as negative. 
Polling data also suggest that there is a 
widespread impression among majorities of 
the polled that the United States does not 
consider the interests of other nations (Pew 
2009:19), and though there is a fairly 
significant expectation among especially 
America‘s European allies that President 
Obama will strive to act more multilaterally, 
only a minority of these countries describe 
the actual policies of the Obama-
administration as multilateral (Pew 2009:6). 
Though the favorability figures for 2009 are 
in general far more positive than those of the 
preceding years, it is clear that there remains 
a certain global apprehension regarding the 
most potent attributes of American power 
and the way it is wielded. Table 3.6 depicts 
the extent to which U.S. foreign policy was 
seen in 2005 as considering others and 
Table 3.5: U.S. Influence Widely Felt 
 
** U.S. influence is a… 
U.S. influences   Good    Bad   Neither/ 
 your country*    thing   thing      DK 
              %         %      %      % 
Canada        88         22     27     40 
Britain        81         15     31     35 
France        74         16     15     43 
Germany      83         19     24     40 
Spain         66         13     33     20 
Poland        63         13     27     23 
Russia        62          7      39     17 
Turkey        58         6      45      7 
Egypt         74         16     42     17 
Jordan        74         7      53     14 
Lebanon       91         32     48     11 
Palest. ter.      84         6      70      9 
Israel         91         20     34     37 
China         65         21     31     12 
India         85         51     25      8 
Indonesia      62         20     21     21 
Japan         92         19     37     36 
Pakistan       55         5      43      7 
S. Korea       91         30     30     31 
Argentina      72         8      48     16 
Brazil         77         21     38     19 
Mexico        79         18     38     23 
Kenya         73         52     12     10 
Nigeria        73         43     22      9 
*% of total sample saying U.S. influences their 
country a great deal or fair amount. 
**% of total sample saying U.S. influence is good 
thing, bad thing, neither, or don’t know. Question 
asked only of those who say U.S. has great deal/fair 
amount of influence. 
Source: Pew 2009:26. 
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responses to the question of whether it would be better, if U.S. military power was rivaled
13
. 
 
The most striking conclusion to be drawn from this survey is naturally that even among its 
closest allies, it would seem that there was just a few years ago a massive rejection of what 
can well be described as a perception of U.S. unilateralism. Furthermore, the rather 
overwhelming wish for a rival to U.S. military power can only be interpreted as a testimony to 
the fact that the U.S. military hegemony was deplored, even among its allies within NATO.  
Though the figures regarding the degree to which the U.S. considers the interests of other 
countries have improved slightly since the election of President Obama (Pew 2009:19), there 
is no escaping that America‘s preeminence as the world‘s foremost military power 
contributed to foster resentment, even among its allies. Military might is one of the two most 
salient attributes of traditional notions of (hard) power; the other is economic power. Despite 
the impact of the financial crisis and the growing impression of China as a rising economic 
power, surveys show that the United States remains in the eyes of most of the world the 
leading economic power (Pew 2009:25). However, there is also a widely shared impression 
 
  
 
Table 3.6: Opinions of U.S. policies. Source: Pew 2005:23 and 30.  
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that America‘s economic influence is negative (table 3.7). 
Though the survey registers a certain improvement in the 
assessment following the election of Barack Obama, the 
figures remain high, especially among the United States‘ 
European partners. These surveys indicate that while the 
way American power was wielded by George W. Bush 
may have been the primary reason for the disenchantment 
with the United States registered during his presidency, 
there is no escaping that the two most prominent attributes 
of American (hard) power, namely its military pre-
eminence and its economic preponderance give rise to 
resentment around the globe. To the extent that such 
surveys can be said to indicate reasons for anti-American 
prejudices, it would seem that these prejudices have as 
their structural base a perception of disproportionate 
American power; a perception which appears to be 
magnified whenever this power is furthermore perceived 
as being wielded in a unilateral way. As such, polling data 
from the Pew Global Attitudes Project seem to validate 
the contention made by this study that anti-Americanism can, at least to a certain extent, be 
viewed also in terms of a rejection of American power. Yet power should not be reduced just 
to its hard power attributes, and though the surveys conclusively show that there is a certain 
global apprehension regarding American (hard) power and the way it is wielded, the same 
surveys show that other factors are at play regarding the rejection of America. A 2007 poll for 
example shows that critiques of the U.S. are not confined to neither American hard power nor 
its policies: 
In much of the world there is a broad and deepening dislike of American values 
and a global backlash against the spread of American ideas and customs. 
Majorities or pluralities in most countries surveyed say they dislike American 
ideas about democracy – and this sentiment has increased in most regions since 
2002 (Pew 2007:5) 
Table 3.7: U.S. Economic 
Influence Is Negative 
 
 2008  2009  Change 
  %     % 
 Canada       --    78    -- 
 Britain        72     62   -10 
 France       70    63     -7 
 Germany     72    72      0 
 Spain        56    47     -9 
 Poland       24    37   +13 
 Russia       31    50   +19 
 Turkey      70    55   -15  
 Egypt       49    43     -6 
 Jordan       45    52    +7 
 Lebanon     41    47    +6 
 Pal. ter.      --    68    -- 
 Israel        --    63    -- 
 China       18    27    +9 
 India        25    23     -2 
 Indonesia     37   27   -10 
 Japan       63    67    +4 
 Pakistan     30    40   +10 
 S. Korea     41    37     -4 
 Argentina    50    55    +5 
 Brazil       45    49    +4 
 Mexico      49    58    +9 
 Kenya        --     23    -- 
 Nigeria      18    46   +28 
 
% of total sample saying U.S. economic 
influence is negative. Asked only of 
those who say U.S. economy has great 
deal/fair amount of influence. 
Source: Pew 2009:8.  
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Table 3.8 provides us with a rather eerie image of the 
critics and supporters of American ideals. Whereas several 
Western allies, including France, seem to be among the 
harshest critics, the list of potential new political 
bedfellows that are polled as supporting the American 
ideals come, with the exception of Israel, from countries 
with a rather dubious record in terms of democracy, human 
rights and transparency. Though it is encouraging that the 
public opinion in these countries admires American ideals, 
it is with the countries that are critical that the U.S. has the 
most important relationships, indeed a number of them are 
among its closest allies. The poll can well be criticized for 
presenting the polled with questions, which are vague. It is 
for example not clear whether the pollsters are referring to 
American domestic ideas about democracy or the Bush administration‘s policy to promote 
democracy in the Middle East by force. Nonetheless, it is an interesting indicator of the 
disenchantment, not least in the West, with the American ideals that were once shared by 
many developed nations.  
Until 2007, the Pew Global Attitudes Project presented their surveys as evidence 
of rising anti-Americanism. The magnitude of the criticism directed towards the United States 
in the period makes it difficult to disagree with that assessment. One should however be 
careful not to overemphasize the point: A decrease of 23 percentage points in favorability 
ratings of the U.S. in France over a five-year period is in no way an indication of a 
proportionally similar increase in French anti-American sentiments. At best, the surveys give 
us indications of an increasing malaise vis-à-vis the United States, which in all evidence also 
corresponds with rising anti-Americanism in large parts of the world. Furthermore, by 
uncovering some of the areas in which this malaise is most noticeable, the surveys furnish us 
with partial clues as to the causes of disenchantment with the United States. Other surveys 
may provide us with further clues. A 2004 Harris Interactive survey of Western European 
perceptions of the U.S. focuses more broadly on a number of issues that not only relate to 
foreign policy. The results are reproduced in table 3.9 below:  
Table 3.8: Critics and Supporters 
of American Ideals 
 
American Ideas about Democracy 
 
Like most     %   Dislike most     % 
Ivory Coast  81   Turkey      81 
Nigeria     75   France       76 
Ghana      73   Pakistan     72 
Kenya      72   Palest. ter.   71 
Ethiopia    65   Argentina    67 
Mali       63   Brazil       67 
Israel      61   Spain        66 
Uganda     60   Germany     65 
 
American Ways of Doing Business 
 
Like most     %   Dislike most     % 
Kenya      79   Turkey      83 
Nigeria     78   France       75 
Ivory Coast   78   Argentina    67 
Ghana      74   Germany     64 
Kuwait     71   Brazil       61 
Israel      70   Canada      59 
Lebanon    63   Pakistan     56 
 
Source: Pew 2007 
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48 13
48 22
45 21
37 24
30 34
28 35
26 40
26 41
17 56
16 57
13 62
13 69
10 70
36 33
The American people
American films and tv programs
The quality of life in America
How  Americans do business
American values
American multinational companies
American system of government
American system of justice
American food
U.S. policies in Afghanistan
U.S. foreign policy since 2000
U.S. policies in Iraq
President George W. Bush
Overall attitudes to the U.S.
 Positive %
 Negative %
 
The findings confirm that it was primarily issues associated with the foreign policies of the 
Bush administration, which caused resentment among the five largest Western European 
countries at the time. Though the figures were not representative neither for Europe per se nor 
for the rest of the world, they indicate that there might be other reasons for rejecting the 
United States than those based on U.S. policies or perceptions of unrivaled American power. 
Just as is the case with the surveys carried out by Pew Global, this poll cannot be taken as 
evidence of anti-Americanism as such. Just as it is no indication of pro-Americanism to be 
fond of American films, it is not necessarily a sign of anti-Americanism to dislike American 
food. Though such polls are often presented in the press as evidence of anti-Americanism, 
they can be used in this respect only to illustrate some of the many attitudes that individuals 
abroad might have towards aspects of the United States. Polls gauging the level of world 
opinion of U.S. policies might give us a snap shot of the level of frustration with U.S. 
administrations at the specific moment when the polls are carried out, and polls such as the 
Harris poll reproduced above may confirm stereotypes either about America or about how 
Source: Harris Interactive: What Do Europeans Like and Dislike about the United States. Released March 24, 2004.  
Note: Excludes those who said "neither positive nor negative" or "not sure." 
Table 3.9: Western European attitudes to various aspects of the U.S. 
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America is viewed globally. But only by comparing polls over a long period of time could we 
acquire any basis for using these polls as evidence to the development of anti-Americanism. 
The ambition here is not to measure the level of anti-Americanism over time but to explore 
some of the root causes of anti-Americanism as a phenomenon. The above-mentioned polls 
may have shown a remarkable consistency in the views of the polled regarding their views on 
not least U.S. foreign policy. While the surveys do not offer us a complete or comprehensive 
picture of the grievances held towards the United States, as the interviewees have responded 
mostly to ‗closed-end questions‘, they do offer us some clues. Chief among them is the 
dimension of power, where there is a widespread perception that America holds and wields 
excessive power over other nations and their inhabitants. It is naturally an open question 
whether such polls can really be taken at face value. Josef Joffe has argued that what he terms 
―policy anti-Americanism‖ (which is basically the kind of anti-Americanism that is measured 
in polls such as those reproduced above) is not really a gauge of real anti-Americanism: 
in polite Western society it is usually infra dig to say, ―Yes, I hate the 
Americans‖. But one is a thousand times more likely to hear, ―I hate this 
American president‖. At this juncture, Professor Freud would begin to muse 
about ―displacement‖, about the human habit of clobbering one object or person 
but actually targeting another that is protected by fearsome power, be it because 
of taboo or real clout. Lashing out at specific American policies and leaders 
doesn‘t risk the raised eyebrows that demonizing the country as such would do. 
In a post-racist age, collectives usually are protected; individuals are not. Freud 
might also invoke another standby of his craft: the patient who is in denial. [..] 
The denial mechanism offers a clue as to why opinion surveys, though they 
deliver much harder evidence than voyages through the unconscious, tell only 
part of the story. (2006a:3) 
 
Joffe undoubtedly has a point here, yet while he is right in asserting that there is a limit to 
how much we can use surveys to gauge the level of anti-Americanism, they nonetheless 
provide us with some clues. The above-mentioned surveys have shown us that there was at 
the beginning of the 21
st
 century a real sense of dissatisfaction with U.S. foreign policies. And 
while, following Joffe‘s lead, we should be wary of over-interpreting the results of such polls; 
a common complaint seems to be the perceived hegemonic status of the United States as well 
as the policies that are carried out. Yet, though the most frequent attacks are directed at the 
use of American hard power, popular denigration of elements of the American society such as 
its food and culture are precisely attacks on its soft power, since American products have to a 
large extent acquired global status. The surveys presented above clearly corroborate the 
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argument that anti-Americanism is to a very large extent a reflection of perceptions of 
excessive American power. Though the surveys focus primarily on the dimension of power 
that Nye has labeled hard power, there is good reason to believe that the soft power dimension 
is in the process of being rejected as well. 
 
3.2 Anti-Americanism and the Perception of Power 
The above-mentioned surveys from Pew Global Attitudes Project give us an indication that 
there is a case for linking negative perceptions of America with tendencies toward a rejection 
of American power. It transpires that in many parts of the globe what can best be described as 
the United States‘ role as an international hegemon or near-hegemon is (or was) rejected. The 
power dimension, clearly, can not be ignored, and it is doubtful whether anti-Americanism 
would be equally strong if the United States was a relatively weak power. Without the power 
dimension, anti-Americanism might still exist in certain countries, but it would hardly be a 
universal phenomenon and it certainly would have a much smaller impact. Anti-Americanism 
based on the rejection of America‘s unparalleled ability to wield power cannot be labeled 
‗rational‘. That would be going too far. Yet it would probably not be completely erroneous to 
describe such anti-Americanism as at least partially ‗natural‘, in the sense that it is a human 
trait to fear and envy the ‗number ones‘ of this planet – especially when they are perceived as 
bullying. Indeed, Barry and Judith Rubin have portrayed it as an ―explicable unpopularity‖ 
(Rubin and Rubin 2004:219). Anti-Americanism however, is not exclusively about opposition 
to American ‗hard power‘. It is just as much a reflection of the rise and fall of America‘s ‗soft 
power‘. 
―Power, like love, is easier to experience than to define or measure‖, Joseph S. 
Nye noted in 1990 (Nye 1990:25). This did not prevent him from analyzing power transitions 
and the transformation of power at the end of the twentieth century in a study that came to be 
classic. His study, which can be read as a gentle rebuke at the notion of power employed by 
Paul Kennedy in his The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (1988), has one argument that is 
central in this respect: that power cannot just be measured in military or economic terms. 
―Although force may sometimes play a role, traditional instruments of power are rarely 
sufficient to deal with the changing issues in world politics‖ (Nye 1990:187). Evaluating the 
leading states in the period 1500s-1900s by their major power resources (ibid:34), he 
demonstrates that in an era of transnational interdependence, traditional hard power has been 
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supplemented by what he terms ‗soft power‘. In a study devoted entirely to this notion, he 
describes soft power as: 
[..] the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or 
payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country‘s culture, political ideals, 
and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our 
soft power is enhanced. [..] When you get others to admire your ideals and to 
want what you want, you do not have to spend as much on sticks and carrots to 
move them in your direction. Seduction is always more effective than coercion, 
and many values like democracy, human rights, and individual opportunities are 
deeply seductive. [..] But attraction can turn to repulsion if we act in an arrogant 
manner and destroy the real message of our deeper values (Nye 2004a:x). 
 
Nye has given a useful graphic description of the two dimensions of power, which is 
reproduced below. The figure offers a good overview of both the spectrums of behaviors that 
can be associated with the two dimensions of power, and the resources most likely to be 
utilized.  
 
 
Hard 
 
Soft 
 
Spectrum of 
behaviors 
    
                      Coercion        Inducement 
Command 
 
 
 
   Agenda setting      Attraction 
                                                      Co-opt 
 
 
Most likely 
resources 
                
                       Force             Payments 
                       Sanctions       Bribes 
 
   Institutions            Values 
                                 Culture 
                                 Policies 
 
Hard and soft power. Source: Nye 2004a:8. 
 
Writing on the relationship between power and anti-Americanism, Nye observes that: 
Opposition to American politics is not the same as general opposition to the 
United States. Reactions to policies are more volatile than underlying reactions 
to culture and values. [..] Unpopular policies are the most volatile element of the 
overall image, and there seems to be more stability in the reservoir of goodwill 
that rests on culture and values. Nonetheless, there has also been anti-
Americanism in the sense of a deeper rejection of American society, values, and 
culture. It has long been a minor but persistent strand in the image, and it goes 
back to the earliest days of the republic [..] Another source of anti-Americanism 
is structural. The United States is the big kid on the block and the disproportion 
in power engenders a mixture of admiration, envy, and resentment. [..] Size may 
create a love-hate relationship, but since in recent decades size is a constant, it 
cannot explain why anti-Americanism is higher or lower at some times than at 
others. (Nye 2004a:35-39). 
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The distinction between hard and soft power with respect to sources of anti-Americanism can 
to a certain extent be compared with the distinction between what America is and what 
America does. As many of the parameters of hard power are more or less given (military 
supremacy, economic advantages), a rejection of America‘s hegemonic or near-hegemonic 
status in these realms borders on a rejection of what America is: powerful, because it has the 
means to be so. Similarly, if soft power is goodwill based on positive agenda setting and 
attractiveness, it is tempting to regard mounting rejection of what America does as evidence 
of the fact that America‘s soft power is in decline. The comparison should, however, not be 
stretched too far. Large parts of the rejection of what America is have just as much to do with 
values and culture as with hard power. But the distinction between opposition towards what 
America is and does is good to bear in mind when analyzing anti-Americanism as a rejection 
of American hard power and the way the soft power is utilized. Analyzing anti-Americanism 
with respect to rejection of U.S. hard power and frustration with U.S. soft power may not be 
altogether faithful towards Nye‘s concepts. Soft power is in Nye‘s version primarily a term 
with positive connotations
14
. Taking his cue from Machiavelli, who almost five centuries ago 
advised princes in Italy that it was more important to be feared than to be loved, Nye remarks 
that ―in today‘s world, it is best to be both‖ (2004:1)15. In this respect, hard power can be seen 
as inspiring fear (or admiration, depending on the point of view), whereas soft power has the 
capacity to win the hearts and minds, if it is wielded wisely. Yet if what characterizes anti-
Americanism over other anti-isms is the power dimension, we need to address hard and soft 
power more or less distinctively. Bearing in mind that it can at times be just as difficult to 
dissociate hard power from soft power as it is to distinguish between animosity towards what 
America is from what it does, it nevertheless allows us to differentiate between several causes 
of anti-Americanism. 
As mentioned previously, the focus on power is important, as it is the dimension, 
which gives anti-Americanism a specificity that sets it apart from other anti-isms. Together 
with its twin brother, the universality dimension, it can account for some of the causes of anti-
Americanism. However, another factor needs to be taken into account: the cultural or 
national/nationalistic factor. While anti-Americanism can be conceived as unique by its 
universality, i.e. the global nature of its manifestations, it is also characterized by great 
divergences in the different countries where it manifests itself. While present in all societies, 
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anti-Americanism is markedly stronger in some countries than in others. While the causes of 
anti-Americanism that can be related to the power dimension are to be found in virtually all 
societies, each society has its own brand of anti-Americanism based on its own historic 
relationship with the U.S., its own values, its own worldview, aspirations and perceptions. 
Scholars of anti-Americanism frequently highlight this dimension, which we can term 
national, nationalistic, or cultural. This is the dimension, which is typically associated with 
the notion of ‗irrationality‘, as it borders on national psychology with all its connotations of 
envy, jealousy, or misplaced vanity. It is also the dimension that is most difficult to generalize 
about. If each nation can present its own specific version of anti-Americanism, a proper in-
depth understanding of the phenomenon would entail a detailed analysis of the cultural 
dimension in all countries. That would be a massive undertaking, and in this study, the focus 
will be on the analysis of the phenomenon in France. Yet in spite of the particularistic traits 
characterizing anti-Americanism in different societies, it is not inconceivable that these are to 
a large extent domestic reactions to perceptions of disproportionate American power. This 
will be discussed in chapter 5. The more fundamental causes of anti-Americanism can, 
however, be summed up as rejection of American hard power and rejection of the attributes of 
American soft power. These two dimensions will be analyzed in greater detail below. 
 
3.3 Rejection of America’s Hard Power 
Hard power has two main attributes: military power and economic power. These are the two 
attributes around which Paul Kennedy elaborated his impressive chronicle of The Rise and 
Fall of the Great Powers in 1988. The two can hardly be dissociated. Admitting that it 
sounded ―crudely mercantilistic‖, Kennedy remarked on the relationship between military and 
economic power that ―wealth is usually needed to underpin military power, and military 
power is usually needed to acquire and protect wealth‖ (Kennedy 1988:xvi). The conjunction 
of these two attributes is also central to the understanding of much modern anti-Americanism. 
The power dimension associated with military and economic might is where anti-
Americanism acquires almost systemic features. Some regard systemic variables as belonging 
exclusively to the interaction of states in an international system with properties such as its 
inherent anarchy, where values and belief-systems are regarded as of minor importance (see 
for example Waltz 1959). Many would probably reject the idea that a phenomenon such as 
anti-Americanism could be described in systemic terms. Yet the hard power attributes of anti-
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Americanism can be considered nearly as systemic as the notion of balance of power that 
realists and neorealists usually conjure as the defining characteristic of the international 
system. Most realists would agree with Morgenthau‘s classic description of balance of power 
as not just a policy, an objective state of affairs, or an approximately equal distribution of 
power, but also as a mechanism associated with any distribution of power whereby the 
international system will tend to react in such a way that power is balanced (Morgenthau 
1973:167-169). Though similar theories of balance of power precede the realist and neorealist 
schools of international relations by several centuries
16
, the notion of balancing has come to 
be connected with these schools to such an extent that it became a virtual paradigm during 
much of the Cold War, when realists reigned almost supreme within both the study and the 
practice of international politics. Moreover, the balance of power policies that were carried 
out often seemed to confer on their architects a status of cool-headed custodians of a 
realpolitik that was legitimized by the upholding of the balance between the two poles. Even 
if the balance of power was not recognized as the driving force of the international system by 
all, it was at the very least considered its real fundament by most.  
Yet there have been times in history, when power was unbalanced or so 
unevenly distributed that one state was able to impose its will on large parts of the known 
world that it controlled. Present day talk of a Pax Americana harks back to the times when the 
world seemed subjected to a Pax Britannica or a Pax Romana (Hippler 1994). Although there 
have throughout history been other powers enjoying a preeminent position in the international 
system, albeit for a relatively shorter period (Duroselle 1982, Kennedy 1988, Nye 1990), 
these two empires probably offer the best comparison to America‘s role in the international 
system today. And just as perceptions of American hegemony today generate resentment, the 
same was the case for previous empires (Duroselle 1982:343-348). Anti-ism against the 
dominant state is by no means a modern phenomenon. As Raymond Aron noted, ―It is quite 
normal for the leading nation to be blackguarded by the others‖ (Aron [1955] 2001:222). Eliot 
Cohen has similarly observed that the ―logic of contemporary international politics is that of 
predominance and its discontents‖ (2004:56). Drawing on the lessons that can be learned from 
the British and Roman examples, he further asserts that: 
The universal enmity that hegemonic power breeds presents another, and 
perhaps graver, challenge to imperial statesmen. Empires have no peers and 
precious few friends. Indeed, to the imperial mind, ―friendship‖ means a 
relationship in which clients render services and patrons provide protection. The 
result, as Great Britain found out at least twice during its heyday [..] is 
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diplomatic and military isolation. An empire‘s opponent always looks like the 
underdog, the imperial power always the bully. [..] The empire‘s claims to act 
for the good of the international system will always be dismissed (often rightly) 
as the mere exercise of self-interest. [..] The inevitability of anti-imperial 
sentiment may help explain the tide of anti-Americanism that has swept much of 
the world since September 11, 2001. (ibid:57)   
 
In this respect, anti-ism based on rejection of a dominant power can be considered a systemic 
feature of any international system. It is a logical supposition that anti-ism and the notion of 
balance of power are connected, since the absence of a working balance of power is – if we 
follow Cohen‘s lead – more conducing to anti-ism than the presence of one. It is furthermore 
important to bear in mind that the balance of power situation that characterized the bipolar 
system during the Cold War was historically unique. Previous balances of power in the 
western world have in modern times, that is since approximately the late seventeenth century, 
revolved around a number of great powers either trying to achieve territorial gains in order to 
bolster their position in the international system or attempting to limit such advances in order 
to maintain the stability of the system (especially when the status quo was in their interest). 
Though Fénélon‘s assessment in 1835 that ―the aggrandisement of one nation beyond a 
certain limit changes the general system of all the other neighbours‖ (quoted by Sheehan 
1996:2) was widely shared in most European capitals, the temptation to overcome the 
restrictions that a relatively stable balance of power presented were never fully squelched. 
Yet, while serious challenges to the established balance of power system may have provoked 
changes in the system and the advancement of the position of some states at the expense of 
others, the fundamental nature of the system was not altered until the onset of the twentieth 
century. Two world wars resulted in the effective dismantling of a multipolar world 
dominated by a number of great powers of roughly equal size. The balance of power 
characterizing the ensuing bipolar world was very different in both meaning and mechanisms. 
The image associated with the term ‗balance‘ no longer referred to a situation in which states 
would more or less constantly seek to act in order to insure that the balance was not 
fundamentally upset. Rather, it came to represent a stalemate situation, where the two 
superpowers sought to maintain the balance by not upsetting it too much. In this respect, the 
bipolar balance of power was both stronger and more delicate than previous ones. Stronger, 
because the balance rarely reared out of equilibrium, as the superpowers were understandably 
reluctant to risk upsetting the balance. More delicate, because a challenge to the balance was 
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perceived as carrying the risk of mutual destruction. Though it would be tempting to see 
bipolar balance of power and anti-ism as progressively opposite phenomena, it would be 
utterly unverifiable. However it is hardly a coincidence that anti-Americanism came to be on 
the rise soon after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Whereas 
anti-Americanism did certainly exist during the Cold War, not least among the American 
allies in the West, it was to a certain extent kept at bay by the realities of bipolarity. It has 
been convincingly argued that the Cold War was characterized by a balance of threat rather 
than a balance of power (Walt 1987), as the states that were free to choose more often than 
not opted for an alliance with the West, arguably the strongest pole in both military and 
economic terms, as the opponent bloc was deemed to be more threatening. Opting for the 
stronger of two poles might be conceived as bandwagoning in balance of power terms, but 
was most likely a balancing strategy in balance of threat terms. The fact that the American-
lead alliances were regarded as less threatening by most at a time with a high level of tension 
has undoubtedly mitigated much of the anti-ism that might otherwise have been directed 
against the world‘s most powerful nation.  
The logic behind an increase in anti-ism as a consequence of the erosion of 
bipolarity is thus twofold: First, the end of bipolarity has led to a reduction of the threat 
associated with a potential war between the superpowers and their allies. This has engendered 
new possibilities for states who hitherto felt forced to pledge allegiance to a superpower in 
order to attain its protection as well as those that professed to be non-aligned but who 
nevertheless maintained a certain reservation towards criticizing a superpower whose favor 
they might seek if threatened. These states have not necessarily turned away from the 
dominant superpower as such, but rather permitted themselves (and their subjects) to voice 
either long-held or new criticisms towards the United States. Second, and most importantly, 
anti-ism in the guise of anti-hegemonism has achieved a greater legitimacy, as the dominant 
power comes to be seen increasingly as a potential oppressor if not outright threat. The above-
quoted surveys from the Pew Global Attitudes Project show not only that an overwhelming 
number of respondents in many parts of the world would favor a balancing of U.S. power, but 
also that the combination of massive U.S. power and mistrust in the Bush administration were 
considered a potential threat to world peace. Anti-Americanism is just the latest of a series of 
anti-dominating-nation-isms: it is based on a rejection of America‘s hard power in the sense 
of rejection of one nation‘s dominating status as unchallenged empire or even hegemon.  
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3.3.1 The American Empire 
There is a certain irony to the fact that while Americans have generally been reluctant to 
regard the United States as an empire, it is often perceived abroad as just that – a vast empire 
capable of dictating its will in most areas of policy. In Jim Garrison‘s words, ―the United 
States has become what it was founded not to be. Established as a haven for those fleeing the 
abuse of power, it has attained and now wields nearly absolute power. It has become an 
empire‖ (2004:11). The reluctance to view America as an empire certainly has historical 
roots
17
, yet charges of American imperialism are not confined to developments in the 
twentieth century. In his study of the United States‘ role as an imperial power in the 
Philippines, H.W. Brands rightly points out that though Americans have been beneficiaries of 
the first successful anti-imperial revolution of the modern era, much in the American 
experience has belied the nation‘s anti-imperial tendencies:  
Only on rare occasions did significant numbers of Americans express 
compunctions about dispossessing the indigenous inhabitants of North America. 
In annexing Louisiana, the Floridas, Texas and California, Americans scarcely 
paused to consider the wishes of the French and Spanish populations involved. 
Americans would have snatched Canada had Britain not blocked the way, and 
perhaps Cuba and all of Mexico if not for the divisive influence of slavery. To 
some extent the slave system itself exhibited features of imperialism, with the 
object of conquest being not land but labor, and the conquered residing within 
the metropolis rather than abroad. [..] In the war with Spain the United States 
acquired an overseas empire, of which the most significant part was the 
Philippine archipelago. Americans took the Philippines for the same reason men 
have long taken wives (and women, when given a choice in the matter, 
husbands): they were attractive and available (1992:v-vi). 
 
Though to many this description would certainly fit the notion of imperialism, to others 
imperialism is associated primarily with the race for empire commonly connected with 
nineteenth century Europe. The negative connotations of imperialism – colonialism, mission 
civilisatrice, and chauvinism, all glorified in Kipling‘s poem, The White Man‟s Burden – has 
made it an opprobrious term. With the scramble for Africa and great parts of Asia at the close 
of the nineteenth century, imperialism became synonymous not just with territorial expansion 
but also with colonial oppression (Gildea 1987:333-350). It is no wonder that Americans 
resent being associated with a phenomenon that is the contradiction of the values on which the 
United States was founded. Unable to reject that U.S. history has been one of expansion, both 
in terms of territory, economic power and military presence, other formulas are typically 
applied: 
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Of course, the United States never had a large, formal overseas empire as did 
Britain. Its overseas empire has been mostly an informal one: a neo-colonial 
rather than a colonial empire. This has meant that while the United States has 
generally not sought to bring distant territories under its legal control, it has tried 
to preserve and extend its economic domination over as many countries as it 
could (Shalom 1993:8).  
 
It might be that the adjectives neo-colonial or neo-imperial are useful to nuance the notion of 
America as empire. The fact is that it has become en vogue to describe the United States in 
terms of empire. Whether depicting it as having ―been long time in the making‖ (Johnson 
2004:2) or as a relatively more recent transition from republic to empire (Garrison 2004:4-5), 
scholars are queuing up with works describing contemporary America as an empire, either 
using the word itself (Bacevich 2002, Gardner and Young 2005, Garrison 2004, de Grazia 
2005, Johnson 2004, Petras and Morley 1995) or metaphors such as Colossus (Ferguson 2005, 
Nye 2002) or hegemon/hegemony (David and Grondin 2006, Foot, MacFarlane and 
Mastanduno 2003). And one might well ask: in today‘s world, if America cannot be described 
as an empire, which nation can? Indeed, Garrison has argued that the two World Wars were in 
reality ―wars for the British succession‖, out of which America emerged as the victor 
(Garrison 2004:76), demonstrating that regardless of whether America is a new kind of 
empire or not, it can be written into the list of dominant powers to have shaped history.  
While it seems difficult to escape the notion of empire, there remains a complete 
lack of consensus concerning the nature of the American Empire. Many historians have long 
tried to avoid the negative connotations associated with the term by resorting to hyphenated 
notions such as ―quasi-American Empire‖, ―empire by invitation‖ or ―consensual‖ empire 
(Maier, in Gardner and Young (eds) 2005:xii, Lundestad, in Hogan (ed.) 1999:52). Those who 
decry it typically see American supremacy in world affairs as the result of successful 
imperialistic strategies carried out by successive U.S. governments to achieve an unparalleled 
global position. Others analyze it as the consequence of deep structural factors imbued in the 
international system which have favored the advent of the United States as the world‘s only 
true superpower. Ernest May‘s oft quoted assessment that ―some nations achieve greatness, 
the United States had greatness thrust upon it‖ (1961:270) 18 has often been echoed by 
scholars possibly keen to demonstrate that American supremacy is not the result of an 
imperial design or will to dominate world affairs. Watt, for example, is skeptical of the image, 
or label, as he terms it, of ―U.S. globalism‖ (in Kimball (ed.) 1992:37), arguing that the 
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United States did not have any manifest aspirations towards becoming a global power in the 
first decades following the end of World War II (ibid:37-53). In his view, American foreign 
policy and American involvement in global affairs in that period can be explained to a large 
extent as reactions to external factors. Others, such as Bacevich, have rejected this 
interpretation, quoting Theodore Roosevelt‘s words ―of course, our whole national history has 
been one of expansion‖ (2002:7), as evidence to the contrary. Bacevich acknowledges that 
few contemporary scholars specializing in American diplomatic history accept the description 
of U.S. foreign policy in the twentieth century as being carried out solely or primarily in 
response to aggressions or potential threats emanating from outside its borders or outside its 
control. However, he finds that ―in practice, the myth of the ‗reluctant superpower‘ – 
Americans asserting themselves only under duress and then always for the noblest purposes – 
reigns today as the master narrative explaining (and justifying) the nation‘s exercise of global 
power‖ (ibid:8). The debate about the nature of the American Empire is important to the 
analysis of anti-Americanism because it is a good example of the different perceptions 
regarding what America is and what America does. In this respect, there is, as Hardt and 
Negri have noted, an important distinction to be made between empire and imperialism:  
Imperialism was really an extension of the sovereignty of the European nation-
states beyond their own boundaries. [..] In contrast to imperialism, Empire 
establishes no territorial center of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries 
or barriers. It is a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that 
progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding 
frontiers (2000:xii).  
 
It stands out that while Hardt and Negri‘s definition of imperialism is rather traditional, 
confining it to a specific period in history and even centering it on a specific continent of 
origin, their definition of empire is modernist, virtually stripping it of imperialist overtones. 
While such a clear-cut distinction is not necessarily altogether convincing, it helps us 
understand the American reluctance towards being associated with imperialism. The 
modernist version of empire may befit the United States much better. The fact that most 
scholars, irrespective of whether they are American or not, now concede that America can be 
considered an empire is also an indication that the modernist version of empire is widely 
employed
19
. Garrison‘s alternative term ―imperial republic‖ (borrowed from Aron ([1974] 
2009) is a useful corrective to the notion:  
The very essence of empire is one nation‘s control over other nations. Although 
America remains a republic inside its own borders, it has become an empire in 
72 
 
relationship with the rest of the world. In this sense, America is an imperial 
republic (Garrison 2004:4). 
  
Yet shortly after, Garrison states that:  
Whatever qualms people may have about it, America has become an empire, and 
there is no turning back. [..] The transition from republic to empire is 
irreversible, like the metamorphosis from caterpillar to butterfly. Once power is 
attained, it is not surrendered. It is only exercised. (ibid:5). 
 
Garrison proceeds to demonstrate that ―Britain taught America the ways of empire‖ (ibid:74) 
and that following Britain, ―the United States has been motivated fundamentally by resources 
and trade, not territory‖ (ibid:79): 
Indeed, it has been characteristic of American imperialism that it took territories 
only reluctantly, preferring to use its military might to open markets and ensure 
commercial advantage rather than administer foreign states (ibid:80). 
 
Regardless of whether the modernist version of empire is used or whether a more traditional 
approach is maintained, it nonetheless seems indisputable that in terms of hard power, the 
United States fits the description of an empire. It has developed into the world‘s foremost 
global power, capable of wielding power to a much higher degree than any other nation. The 
American Empire reigns supreme in the three dimensions of power usually associated with 
empires: military power, economic power and cultural dominance. Measured in military 
terms, the United States simply dwarfs all other nations: it is responsible for 43 percent of the 
global total defense expenditures, spending more than eight times as much on defense as the 
second biggest spender, Britain (IISS 2009:447-452)
20
. U.S. military spending is greater than 
all the military expenditures of the next twenty countries combined (ibid.). Of these, at least 
eight can be counted as not just formal U.S. allies but as members of either military alliances 
led by the United States or countries whose national security strategies are based on U.S. 
military support (ibid.)
21
. As Garrison has noted, the primacy of American military power is 
one of the few undisputed truths of international affairs: 
The United States dominates the world militarily with 436 bases in North 
America and Europe, 186 in the Pacific and Southeast Asia, 14 in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, 7 in the Middle East, and 1 in South Asia, 647 altogether. It 
has bases or base rights in over forty countries around the world and a navy with 
an array of aircraft carrier task forces that dominate every ocean. The U.S. Air 
Force has a presence on six of the world‘s continents. [..] The United States has 
developed an unrivaled mastery of high-technology weaponry that has radically 
redefined the meaning of modern warfare and includes a massive nuclear arsenal 
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on hair-trigger alert, capable of destroying any enemy completely and the world 
several times over. It has the military capability of fighting on several fronts 
simultaneously and is building a national missile defense system to protect the 
American mainland from sneak missile attack. It almost certainly will weaponize 
space within the next decade, giving the United States essentially complete 
military control over global communications (Garrison 2004:25). 
 
It is thus not just the level of defense expenditures that assures the United States an unrivaled 
primacy in military matters. America‘s technological primacy is no less daunting, and the 
presence of American forces overseas, although presented in the U.S. national security 
strategy as ―one of the most profound symbols of the U.S. commitments to allies and friends‖ 
(NSS 2002), assures it an absolute military preponderance over the rest of the world (Johnson 
2004:151). Indeed, Chalmers Johnson has termed the permanent deployment of U.S. troops in 
great parts of the world ―the Empire of Bases‖ (2004:151-185). In terms of military 
supremacy over other nations, the only historic parallel is the Roman Empire at its heyday, 
though it has become almost a cliché to mention it.  
The U.S. economic supremacy may by comparison seem somewhat less 
formidable at first, but is nonetheless a key factor in understanding the nation‘s primacy on 
the global stage. Even despite the current economic crisis, the United States remains the most 
performing economy in terms of gross domestic product, exports and foreign direct 
investments. As such, the American domination of the global economy remains ―extensive 
and deep-rooted‖ (Guyatt 2003:34), even if nations such as China or conglomerates such as 
the European Union seem to be closing in. Though a well-performing economy is central to 
the imperial dimension of the United States, more important than its ―flourishing economic 
base‖22 is its ability to control the world economy: 
Throughout the twentieth century, the United States patiently built a world 
system of control, first in Latin America and the Philippines and then in Europe, 
Japan, Korea, and the Middle East. Its superior army, weapons systems, and 
intelligence networks have been an essential part of this system, but an equal if 
not more important role has been played by its control of the world economy. 
The principal weapon for this economic control has been the position of the U.S. 
dollar as the world‘s reserve economy. [..] Dollar hegemony thus has always 
been strategic to the future of American global dominance, in many respects 
more important than America‘s overwhelming military power (Fouskas and 
Gökay 2005:13). 
 
The dollar hegemony that gave the United States the control over the economy of the Western 
World (and large parts of the rest of the world as well) during the Cold War has if anything 
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increased. Garrison notes that while the U.S. military dominance is more obvious, its 
corporate dominance is more pervasive: ―Of the one hundred largest economies in the world, 
fifty-one are corporations. Of these corporations, forty-seven are American‖ (Garrison 
2004:189). It is not just by numbers that America dominates the world economy. No nation 
has been more successful in shaping the twentieth century international economic system than 
the United States. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent expansion of market 
economy and the principle of liberal democracy to erstwhile foes, the Western mode of 
capitalism spearheaded by the United States seemed to have achieved the ultimate victory. 
What Fukuyama has termed ―the end of history‖ (Fukuyama 1992:xiii) was in fact heralding a 
new global beginning in economic terms. As Thomas Friedman has remarked, globalization 
has become ―the international system that has replaced the cold-war system‖ (1999:42). 
Bacevich has even termed the post-Cold War era ―the Age of Globalization‖ (2002:38), 
noting that the implications for the U.S. as the primary custodian of the globalized economy 
are profound:  
Though in an immediate sense about profit, globalization ultimately was about 
power. On the surface it promised a new economic order that would benefit all. 
Beneath the surface it implied a reconfiguring of the international political order 
as well. Globalization established the rules for the latest heat in the long-
standing contest to decide which nation – and whose values – would 
predominate (Bacevich 2002:39).  
 
Both Bacevich and Friedman contend that in practice, globalization means Americanization, 
both in economic and cultural terms (Bacevich 2002:40, Friedman 1999:43). Nobel laureate 
Joseph E. Stiglitz agrees: ―Globalization should not mean the Americanization of either 
economic policy or culture, but often it does – and that has caused resentment‖ (Stiglitz 
2006:9. See also Falk 1999). The American Empire is thus not just a formidable entity; its 
dominating position gives it an almost hegemonic position in the world that is unrivaled in 
terms of hard power.  
 
3.3.2 Perceptions of hegemony 
While the notion of empire in association with the United States has more or less ceased to 
cause a stir, it may be that it is not as much the perception of America as an empire that fuels 
modern anti-Americanism as the perception that this empire has become what Ferguson has 
termed a ―colossus‖ (2005) with near-hegemonic powers. It is not unnatural for a dominating 
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world power or near-hegemon to be universally rejected in some way or the other. No country 
and no people take kindly to the idea that it is subordinated to another that can readily dictate 
its terms on the rest of the world. And the United States is not the only country that 
historically has been first among equals – or not so equals, as it has turned out. This was the 
case for the Roman Empire at its highest and to a lesser degree, at least in the western world, 
for Spain in the 16
th
 century, for France in the 18
th
 century and for Britain in the 19
th
 century 
(Kennedy 1988, Nye 2002:13). And in all these cases, history tells us that while imperial 
fashions and practices have often been envied by other states to the point of being frequently 
copied, domination has been opposed by those fearful of losing influence on world affairs 
(Garrison 2004:109-126). Geoffrey Gorer has termed this ―megaloxenophobia‖, described by 
Cunliffe as the process whereby ―Top dog nations, wielding power on a gigantic scale, attract 
to themselves a comparably sizeable jealousy and disapproval‖ (1991:399). Or, as Kenneth 
Waltz has remarked, ―In international politics, overwhelming power repels and leads other 
states to balance against it‖ (1991:669). In this sense, anti-Americanism can be seen as an 
almost natural phenomenon, sparked by a rejection of the overwhelming might that the United 
States exudes. Anti-Americanism could in these terms just as easily be termed anti-
hegemonism and analyzed as opposition to a dominating political force which, however 
benign its intentions might be, imposes serious limits on the ability of other states to pursue 
policy actions that are viewed unfavorably in Washington DC.  
It is naturally a matter of dispute, whether the United States can be termed a 
hegemon, however frequently the word is used in that connection. Goldstein has defined a 
hegemony as ―being able to dictate, or at least dominate, the rules and arrangements by which 
international relations, political and economic, are conducted [..] Economic hegemony implies 
the ability to center the world economy around itself. Political hegemony means being able to 
dominate the world militarily‖ (1988:281). To a large extent, this definition of hegemony in 
international affairs mirrors the impact that the United States has in the world today. Nye‘s 
assertion that ―Not since Rome has one nation loomed so large above the others‖ (2002-
3:545) is shared by most. Yet he has attempted to soften up Goldstein‘s definition, arguing 
that if ―hegemony is defined more modestly as a situation where one country has significantly 
more power resources or capabilities than others, then it simply signifies American 
preponderance, not necessarily dominance or control‖ (2002-3:558). Nye can rightly point to 
a number of occasions over the last decade, where the U.S. has been unable to dictate or 
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control events to its liking. Yet there is an oft-expressed perception in several countries that 
the United States has both the capability and the will to dominate if not dictate world affairs. 
Regardless of whether the U.S. can be characterized as a hegemon or not by academic 
standards, it is regarded as precisely that by large parts of global opinion.  
Though American economic supremacy can be described as relatively stronger 
in 1945, when it controlled half the world‘s economic production (Nye 2002-3:558) than it is 
today, the perception of hegemony is not linked exclusively to the distribution of power or the 
attributes of power. It is linked as much to two other factors: the absence of present or 
potential counter-powers and the manner in which power is wielded. With the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent implosion of the Soviet Empire, American supremacy 
in world affairs was beyond question. While the Gulf War in 1990 gave rise to aspirations for 
a new multilateral era, indeed, as then president George H.W. Bush termed it, a new world 
order
23
, the international system itself seemed less multipolar than ever. Charles Krauthammer 
was among the first to introduce the concept of unipolarity in an article in Foreign Affairs, 
arguing that ―the immediate post-Cold War world is not multipolar. It is unipolar. The center 
of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western 
Allies‖ (1990-91:23). Though the international mood in the early 1990‘s might have been for 
multilateralism, Krauthammer repudiated the notion: 
What we have today is pseudo-multilateralism: a dominant great power acts 
essentially alone, but, embarrassed at the idea and still worshipping at the shrine 
of collective security, recruits a ship here, a brigade there, and blessings all 
around to give its unilateral actions a multilateral sheen (ibid:25). 
 
Krauthammer is undeniably right in assessing that the realities of the early 1990‘s were that 
U.S. supremacy was becoming firmly embedded in the international system. But did this 
unipolar moment, if Krauthammer‘s term is to be used, last beyond the first few years? It 
would seem not. Already by the mid-1990‘s, the ―Pax Americana‖ seemed to be fading. The 
post-Cold War still resembled ―a unipolar one with the United States as its sole superpower, 
yet the United States no longer commanded the broad unconditional support characteristic of 
a unipolar system‖ (Rahman 2002:41). Samuel P. Huntington argued that the international 
system could neither be characterized as unipolar, nor as multipolar:  
A unipolar system would have one superpower, no significant major powers, and 
many minor powers. As a result, the superpower could effectively resolve 
important international issues alone, and no combination of other states would 
have the power to prevent it from doing so. [..] A multipolar system has several 
77 
 
powers of comparable strength that cooperate and compete with each other in 
shifting patterns. (1999:35-36) 
 
Huntington instead proposed to view the contemporary international system as a hybrid, ―a 
uni-multipolar system with one superpower and many major powers‖ (ibid:36). A few years 
later, Hulsman, Polansky and Prager used the same term, arguing (2003) that ―in the nature of 
the world they found themselves in, post-Waterloo Great Britain eerily mirrors the conditions 
facing the United States at the dawn of the twenty-first century‖. Their argumentation is based 
on a simple analysis: 
The Britain of Castlereagh and the United States of Rumsfeld share a staggering 
number of similarities: a historical experience of defeating a revolutionary 
power over many years; military might centered around speed of reaction time; a 
common geopolitical position of being an ―island‖ off the Eurasian landmass; 
inhabiting a ―uni-multipolar‖ world in which they are the preeminent powers; 
possessing the world‘s most dynamic economies; and serving as the repository 
of most of the world‘s soft power. (ibid.) 
 
The comparison of the United States of today and early nineteenth-century Britain is at first 
glance compelling. And it is a fact that in strictly territorial terms, the British Empire in the 
heyday of its power was even more impressive than the United States of today, as it covered 
approximately 23 percent of the world‘s land surface (Ferguson 2005:15). But hegemonic 
power does not reside as much in the amount of square miles controlled, but in the capacity to 
wield power whenever it is deemed necessary. In this respect Hulsman, Polansky and Prager 
seem to underestimate the scale of the supremacy characterizing the United States at the start 
of the twenty-first century. As opposed to Great Britain, the United States is undeniably the 
most powerful nation that has ever existed in the world. At best, Great Britain had an 
advantageous geopolitical position as an insular nation and a hitherto unparalleled mastery of 
the seas, but nowhere near the same level of political, military, economic, or cultural 
supremacy over its rivals that the United States possesses some two hundred years later 
(O‘Brien, in O‘Brien and Clesse (eds) 2002:44-56). In military terms alone, Britain was 
seriously rivaled by other major powers
24
. Furthermore, the victor at Waterloo soon became 
sidelined in the Concert of Europe and thereby lost any real capability of dominating events 
on the European continent (Kissinger 1994:88-92). In short, while Britain in the nineteenth 
century may have been what Sellar and Yeatman in their best-selling pastiche on a Victorian 
British history schoolbook called ―top nation‖ (Sellar and Yeatman 1930:v), it never came 
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near having hegemonic status. Even at the pinnacle of its power, Britain never enjoyed a 
―unipolar moment‖. The United States is, in this respect, in a league of its own. Zbigniew 
Brzezinski has claimed that the United States is and will remain ―the first, only and last truly 
global superpower‖ (1997:215). And there can be no doubt that the international system at the 
turn of the millenium is decidedly more unipolar than it was in the years following 1815. 
Furthermore, there are no indications that the current U.S. supremacy might for the 
foreseeable future be seriously challenged. The assessment made by Brzezinski some ten 
years ago is still valid:  
For some time to come – for more than a generation – America‘s status as the 
world‘s premier power is unlikely to be contested by any single challenger. No 
nation-state is likely to match America in the four key dimensions of power 
(military, economic, technological and cultural) that cumulatively produce 
decisive global political clout. (1997:195). 
 
Since the implosion of the Soviet Empire, the international system has seen what can arguably 
be described as a tendency towards unipolarity emerge for the first time in modern history. 
Yet it is clear that this relative unipolarity is mitigated by the failures of the dominant power 
to achieve its objectives. Since Huntington coined the term uni-multipolar in 1999, the 
difficulties of the U.S. led coalition in Iraq have highlighted the limits of unilateral or near-
unilateral action, even when undertaken by the world‘s sole remaining superpower. Hulsman, 
Polansky and Prager on their part wrote their essay in the coalition building phase that marked 
the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, when U.S. foreign policy did indeed seem to have some 
resemblance with nineteenth-century gunboat diplomacy. At the same time, Krauthammer 
revisited the notion of unipolarity, arguing that if anything, the dominance of the United 
States since 1990 has ―dramatically increased‖ (2002-03:6). He argues that ―those denying 
unipolarity can do so only by applying a ridiculous standard: that America be able to achieve 
all its goals everywhere all by itself. This is a standard not for unipolarity but for divinity‖ 
(ibid:6). Quoting Brooks and Wohlforth (2002), Krauthammer asserts that 
Among mortals, and in the context of the last half millennium of history, the 
current structure of the international system is clear: ―If today‘s American 
primacy does not constitute unipolarity, then nothing ever will‖ (2002-03:6). 
 
Krauthammer‘s observation might be correct, but the logic is decidedly less so: the fact that it 
would be impossible to imagine a more unipolar situation than the present does not in itself 
validate the claim of unipolarity. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the failure to bring peace to 
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the region has highlighted two factors, which make it more than questionable, whether the 
international system can be described as unipolar or even uni-multipolar. First, the unipolar 
feature of the international system tends to be exaggerated. It is true that there is a marked 
absence of any likely coalition capable of balancing the U.S. as a dominant power for the 
foreseeable future, at least in military terms. However, the political price of unilateral or near-
unilateral action in Iraq has clearly been to weaken the dominant power‘s political and 
diplomatic supremacy to the point where it risks being seriously rivaled by other powers. 
Second, if the premise for a multipolar international system is that its major powers are, as 
Huntington terms it, ―of comparable strength‖, it becomes difficult to identify which powers 
today can be termed major powers
25
. Is France, the world‘s fifth largest economy26 and third 
largest military force
27
, one of these major powers? Or should it be considered merely in this 
respect as part of the European Union? And if so, will the European Union ever acquire the 
capability of decisive foreign-policy action? Which power is the nearest potential rival to the 
supremacy of the United States, China or a semi-united Europe? Is India, predicted to 
overtake China‘s role as the world‘s most populous nation within decades, one of the major 
powers already, and could it possibly in time become a rival to American – or Chinese – 
supremacy? Given that there are as yet no clear answers to these questions, it seems obvious 
that it would be absurd to view these major powers as of ‗comparable strength‘. Besides, as 
Martin Griffiths notes, ―neither China nor India represents a body of political ideas and social 
values which acts as a source of attraction towards other countries‖ (in O‘Connor and 
Griffiths (eds) 2007:266). This study largely agrees with the assessment made by Michael 
Hirsh: 
While some authors see the rise of a rival great power in the European Union 
and others project that China will play this role, the evidence is to the contrary: 
there is virtually no evidence these societies are gearing up to challenge 
American primacy. (2003:12) 
 
Even if the economic supremacy of the United States is slowly being eroded, not least as a 
result of the financial crisis starting in 2008, America is still ―likely to remain the preeminent 
global power for decades to come‖ (O‘Connor and Griffiths, in O‘Connor and Griffiths (eds) 
2007:xx, see also Gelb 2009:73-90). Lately, Richard Haass has argued that the international 
system can neither be described as unipolar nor multipolar. Instead, he offers the image of a 
nonpolar world, ―characterized by numerous centers with meaningful power‖ (2008). Arguing 
that ―Power and influence are less and less linked in an era of nonpolarity‖, he finds that 
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today‘s nonpolar world is ―an inevitable consequence of globalization‖ (ibid.). But since 
globalization is, as was shown above, frequently described as – and no less frequently 
perceived as – tantamount to Americanization, it seems odd to depict the contemporary 
international system as nonpolar, given that one pole clearly has been able to shape that 
system more than any other, while simultaneously drawing huge advantages from its role as 
primary shaper of the system. Haass admits that ―the United States still retains more capacity 
than any other actor to improve the quality of the international system‖ (ibid.), and that alone 
should make us wary of notions such as nonpolarity. If one nation is uniquely more able than 
any other to influence the international system, it seems unlikely that the system could be 
characterized as ―nonpolar‖. As Griffiths notes, ―any viable international order is bound to 
reflect the prevailing power structure‖ (in O‘Connor and Griffiths (eds) 2007:264). In this 
respect labels matter, and clearly neither unipolarity, multipolarity, uni-multipolarity, nor 
nonpolarity seem to properly fit the bill. Dominique Moïsi‘s notion of ―asymmetric 
multipolarity‖ is interesting, but as he uses the term in order to describe how the key actors in 
the international system are unequal not just ―in terms of power and influence but also differ 
dramatically in their views of the world‖ (Moïsi 2009:10), the concept reflects much more 
than the current distribution of power. It is clear that the international system today appears 
less than unipolar, yet more than nonpolar. The preponderant power and influence of the 
United States means that it can clearly not be termed multipolar, and Huntington‘s hybrid of 
unipolarity and multipolarity, while being the best description offered to this day, also seems 
problematic, given that it resembles neither of the two. A more adequate term might be 
primopolarity. Primopolarity would indicate that while the international system is 
characterized by the relative fragmentation common to a multipolar system, though without 
its leading powers being any longer properly comparable, there still exists one remaining 
superpower more capable of acting as primus inter pares than any other. This notion 
corresponds with what Chinese geopoliticians call ―many powers and one superpower‖ 
(Zakaria 2008:43) and seems well placed to capture the current configuration of the 
international system, which is, as Leslie Gelb has argued, ―decidedly pyramidal — with the 
United States alone at the top, a second tier of major countries (China, Japan, India, Russia, 
the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Brazil), and several tiers descending below‖ 
(Gelb 2009:xv). As will be discussed below, there are other reasons why especially the 
American public might feel that primopolarity would be an appropriate description of the role 
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of the United States in the world. Primopolarity would indicate that one nation is better able at 
shaping and influencing the international system than any of the others. It would also indicate 
that though this state of affairs might be temporary, it is unlikely to change for the foreseeable 
future. Primopolarity implies preponderant influence, but, as opposed to unipolarity, not 
hegemony as such.  
There is no doubt that in the absence of a truly unipolar international system, it 
becomes difficult to describe the dominant power as a hegemon in the proper sense of the 
word. Samuel P. Huntington for one rejects the term benign hegemon to qualify the United 
States at the turn of the 21
st
 century. While he has no doubts that the United States would 
―clearly prefer a unipolar system in which it would be the hegemon and often acts as if such a 
system existed‖ (1999:37), he finds that the term hegemon, benign or otherwise, does not 
correspond to realities. Though he undoubtedly has a point, what matters in this respect is 
perhaps more whether the United States is perceived, by its own officials as well as by those 
in other nations, as a hegemon, whether, as Thomas McCormick terms it, as an ―imperial 
hegemony‖ (in Gardner and Young (eds) 2005:94), or as a ―reluctant, open, and highly 
institutionalized – or in a word, liberal‖ hegemony (Ikenberry1998-1999:77). And there is no 
doubt that the perception of America acting as a hegemon certainly exists. The figures 
presented in table 3.6 show a relatively high level of opposition to an American empire able 
and apparently willing to ‗go it alone‘ on the international scene. America‘s imperial or near-
hegemonic dimension is crucial for the understanding of modern anti-Americanism. Not just 
because such overwhelming power generates frustration among those who feel threatened or 
intimidated by it, but also because this unprecedented dominance in hard power terms is not 
necessarily perceived as securing effective global leadership. Garrison has rightly noted that: 
The great irony confronting the United States is that while it has more military 
power than any empire in history, it also is more constrained in the use of that 
power than any empire has ever been. This is not only because of the growing 
body of international laws and procedures within which it must act, but because 
the very nature of violence and politics has changed. [..] The United States is 
exercising its military power in a world system in which there are now two 
superpowers: the United States and world public opinion (2004:186-188). 
 
Though the causes of anti-Americanism that can be associated with America‘s position as a 
near-hegemon might be termed systemic, it is clear that opposition to the proverbial 800 
pound gorilla in itself is not enough to explain neither the historic dimensions of anti-
Americanism nor its vehemence. The nature of power – and the perception of power – owes 
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as much to the way in which power is presented and wielded. That America is a formidable 
superpower is beyond questioning. That America can be perceived as an empire with near-
hegemonic features is highly arguable. Both factors can account for some of the animosity 
leveled against the Mr. Big of the international system, to use Katzenstein and Keohane‘s 
expression. Yet these factors alone can only explain the part of antipathy that any leading 
world power can expect. In this sense, Katzenstein and Keohane are correct in stating that 
insofar as anti-Americanism is depicted as rejection of overwhelming (hard) power is 
concerned, only the label is new. Yet what is at stake is probably more related to the 
perceptions associated with this overwhelming power than to the power itself. As Ian Clark 
reminds us, 
style and content matter, just as much as do any crude power differentials. Power 
does not directly translate into anything else, except in so far as it is mediated 
through policy and actions. [..] As we have been aptly reminded, ‗there are ways 
and ways of hegemons exercising power‘, and the root cause of today‘s malaise 
is not simply the power disequilibrium, but rather the fact that ‗many people 
outside the United States simply do not trust America to use its enormous power 
wisely or well‘ (2005:230). 
 
The question of legitimacy clearly is crucial. As Hurrell has noted, ―even the most powerful 
need to legitimize their power‖ (2002:188-189), and part of the rejection of American power 
probably resides, at least among America‘s allies, in the fact that it is not perceived as being 
wielded in a wise or even legitimate way. This sensation is aggravated by the impression that 
the United States is perceived as being the world‘s foremost ―norm entrepreneur‖ (Clark 
2005:232), a position it has held since the end of the Second World War, but which became 
further consolidated after the end of the Cold War. In this respect, Anti-Americanism as a 
rejection of American power must be interpreted as much, if not more, in terms of a rejection 
of the attributes of American soft power, as in association with the dimension of hard power 
outlined above. 
 
3.4 Rejection of the Attributes of America’s Soft Power 
Joseph S. Nye has observed that ―Anti-Americanism has increased in recent years, and the 
United States‘ soft power – its ability to attract others by the legitimacy of U.S. policies and 
the values that underlie them – is in decline as a result‖ (Nye 2004b:16). Stanley Hoffmann 
has equally asserted that ―the Bush Administration has reduced America‘s soft power 
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drastically‖ (2004:18). Only the hardest skeptics of soft power would disagree with this. Yet 
could it not equally be said that the increase in anti-Americanism is also a reaction to how 
especially the Bush administration has used its soft power tools? A little flexibility as to the 
use of the term soft power is needed here. Soft power is used by Nye as well as by those 
taking their cue from his works primarily in positive terms. Yet the instruments of soft power 
(institutions, values, culture and policies) may be used unwisely with the effect that they repel 
more than they attract. Indeed, it seems to be Nye‘s assessment that this has been partially the 
case following the September 11 attacks, although his main criticism is that the Bush 
administration has relied too much on wielding hard power, neglecting the benefits that soft 
power might entail (2004b16-20). Whereas distributions of hard power are frequently 
analyzed critically, i.e. as potential causes of conflict, soft power is often used more or less 
normatively, i.e. as a prescriptive for an alternative to the use of hard power. Yet if one 
accepts Nye‘s definition of soft power, it clearly represents different attributes compared with 
those of hard power. Indeed, in a modern post-Cold War period, these attributes seem as 
important, if not more, than the attributes of hard power. It might even be, as Josef Joffe 
states, that: 
America‘s ―soft power‖ [..] looms even larger than its economic and military 
assets. U.S. culture, low-brow or high, radiates outward with an intensity last 
seen in the days of the Roman Empire – but with a novel twist. Rome‘s and 
Soviet Russia‘s cultural sway stopped exactly at their military borders. 
America‘s soft power, though, rules over an empire on which the sun never sets 
(2001:43). 
 
In short, it would be a fallacy to regard soft power as exclusively imbued with positive 
characteristics. Soft power is still power, however frequently the term is associated with 
positive connotations. If hard power can repel, so can soft power, at least if it is seen as 
overwhelming or insensitive to the wishes or values of other nations.  
Nye identifies four major sources, or resources, as he terms them, of soft power: 
values, policies, institutions, and culture. Paul Kennedy remarked that it can be difficult to 
dissociate the typical attributes of hard power, military might and economic power. When it 
comes to soft power, it becomes even more difficult. As these sources of power feed on each 
other, it would be a rather artificial exercise to attempt to disentangle these power resources 
into separate subcategories of soft power. It is especially clear that values must underpin the 
other elements; neither policies, nor institutions, nor culture can be regarded as separate or 
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separable from the values on which they build. In relation to anti-Americanism as a rejection 
of America‘s soft power, it therefore seems more useful to focus on the broader notions of 
political values and cultural norms. The political values can be considered as the values that 
form a nation‘s political and institutional fabric as well as provide the basis for its political 
actions. The cultural norms, although impossible to dissociate completely from the political 
values (and vice versa) are typically to a larger extent the result of forces in civil society that 
have shaped the imaginary of its inhabitants – and in the case of America also increasingly of 
those in other countries. America‘s political values and cultural norms have simply had a 
tremendous impact on the rest of the world, frequently leading to charges of Americanization 
of the political and cultural institutions of other nations.  
 
3.4.1 Political values and exceptionalism 
There is a fundamental dichotomy between how Americans typically view their own nation 
and how others increasingly view it. Inherent in the American national identity is the 
sentiment that America is a special nation, endowed with high values and morals, which put it 
on a special level. The Puritans‘ vision of the shining ‗city upon a hill‘ has led to notions of 
American exceptionalism and manifest destiny. The idealistic trait has been present 
throughout most of American political history and it has shaped its policies and not least its 
foreign policies. American political institutions have set a powerful example, especially to 
citizens in other Western societies, and as such America‘s power of attraction has been 
important. Yet by in several instances failing to live up to the high moral levels on which the 
American nation was built, successive American administrations have eroded some of the 
goodwill it enjoyed in especially liberal circles around the world (Katzenstein and Keohane 
(eds) 2007). Furthermore, while the notion of American exceptionalism can account for some 
of the main recurrent themes in American foreign policy, there is a rejection of the thought 
that some nations can bestow exceptional rights on themselves. America might present itself 
as a universal nation, but tendencies toward unilateralism have met with disapproval and 
rejection, especially following the end of the Cold War. As such, America‘s soft power 
attributes of institution-building and diplomacy have been tarnished by perceptions of 
hegemonic intentions. Such perceptions increased during the presidency of George W. Bush, 
leading to rising anti-Americanism worldwide.   
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The great nation of futurity 
Though the United States can trace back its history over just a few centuries, which compared 
with at least most European states is an extremely short period, it nonetheless commands a 
powerful imaginary for its citizens. America‘s Founding Fathers created the first 
representative democracy known to man. This was a novelty in terms of political organization 
and representation. The political values on which the new republic was founded were not of 
purely American origins. They were inherited in large parts from the European philosophers 
of the Enlightenment, not least inspired by the writings of John Locke (Himmelfarb 
2008:191-203), modeled on the Roman Republic (Skillen 2005:67), and indebted to British 
parliamentarism and the Athenian democratic heritage (Garrison 2004:73), as well as the 
Dutch and Swiss experiences with federal government (Skillen 2005:67). They also built to a 
large degree on the unique American colonial experiences such as the 1629 Charter of the 
Massachusetts Bay Company (Benedict 1996:8-10) and the writings of the post-revolutionary 
essayists, most notably those in the Federalist Papers (later assembled in The Federalist, 
Hamilton, Madison, and Jay [1788] 2006). The result, however, was a nation built on unique 
political premises providing freedom and democracy to its (white, male) inhabitants to a 
degree hitherto unseen. It would take several decades before the promise of democracy and 
government ―of the people, by the people, for the people‖ to use the notion later immortalized 
by Abraham Lincoln (quoted by Basler (ed.) 1953-1955:22), spread to other nations. Great 
Britain, in some ways the most democratic European nation at the time
28
, allowed barely 2 
percent of its population to vote prior to the Reform Act of 1832, and only in the late 1940s 
did most Western European countries become full-fledged democracies (Zakaria 1997:137). 
The nation‘s political identity, however, came not just from its constitutional 
democratic republicanism; more important was the fact that the new republic from the onset 
saw itself as an exceptional polity, unlike any other in the world (Skillen 2005:72). This 
perception was first and foremost due to the millenarian legacy of the Puritans. John B. Judis, 
although highly critical of America‘s contemporary political system, has no qualms in stating 
that ―Since the seventeenth century, the attempt to create a ―new Israel‖ and a ―city on the 
hill‖ in America has inspired the finest moments of our politics‖ (2000:257). As James 
Skillen has remarked, this Puritan vision, although naturally inspired by biblical stories, was 
also indebted to both medieval European Christianity and the later English Protestant 
extension of Christendom (2005:72-73). Yet though the idea of a ―new Israel‖ or ―new 
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Jerusalem‖ was not original with the American Puritans, it was in New England that the 
Puritans found their promise fulfilled. This settlement of a community of faith was ―intended 
not as a retreat from ordinary society but as a light for the nations‖ (Skillen 2005:73). Anatol 
Lieven asserts that: 
This sense of America not just as an unfulfilled dream or vision, but also as a 
country with a national mission, is absolutely central to the American national 
identity and also forms the core of the nation‘s faith in its own ―exceptionalism‖. 
It was inscribed on the Republic‘s Great Seal at America‘s birth as a united 
nation: Novus Ordo Seclorum: A New Order for the Ages (2005:33) 
 
In political terms, the United States indeed represented a new order for the Ages. It would not 
be an exaggeration to state that from the onset, American political institutions heralded a 
political modernity, not just in the sense of a novel polity, but as the precursor for a 
development that was soon to spread to a large number of European states. As Robert Palmer 
has argued, many Europeans saw in the American Revolution a lesson and an encouragement 
for mankind. ―It proved that the liberal ideas of the Enlightenment might be put into practice‖ 
(1959:239). Indeed, the French philosopher Condorcet declared in his 1786 essay on The 
Influence of the American Revolution on Europe that ―it is not enough that the rights of man 
be written in the books of philosophers and inscribed in the hearts of virtuous men; the weak 
and ignorant must be able to read them in the example of a great nation. America has given us 
this example‖ (quoted in Muravchik 1992:83. See also Churchill 1957:221). In this respect, 
the United States had a tremendous attribute of soft power long before it acquired any 
dimension of hard power comparable to that of the great European powers of the day, namely 
the power of attraction. Though this power of attraction was by no means universally 
accepted, as will be shown in chapter 5, it was soon confirmed both by the waves of 
immigrants fleeing the Old World in search of the American Dream and by the increasing 
calls for democratization of the European societies. And though the United States remained 
underdeveloped in terms of hard power during the first many years of its existence, informed 
observers clearly saw its potential for hard power early on. America‘s superpower status had 
been predicted long before it acquired any semblance of hard power attributes. Already during 
the negotiations for the Paris Peace Treaty which established the United States as an 
independent nation in 1783 John Adams had asserted that America was destined to ―form the 
greatest empire in the world‖ (quoted by McCullough 2001:395). The best known prediction 
is probably the one made by Tocqueville, who in 1835 concluded his first volume of 
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Democracy in America with the prophecy that some day, America and Russia were destined 
each to ―hold in their hands the fate of half the world‖ ([1835] 2003:485).  
From the onset, America was born as a universal nation with a messianic quest 
to spread its values. This notion of being a universal nation, ―summing up the best in mankind 
and also embracing the whole of mankind with their universally applicable values‖, has, as 
Lieven rightly points out (2005:34), been present in all great powers in history. Yet, whereas 
this sense of purpose has to a large extent abated in other nations, in the United States it has 
shown a remarkable continuity and resilience over the last two centuries. In this respect, the 
messianic streak indeed makes ―Americans exceptional in the developed world‖, (ibid:33). 
The notion of an American exceptionalism originates from Toqueville‘s description of the 
collective character of American society and its polity (Shafer 1999:447). Far from being the 
reserve of politicians or philosophers, this notion of exceptionality and the idea that 
Americans are God‘s chosen people can be found as well in the popular imagination and in 
American literature, as here in Herman Melville‘s White-Jacket: 
We Americans are the peculiar chosen people – the Israel of our time; we bear 
the ark of the liberties of the world. God has predestined, mankind expects, great 
things from our race; and great things we feel in our souls. The rest of the 
nations must soon be in our rear. We are pioneers of the world; the advance 
guard, sent on through the wilderness of untried things, to break a path into the 
New World that is ours. (1967:150) 
 
The journalist John O‘Sullivan coupled the sense of exceptionality with the modernity that it 
promised in his famous description of the United States as the Great Nation of Futurity:  
[..] so far as regards the entire development of the natural rights of man, in 
moral, political, and national life, we may confidently assume that our country is 
destined to be the great nation of futurity. [..] America is destined for better 
deeds. [..] We are the nation of human progress, and who will, what can, set 
limits to our onward march? Providence is with us, and no earthly power can. [..] 
The far-reaching, the boundless future will be the era of American greatness. In 
its magnificent domain of space and time, the nation of many nations is destined 
to manifest to mankind the excellence of divine principles [..] We must onward 
to the fulfilment of our mission [..] For this blessed mission to the nations of the 
world, which are shut out from the life-giving light of truth, has America been 
chosen; and her high example shall smite unto death the tyranny of kings, 
hierarchs, and oligarchs [..] Who, then, can doubt that our country is destined to 
be the great nation of futurity? (1839:426-430)  
 
O‘Sullivan‘s words highlight that the year 1776 saw more than the foundations of a new 
nation and a new polity. It marked the beginning aspirations to found a new civilization, 
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inspired by ideas of the Enlightenment, indeed incorporating the Enlightenment theme into its 
creed (―the life-giving light of truth‖). The progressive promise of the American polity was 
however from the onset mitigated by its exclusion of large parts of the American population, 
most notably the Indians and the slaves. As Himmelfarb has noted, already the Founding 
Fathers ―were well aware that the Constitution failed to carry out the bold affirmation of the 
Declaration [of Independence] that ‗all men are created equal‘ and endowed with the 
‗unalienable rights‘ of ‗life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.‘‖ (Himmelfarb 2008:222). 
The racism leveled against the non-white population and the at times willful persecution of 
Indians is indeed a moral stain on the lofty aspirations that guided the founding of the United 
States. Yet it should be remembered that the notions of racial and civilizational superiority 
displayed in eighteenth and nineteenth century America could be found readily on the other 
side of the Atlantic as well. The difference naturally lies in the fact that the discourse 
surrounding the establishment of the United States became vulnerable to charges of 
hypocrisy. Political philosopher Herbert Storing‘s assessment that the creation of a union 
represented the ―greatest instrument of liberty ever made‖ (quoted by Himmelfarb 2008:225), 
clearly only held true for part of the population. The charges of racism and discrimination in 
the American society have been a constant feature of especially much European anti-
Americanism for two centuries. Neither the outcome of the American civil war, granting the 
last slaves their freedom, nor the formal end to segregation in the 1960s have succeeded in 
completely removing the impression that the United States is a society founded initially as 
much on notions of racial superiority as on enlightened ideas of freedom and democracy. 
Especially to large parts of the European public, and most notably on the political left, the 
promise of a new American civilization has simply been too tarnished by the blood of Indians 
and the sweat of slaves to be accepted with the same enthusiasm as the one typically 
presented in American discourses. The soft power of attraction to American political values 
was and is still present in large parts of the world‘s population, but it has been seriously 
mitigated by the policies of exclusion that have figured prominently in American history
29
. It 
is reflected by exactly the kind of anti-Americanism that Katzenstein and Keohane have 
labeled liberal anti-Americanism, which ―feeds on perceptions of hypocrisy‖ (Katzenstein and 
Keohane (eds) 2007:30). 
The policies of exclusion are, however, only one side of the coin. While they 
were decried by the ‗progressive‘ political environment in especially Europe, America‘s 
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policies of immigration have conversely attracted not just millions of emigrants, but also 
widespread admiration by the very progressives who lament the racist tendencies of the 
United States. “Give me your tired, your poor, Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, 
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore”, as the inscription on the Statue of Liberty 
reads
30
, is a powerful testimony to the promise offered by one nation to the rest of the world. 
It is in this promise that American soft power has probably been historically most manifest. 
The power of attraction of the United States has literally attracted people from all parts of the 
globe to the nation seemingly offering the best promise of ‗life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness‘.  Throughout the nineteenth century, the United States remained in the eyes of 
many Europeans the distant utopia where man was free to pursue his dreams and shape his 
own destiny. In Frederick Jackson Turner‘s memorable words, ―Since the days when the fleet 
of Columbus sailed into the waters of the New World, America has been another name for 
opportunity‖ (Turner [1894] 1966:227). A cliché in many ways, but a cliché that nevertheless 
highlights the appalling social conditions under which millions of Europeans lived at the time. 
Anti-Americanism was then almost purely the project of the elites. While it was, as will be 
seen, fashionable in certain milieus to denigrate ‗America‘, the country attracted millions of 
Europeans eager to pursue the American dream. Probably very few of them had read 
Tocqueville‘s Democracy in America. Though eager to live as free men, they were attracted 
as much by the prospect of prosperity. In the European countries they emigrated from, they 
were nominally free men. But freedom in poverty offers few rewards, and probably more than 
any other nation, America gave people with few resources the hope of a better future. Also in 
this respect one might, as Freedom House does, ―consider the United States to be the world‘s 
first truly globalized nation, given the origins of its people‖ (Puddington and Melia 2008). 
The U.S. policy of open borders could not, however, in the long run live up to the famous 
words inscribed on the Statue of Liberty. Like other developed societies, American 
administrations fearing that the levels of immigration were leading to a saturation point 
decided that rather than admitting the tired and poor, priority should be given to the more 
resourceful immigrants who could bolster the national economy. America and the pursuit of 
the American Dream nonetheless remains a potent symbol for the many thousands of people 
who still each year decide to break up from home in order to try their luck in what has 
euphemistically been referred to as ‗the land of milk and honey‘31.  
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America‘s historic power of attraction cannot be denied. Yet the nation that sees 
itself as a model to others, and the nation that indeed throughout much of the past two 
centuries has been a source of inspiration to many, is increasingly perceived to have lost much 
of its former luster. What was once the only true democracy in the world, even if based on the 
exclusion of large parts of its population, is today seen by many as a political anachronism. 
The political system of the United States has changed little since its establishment compared 
with those of virtually all other Western nations; a fact that would probably have surprised the 
Delegates to the Constitutional Convention greatly (Berkin 2002:209-210). Aron argues that 
the fact that the American constitution has been preserved intact for two centuries has given it 
―an almost mystical prestige‖ (Aron [1957] 2001:41). However, the bipartisan model 
characterizing the American political system excludes a more proportional representation in 
which political minorities can voice their opinions within the legislative system, unless they 
submit to the tutelage of one of the two big parties. In some ways, the system of checks and 
balances invented by the Founding Fathers is frequently perceived to have hindered the 
modernization of a political system that at times, such as for example during the Monica 
Lewinsky affair
32
, seems locked in a bitter bipartisan strife that to many observers, both 
domestic and foreign, negates the spirit of democracy by attempting to undermine a 
democratically elected president (see for example Fabbrini in Fabbrini (ed.) 2006:9-10). Other 
common points of criticism are the importance of money in political campaigns, and the 
disproportionate political impact of the American Supreme Court. Zakaria for example 
remarks that:  
What is distinctive about the American system is not how democratic it is but 
rather how undemocratic it is, placing as it does multiple constraints on electoral 
majorities. Of its three branches of government, one – arguably paramount – is 
headed by nine unelected men and women with life tenure. Its Senate is the most 
unrepresentative upper house in the world, with the lone exception of the House 
of Lords, which is powerless. (1997:149)
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Especially the Supreme Court is regarded by many abroad as evidence that the American 
institutions are seriously flawed. The essence of democracy is that policy is determined by the 
peoples‘ elected representatives. Yet the American Supreme Court is in many respects what 
Churchill called ―the most formidable part of the Federal machinery‖ (Churchill 1957:212). It 
can determine not just important policy matters such as whether abortion should be legal (the 
famous Roe versus Wade case), but also the outcome of a presidential election, as was the 
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case in 2000, when the Court declared against a recount of the ballots in Florida. Though 
these incidents contribute to an image that the most mature of all democracies displays signs 
of political immaturity, such observations are mainly the reserve of political aficionados. 
They demonstrate that developments in American politics are a source of fascination to many 
and worry to some, but they hardly constitute an important source of anti-Americanism, 
although they might diminish the soft power that is associated with the attractiveness of 
America‘s political institutions. 
Much more serious is the growing impression that successive American 
administrations, and especially the Bush administration, have infringed upon the civil liberties 
that were once the promise of a nation. The frequent use of the death penalty in America, even 
for juvenile offenders or offenders with mental retardation (see for example the reports 
Human Rights Watch 1995, 2001 and 2003), has been a source of liberal anti-Americanism 
for decades (Death Penalty Information Center 2008). With the exception of Japan, all other 
Western nations have abolished capital punishment, considering it inhuman and barbaric 
(Amnesty International 2008a and 2008b). Together with successive governments‘ ‗liberal‘ 
attitude toward the purchase of firearms and the perceived trigger happiness of law 
enforcement officers, the death penalty was long a major source of anti-Americanism in 
Western Europe and especially on the political left (Singh, in O‘Connor (ed.) 2007a). The 
notion that a society has the right to execute its inhabitants has become anathema to large 
parts of the western world. The fact that the only western nation to uphold the capital 
punishment bar Japan presents itself as a champion of human rights is a source of deep 
puzzlement and resentment among especially the populations in nations of Western Europe. 
These issues have refueled the liberal anti-Americanism that previously built on rejections of 
for example the policies of exclusion mentioned above. If anything, the liberal rejection of 
American political practices has increased recently. The incarceration at Guantánamo Bay 
without prior trial of what has euphemistically been termed ‗illegal combatants‘ and the 
evidences of serious physical and psychological abuse of prisoners of war at the infamous 
Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq have seriously undermined America‘s political soft power in liberal 
communities around the globe (Puddington and Melia 2008) by reinforcing ―the belief that 
the United States does not abide by its own ideals‖ (Walt 2005). The nation that invented the 
term ―rogue state‖ is increasingly referred to by that very designation abroad (Garrison 2004). 
And though, as Walt notes, ―Americans may dismiss these accusations as false, misleading, or 
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exaggerated [..] the issue is not what American‘s think of their nation‘s conduct; the issue is 
how that conduct appears to others‖ (2005). What is beyond doubt is that this has fuelled a 
liberal anti-Americanism that is not just to be found on the fringes of the left wing of 
European public opinion; it has raised widespread critiques even from traditionally pro-
American quarters who had otherwise granted the United States a long leach following the 
September 11
th
 attacks. There was in Europe, at least during the Bush era, a widespread 
feeling that such practices were ―rapidly draining the reservoir of international goodwill‖ 
(itself almost a synonym for soft power) ―that makes the United States‘ status as a superpower 
acceptable to the world‖ (ibid.). The fact that this was a sentiment shared by many Americans 
did not mitigate the uneasiness abroad significantly. These perceptions have, no doubt, had an 
impact on the negative polling of attitudes toward the United States that were presented in the 
start of this chapter. The political achievements of which the Americans are rightly proud 
have been eroded in the opinion of many foreign observers by impulses that appear to 
contradict the fine ambitions on which the Great Nation of Futurity was built. 
 
The nature of the beast: Leader or bully of the Free World? 
Though the application of political values on domestic matters might cause the disapprobation 
of foreign observers who regard some of the more dubious practices as infringements upon 
the moral dignity of man, the application of these political values on American foreign policy 
is probably a greater source of anti-Americanism. The idea that America is somehow special 
and the missionary zeal to preach American values to the rest of the world can be found on all 
sides of American politics and has been a constant source of influence for American foreign 
policy. This pervading view of the United States as what former State Secretary Madeleine 
Albright termed an ‗indispensable nation‘ is a central element of American national identity. 
It also explains why so many Americans are truly surprised when confronted with anti-
American sentiments. Exceptionalism and the feeling of representing a model to the rest of 
the world lies so deep in the national conscience that it has become one of the defining 
premises for regarding the rest of the world – as nations and populations eager to adopt the 
same values and embrace the same virtues as the great nation of futurity:  
America‘s purposes were never understood by its people and its leaders to be 
those of any ordinary state. To the contrary, Americans have believed from the 
beginning that their nation has a divine mission to fulfill, to bring light to the 
world, a light that was subsequently defined as the light of freedom, democracy, 
and prosperity rather than the light of biblical righteousness. But America was 
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and remains, in its citizens‘ minds, a nation that is both righteous and right to be 
marching at the vanguard of history, leading all nations to their true destiny, to 
the true end or goal of earthly history. (Skillen 2005:78) 
 
The messianic political values inherent in the American creed have been present in American 
foreign policy since the creation of the United States (Ellis 2000:3). As Skillen notes, there 
―can be little doubt that American exceptionalism included the conviction that the American 
state structure and the historical process of achieving it were the model for all peoples of the 
world‖ (Skillen 2005:84). To the term American exceptionalism can be joined the notion of 
America‘s manifest destiny, originating from John O‘Sullivan, who used it to advocate the 
territorial expansion of the United States over great parts of the North American continent, 
and specifically the annexation of Texas in 1845 (Pedersen 2006:36-37). As Tuveson has 
noted, the notion of manifest destiny incorporates ―a vast complex of ideas, policies, and 
actions‖ (1968:91). There is no doubt, however, that to some, it came to entail the missionary 
view that America should endeavor to export its political values to the rest of the world. The 
great American historian Frederick Jackson Turner concurred with O‘Sullivan in believing 
that the frontier had shaped the American people‘s worldview of a manifest destiny and 
further concluded that in this could be found the meaning of America in world history, 
impelling the United States to move beyond its continental borders ([1894] 1966:199-227. 
See also White 1996:2-8). 
American foreign policy is often portrayed in terms of different historical 
phases, each corresponding to shifts in perception following upheavals in the international 
system. Yet in essence, there are good reasons to assert that a number of value-based 
constants have given American foreign policy a remarkable continuity in terms of goals and 
aspirations. Regardless of whether the foreign policy has been isolationist, internationalist or 
interventionist
34
, the belief that America was somehow different from other nations, and 
indeed a model society for others to follow, has been a constant. While isolationists might 
have favored the expansion of American values solely on the North American continent, their 
vision of America having a manifest destiny was by no means less fervent: 
If we take seriously the American civil religion as a national identity and a 
mission that established the terms of America‘s role in the world, we can see that 
the tendency toward isolationism, on the one hand, and toward internationalism, 
on the other hand, are two sides of the same coin. In order for America to retain 
its identity as light to the world, it must, above all, survive and protect its 
position on the hill: thus, isolationism. But insofar as the American witness and 
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influence manage to extend farther and farther into the world, then America 
must follow up to protect the fruits of the success of its messianic calling: thus, 
internationalism. (Skillen 2005:82-83) 
 
If Skillen‘s assessment is correct, it would entail that retreat from isolationism would 
primarily be a question of timing. As America reluctantly got dragged into the First World 
War, it seemed that the moment had come for America to export its values. When President 
Woodrow Wilson announced to the House and Senate on April 2, 1917 his decision to enter 
the war, he called on America ―to make the world safe for democracy‖ (quoted by Gamble 
2003:149), a phrase reminiscent of Emperor Constantine‘s aim in the fourth century ―to make 
the world safe for Christianity‖ (Cochrane 1944:197). According to Lloyd Ambrosius, 
Wilson, confident that the American model was what the world craved, 
projected his conception of American nationalism onto the rest of the world, 
presupposing its universal validity [..] Viewing the United States as the 
vanguard, he expected other nations to follow its example and develop in the 
same way. His vision of the future consequently combined both universalism 
and unilateralism. While proclaiming a new era of internationalism, the 
president actually expected others to conform to his particular understanding of 
American ideals and practices. (Ambrosius 2002:33) 
 
The Presbyterian president believed that ―America was born to exemplify that devotion to the 
elements of righteousness which are derived from the revelations of Holy Scriptures‖, which 
enabled him to define the First World War as ―a crusade‖ (ibid:36). The establishment of the 
League of Nations was defined in terms of a ―worldwide expansion of the Monroe doctrine‖ 
(ibid:41); it was, as Skillen remarks ―the expression of a hope that America‘s example would 
draw people throughout the world to share the same faith and desire for freedom, leading 
them to develop democratic states like the American republic‖, although ―Wilson was either 
unconscious of, or simply unwilling to acknowledge publicly, the dependence of the entire 
system on American hegemony of the League‖ (2005:85). As such, the League of Nations 
failed to make the world safe for democracy, not least due to the refusal of the Senate to ratify 
the treaty (Judis 2004:96). 
The opportunity was to present itself again some decades later, when another 
World War raged. America was slowly retreating from the interwar period of isolationism, 
when in 1941 Henry Luce published his famous editorial The American Century in Life 
magazine. His text could be read as an affirmation that the promise set forth by O‘Sullivan 
was finally about to be delivered upon. Not only was the United States an exceptional nation 
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with a manifest destiny, but the time to fulfill that destiny had arrived. ―It now becomes our 
time‖, Luce wrote, ―to be the powerhouse from which the ideals spread throughout the world 
and do their mysterious work of lifting the life of mankind from the level of the beast to what 
the Psalmist called a little lower than the angels‖ (reprinted in Hogan (ed.) 1999:28, see also 
Judis 1992:5). President Truman later embraced the notion, stating that indeed ―this is 
America‘s century‖, adding that it should however ―be more than that. We want it to be 
humanity‘s century‖ (quoted by White 1996:9). The creativity of the Truman administration 
must have satisfied Luce. The American post-World War II strategy to ‗make the world safe 
for democracy‘ came to rest mainly on three pillars: Containment of the Soviet bloc, deemed 
out of democratic reach; export of the American model through the Marshall plan to friendly 
states in especially Europe; and the establishment of international organizations based on the 
same dual notions of democratization and American influence that had characterized Wilson‘s 
earlier designs. In spite of its overwhelming political, economic and military power at the end 
of the war, the United States still rejected the notion that it had become the heir and successor 
to previous empires (Garrison 2004). Ferguson has noted that ―For an empire in denial, there 
is really only one way to act imperially with a clear conscience, and that is to combat 
someone else‘s imperialism. In the doctrine of containment, born in 1947, the United States 
hit on the perfect ideology for its own peculiar kind of empire: the imperialism of anti-
imperialism‖ (Ferguson 2005:78). The policy of containment of the communist bloc was but 
one of many policies favored in Washington that had imperial overtones. The Marshall Plan 
seemed almost modeled on the Roman example of extending Pax Romana to the satellite 
states that it controlled. Olivier Zunz has noted that though there was originally domestic 
political opposition to the Marshall Plan, most policymakers were convinced that  
the ―American century‖ and the new world order were becoming one and the 
same, for American prosperity would continue to expand only if Americans 
looked outward. Moreover, the time had come to applaud the American blend of 
democratic institutions and managerial capitalism and to credit them for victory. 
(Zunz 1998:185)  
 
The Marshall Plan may have presented commercial benefits to the United States as well as to 
the receivers of the vast funds that were handed out
35
, but its main political mission was to 
bolster the democratic and pro-American character of the recipients‘ societies (Pells 1997:52-
57). The final pillar of this strategy (or series of strategies) was the establishment of 
international institutions that were created if not in America‘s image (although highly 
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indebted to it), then at least according to its wishes. The Bretton Woods system comprising 
both the establishment of the United Nations as a successor to the ill-fated League of Nations 
and a host of financial regimes such as the World Bank and the IMF gave Washington 
eminent tools for shaping the global democratic discourse. Meanwhile, seemingly 
relinquishing the policy of shunning ‗entangling alliances‘ that had been a constant since the 
presidency of George Washington, the United States created a series of military alliances such 
as NATO and ANZUS that secured its military stronghold on a world wide scale. This 
process of institution building was in effect an internationalization of the American 
universalism that greatly strengthened America‘s soft power. These organizations were not set 
up as an alternative to American leadership, but as a way of exercising and preserving it 
(Judis 2004:204-5, Daalder and Lindsay 2005:9). 
American exceptionalism had come of age on a global scale, and America had 
established itself as the leading western nation. The new primacy was not deplored though, 
but rather welcomed, at least by the inhabitants of Western European nations fearing both 
their own historical demons and the rising Soviet threat. When Arthur Schlesinger described 
American leadership of the Western World under the Cold War as ―the brave and essential 
response of free men to Communist aggression‖ (1967:23), it may have been an eminently 
American phrase, but its essence was to a large extent shared by America‘s allies. While 
Schlesinger‘s phrase today has a rather démodé ring to it, there is little doubt that the 
underlying assumption – that the United States is a nation that acts as a force of good in a 
dangerous world – builds on the notion of American exceptionalism. During the Cold War, 
ideological anti-Americanism based on the rejection of the liberal capitalist economic and 
political systems might have been en vogue among the more left-wing political factions in 
especially the Western European nations, but the vast majority of Western Europeans saw 
America as not only a liberator from the horrors of Nazism‘s bid for preeminence in Europe, 
but also as the provider and protector of peace on the European continent. The United States 
may have been portrayed as a ‗reluctant superpower‘; it was nonetheless a superpower whose 
status was morally legitimized not only domestically by the feelings of exceptionalism and 
manifest destiny, but also to a large extent by its allies, who shared the commitment to 
upholding democracy. The price America‘s allies paid for their security was an increasing 
hegemonization of the security arrangements guaranteeing their freedom. With reference to 
the international situation characterizing the Cold War period, Fabbrini has noted that 
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Never before in history has a victorious power undertaken so strongly, as the US 
has, to constitutionalize its own hegemony (in the Western sphere), setting in 
motion relations of reciprocal recognition between the interests of the leading 
hegemon (namely the US) and those of the hegemonized (countries of Western 
Europe, but also Japan). This has given life to an American hegemony defined 
by commentators as benign or reluctant. (in Frabbrini (ed.) 2006:8) 
 
American hegemony over the West was, however, both a structural reality and to a large 
extent also a convenience for the hegemonized who, secure under America‘s protective 
military and nuclear umbrella, could undertake the development of their welfare states and 
even, for the Western European states, engage in the establishment of a post-national 
European polity that was later to become an increasing source of concern for Washington, 
frequently wondering about the nature and ambitions of the European Union. 
Whereas the element of anti-Americanism based on its perceived hegemony can 
in large parts be considered a rejection of what America is, the way this near-hegemonic 
power is used by U.S. administrations can clearly fuel rejection of what America does. To the 
myth of the reluctant superpower can be added the portrait frequently put forward of America 
as a benign or benevolent hegemon. The notion of primopolarity that was introduced above is 
especially interesting when the primary pole in the international system is the United States. 
The long American history of presenting the United States as an exceptional country or 
indeed an essential or indispensable nation gives the notion of primus inter pares an extra 
dimension. The international system now reflects the belief that Americans have traditionally 
held of their own nation as superior compared with other nations. While American 
exceptionalism entailed a perception of superiority primarily in terms of values and 
aspirations, the realities of power have imbued these perceptions with a heightened sense of 
destiny. It is no wonder that the idea of American exceptionalism in conjunction with the 
country‘s rise to near-hegemonic status at the dawn of the twenty-first century is to many 
Americans a final validation of John O‘Sullivan‘s description of the United States as the 
Great Nation of Futurity, where ―The far-reaching, the boundless future will be the era of 
American greatness. In its magnificent domain of space and time, the nation of many nations 
is destined to manifest to mankind the excellence of divine principles‖ (O‘Sullivan 1839:429-
430). When shortly before the fall of the Berlin Wall Francis Fukuyama wrote his essay on 
The End of History, it was a celebration of not just the triumph of ―the Western idea” 
(Fukuyama 1989). His assertion that the Western mode of liberal democracy is the ultimate 
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destiny in terms of ideological aspirations was fundamentally a validation of the key premise 
of American exceptionalism: that the values on which America was founded represent the 
pinnacle of human political aspirations
36
. Whether his celebration was premature or not, it 
was nevertheless firmly molded as ―an essentially American vision of the world disguised as 
an internationalist theory‖ (Crockatt, in Frabbrini (ed.) 2006:75). In this respect, the end of the 
Cold War represented a dawning of U.S. moral and political supremacy – a supremacy that 
had not just been foretold by the visions of the Puritans and the Founding Fathers (Ellis 
2000), but indeed a supremacy that was philosophically and ideologically the highest 
attainable, and, if Fukuyama is to be believed, the culmination of humanity‘s political 
aspirations. 
 
The uses and misuses of political soft power 
The hard power attributes of this perception of hegemony and possible neo-imperialism were 
described above. It was noted that there is a long historic tradition of rejecting any dominant 
power and that as such, rejection of American hegemony could be seen in almost structural 
terms as a predictable feature of international politics at the dawn of the twenty-first century. 
The soft power dimension is, however, probably much more important in generating anti-
Americanism, at least among the inhabitants of nations who otherwise share most of the 
political values of the United States. It is when these political values are transformed into 
foreign policy aims and diplomatic practices that the American quasi-hegemonic might 
becomes a source of dissatisfaction among its allies. Among the resources of soft power 
identified by Joseph Nye are policy and diplomacy. In light of the growing anti-Americanism 
registered over the last decade (see 3.1), it is obvious to enquire about the potential link 
between how America wields its soft power resources and the rejection that the United States 
is subjected to among both friends and foes. It could be, as Skillen argues, that 
What requires explanation is why the American people and leaders are blind to 
the imperial characteristics of their colossal global hegemony. The peculiarity 
originates in the earliest self-interpretation of the nation as a city on a hill, whose 
calling is to exemplify the political truth of universal history. America‘s calling 
is not to achieve that goal by military conquest. Yet insofar as the civil-religious 
calling bears witness to a universal goal, the whole world must always be kept in 
American sights as both a field of opportunity for freedom‘s expansion and as a 
potential threat to freedom‘s survival. (2005:87) 
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The fact that previous American hegemony over the West was to a large extent accepted by 
its allies was probably very much due to its internationalist nature. Yet among America‘s 
allies, there was during the Bush administration an increasing perception that the earlier 
American internationalism was abandoned by in favor of a neoconservative unilateralism (see 
for example Fabbrini, in Fabbrini (ed.) 2006:3-26). The decision to invade Iraq in the spring 
of 2003 against the express wishes of the United Nations Security Council was but one, albeit 
the most prominent example of the unilateral policies of the Bush administration. The list of 
perceived infringements upon the internationalist tradition is well known: the repudiations of 
the Kyoto Protocol, the nuclear test-ban treaty, a new protocol to the biological weapons 
treaty, and the International Criminal Court (Holsti 2004:249-253). And though, as Judis has 
argued, the administration might have had a rationale for each of these actions, taken together, 
they cast doubt on President Bush‘s support for ―a fundamental principle of Wilsonian 
internationalism: that to create a peaceful, prosperous, and safe world, the United States 
would have to commit itself not simply to ad hoc coalitions but to enduring international 
organizations and treaties‖ (2004:165). Furthermore, the United States has an ingrained 
―tendency to play the Lone Ranger with the trading system‖, which added to ―America‘s 
tendency to extend the long arm of its laws to other countries is a practice that unites even its 
natural allies against it‖ (Buchan 1993:144-145). The Economist has called this approach a 
―parallel unilateralism‖, a ―willingness to go along with international accords, but only so far 
as they suit America, which is prepared to conduct policy outside their constraints‖ (quoted by 
Fabbrini, in Fabbrini (ed.) 2006:12). This mounting unilateralism has been almost universally 
deplored by other nations, fearing that it threatens to undermine the very foundations upon 
which international diplomacy has developed since the Second World War (ibid:3-26). 
Edward C. Luck has shown that in the context of international organizations, four related 
characteristics stand out that make a member state exceptional: 
1. A willingness to go it alone on a variety of issues, along with apparent 
immunity to the pressures and criticisms of others; 
2. An assumption that its national values and practices are universally valid and 
its policy positions are moral and proper, not just expedient; 
3. A strong tendency to look inwards, to domestic political considerations and 
processes, when determining how to act in international forums, in some cases 
coupled with a willingness to adopt national legislation that contradicts the 
rules and responsibilities imposed by international arrangements; and 
4. A belief by national policy-makers and legislators that they have other options 
for pursuing their nation‘s interests and that acting through multilateral 
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institutions is only an option, not an obligation. (in Foot, MacFarlane and 
Mastanduno 2003:27) 
 
In this respect, America has reaffirmed its exceptionality. This reaffirmation, however, does 
not meet with the approval that the more internationalist variety of exceptionalism did. The 
trademark description of Theodore Roosevelt‘s foreign policy, ―speak softly and carry a big 
stick‖37, is an early reminder that diplomacy, one of the attributes of soft power, is often best 
exercised with a certain amount of sensitivity towards the feelings of others – although 
according to Roosevelt it may need to be backed up with hard power in order to be really 
efficient. Eliot Cohen has remarked that 
U.S. power is so obvious a fact, particularly to non-Americans, that there is no 
need to remind anyone of it. If the United States intends to exercise its power 
effectively, even against the wishes of its allies, it should do so with a bland 
smile, not boastful words. Weaker states will inevitably view the strongest 
power as arrogant, inconsiderate, and demanding. There is no need to make it 
any worse than it must be: Roman discretion offers as important a historical 
example as Roman assertion. (2004:59-60)  
 
Fukuyama, using another analogy, agrees: ―The United States cannot avoid provoking fear 
and resentment given its de facto power any more than Bismarck‘s Germany could, but it can 
try to minimize the backlash by deliberately seeking ways to downplay its dominance‖ 
(Fukuyama 2006:190). Crockatt has correctly argued that independence is a political culture 
with deep historical roots in America and among the prime values in American foreign policy 
(in Frabbrini (ed.) 2006:87-88). The neoconservative unilateralism is therefore, if regarded in 
terms of independence, hardly a paramount break with the traditions of American foreign 
policy:  
Whatever the reigning orthodoxy or slogan, at whatever time in its history, 
whether it be non-entanglement, isolationism, manifest destiny, making the 
world safe for democracy or ensuring the survival of liberty, the notion of 
independence has never been far from the surface (ibid:88).  
 
Crockatt further asserts that ―America‘s will to independence – independence absolute – is 
visible not only in its separate declarations but also in the manner in which it enters into 
arrangements with others‖ (ibid: 87). The American policy of internationalism during the 
Cold War was in this optic not a reduction of American foreign policy independence as such, 
but rather self imposed limitations in an ―institutional bargain [..] between the hegemon and 
the hegemonized which structured the Western world during the Cold War period‖ (Fabbrini, 
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in Frabbrini (ed.) 2006:24). The point here is neither that the foreign policies of George W. 
Bush were a complete reversal of traditional American foreign politics (they were not), nor 
that such tendencies toward unilateralism will necessarily sap America‘s soft power in the 
long term (previous examples have at times ended up having virtually the opposite effect). 
Other presidents have traveled down the unilateral or semi-unilateral road without incurring 
the wrath that the Bush administration has been subjected to. The Vietnam debacle was a 
prominent cause for displays of anti-Americanism among especially European publics, but it 
rarely really led to official reactions from their governments to the extent seen during the 
unfolding of the Iraq crisis. President Reagan‘s posture vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in the 
1980s was followed with apprehension in most European capitals, who feared an escalation of 
the Cold War, yet his policies were to a large extent vindicated with the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and the subsequent implosion of the Soviet empire. The difference between the former 
unilateral or semi-unilateral measures and the ones employed by the Bush administration is 
twofold: First, on a structural level, the end of the Cold War also signaled the end of a threat 
against the survival of America‘s allies as independent states. The American tutelage that they 
had (mostly willingly and by their own accord) been subjected to, at least in terms of security 
matters, no longer looked neither as necessary nor as desirable as previously. This 
fundamentally led to a change in how American foreign policy came to be seen in European 
capitals. Whereas previous examples of American unilateralism had grudgingly been accepted 
by America‘s partners, unwilling to ‗rock the boat‘ in spite of deep reservations toward these 
policies, this restraint has largely been lifted following the dismantlement of the Soviet threat. 
Second, on a political level, there has been a perception that unilateralism became the norm 
during the Bush presidency rather than the expedient exception. There has also been a 
widespread perception that the new American unilateralism was of a more nationally selfish 
nature than the previous ones. Previous U.S. unilateral measures such as the CIA-backed 
toppling of the democratically elected government in Chile in favor of a military dictatorship 
were vehemently rejected by the public opinion in large parts of the world. America‘s official 
partners, while highly opposed to such measures, accepted them, at least partly, as evidence of 
a (misconstrued) American willingness to secure the interests of the West as such. The Bush 
administration‘s rejection of the Kyoto protocol, the ICC etc. had only one aim: to protect 
short term American interests. And while the Iraq war may be the exception to this rule, the 
moral arguments for waging war turned out to be seriously flawed. No weapons of mass 
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destruction were found, there was no evidence of a link between Saddam Hussein‘s regime 
and al-Qaeda, and the attempts to create a democracy in Iraq became bogged down by feuding 
between the different religious communities (Walt 2005). John Lewis Gaddis‘ observation 
following the invasion of Iraq that ―within a little more than a year and a half, the United 
States exchanged its long-established reputation as the principal stabilizer of the international 
system for one as its chief destabilizer‖ (2004:101), is probably shared by many foreign 
observers. 
Opposition toward these policies has frequently been presented as opposition 
toward the neoconservatism supposedly characteristic of the Bush administration rather than 
as anti-Americanism as such. Critics of American foreign policies in the years 2001-2008 
keen to avoid the label of anti-Americans have instead directed their opposition toward the 
conservative nationalist ideology that they associate with neoconservatism, hoping that 
neoconservatism only represented an exception to the tradition of liberal internationalism that 
is often portrayed as having been the ‗normal‘ American basis for foreign policy. Yet, as 
Fabbrini has noted,  
In America it is possible to be nationalist and universalist at the same time, 
because America is perceived by its citizens as the universal nation. It is against 
this conservative nationalism, which conflates the national interest of America 
with the interests of the world, that the European anti-American mood [..] has 
developed. (in Frabbrini (ed.) 2006:4).  
 
The notion of American exceptionalism may be unconsciously felt by the public opinion 
abroad witnessing the foreign policy actions of the United States, even if they do not 
acknowledge its existence. While the United States may feel that large part of their legitimacy 
lies in precisely this notion, it is clear that were it to be presented to a foreign public, it would 
be rejected on the grounds that no nation can claim to be endowed with special rights that do 
not apply to others. Although the more realistic foreign observers will acknowledge that the 
larger powers have more influence and clout on the world stage than do the smaller, the 
notion that this gives the larger nations a higher moral legitimacy would most likely be 
rejected by most. Francis Fukuyama, an erstwhile neoconservative later turned into a 
prominent critic of American unilateralism, has noted that an important reason why the Iraq 
war provoked a surge in anti-Americanism was ―built into the National Security Strategy 
doctrine of preventive war: its implicit recognition of American exceptionalism‖ (Fukuyama 
2006:101). According to Fukuyama, ―The fact that the United States granted itself a right that 
103 
 
it would deny to other countries is based, in the NSS, on an implicit judgement that the United 
States is different from other countries and can be trusted to use its military power justly and 
wisely in ways that other powers could not‖ (ibid. See also Hirsh 2003:xvii). Holsti concurs, 
describing it as ―the most important example of American exceptionalism‖ (2004:253). 
George W. Bush‘s famous post-9/11 line about being either ―with us or [..] with the terrorists‖ 
(Guyatt 2003:237) was, while intended for those inclined to support rogue states ―heard in 
Europe as a challenge to get with the Bush administration‘s agenda in the take-it-or-leave-it 
fashion, which they naturally resented‖ (Fukuyama 2006:105). In sum, Fukuyama finds that 
Benevolent hegemony rests on a belief in American exceptionalism that most 
non-Americans simply find not credible. The idea that the United States behaves 
disinterestedly on the world stage is not widely believed because it is for the 
most part not true and, indeed, could not be true if American leaders fulfill their 
responsibilities to the American people. (ibid:111) 
 
Conclusion 
America‘s soft power resources of policy and diplomacy are prominent, unique and 
considerable. They have had an important power of attraction in the West, but have frequently 
also been objects of concern if not outright opposition. As Crockatt rightly concludes, 
The biggest and most potent idea among the many big ideas which have been 
spawned since the end of the Cold War is the idea of the American nation and its 
peculiar destiny. Americans need to understand this as well as others. They will 
then understand why American power is so fiercely contested (in Fabbrini (ed.) 
2006:88-89).  
  
The contestation of American power has been particularly fierce during the presidency of 
George W. Bush. And there is no doubt that since the election of President Barack Obama, 
much of the criticism has abated. As Timothy Garton Ash notes, if soft power means power of 
attraction, then Obama is the personification of America‘s soft power to most Europeans 
(2008); an assessment which seems validated by the Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brand Index 
2009, in which the United States improved its ranking from 7th to 1st position, an 
improvement, which its authors describe as ―astonishing‖, while adding that ―There can‘t be a 
more illustrative example of the American Dream‖ than the election of ―a mestizo and the son 
of an African immigrant‖ (Anholt-GfK Roper 2009). In truth, he has the potential to represent 
much more than that. Given his background, he is the first president to embody in his persona 
America as a universal nation. Yet the endemic features of American political values, and not 
least those transposable on American foreign politics, suggest a possible recurrent source of 
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anti-Americanism: a perception that in spite of the affirmations of universalistic values, the 
United States, seeing itself as an exceptional nation, pursues primarily a nationalist foreign 
policy agenda according to which the interests of other nations are not just subordinate to 
those of America (all nations pursue first and foremost policies which are deemed to be in 
their own interest), but much more seriously of lesser moral value. In this respect, a system of 
foreign policy attitudes built on notions of exceptionalism and higher moral standards is the 
antithesis to realist, value-free notions of diplomacy. Though no nation or polity is value-free, 
the combination of overwhelming American hard power and the massive use of soft power 
resources in order to fulfill the promise of manifest destiny is a cocktail that is becoming 
increasingly hard to swallow for not just America‘s political partners, but for their publics as 
well. It was noted in chapter 2 that several scholars of anti-Americanism, and not least Paul 
Hollander, typically stress that opposition toward aspects of American policies do not 
constitute anti-Americanism. Yet if these aspects are seen increasingly as a pattern of 
behavior, it is bound to lead to increased rejection. Joseph Nye has noted that the influence of 
example can repel as well as attract, and that ―the arrogance, indifference to the opinions of 
others, and narrow approach to [..] national interests advocated by the new unilateralists are a 
sure way to undermine [..] soft power‖ (2002:11). The surveys quoted in 3.1 suggest that in 
the early twenty-first century, this is already to a large extent the case. Joseph Nye concurs: 
―Polls show that [America‘s] soft power losses can be traced largely to our foreign policy‖ 
(Nye 2004c:255). He further remarks that there is good evidence to suggest that ―unpopular 
foreign policies might be spilling over and undercutting the attractiveness of some aspects of 
American popular culture‖ as well (ibid:256). That is indeed a strong possibility, yet there is 
also a case to be made for the argument that America‘s massive soft power in terms of its 
dominating influence on global cultural norms might, irrespectively of the foreign policies 
carried out, be rejected by societies fearing an erosion of their own cultural norms. 
 
3.4.2 Cultural norms  
Just as the United States has heralded a political modernity, America has become largely 
synonymous with what one might call a cultural modernity: American cultural products and 
norms have become global to an extent far more important than those of other countries. The 
American Century was not just an affirmation to some of the fulfillment of America‘s 
political destiny; it could just as well describe America‘s enormous cultural impact: ―The 
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United States came to represent modernity because many of the trends associated with the 
Western world in the twentieth century occurred first in America‖ (Pells 1997:270). As 
America‘s preeminence in military matters is an undisputable fact, so is its ubiquitous 
prevalence within the cultural sphere. Indeed, the ―American era conjures up images of 
military might and political power, but from abroad the most immediate and pervasive point 
of contact with the United States is often at the intersection of globalization and culture‖ 
(Lieber 2005:96). Lieber further states that ―Primacy and influence in the cultural arena are 
more difficult to gauge than in the economic or military realms. Many of the criteria are less 
specific and more subjective, but here too American preponderance is evident‖ (ibid:101). 
This is the case both on a material and a nonmaterial level. American cultural products are 
consumed worldwide and often set the norm for consumer preferences, regardless of whether 
the products in question relate to popular culture, food consumption or the information 
society. These products are typically products of mass consumption, and as such, it is not just 
the products themselves that are associated to America, but the way they have been 
manufactured and promoted as well. The notions of Americanization, modernization and 
globalization are increasingly being used to denote the same process, namely one whereby 
one particular model of production and consumption has imposed itself on a global scale 
(Ritzer and Stillman, in Beck, Sznaider and Winter (eds) 2003). The charge against this 
perceived Americanization is that traditional norms and customs are being challenged by a 
new mindset and that this has largely been imported from America. As such, the dimension of 
American soft power that can be related to culture is important. Almost two decades ago, Nye 
termed American culture ―a relatively inexpensive and useful soft power resource‖ 
(1990:193), though he added that ―Obviously, certain aspects of American culture are 
unattractive to other peoples, and there is always a danger of bias in evaluating cultural 
sources of power. But American popular culture embodied in products and communications 
has widespread appeal‖ (ibid:193). That is to a large extent still the case. Yet the 1990s saw a 
rising movement against both certain types of American cultural products and the effect that 
globalization was having on culturally related preferences worldwide. The kind of anti-
Americanism that is directed at American cultural products and icons has a long history, 
especially among members of the European cultural elites, but has become more pervasive 
under the sensation of a growing, ―predatory‖ globalization (Falk 1999). The soft power 
dimension of cultural norms has two main components: the norms and products themselves 
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and their spread to all corners of the world. A culturally based anti-Americanism feeds on 
both, rejecting the nature of America‘s cultural exports and deploring their attractiveness to 
the world‘s populations. 
 
 
The Republic of Mass Culture
38
  
The United States is widely seen as the embodiment par excellence of mass consumption and 
mass culture. Popular culture – the fast food industry and its products, popular music, films, 
television, advertising, web sites and other computer-based media – is America‘s most visible 
and one of its most pervasive exports. There is an enormous American trade surplus in 
cultural matters. In countries without strong cultural protection laws, American music, films, 
and television programs appear far more frequently than other countries‘ music, films, and 
television programs appear in the United States, or for that matter, than do domestic 
productions
39
. Even countries that heavily subsidize their national film industry repeatedly 
complain about ‗unfair‘ competition from Hollywood on its home turf. Though other nations, 
not least in East Asia, have overtaken America in terms of mass production, and though the 
Indian Bollywood industry seriously rivals Hollywood in terms of output
40
, mass 
consumption and mass culture are seen as quintessentially American in origin. There are 
different opinions as to when consumer culture started, but there is widespread agreement that 
the flowing of consumer culture dates from the 1920s (Kammen 1999:53) and that it was, to a 
large extent, first and foremost an American phenomenon (ibid:55-69). This consumer culture 
was made possible by new modes of mass production, most famously pioneered by Henry 
Ford in the automobile industry
41
, but present within a wide range of economic sectors and 
increasingly available to large parts of the American public. Culture became an industry in the 
early twentieth century (Denning 1996:xvii), and though there is disagreement among 
scholars as to when mass culture was born
42
, or what exactly it encompasses
43
 (Kammen 
1999:3-26), it early on became associated with America more than with any other nation 
(ibid:62-69, and Pells 1997:205-262). Mass culture, having first seduced the American 
people, quickly became tempting to the European citizenry (Pells 1997:238) and later to 
populations worldwide. The soft power of cultural attraction was evident from the early 
twentieth century. Already in the interwar period, Hollywood caught the imagination of 
millions of European movie spectators and projected images of glamour that sharply 
contrasted with the lingering economic difficulties during the Depression. This was where 
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America exerted its greatest cultural influence, as cinema gradually became synonymous with 
Hollywood: ―The United States dominated every facet of popular filmmaking, and with it the 
power to ―Americanize‖ the imaginations, if not the behavior, of audiences throughout the 
world‖ (ibid:14). Jazz music, a quintessentially American phenomenon, excited new 
generations of Europeans and frequently met with the disapproval of older generations. 
During the 1930s, European intellectuals migrating to the United States had contributed to 
―Europeanizing‖ American culture (Fermi 1971:383-388, Pells 1997:22-31), but by the end of 
the Second World War, cultural supremacy had irrevocably passed from Europe to America 
(Leclerc 2000:444). It was however in the period following the end of the Second World War 
that American cultural products and norms began to seriously make an impact in Western 
societies. The Marshall Plan not only boosted the weak postwar European economies, it had a 
less publicized but no less significant cultural component as well. The Marshall Planners, 
writes Richard Pells, ―functioned as evangelists on behalf of the American way. Their mission 
was to make Western Europe resemble the United States‖ (1997:54), convinced that the 
European public was keen to emulate the American way. And though many European 
governments were skeptical, assuming ―that the United States intended for them to become 
not only loyal allies in the conflict with the Soviet Union, but also faithful consumers of 
American merchandise and American culture‖ (ibid:56), they accepted the premises of the 
recovery plan, ―while they grumbled about its arrogance‖ (ibid:57). The Marshall Plan was an 
example of deliberate and targeted soft power intended to enhance the attractiveness of 
America and its values. The U.S. State Department was acutely aware that culture constituted 
―an essential part of America‘s total international effort‖ and ―an aspect of American foreign 
policy‖ (Kellermann 1978:8). This was obvious to contemporary observers as well. Raymond 
Aron noted without resentment that it ―accelerated a historically significant trend – the spread 
in Europe of American products, customs, and ideas‖, while adding that ―Even without the 
Marshall Plan, this would certainly have occurred‖ anyway (in Burnham (ed.) 1953:197).  
In the 1950s, a host of American products gradually emerged as true products of 
mass culture. Coca Cola had long been sold from coast to coast, and with Ray Kroc‘s 
aggressive franchising of McDonald‘s and the adoption of blue jeans as the universal dress 
code of the young, an industry of mass culture was created (Kammen 1999:182-183) that was 
to spread worldwide in the following decades. Since the late 1960s and early 1970s, such 
products have become household brands worldwide, achieving almost iconic character. As 
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Richard Pells has noted, each European ―generation after World War II did seem more 
Americanized than its predecessor‖ (1997:240). The insurrection in some quarters against 
American culture is not limited to products that can be characterized as ‗cultural‘ in the 
strictest sense of the word. Alongside the fight against Hollywoodization, there is widespread 
rejection of what has been termed the McDonaldization (Ritzer 2000), Disneyfication (Zukin 
1995), Disneyization (Bryman 2004), coca-colonization (Kuisel 1991, Wagnleitner 1994, 
Howes 1996) or even McDisneyization (Ritzer and Liska 1997) of societies. Fast-food 
franchises like McDonald‘s are seen as symbols of the American way of life substituting the 
traditional local businesses and threatening local gastronomic traditions, leading to charges 
against an emerging McWorld (Barber 2001). Though much of the resistance to American 
products is dictated by economic fears of lagging too far behind the United States in trade 
exchanges, there is a conservative bias to much of the charges against American culture as 
well: that it entails a risk of erosion of the cultural values and norms of the importing 
societies. As Lieber notes, 
Culture, in the broadest sense, can evoke deeply emotional responses because of 
the way in which it encompasses both identity and beliefs. Contact with 
American culture and Western values often serves as a trigger for social 
resentments, especially in troubled regions where modernity is suspect and 
suppressed. At times, these bitter feelings are deflected from domestic and 
systemic causes and redirected at the United States as a convenient symbolic 
target. Under these circumstances, the root causes of anti-Americanism [..] lie 
within the societies and identities of those who promote them. (2005:96-97). 
 
Though Lieber has mostly non-Western societies in mind, the argument is valid for much 
European opposition to American cultural norms as well. It may well be, as Richard Pells 
argues, that the charges of Americanization in the cultural sphere are greatly exaggerated, 
especially in Europe. He convincingly describes how Europeans have ―resisted the 
standardization and homogeneity allegedly inflicted on them by their American masters‖, 
having instead frequently domesticated and ―Europeanized‖ the items and images they 
received from America (1997:279). He states that in essence, transatlantic cultural relations 
have been characterized more by cross-fertilization than by Americanization (ibid.), and that 
in this respect, the notion of Americanization of Europe is a myth, a ―powerful and enduring 
myth, often cherished by the Europeans themselves because they can use it to explain how 
their societies have changed in ways they don‘t like, but a myth nonetheless‖ (ibid:xiv). He is 
correct in the sense that though modernization is frequently associated with America, 
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sometimes to the extent where the terms modernization and Americanization are used 
synonymously, modernization of societies would to a large extent have taken place anyway 
without the example of America, although probably with different characteristics. However, 
the fact remains that there is an ingrained perception among many Europeans that their local 
cultures are becoming bastardized by the massive import of American cultural products. 
Irrespective of whether the prolific consumption of mass culture is due to the impact of 
Americanization or not, it is often perceived to be just that. Pells is nonetheless right in 
warning us against the simplistic assumption that mass culture has converted consumers 
world wide ―into a collection of zombies, docile and passive, too drugged to discriminate 
between art and trash, too hypnotized to switch off the television set or get off the information 
highway‖ (1997:279). And though ―Sometimes a movie is just a movie and a cheeseburger is 
just a cheeseburger‖ (ibid:282), there is especially among what is referred to as cultural elites 
an innate feeling that a Hollywood movie or a cheeseburger are symptoms of cultural 
degeneration, and that this degeneration originates from America. Already in 1955, Raymond 
Aron noted that 
The feeling that the ‗American way of life‘ – with the Reader‟s Digest, mass 
entertainment, loud and vulgar publicity – is guilty of aggression against 
superior forms of culture is [..] widespread among [..] intellectuals. [..] At the 
same time, there is a reluctance to invoke the cultural argument, which might 
sound reactionary. It is easier to attribute all the evil to ‗capitalism‘. [..] In fact, 
[intellectuals] hate Americanism not because of McCarthy or the capitalists, but 
because they are humiliated by American power and feel their cultural values 
threatened by the masses whose advancement, in the name of their ideologies, 
they are bound to applaud ([1955] 2001:252).  
 
America‘s vast exports of cultural products and norms have furthermore been significantly 
helped along by the pervasive impact of the English language – and vice versa. At least since 
the end of World War II, English has become the most important vehicular language, often 
referred to as the world‘s lingua franca (Dovring 1997)44; a powerful testimony to the 
influence of both colonial Britain in its heyday and its twentieth century successor, America 
(Garrison 2004). The languages of leading states have expanded throughout history, usually at 
the expense of other languages, yet the expansion of English worldwide has been unique 
compared with previous lingua francas (Phillipson 2005:5): ―Languages are the medium 
through which communication takes place in politics, commerce, defence, academia, the 
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media, technology, the internet, and most aspects of life‖ (ibid.), and as such the primacy of 
the English language gives advantages to English-speaking nations. According to Lieber,  
The growing linguistic globalization based on English as the common 
international language not only poses cultural questions, but also provides 
intrinsic advantages to the United States and other English-speaking countries. 
For example, the most skilled individuals from lands where the national 
language is not English tend to look abroad for education, career advancement, 
and better pay, and America has benefited from this ―brain drain‖. (2005:103) 
 
The worldwide impact of films in English might be a source of discontent to cultural anti-
Americans, worried about the effects of Hollywoodization on their national film industries, 
but the impact of the internet and, as Lieber suggests, of English as having become the 
language of commerce, science, and academia, is probably a much more powerful testimony 
to its embedment as what has been termed ―the language of power‖ (Phillipson, 2003:1 and 
5). This issue of language dominance invariably leads to the broader issue of cultural 
imperialism: ―the idea that a global culture is in one way or another liable to be a hegemonic 
culture‖ (Tomlinson 1999:79).  
Perceptions of hegemony are no less rejected because they are related to the 
cultural sphere than when they are related to the military, economic, or political sphere. But 
the perception of American cultural dominance not only leads to a rejection of this dominance 
per se, but also frequently to a rejection of the nature of this dominance. A common 
nineteenth century criticism of America was that it lacked culture (see examples in chapter 5). 
The same criticism is advanced today, albeit in almost the opposite meaning: that though 
America is arguably the world‘s largest exporter of cultural products, it is the wrong kind of 
culture that they promote. Their perceived lack of culture is no longer a lack of cultural 
products, but a lack of culture in the products that they export. These cultural exports are 
commonly attacked for having profound homogenizing effects on societies, limiting 
opportunities for diverse and original perspectives. Coupled with this is the concern of the 
sheer volume of American cultural exports, irrespective of any specific concerns with content. 
In this context, cultural anti-Americanism joins hands with opposition to the globalization 
process which is seen by some as another manifestation of America‘s bid to world hegemony. 
 
Anti-Americanism as anti-globalization 
The last decades of the twentieth century saw an increasing apprehension concerning the 
emergence of a global economy and a global culture. Globalization, ―a vague and, to some, a 
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terrifying concept‖ (Pells 1997:325), was perceived by its critics as an insidious threat to the 
nation state and its cultural identity (ibid:326-331). Complaints about the near-hegemonic 
nature of some cultures are not new. Historically, they can be traced back as far as to the 
impact of Hellenic culture and koine (common Greek language) on other Mediterranean 
cultures. In modern times, charges of cultural imperialism have frequently been leveled 
against the West and especially colonizing nations such as Britain and France. Critics have 
argued that Western nations have not only exported their notions and standards of culture to 
others (sometimes even by force); their incapacity to comprehend the diversity of other 
cultures has led them to maintain an essentially imperialist stance long after their policies of 
colonialism had been formally abandoned (e.g. Said 1993 and [1978] 1995). There is, as was 
noted above, widespread disagreement among scholars as to the nature and scope of 
globalization and whether it constitutes a new phenomenon or rather the latest phase in a long 
process of internationalization that has characterized the world since the late nineteenth 
century. Herman Daly has in this respect argued that although the terms internationalization 
and globalization are often used interchangeably, there is a formal difference. The term 
internationalization refers to the importance of international trade, treaties, and relations; 
globalization on the other hand entails the erasure of national boundaries for economic 
purposes where international trade, governed by comparative advantages, becomes 
interregional trade, governed by absolute advantages (1999). Irrespective of whether 
globalization does in fact constitute a new phenomenon, the popular perception of a rapidly 
globalizing world is, however, mainly a phenomenon that dates from the late 1980s, when the 
word entered the political agendas and indeed the global vocabulary (Friedman 2005). While 
most of the debates surrounding globalization are centered around its effects on local 
economies, seemingly threatened by the specter of out-sourcing, the cultural effects figure 
prominently as well. The anti-globalization discourse has two main features: economically, it 
centers on what is typically a badly veiled opposition to the capitalist market economy while 
culturally, it breeds on the fear of an erosion of national and local identities. 
The strong anti-capitalist undertones in the kind of anti-globalization rhetoric 
forwarded by movements such as ATTAC
45
 are evident. Here again, America is targeted as 
the world‘s capitalist nation par excellence, the embodiment of money-grabbing entrepreneurs 
with their eyes firmly set on amassing wealth without regard for its social consequences. 
Already Max Weber noted that ―in the United States, the pursuit of wealth, stripped of its 
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religious and ethical meaning, tends to become associated with purely mundane passions, 
which often actually give it the character of sport‖ ([1904-05] 1992:181-182). The economic 
anti-globalization discourse that presents America as its prime target of attack feeds on a 
powerful legacy of opposition toward both capitalism and its main symbol: the almighty 
dollar. And it is not just the influence of the dollar abroad that is opposed. The American 
society itself is depicted as a society dominated by the forces of speculation and exploitation, 
where low wage workers, bereft of a welfare system that can provide them with basic medical 
care, struggle to make ends meet. This American society, decried as characterized by ‗jungle 
capitalism‘, is presented as an anti-model, even by many otherwise sympathetic toward the 
United States. The term ‗American model‘ is today rarely meant positively. Quite the 
contrary; it is often used by politicians and opinion makers in Europe to denote a society that 
fails to properly care for those of its citizens that have been marginalized by the forces of raw 
capitalism
46
. This discourse frequently borders on anti-Americanism, mixing the two kinds of 
rejection that Katzenstein and Keohane have termed respectively social and sovereign-
nationalist anti-Americanism. Anti-globalization protesters have turned many of the factors 
that have traditionally fostered anti-Americanism into a political movement that is critical of 
the work and trade patterns associated with globalization. In this way, anti-globalization and 
anti-Americanism have become two sides of the same coin. Though America may be the 
primary target of rejection, most economic anti-globalization discourse, however, opposes a 
wide range of Western practices and institutions. The European Union and its policies of 
(relatively) free trade are increasingly rejected as much as America and perceived American 
clientelism. With the strong euro seriously rivaling the weakening American dollar and the 
increasing level of European foreign and direct investment in third countries, including the 
United States, economic anti-globalization discourses are directed as much against the West 
as such, or at least against Western economic institutions and practices, as they are directed 
against the United States, although ‗America‘ still remains a powerful image of resentment to 
many protesters
47
. 
But it is first and foremost in the cultural sphere and in the cross-section between 
culture and economy that anti-globalization becomes almost synonymous with anti-
Americanism. The soft politics of cultural policy have increasingly become hard politics of 
trade relations and foreign policy. Though America‘s exports of products of mass culture 
have, as noted above, been a highly visible part of America‘s soft power since at least the late 
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1950s, American cultural norms have increasingly been adopted by others, to an extent where 
the forces of globalization are viewed as much as a process whereby cultural norms and 
values are becoming steadily more global in nature: 
In an increasingly globalized world, culture has emerged as a central arena of 
conflict. Other issues on the globalization agenda, especially economic ones 
such as trade, aid, and investment, are more readily subject to negotiation and 
compromise, but culture in its various forms serves as a primary carrier of 
globalization and modern values. Cultural issues are so fraught precisely because 
of their impact on both individual and national identity, and because culture has 
become a signifier for other more deep-seated and intractable issues, the 
problems it poses are harder to resolve (Lieber 2005:120). 
 
Cultural globalization has accelerated the sensation of what has been termed delocalization 
(Thompson 1995) or deterritorialization (Canclini 1995, Featherstone 1995, Latouche 1996, 
Tomlinson 1999, Lull 2000). Canclini defines it as ―the loss of the ‗natural‘ relation of culture 
to geographical and social territories‖ (1995:229). Tomlinson sees it as ―something like a 
general cultural condition which proceeds from the spread of global modernity‖ (1999:148). 
Coupled with the unequal ―power geometry‖ of globalization, in which ―some people are 
more in charge of it than others; some initiate flows and movement, others don‘t; some are 
more on the receiving-end of it than others; some are more effectively imprisoned by it‖ 
(Massey 1994:149), globalization is experienced by many as an uneven process, where certain 
cultures impose themselves on societies unable to protect their local identities from being if 
not supplanted then at least watered down by the new impulses and norms. And where there is 
deterritorialization, there is, according to Tomlinson, attempts at reterritorialization, which 
can be witnessed in various attempts to re-establish a cultural ―home‖ (1999:148). Such 
attempts frequently present their own cultural identities as ―original‖ or ―authentic‖ and 
therefore in need of preservation, while adversely depicting the forces of uniform modernity 
as devoid of deeper, or original, qualities. As the primary representative of modernity, not 
least in the cultural sphere, America becomes the antithesis to the authentic and a challenger 
to local identities. Benjamin Barber‘s claim that the American mode of capitalism has turned 
into not just consumerism but also infantilism
48
 (2007) is probably shared by many. 
Perceptions of the degenerating nature of mass culture abound, and Americanization is 
blamed for its impact on both societies and hearts and minds. The soft power of attraction has 
turned into a sense of repulsion among those who most fervently oppose the effects of cultural 
globalization.  
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Conclusion 
America‘s soft power in terms of culture is impressive and important. There is no doubt that 
American cultural norms and products are highly attractive to large parts of the populations 
worldwide. This is an undeniable fact, as can be witnessed by the high level of demand for 
these products and the image they are thought to bestow on their purchasers. The Republic of 
Mass Culture, in other words, has loyal citizens throughout the world, eager to acquire the 
icons of American life and given the choice more than willing to pursue the American Dream. 
However, it also has numerous detractors, rejecting its nature and impact on other societies. 
And though these detractors represent a minority, even in their own societies (where the 
citizenry at large seem to embrace American culture), their discourse is carrier of both elitist 
and a national-sovereign anti-Americanism. With the advent of globalization, the opposition 
to the Americanization of world culture has received further impetus. Anti-globalists 
marching against ‗the evil effects of world capitalism‘ or ‗cultural imperialism‘ typically 
display an ill-concealed animosity toward the United States as the primary agent of 
globalization. American culture is highly visible in all corners of the globe; it is a symbol of 
American power and as such rejected by those who oppose either the modernity it represents 
or the Americanized variety that dwarfs the cultural impact of other societies, keen to export 
their products and values as well, but unable to rival America‘s cultural juggernaut. America‘s 
soft power of culture is a double-edged sword: it is truly a testimony to America‘s hegemonic 
status within the realm of culture, yet it is also an important area of contention for those who 
fear an erosion of their local cultural norms and values. It breeds anti-Americanism among 
those levels of societies who feel their national or local identities threatened by an 
Americanization that they feel powerless to oppose.    
 
3.5 Conclusion: The Rejection of American Power 
In this chapter, it has been argued that there is a strong correlation between contemporary 
opposition toward the United States and perceptions abroad of disproportionate or even 
excessive American power. This was illustrated first by surveys gauging the level of 
opposition toward America; a key component in much of the criticism directed at the United 
States was the perception of disproportionate American power and the ways in which this 
power has been wielded. The surveys reproduced in 3.1 showed a remarkable consistency in 
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the views of the polled regarding their views on not least U.S. foreign policy. While the 
surveys do not provide a complete or comprehensive picture of the grievances held towards 
the United States, they do offer some rather conclusive clues. Chief among them is the 
dimension of power, where there is a widespread perception that America wields excessive 
power over other nations and their inhabitants. While one should be wary of over-interpreting 
the results of such polls, a common complaint seems to be the perceived hegemonic status of 
the United States as well as opposition to some of the policies that have been carried out over 
the last decade. Yet, though the most frequent attacks are made with reference to the attributes 
associated with American hard power, popular denigration of elements of the American 
society such as its culture are attacks on another power dimension, namely that of soft power, 
as American cultural products have to a large extent become synonymous with globalization. 
On an overall level, it is fair to assume that the polls show a clear indication that America‘s 
power of attraction has been in decline over the past decade. 
The second part of this chapter sought to analyze the rejection of the United 
States in terms of the elements of power associated with it. This was analyzed by 
decomposing the notion of power into its dimensions of hard power and soft power as 
introduced by Joseph S. Nye. It was argued that the various notions of power can explain 
much of the anti-Americanism, including the major types identified by Hollander 
(nationalistic, anticapitalistic, and antimodernist) or by Katzenstein and Keohane (liberal, 
social, sovereign-nationalist, and radical, as well as the more particularistic varieties such as 
elitist and legacy anti-Americanism). Furthermore, an attempt was made to demonstrate that 
the power dimension is as relevant as regards the promise of American power as the actual 
existence of American power. It was argued that the focus on power is particularly important, 
as it is the dimension which gives anti-Americanism a specificity that sets it apart from other 
anti-isms. Viewing anti-Americanism in terms of rejection of American power presents a 
simple, yet to this author‘s mind convincing, explanatory cause for most, if not all, facets of 
anti-Americanism. This does not mean that anti-Americanism can be reduced to mere 
opposition to American power, or that America‘s power domination can explain all aspects of 
anti-Americanism, and the typology delineated by Katzenstein and Keohane (in Katzenstein 
and Keohane (eds) 2007) gives a good indication of the many different types of anti-
Americanism. Nevertheless, this study contends that at the heart of most of the different 
displays of anti-Americanism lies a rejection of facets of American power, and that even to 
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the extent that there are other, more psychological or ideological forces at play, these are 
―multiplied by simple jealousy of American power‖ (Revel, quoted by Higgott and Malbašić, 
in Higgott and Malbašić (eds) 2008:4). 
In terms of hard power, what has been called by some the American Empire 
reigns supreme in the dimensions of power mostly associated with empires: military power 
and economic power. While American historians previously rejected the association of 
notions of empire with the United States, this association has more or less ceased to cause a 
stir. It is, however, probably not as much the perception of America as an empire that fuels 
modern anti-Americanism as the perception that this empire has become a ‗colossus‘ with 
near-hegemonic powers. It is not unnatural for a dominating world power or near-hegemon to 
be universally rejected in some way or other. No country and no people take kindly to the idea 
that it is subordinated to another that can readily dictate its terms on the rest of the world. And 
the United States is not the only country that historically has been first among equals and as a 
result also the primary target of rejection. Anti-Americanism could in these terms just as 
easily be termed anti-hegemonism and analyzed as opposition to a dominating political force 
which, however benign its intentions might be, imposes serious limits on the ability of other 
states to pursue their policy actions. This perception of hegemony is not linked exclusively to 
the distribution of power or the attributes of power. It is linked as much to two other factors: 
the absence of present or potential counter-powers and the manner in which power is wielded. 
As such, American political, military, and economic primacy has become a defining feature of 
the international system to the extent where it was argued that the current international system 
is primopolar in nature. Primopolarity would indicate that while the international system is 
characterized by the relative fragmentation common to a multipolar system, there still exists 
one remaining superpower more capable of acting as primus inter pares than any other. It was 
argued in this respect that under such circumstances, the hard power attributes of anti-
Americanism could be considered almost a systemic feature of the current international 
system.  
The notion of soft power mostly carries positive connotations. Joseph S. Nye‘s 
observation that ―Anti-Americanism has increased in recent years, and the United States‘ soft 
power – its ability to attract others by the legitimacy of U.S. policies and the values that 
underlie them – is in decline as a result‖ (Nye 2004b:16) is a telling example: Basically, his 
premise is that soft power is being eroded by rising anti-Americanism. This study, however, 
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contends that such an assertion may very well be a case of confusing cause and effect, that is, 
if a more dualistic reading of the notion of soft power is accepted. In 3.4 it was argued that 
soft power can repel as much as hard power, at least if it is seen as overwhelming or 
insensitive to the wishes or values of other nations, and that in this respect, it would be 
erroneous to regard soft power as exclusively imbued with positive characteristics. Soft power 
is still, however soft it is presented, power. In relation to anti-Americanism as a rejection of 
America‘s soft power, it was suggested that it could be useful to analyze it in terms of the 
notions of political values and cultural norms. America‘s political values and cultural norms 
have had a tremendous impact on the rest of the world, frequently leading to charges of 
Americanization of the political and cultural institutions of other nations. In this respect, the 
United States had a substantial amount of soft power long before it acquired any dimension of 
hard power comparable to that of the great European powers of the day, namely the power of 
attraction. From the onset, America was born as a universal nation with a messianic quest, or 
manifest destiny, to spread its values. American exceptionalism and the feeling of 
representing a model to the rest of the world lies so deep in the national conscience that it has 
become one of the defining premises for regarding the rest of the world – as nations and 
populations eager to adopt the same values and embrace the same virtues as the great nation 
of futurity. The power of attraction of the United States has literally attracted people from all 
parts of the globe to the nation seemingly offering the best promise of ‗life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness‘. Yet the values on which America were founded have progressively 
ceased to be as exceptional as the American creed would have it (large parts of the world are 
now democracies, obeying human rights often far more diligently than the United States). As 
such, the soft power of attraction (and admiration to some) has been supplanted by the 
perception that the most exceptional feature of the United States is, its size and hard power 
attributes apart, its insistence on an exceptionality that allows it to submit to international 
rules and regulations only when it sees fit. The long American history of presenting the 
United States as an exceptional country or indeed an essential or indispensable nation gives 
the notion of primopolarity an extra dimension. The international system now reflects the 
belief that Americans have traditionally held of their own nation as superior compared with 
other nations. While American exceptionalism entailed a perception of superiority primarily 
in terms of values and aspirations, the realities of power have imbued these perceptions with a 
heightened sense of destiny. It is when these political values are transformed into foreign 
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policy aims and diplomatic practices that the American quasi-hegemonic might becomes a 
source of dissatisfaction among its allies. The inherent features of American political values, 
and not least those transposable on American foreign politics, suggest a possible recurrent 
source of anti-Americanism: a perception that in spite of the affirmations of universalistic 
values, the United States, seeing itself as an exceptional nation, pursues primarily a nationalist 
foreign policy agenda.  
Just as the United States has heralded a political modernity, America has become 
largely synonymous with what one might call a cultural modernity: American cultural 
products and norms have become global to an extent far more important than those of other 
countries. The notions of Americanization, modernization and globalization are increasingly 
being used to denote the same process, namely one whereby a particular model of production 
and consumption has imposed itself on a global scale. The charge against this perceived 
Americanization is that traditional norms and customs are being challenged by a new mindset 
and that this has largely been imported from America. As such, the dimension of American 
soft power that can be related to culture is important. The soft power dimension of cultural 
norms has two main components: the norms and products themselves and their spread to all 
corners of the world. A culturally based anti-Americanism feeds on both, rejecting the nature 
of America‘s cultural exports and deploring their attractiveness in the eyes of the world‘s 
populations.  Perceptions of hegemony are no less rejected because they are related to the 
cultural sphere than when they are related to the military, economic, or political sphere. But 
the perception of American cultural dominance not only leads to a rejection of this dominance 
per se, but also frequently to a rejection of the nature of this dominance. In this context, 
cultural anti-Americanism joins hands with opposition to the globalization process, which is 
seen by some as another manifestation of America‘s bid to world hegemony. The soft politics 
of cultural policy have increasingly become hard politics of trade relations and foreign policy. 
Perceptions of the degenerating nature of mass culture abound, and Americanization is 
blamed for its impact on both societies and hearts and minds. The soft power of attraction has 
turned into a sense of repulsion among those who most fervently oppose the effects of cultural 
globalization.  
Another factor needs to be taken into account: the national or nationalistic factor. 
While anti-Americanism can be conceived as unique by its universality, i.e. the global nature 
of its manifestations, it is also characterized by great divergences in the different countries 
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where it manifests itself. While present in all societies, anti-Americanism is markedly 
stronger in some countries than in others. While the causes of anti-Americanism that can be 
related to the power dimension are to be found in virtually all societies, each society has its 
own brand of anti-Americanism based on its own historic relationship with the United States, 
its own values, its own worldview, aspirations and perceptions. Scholars of anti-Americanism 
frequently highlight this dimension, which we can term national, nationalistic, or cultural. Yet 
in spite of the particularistic traits characterizing anti-Americanism in different societies, it is 
not inconceivable that these are to a large extent domestic reactions to perceptions of 
disproportionate American power. This will be discussed in the second part of this study. 
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4 Anti-Americanism and National Habitus 
 
It was noted at the onset of the study that the ambition was to present a structural analysis of 
an eminently cultural phenomenon. The first part of the study attempted to do this with regard 
to anti-Americanism as a general phenomenon, arguing that as a universal phenomenon, it 
could largely be analyzed in terms of rejection of American power, both hard and soft. Yet 
though it seems relatively straightforward to analyze the global rejection of America in terms 
of a rejection of American power, at least if the ambition is to outline the premises for a 
structural interpretation of the phenomenon in general terms, it becomes much more difficult 
to use such a basic concept as the sole framework of analysis for a particularistic analysis of 
anti-Americanism in one country. As opposed to the first part of this study, which focused on 
the general forces partaking in promoting anti-Americanism worldwide, the second part will 
focus more particularly on the forces, which can be regarded as predisposing the French mind 
against America. This does not mean that as a general phenomenon, anti-Americanism should 
be regarded in terms of rejection of American power, but that as a particularistic phenomenon, 
other explanations are more pertinent. It remains the contention of this study that by and large, 
the notion of a rejection of American power offers the best overall explanation for the 
phenomenon of anti-Americanism, whether in its general or in its more particularistic forms. 
However, the fact that anti-Americanism is a universal phenomenon does not entail that the 
United States is uniformly rejected by the world‘s nations or their inhabitants. The substantial 
body of literature on the phenomenon shows that there is clear evidence that America, and by 
extension American power, is rejected differently within different societies, both as regards 
the vehemence of the different anti-American narratives and the attributes associated with 
American power. Any particularistic account of anti-Americanism in one society is therefore 
bound to enter into a discussion of why the society in question harbors its specific form of 
anti-Americanism, i.e. why particular attributes of American power are perceived as 
especially oppressive or objectionable by the propagators of anti-American narratives in that 
society.  
Before progressing with an analysis of the particular and, as will be argued, 
constitutive elements, which contribute to engender anti-American emotions and actions in 
France, this chapter will attempt to sketch a conceptual and methodological framework, 
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through which a particularistic variety of identity-related anti-Americanism such as the 
French can by analyzed. It was noted in chapter 1 that anti-Americanism could best, at least 
within the IR tradition, be analyzed as a cultural phenomenon. It was further suggested that 
the cultural nature of a phenomenon such as anti-Americanism could best be understood in 
terms of identity, as the identity dimension is conducive to producing images of othering and 
that these can lay the foundations for subsequent (anti-American) behavior, an argument 
which will be expanded further upon in the present chapter. Paul Gilbert has noted that there 
is ―a distinction between culture as what guides people‘s behaviour, and culture as what 
makes them, in one supposed sense of the term, the particular people that they are‖ (Gilbert 
2000:33). This chapter will focus on both, arguing that the latter, which can for the purposes 
of this study be referred to as national identity, partakes in predisposing people sharing the 
common cultural identity associated with their belonging to a nation toward a certain shared 
Weltanschauung, which in turn affects their behavior. Beginning with a general discussion of 
national identity constructs, the present chapter will turn especially to the discipline of 
sociology in order to explore the notion of othering, arguing that perceptions regarding the 
Other can be regarded as deeply embedded in a nation‘s national habitus, to use another 
eminently sociological term. The relationship between national identity and national habitus 
will subsequently be used in chapter 5 as the conceptual linchpin for an analysis of the 
constitutive core of French anti-Americanism, i.e. the essential values which can be regarded 
as promoting anti-American predispositions in France, while chapter 6 will relate these to the 
situational factors in modern France, which have contributed to prompt the activation of anti-
American mechanisms and reactions. 
 
4.1 Modernism and the Study of National Identity  
The study of national identities has, as is the case for the study of culture as a factor in 
international relations and the admittedly more marginal research area of anti-Americanism, 
been subjected to renewed interest over the last decades (Østergård, in Andersen and 
Kaspersen (eds) 2000)
49
. In the 1970s and 1980s, scholars such as Ernest Gellner and Eric 
Hobsbawm succeeded in firmly imposing their modernist
50
 perspective on nationalism and 
national identity as the dominant paradigm in the field (Smith 2003:72), arguing that national 
identity should in essence be regarded as constructed through the mechanism of nationalism 
(Gellner 1964 and 1983, Hobsbawm 1990, Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds) 1983). Gellner early 
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on remarked that ―Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it 
invents nations where they do not exist‖ (1964:168), a point he maintains two decades later by 
reaffirming that ―It is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way round‖ 
(1983:55. See also Hobsbawm 1990:10 for similar claims). As opposed to the traditions, 
which emphasize the primordial or perennial nature of national identity (for example as 
developed by respectively Geertz 1973, and Seton-Watson 1977), modernists claim that 
nations and national identity have originated essentially as a result of the industrial society 
(Gellner 1964 and 1983), and that as such, they are ―very recent newcomer[s] in human 
history‖ (Hobsbawm 1990:5). Hobsbawm specifically traces the origins of national identity to 
the socio-political forces which were released by the French and American Revolutions 
(Hobsbawm 1990). Numerous scholars have taken their cue from this tradition, without 
however necessarily subscribing to all its elements. The latest challenge against the dominant 
modernist perspective comes from the alternative tradition of ―ethno-nationalism‖ (Smith 
1995) or ―ethno-symbolism‖ (Smith 2003). The sociologist Anthony D. Smith is usually seen 
as the primary representative of this relatively recent school (Treanor, in Gettel and Dunning 
(eds) 2004), and he has raised especially two points of contention against what he calls 
―structural modernism‖ (Smith 2003:72), both of interest to this study: the association 
between national identity and modernity, and the emphasis on the largely constructed nature 
of national identity, not least as represented by Hobsbawm‘s notion of ―invented traditions‖ 
(in Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds) 1983)
51
. Smith distances himself from the modernist 
perspective, although without embracing the perennial or primordial standpoints, arguing 
instead that the character of modern nations and thus of national identity should also be 
explained in terms of their antecedent popular ethnic memories, myths, and symbols, the 
conclusion being that nations and national identities have pre-modern origins (1991, 1995, 
2003). Building much of his argumentation on the notion of ethnies, which he defines as 
―named units of population with common ancestry myths and historical memories, elements 
of shared culture, some link with a historic territory and some measure of solidarity, at least 
among their elites‖ (1995:57), Smith stresses, and therein lies his principal dissociation from 
those within the primordialist tradition who focus on the objective, i.e. biological dimension 
of ethnicity (see for example Van den Berghe 1981 and 1995), that his focus on ethnies is 
essentially related to their subjective elements such as those related to memories, values, 
feelings, and symbols (Smith 1995:57). It is highly probable, as Smith argues, that the 
123 
 
mainstream modernist approach with its tendency to dismiss the pre-modern facets of national 
identity as largely the result of invented traditions, is vulnerable to criticism of constructing a 
theoretical case, which is highly Euro-centered in its approach, while frequently ignoring 
historical evidence found elsewhere (2003). Nevertheless Smith‘s own ethno-symbolist 
approach raises a number of questions, at least when applied to the present study. First, while 
there has admittedly been, as will be further discussed below, a strong tendency among the 
primary shapers of national identity to focus on the mythical past as evidence to a prolonged 
historical sense of belonging, as can be witnessed especially in the classical tradition of 
regarding national identity in terms of national genius, national spirit, or national 
characteristics (Karlsson 1997:93, Smith 1991:85-90, Jenkins and Sofos, in Jenkins and Sofos 
(eds) 1996:22-23), there is no escaping the fact that though there are undoubtedly pre-modern 
origins to many of the central tenets of modern national identity, these have largely been if not 
constructed, then at least reconstructed and remodeled in a willful attempt at forging a sense 
of national community among the members of modern nations. This is not least clear as 
regards the French national identity, as we shall se in chapter 5. Second, Smith‘s emphasis on 
ethnies appears problematic, even when referred to in a subjective sense. Though there can be 
no doubt that the perception of ethnicity features strongly in certain national cultures – and 
this is particularly prominent when we observe for example the German national identity
52
 – it 
nevertheless remains an inherently ambiguous notion, especially when applied to nations, 
which see themselves as universal nations, theoretically open to new members willing to 
share their values and aspirations. Two prime examples of such universal nations are, as will 
be argued in chapter 5, France and the United States. Smith is clearly attentive to this 
problem, and he attempts to solve it by stressing that for example the American national 
identity, although undeniably incorporating both several ethnies and multiethnic and 
universalist identity components, nonetheless builds largely on ―Anglo-Saxon culture‖ 
(1995:108, see also 1991:149). This is neither a controversial, nor a particularly convincing 
argument, if the intention is to highlight the importance of ethnies as constitutive of national 
identities. Greenfeld has for example made the same observation, yet nevertheless finds that 
―The American case illustrates the essential independence of nationality from geo-political 
and ethnic factors and underscores its conceptual, or ideological, nature‖ (1992:23). The same 
argument can, although perhaps with less emphasis, be transferred to France, where there 
undoubtedly is a perception of Gallic ancestry (largely constructed, as has been demonstrated 
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especially by Citron 1991) and Latin affiliation (less constructed, but equally problematic, as 
it largely refers to a much wider linguistic and cultural community than the one made up by 
territorial France, i.e. one incorporating several ethnies). The social anthropologist Thomas 
Hylland Eriksen has rightly stated that ―The question which must be asked pertains to whether 
or not ethnic identities are by default more ‗basic‘ than others. Some would say yes, others 
would say no – and that is the state of the art‖ (1993:154). Smith would seem to say yes, 
Etienne Balibar clearly says no: 
No nation possesses an ethnic base naturally, but as social formations are 
nationalized, the populations included within them, divided up among them or 
dominated by them are ethnicized – that is, represented in the past or in the 
future as if they formed a natural community, possessing of itself an identity of 
origins, culture and interests which transcends individuals and social conditions. 
(in Eley and Suny (eds) 1996:140) 
 
Basically, the perception of ethnicity may be an important component of national identity if it 
is felt as important, yet this does not imply that it can be imposed as the constitutive element 
of national identities as such
53
. By and large, I am inclined to agree with Greenfeld when he 
emphasizes that 
―ethnicity‖ in itself is in no way conducive to nationality. ―Ethnic‖ 
characteristics form a certain category of raw material which can be organized 
and rendered meaningful in various ways, thus becoming elements of any 
number of identities. National identity, in distinction, provides an organizing 
principle applicable to different materials to which it then grants meaning, 
transforming them thereby into elements of a specific identity. (1992:13-14) 
 
Third, the fact that there may be pre-modern origins to the modern nations (but even the most 
ferocious of the structural modernists accept that: Gellner describes how nationalism 
―sometimes take pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, 
and often obliterates pre-existing cultures‖ (Gellner 1983:49), Hobsbawm talks of ―proto-
nationalism‖ to denote certain pre-modern variants of feelings of collective belonging 
(1990:46)) does not mean that Smith succeeds in convincing at least this reader that we need 
to antedate the birth of the modern nation. Smith argues that the analysis put forth by 
modernists is ―elite-oriented‖ (2003:83), i.e. that the constructivist notion of invented 
traditions implies that the elites are the primary forces, which construct, shape, or invent such 
traditions. Yet the same could be said for Smith‘s ethno-symbolic school given that he 
concedes that the notion of solidarity, which he associates with the ethnies, may be especially 
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found ―among their elites‖ (1995:57). Furthermore, by remarking that 1789 ―marked the 
moment of transition from ‗nationalism as a form of culture‘ [..] to ‗nationalism as a form of 
politics‘‖ (1991:94), Smith effectively validates much of the modernist assertion about the 
birth of the modern nation. This does not mean that the reservations he raises are not valid, 
and he has made a compelling case for including the symbolist dimension to national identity 
and for focusing also on alternative explanations for extra-European nationalism. However, he 
has neither persuaded this reader that ethnies should be regarded as the constitutive part of 
national identity, nor that the pre-modern origins of the nations invalidate the modernist 
claims regarding the essentially modern nature of national identity, at least as regards Europe 
and North America. This, however, does not mean that the modernist explanation should be 
subscribed to part and parcel. A central modernist claim is that nationalism and by extension 
national identity is a feature of the ―age of nationalism‖ (Gellner 1983:39-52), an age which is 
perceived as having both a starting point (typically attributed to industrialism and/or the 
French Revolution) as well as an end. Hobsbawm predicted in 1989 that the age of 
nationalism was drawing to a close, with nationalism and national sentiment ―retreating 
before‖, or even ―being absorbed or dislocated, by the new supranational restructuring of the 
globe. Nations and nationalism will be present in this history, but in subordinate, and often 
rather minor roles‖ (Hobsbawm 1990:182). That turned out to be a rather premature 
assessment. The last decade of the twentieth century saw, as George Schöpflin has noted, a 
―sudden return of nationalism‖, reemerging ―as a significant political force in the world 
system‖ (in Kupchan (ed.) 1995:37). In an era of globalization, there is little doubt that 
nationalism is still very much alive and kicking – one can tell by the kicking.  
Though the modernist claims for associating national identity with modernity are 
strong, the modernist approach, especially in what Smith has termed its ―structural‖ form, 
nonetheless needs to be qualified. Although Smith describes ethno-symbolism as the fourth 
paradigm within the study of nationalism and national identities (2003:83), his emphasis on 
the subjective nature of identity build around the notion of ethnies and his acceptance and 
reformulation of relatively many of the core assumptions presented by the modernists, leads 
me to wonder whether ethno-symbolism should not be seen as a modified version of 
modernism rather than as a fourth independent tradition. Smith acknowledges that so far, 
ethno-symbolists have not developed a theory of nationalism, but only an alternative 
approach, which can act as a necessary corrective to the existing traditions (2003:88). This 
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would imply that some of the relevant observations raised by the ethno-symbolists could well 
be applied also in a largely modernist analysis of national identities, which could benefit from 
a softening of some of its more dogmatic notions regarding especially the constructed or 
‗invented‘ nature of national identities. This is in essence the approach taken by another 
modernist, Benedict Anderson, who has presented us with a more nuanced reading of national 
identity, which he analyzes through the notion of ―imagined communities‖ (1991). To 
Anderson, the nation can best be described as an ―imagined political community‖, which ―is 
imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their 
fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of 
their communion‖ (1991:6). Anderson‘s emphasis on the imagined nature of the nation and 
thus of national identity is clearly an attempt at softening the determinist dimension of 
structural modernism. As opposed to Gellner and Hobsbawm, ―who concentrate on the 
political aspects of nationalism‖, Anderson is more concerned with understanding ―the force 
and persistence of national identity and sentiment‖ (Eriksen 1993:100). While subscribing to 
the pervasive modernist view that nations were born in the age of ―Enlightenment and 
Revolution‖ (Anderson 1991:7), he nevertheless finds that there is a drawback to the 
―ferocity‖ with which some modernist scholars have stressed the invented origins of nations: 
Gellner is so anxious to show that nationalism masquerades under false 
pretences that he assimilates ‗invention‘ to ‗fabrication‘ and ‗falsity‘, rather than 
to ‗imagining‘ and ‗creation‘. [..] In fact, all communities larger than the 
primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are 
imagined. Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, 
but by the style in which they are imagined. (ibid:6) 
 
Anderson‘s approach is compelling, as it maintains the largely imagined dimension of 
national identities, without necessarily attributing them with the label of falsity commonly 
associated with the modernist tradition. It is certainly a fact, as David Miller notes, that 
―because of the historical dimension of the nation, together with the idea that each nation has 
its own distinct character, it is uncomfortable to be reminded of the forced nature of one‘s 
national genesis‖ (Miller 2000:31). Yet it should be borne in mind that this notion of 
construction or imagination of a national identity has far older antecedents than the theories 
proposed by modernists. In his Projet Corse, Rousseau famously declared that ―The first rule 
which we have to follow is that of a national character: every people has, or must have, a 
character; if it lacks one, we must start by endowing it with one‖ (quoted by Smith 1991:75). 
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The modernist approach to the subject of national identity is of particular interest 
for the study of French anti-Americanism, as it highlights three important factors in relation to 
national identity: First, the association between the birth of the nation and modernity, which is 
typically dated to the French and American Revolutions. Second, the assertion of the largely 
constructed nature of national identities. Third, the role played by the elites in shaping or 
influencing this construction. As we shall see in chapter 5, these three factors seem 
particularly validated when applied to the French national identity, a fact which many 
modernists would probably consider a tautology, given that Republican France in their view 
represents the first modern nation (Hobsbawm 1990)
54
. Yet for there to be an imagined 
community, there must be, as Michael Billig argues, ―acts of collective imagination, which 
‗invent‘ the national society‖ (in Breakwell and Lyons (eds) 1996:185). I would argue that 
such acts of collective imagination can be regarded as typically being built around what one 
might call the major vectors of national identity. While there are, as Renan already noted in 
his famous lecture on the subject, no firm criteria of nationhood (Renan 1882), it should 
nevertheless be possible to define a number of vectors, around which narratives regarding the 
national self are most commonly constructed. Anthony D. Smith has defined five interrelated 
components, on which he claims that national identity is constructed, and these he names as 
―ethnic, cultural, territorial, economic and legal-political‖ (1991:15). Though these five 
components are indeed important, the latter three can largely be regarded as essentially 
political (and geo-political) in nature, while a religious component is strangely absent, given 
that religion plays an tremendously important role as a major component within some national 
identities
55
. Instead of adopting Smith‘s five components, this study will argue that the 
narratives surrounding national identity typically evolve around four major vectors, which can 
be termed political, cultural, religious, and ethnic, and that perceptions of national identity are 
constructed and developed along these major vectors, which in term can give rise to four 
archetypical ideational narratives: 
 The political narratives surrounding national identity, typically centered on the 
historical nature of the geographical entity associated with the nation (whether in the 
form of a state or not), its political traditions, socio-economic practices etc. 
 The cultural narratives, which relate to the determining cultural characteristics, 
including language, habits, cultural outputs, symbolic artifacts etc., which contribute 
to give a nation its cultural distinctiveness. 
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 The religious narrative, which concerns the place (or non-place) of religion in society 
or among the different ethnic groupings comprising society. 
 The ethnical narratives, which relate to perceptions of ethnicity among the members 
belonging to a nation. These perceptions may be inclusive, i.e. not necessarily 
considered as limited to any original ethnie, as long as the other identity variables are 
subscribed to, or exclusive, in the sense of being inherently associated with one 
dominating ethnie.  
 
It is the contention of this study that narratives surrounding national identity can largely be 
traced somewhere along these four vectors. There will undoubtedly be numerous overlaps, 
just as some of the vectors will have a stronger impact in some nations than in others. In some 
cases, the religious and ethnical vectors may largely be seen as one (for example if we 
consider Judaism in relation to the state of Israel), whereas in other societies, the religious or 
the ethnical vector might be fairly weak. Conversely, in a number of societies, especially in 
the Muslim world, the ethnic or religious vector appears to be stronger than the political, 
whereas in some tribal societies, the political – and indeed the national identity itself – seem 
to be wholly subordinated to the ethnic (tribal) identity. Yet I would argue that these four 
vectors constitute the four lines of demarcation, along which narratives concerning national 
identity typically evolve. Even if one finds that for example the ethnic or the religious 
narrative can largely be regarded as subcomponents situated somewhere along the cultural 
vector, there is little doubt that in some nations, these narratives play such an important role in 
relation to the primary dimensions of (national) identification that they warrant special 
attention. One can further argue that these four vectors represent the lines according to which 
people typically differentiate their national identity from that of others.  
 
4.2 National Identity and the Creation of ‘We’ and ‘Them’ Images 
There is, regardless of the academic tradition subscribed to, a broad consensus among 
scholars of national identity on the fact that national identity – like any other identity – largely 
evolves around the demarcation from others. Identity stems from the post-classical Latin word 
identitas. The prefix stems from idem, meaning ‗same‘, and identitas is thus traditionally 
translated in the meaning ‗sameness‘. Linguistically, it is operative only dialectically in 
relation to its opposite, ‗otherness‘, as nothing can be the same as something without at the 
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same time being distinct from something else (Therborn 1995:229). Anthropologists such as 
Fredrik Barth have taken this a step further, arguing four decades ago that groups are defined 
by their boundaries (Barth 1969:15), leading to the assertion that there can be no ―us‖ without 
―them‖ (Billig 1995:78), and that ―Alter is primary to Ego‖ (Therborn 1995:229)56. This gives 
the notion of identity a divisive as well as a uniting dimension: One nation or group of people 
which feels united by shared beliefs or practices will feel different from others precisely 
because they perceive that these values and beliefs demarcate them from others (Gilbert 
2000:38). Ideational and cultural values are at the core of image-building, and the self that 
constitutes national identity is closely related to the ‗Other‘ to which it is opposed: ―national 
identities are constituted in relation to others; the very idea of the nation presupposes that 
there are other nations, or at least other peoples, who are not members of the nation‖ (Eriksen 
1993:111), and as such, ―delineation of a self from an other is an active and ongoing part of 
identity formation‖ (Neumann 1995:28). Borrowing from George Herbert Mead‘s notion of 
―Significant Others‖ (1934), Triandafyllidou takes this argument a step further: 
Indeed, for the nation to exist, it is presupposed that there is some other 
community, some other nation, from which it needs to distinguish itself. The 
nation thus has to be understood as a part of a dual relationship rather than as an 
autonomous, self-contained unit. [..] The identity of a nation is defined and/or 
re-defined through the influence of ‗significant others‘, namely other nations or 
ethnic groups that are perceived to threaten the nation, its distinctiveness, 
authenticity and/or independence. (1998) 
 
If we apply this to the modernist notion of the nation as a constructed or imagined 
community, it becomes clear that national identity is largely constructed also, and perhaps 
even primarily in relation to other communities (Stråth, in Stråth (ed.) 2000). In the 
eighteenth centuries, historicism, ―the belief in the birth, growth, efflorescence and decay of 
peoples and cultures‖, became, as Smith has noted, ―increasingly attractive as a framework 
for inquiry into the past and present and as an explanatory principle in elucidating the 
meanings of events, past and present‖ (Smith 1991:87). It was around such historicist 
narratives, with their imbued ―essentialist understandings of ‗national character‘‖, that images 
of the Self and of Others became constructed (McDonald, in MacDonald (ed.) 1997:231). As 
the age of dynastic rivalries was being replaced by the age of nationalism, these narratives 
became elevated from an intellectual pastime among the elites and formed into a common 
national narrative imposed on the people in order to instill them with a shared sense of 
national identity. The narratives of national identity, which gained in momentum from the 
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nineteenth century onwards (Østergård, in Andersen and Kaspersen (eds) 2000), can, as 
argued above, be regarded as evolving along a number of main vectors, yet it should be 
emphasized that these vectors are not just related to perceptions of the national Self. Rather, 
they should be perceived as having a dialectical nature, promoting a sense of national self-
identification while simultaneously contrasting this self-identification with perceptions 
regarding the Others in what Anna Triandafyllidou has called the ―Janus-faced‖ process of 
national identity (2002:26): ―Through signifying Otherness, members of the ingroup also 
define who they are and which are the specific features that render, in their view, their 
community particular and unique‖ (ibid:32). This study will argue that this dialectical 
demarcation of the national Self from the Other primarily takes place on three overlapping, 
yet distinguishable levels, all inherently present in narratives surrounding national identity: 
1. Differentiation from the Other, i.e. by emphasizing the uniqueness and authenticity of 
the national Self, 
2. Preservation from the Other, i.e. by promoting narratives regarding the importance of 
protecting the nation (and the national Self) from being dominated by the other, 
3. Denigration of the Other, the aim being to contrast the national Self with stereotypes 
regarding the Other, typically of a negative nature. 
 
First, the literature on national identity is unanimous in emphasizing the importance of 
differentiation as a key element in the imagining (or construction) of national identities. 
Nations have throughout attempted to stress their uniqueness both by endowing themselves 
with national symbols perceived as particularly representative of their distinctiveness and by 
promoting a distinct national narrative, typically articulated with reference to the 
mythological past. The nation state is, as Gutiérrez notes, ―committed to fulfilling three basic 
goals: the standardization of practices, the construction of homogeneity and the delimitation 
of cultural originality‖ (in Dieckhoff and Gutiérrez (eds) 2001:9). Since the nineteenth 
century, nation states have attempted to fulfill these goals by actively promoting the use of a 
common national language wherever applicable (Gellner 1983, Karlsson 1997) and not least 
by promoting nationally oriented curriculums in schools and universities, in order to forge a 
collective identity built around notions of past and present national glories. The impact of 
national historiography on the construction of national identity is well documented (Citron 
1991, Smith 1991, Weber 1979, Zeldin 1977). Uffe Østergård has even argued that 
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―professional historiography owe[s] its existence to precisely the formation of the national 
states‖ (in Andersen and Kaspersen (eds) 2000:453). According to Therborn, collective 
identities have, like other constructions, ―their architects, their entrepreneurs and their 
builders‖ (1995:229), and as such, we may attribute the primary role as regards the 
construction of images of the national Self to the ―intellectuals and [..] the political will of the 
state‖ (Tishkov 1997:21), i.e. to the ―social elites‖ (Nieguth 1999:259), keen to forge a sense 
of national consciousness among the newly invented concept of ―people‖ (Østergård, in 
Andersen and Kaspersen (eds) 2000:456). This national consciousness was early on 
essentially centered on what was previously termed the ―national genius‖ (Smith 1991:87), 
which Ernest Renan eminently described in his lecture Qu‟est-ce qu‟une nation? 
Un passé héroïque, des grands hommes, de la gloire (j‘entends de la véritable), 
voilà le capital social sur lequel on assied une idée nationale. Avoir des gloires 
communes dans le passé, une volonté commune dans le présent ; avoir fait de 
grandes choses ensemble, vouloir en faire encore, voilà la condition essentielle 
pour être un peuple. [..] Une nation est donc une grande solidarité, constituée par 
le sentiment des sacrifices qu‘on a faits et de ceux qu‘on est disposé à faire 
encore. (1882:26-27) 
 
This was the sense of national sentiment, which nineteenth century historiography attempted 
to impose, and though Renan shrewdly added that to get one‘s history wrong is ―un facteur 
essentiel de la formation d'une nation‖ (ibid:7), there is no doubt that national glorification 
was (and frequently remains) an essential part of the national identity discourse. This national 
glorification was simultaneously meant to demarcate the nation from other nations, lacking 
the virtues on which this glorification was supposedly built. With time, the emphasis on past 
glories may have somewhat faded, to be replaced by for example pride in the nation‘s 
political, socio-economical traditions or cultural features, which have come to be represented 
as ―emblems of difference‖ (Triandafyllidou 2002:30). As such, national identity has 
continued to provide ―a powerful means of defining and locating individual selves in the 
world, through the prism of the collective personality and its distinctive culture‖ (Smith 
1991:17).  
Second, inherent in all notions regarding national specificity is the perception 
that the nation and its distinctiveness need to be preserved and protected. Depending on the 
historical period, the perceived challenges or threats against a nation have changed, and so has 
as a consequence the identification of the Other, against whom protection was needed (Said 
1995:332, McDonald, in Macdonald (ed.) 1997:228-233). Triandafyllidou distinguishes 
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(2002:39-42) between four types of ―external Significant Others‖: 1) the dominant nation, 
against which the in-group seeks to liberate and/or distinguish itself, 2) neighboring nations, 
which might pose a direct territorial threat to the in-group, 3) nations, which do not 
necessarily contest territorial boundaries or pose a military threat, but which threaten the in-
group‘s sense of uniqueness and authenticity, and 4) transnational entities, which might 
indirectly challenge the territorial and political identity of the nation
57
. She further notes that 
these four types typically relate to different phases of a nation‘s history, although there might 
be considerable overlaps. The first type she finds particularly relevant for the initial stages of 
state formation (ibid:39), and to this corresponds the core of nationalist myths according to 
which, ―the nation is born, or arises from a painful rite of passage where it has to fight its 
adversaries‖ (Eriksen 1993:112). The second type corresponds to the standard notions of the 
hereditary enemy inherited largely from the age of dynasties, where close geographical 
neighbors were frequently engaged in territorial disputes. The driving force behind 
geopolitical considerations before the nineteenth century was not ethnic or linguistic unity, 
but rather the ambition to achieve a territory, which was geographically coherent and easy to 
defend (Herslund 2002:99). Yet with the advent of modernity, dynastic rivalries were 
transformed into national rivalries through the workings of national historiography. The 
nations‘ elites promoted the notion of a national genius largely with reference to the past 
glories of the old dynasties, complete with the baggage of historic rivalries and enmities with 
other dynasties, which was now elevated to the national level. Even as some of the dynasties 
fell, the rivalries lingered on, as ancient grievances were transformed into claims regarding 
national destinies and the protection of the nation from foreign influence or domination. This 
competition among nations typically had, as had been the case in the age of dynasties, a 
geopolitical component, yet could exist equally well without one, as protection of the nation 
increasingly came to be regarded not only as a protection of its borders or citizens, but also of 
its values and distinctiveness. This corresponds to the third type identified by Triandafyllidou. 
―Une nation est une âme, un principe spirituel‖, affirmed Renan (1882:26), and as the 
nineteenth century progressed, the cultural fabric of a nation became not just an underlying 
variable that determined the perception of the world; its preservation became an end in itself. 
Today, safeguarding the national identity and cultural autonomy has become not as much a 
matter of preserving the nation‘s borders intact as increasingly in the modern world a matter 
of preserving a matter of life that has been labeled national (Eriksen 1993). 
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Third, archetypes about the national Self, seen as condensing the essence of the 
national genius, are typically contrasted with stereotypes about the Other, usually of a much 
less flattering nature: ―While archetypes reinforce a sense of cultural pride by encouraging 
emulation and admiration, stereotypes convey prejudices and derogatory meanings towards 
other[s]‖ (Gutiérrez, in Dieckhoff and Gutiérrez (eds) 2001:13). At the core of the othering 
impulses inherent in national identities, we find not only a case of demarcation from the 
Significant Other, we also typically (though not exclusively) find one of perceptions of 
superiority. The national identity components are not just presented as authentic or distinctive 
to the nation in question; they also typically enter into what Østergård has called an 
―asymmetric relationship‖ (in Andersen and Kaspersen (eds) 2000:462) with the images 
bestowed on the Other, whereby the national genius is contrasted to the stereotyped attributes 
associated with the Other. While these are typically of a negative nature, this needs not always 
be the case. The stereotypical Other ―can involve looking either up or down at an idealised or 
denigrated object‖ (Pickering 2001:71), and as such ―identity should not be conceived as just 
a blank negation of the Other‖ (Therborn 1995:230). Triandafyllidou emphasizes that though 
the Significant Other always poses a challenge to the nation, this challenge is not necessarily 
seen as constituting a threat, but can also of a positive nature, as when the Other is  ―perceived 
as an object of admiration and esteem, an exemplary case to be imitated, [..] a higher ground 
to be reached by the nation, in brief, an inspiring Significant Other‖ (2002:34). Alexander 
Wendt has similarly suggested that ―Identification is a continuum from negative to positive – 
from conceiving the other as anathema to the self to conceiving it as an extension of the self‖ 
(1994:386). But given that the Significant Others ―are by definition groups that share with the 
nation some common features‖, the inspiring Significant Other may for a number of reasons 
turn into a ―threatening Significant Other‖ (Triandafyllidou 2002:34). This may for example 
come about either because the virtues formerly associated with the Other have ceased to be 
admired, or because they have been so successfully emulated by the nation that it now 
perceives the Other as a rival with respect to these virtues. This is especially the case as 
regards what Rainer Emig terms the ―cultural Other‖, who is typically perceived as ―at once 
an ideal worthy of emulation and a bogeyman that must be distrusted. To complicate matters 
further, what represents the bogeyman in the Other generally displays close affinities with 
what a culture perceives as negative and threatening in itself‖ while at the same time 
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representing ―a slyly externalized suppressed element of the cultural self-image‖ (in Emig 
(ed.) 2000:8). Emig further notes that 
While stereotypes [..] teach us little about the Other, they teach us a great deal 
about ourselves, our dreams, ideals, but also about our anxieties and fears. [..] 
They function as structures of demarcation, but also assimilation. They assert a 
problematic selfhood through imagining a different Other – who is both 
strangely attractive (creating the narcissistic desire of emulation) as well as 
threatening and objectionable (bringing out tendencies of abjection or 
straightforward bedevilment). (ibid.) 
 
In the end, ―the Other is always constructed as an object for the benefit of the subject who 
stands in need of an objectified Other in order to achieve a masterly self-identification‖ 
(Pickering 2001:71), and stereotyping contributes by homogenizing ―this or that stereotypical 
attribute or trait‖ to bolster the legitimacy of the Self ―by its symbolic exclusion of the Other‖ 
(ibid:74). This contributes to a process, where even a ―positive definition of national identity 
ultimately rests on exclusion and negative characteristics‖ (Østergård, in Andersen and 
Kaspersen (eds) 2000:462).  
This clearly is of interest for the analysis of a phenomenon such as anti-
Americanism. The role of stereotypization in relation to anti-Americanism has often been 
raised (Joffe 2006a and 2006b, Hollander 1995), and if we accept the contention made here 
that the more particularistic causes of anti-Americanism can be regarded as linked with key 
elements of national identities, the role of the Self and perceptions regarding the Other 
become crucial to such an analysis. Furthermore, the literature on othering and stereotyping 
seems particularly interesting when we examine the phenomenon of anti-Americanism in 
France. As will be argued in chapter 5, France and the United States share a number of 
essential values, around which their national identities can be said to evolve. Social 
psychological research on group behavior shows us that we may typically expect the strongest 
competition between two groups to occur when the groups closely resemble each other 
(Turner 1975, Volkan 1985 and 1988), given that they will have a particular tendency to 
perceive their distinctiveness and uniqueness as threatened by the Other (Johnston and 
Hewstone, in Abrams and Hogg (eds) 1990). As will be argued below, this seems a 
particularly relevant observation when we analyze how the constitutive elements of French 
national identity can be considered as rivaled by some of the core American ideals. 
Furthermore, there can be little doubt that the combination of national archetypes and 
stereotypes regarding the Other is bound to influence not just the mind, but also the behavior 
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of people. This will be of particular interest when we turn to chapter 6, which will look more 
specifically on the actions and narratives, which may be perceived as influenced, at least to a 
certain degree, by anti-American predispositions. Though there is a certain hesitancy among 
some toward relating national identity with behavior, this study contends that there is a clear 
link, and that this can best be conceptualized by interpreting the impact of national archetypes 
and stereotypes regarding the Other in relation to the notion of habitus – as an ingrained part 
of national perceptions that has become so embedded in the national identities, that it partakes 
in shaping behavior. 
 
4.3 National Habitus and Collective Behavior 
Alex Inkeles finds that national character ―must be defined conceptually as a determinant of 
behavior rather than concretely as a form of behavior‖ (1997:14). This is undoubtedly true, 
yet at the same time, collective identities provide a system of orientation for self-reference 
and action (Ross, in Lichbach and Zuckerman (eds) 1997:42). Notions of who ‗we‘ are 
contribute to guide our perception of the world and thus our political actions (Jönsson 1984, 
Little and Smith 1988), and in this perspective, identities ―shape the behavior of people‖ 
(Huntington 2004:22). Nevertheless, there is a need to conceptualize how identity can 
influence behavior. Inkeles‘ preference is ―to define national character as having reference to 
personality patterns‖ (Inkeles 1997:11), arguing that they can be analyzed using a ―modal 
personality‖ framework. As opposed to Inkeles‘ approach, which has as its point of departure 
a psycho-sociological perspective, this study focuses not so much on the individual 
psychological traits as on the more or less institutionalized ideational and cultural repertoires. 
Yet there is a case for operationalizing the notion of national identity in order to assess how it 
can contribute to promote not just a certain image of the Self in relation to the Other, but also 
how it can be regarded as laying the foundation for subsequent behavior. This study will 
argue that this can best be done by linking the notion of national identity with the concept of 
habitus. 
In sociology, the term habitus is today connected especially to the works of 
Pierre Bourdieu, and though the term has a long prehistory
58
, it has become so associated 
with his terminology, that this arguably provides the most straightforward starting point for 
an analysis wishing to use the concept. In Bourdieu‘s terminology, it denotes socially 
acquired, embodied systems of dispositions and/or predispositions. It refers not to character, 
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identity, or socialization per se, but to ‗deep structural‘ classificatory and assessment 
propensities, socially acquired, and manifested in among others outlooks and opinions 
(Bourdieu 1977). While Bourdieu does not use the term in relation to questions of national 
identity
59
, it might be an interesting path to follow in the attempt to get a better grip of how 
predispositions stemming from the core of national identities can be seen as inductive toward 
a certain form of behavior. Bourdieu reintroduced the concept in order to make sense of why 
people in the same or similar social classes, economic status and cultural affiliations behave 
in remarkably alike ways. To Bourdieu, ―the habitus contains the solution to the paradoxes of 
objective meaning without subjective intention‖ (1999:114), and he holds that an individual‘s 
actions are as much a product of his or her conditioned perception of the world as they are 
stimulated by individual intent. In his terminology, the concept of habitus is inextricably 
linked to the concept of doxa, i.e. an ingrained perception of the world surrounding us
60
. 
According to Bourdieu, the doxa constitutes a system of values and acknowledged 
preconceptions which forms the basis of a group‘s action and communication. It is at the 
same time a system of perception and misperception: Stereotypes allow us to comprehend 
what we perceive as reality while at the same time being an obstacle for a deeper and more 
elaborate comprehension of the world surrounding us. The doxa facilitates communication 
by reproducing the dominant collective belief-representations and is legitimated by its 
beholders as it is accepted at large as true, while at the same time being unverifiable 
(Bourdieu 1979:72-73). This almost unquestionable orthodoxy operates as if it was the 
objective truth and affects, indeed forms the perceptions of individuals and permeates the 
practices and perceptions of the social groups to which individuals belong. In association 
with all the stimuli – social experiences, whether of one‘s own making or inflicted, whether 
conscious or unconscious – that we are subjected to, it becomes part of our habitus, acting as 
some kind of second nature and guiding our behavior (Jerlang and Jerlang 1996:365-9). 
Bourdieu makes the case that the process of socialization is a continuous line of experiences 
gained within a certain class, status or social group, which help to define the way one sees 
the world (1999:113). The habitus is inescapable, for once one is born into one group, that 
group‘s habitus becomes ingrained or socialized into that person. Because people in the same 
social group, class or economic situation share similar experiences, it is likely that these 
people will share a similar understanding of the world. In other words, the environment 
produces the experiences that form that person‘s view of the world. This does not mean that 
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individuals are forever locked into a firm, unchangeable habitus. The habitus might be 
inescapable, but it will evolve as the individual progresses in life and acquires new 
experiences, aspires to become included in new social groups etc. Bourdieu furthermore 
suggests that perhaps the predictability of behavior that is instilled in humans by the habitus 
is its greatest hidden effect (ibid.). Put differently, because the habitus frames the way certain 
groups of people see the world, it contributes to reproducing behavior within the groups to 
which they belong: It is a ―structuring structure‖, which generates action (Swartz 1997:102). 
It is tempting to analyze national stereotypes and processes of othering with 
respect to the notion of habitus, as this allows us to link identity with behavior. Norbert Elias, 
who used the term ‗habitus‘ long before its popularization by Bourdieu (Dunning and 
Mennell, in Elias 1996:ix), has described national character as ―a habitus problem par 
excellence‖ (Elias 1991:182), remarking that ―the traits of national group identity – what we 
call the ‗national character‘ – are a layer of the social habitus built very deeply and firmly into 
the personality structure of the individual‖ (ibid:209). Though there has been an increased 
tendency lately to refer to habitus also in relation to matters regarding national identity or 
international relations, typically with a focus on how the practical consciousness of the 
individuals who comprise a nation play a powerful role in the foundation of cultural relations, 
identity politics and the construction and representation of national identities (see for example 
Maguire & Poulton 1999, Kauppi 2003), it is, however, rare that we encounter the notion of 
‗national habitus‘. Indeed, Elias is among the very few to have used the term national habitus 
in his works. In their preface to his last major work, his translators note that Elias uses the 
term ―in large part to overcome the problems of the old notion of ‗national character‘ as 
something fixed and static‖ (Dunning and Mennell, in Elias 1996:ix). There is little doubt that 
Elias‘s notion of national habitus can also be related to national identity constructs, given, as 
Elias notes, that ―The fortunes of a nation become crystallized in institutions which are 
responsible for ensuring that the most different people of a society acquire the same 
characteristics, possess the same national habitus‖ (1996:18). Hereby, Elias implies that this 
collective identity has a place not just in the hearts and minds of the citizens, but also in the 
workings of institutions that make up the nation as a political and ideational entity. To Elias, 
the habitus replaces the false dichotomy between individual actors and societies (Tuck 
2003:179): Individuals bear in them the habitus of the group to which they belong, and with 
which they share personality characteristics. Though individuals belong to several ―social 
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survival groups‖, Elias finds that as a group, the nation ―usually has special prominence‖ 
(Elias 1991:182-83). Nations are related to powerful we-images and have the potential to 
affect individual images, especially by offering strong contrasts between ‗us‘ and ‗them‘, with 
the self-image of the we-group being ―modeled on its exemplary, most ‗nomic‘ or norm-
setting section‖, while the characteristics attributed to the outsider group are typically ―the 
‗bad‘ characteristics of that group‘s ‗worst‘ section – of its anomic minority‖ (Elias, in Elias 
and Scotson 1994:xix). The contrasts between ‗us‘ and ‗them‘ are sedimented in the ―national 
habitus codes‖, and in that location they can be easily connected to personal images, whereby 
the nation becomes the individual and vice-versa (Tuck 2003). National habitus is not 
essentialist (Dunning and Mennell, in Elias 1996:ix), i.e. as opposed to the image of an almost 
―invariable national character‖, national habitus has the propensity to develop reflecting the 
fortunes and experiences of a nation, though it nevertheless remains characterized by a certain 
social inertness, which entails that change will occur only slowly and gradually with time 
(Gundelach 2001:74). 
It is the contention of this study that the notion of ―national habitus‖ offers a 
good conceptualization of how identity can influence behavior, a point which Elias eminently 
illustrated in The Germans (1996), wherein he explained how features of the German national 
habitus had contributed to produce the rise of Nazism (Dunning and Mennell 1998:346-347). 
As such, it may prove especially useful in a context such as the present. For the purposes of 
this study, national habitus can be characterized in two ways. On an individual level, it can be 
defined as:  
1. a shared set of nationally based and nationally oriented dispositions or predispositions, 
which partake in shaping our outlooks as well as our actions; 
2. these predispositions are largely based on a sense of belonging to a nation (national 
identity) and an adoption of national values and outlooks (akin to a common national 
doxa) that may or (more often) may not be conscious, 
3. and they are shaped or reinforced by the actions of the nation over time, 
4. allowing the citizens not only to share a notion of a national ‗we‘, but also giving them 
a sense of a common heritage and common national aspirations that usually – as a 
result of the shared doxa – results in support for the political paradigms on which the 
nation relies, 
5. and which contribute to forging stereotyped images regarding other nations and their 
inhabitants.  
 
This definition does of course not imply that all inhabitants of a nation share the same 
national habitus. Some immigrants for example often find it hard to integrate into societies in 
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which they neither share the national doxa nor as a consequence the national habitus. And 
most individuals regardless of their ethnic origin will more often than not find that they do not 
share large portions of the ‗generally held beliefs‘ that their compatriots are portrayed as 
having. They may even question the paradigmatic dogmas around which the mainstream 
political parties have built their platforms. Social struggles within societies also mean that 
different groups will constantly challenge what dominant groups are portraying as national 
values. Nevertheless, national identities are rooted in the belief-systems of the nation‘s 
citizens and as a consequence will shape their outlooks and behavior. In short, national 
identity is bound to entail some degree of national habitus. The importance placed by Elias on 
national habitus in relation to questions of international relations and foreign policy is of 
particular importance in this context and is worth recalling in extenso: 
The majority of people who form with each other differentiated industrial 
nation-states have no direct experience, no specialized knowledge and, indeed, 
no opportunities for gaining any specialized knowledge about problems of inter-
state relations and politics, except the knowledge communicated to them 
indirectly, often in a highly selective or muddled and biased form, by public 
media. A deeply felt belief, an individual conscience-formation embodying in 
one of its layers one‘s own state as the highest value, thus performs in the large 
and populous nation-states of the twentieth century, mutatis mutandis, a function 
similar to what could be achieved in dynastic state-societies by practical and 
comparatively rational considerations of self-interest on the part of small ruling 
elites. Such a national belief creates in the mass of the members of a nation-state 
personality dispositions which make them inclined to exert all their strength, to 
fight and if necessary to die in situations where they see the interests or the 
survival of their society threatened. In this way, dispositions are created to which 
actual or potential ruling elites of these large sovereign collectivities can appeal 
by the use of appropriate releaser symbols when they judge the integrity of their 
collectivity to be in danger. [..] And being all-pervasive, such dispositions color 
thinking; they create blockages and biases. [..] The preservation, integrity and 
interests of the state-society, of their own sovereign collectivity and all it stands 
for, are assimilated by each individual as part of his or her habitus, as a guiding 
principle of action which in certain situations can and must override all others. 
(Elias 1996:157) 
 
While Elias does not offer any clear and unambiguous definition of national habitus, using 
instead the term in a more or less off-hand way to denote a human second nature (van Krieken 
1998:47), identifiable on the national level and which partakes in the state formation process 
and the civilizing process (Elias 1991 and 1996), it seems that he uses it first and foremost in 
relation to the individuals grouped in a nation rather than to the nation itself, as when for 
example he writes that ―people‘s habitus, the dominant pattern of their self-regulation, is 
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focused on identification with sovereign states‖ (in Goudsblom and Mennell (eds) 1998:224, 
se also Elias 1996:19). Nevertheless, it seems obvious to interpret national habitus also as a 
collective phenomenon that can be analyzed on a state level. Instead of being seen as a 
national element in the individual‘s habitus, i.e. the citizen dimension of the habitus, national 
habitus can be seen as a collective or institutionalized habitus that can be identified as part of 
a nation‘s workings. In that case, the definition could be: 
1. a national disposition or predisposition that partakes in shaping the outlooks and 
actions of a nation or state; 
2. this disposition is a result of historical and cultural events and developments that have 
shaped the national identity, 
3. and given the nation‘s successive rulers and ruling elites, both political and cultural, a 
common national doxa that has an effect on their actions, creating powerful belief-
systems that in some respects have become paradigmatic in nature; 
4. these belief-systems will tend to sediment into society at large, in turn reinforcing the 
national habitus of the nation‘s citizens;   
5. while offering both the nation and its citizens a sense of identity and purpose of action 
that will often imply a demarcation from the Other(s). 
 
This second definition of national habitus as a national predisposition inherent to the state or 
nation thus departs somewhat from the way in which the term has been used by Elias and 
others taking their cue from his works. Yet if one accepts the existence of a national habitus 
embodied in a nation‘s citizens, it seems obvious that one can analyze it also as a collective 
phenomenon in the process of national identity formation. As opposed to the term national 
identity, the concept of national habitus allows us to bridge the supposed gap between identity 
and behavior: using a term that both denotes a system of collective dispositions and explains 
the forces through which these dispositions can shape behavior, it offers us new ways of 
analyzing the process whereby other nations become viewed by a nation as significant 
‗Others‘. In relation to the study of a phenomenon such as anti-Americanism, it helps us 
conceptualize how stereotypes regarding the Other will necessarily contribute to promote 
actions and narratives shaped to a certain extent by these stereotypes. As Elias notes,  
Even in the most powerful countries, national pride is and remains a sore spot in 
the personality structure of the people concerned. This is particularly true of 
countries which have sunk in the course of time from a higher to a lower 
position within the pyramid of states. (1996:17) 
 
Of special relevance to the present study, Elias further notes with respect to the self-image of 
such nations that: 
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A striking example in our time is that of the we-images and we-ideal of once-
powerful nations whose superiority in relation to others has declined. Their 
members may suffer for centuries because the group charismatic we-ideal, 
modeled on an idealised image of themselves in the days of their greatness, 
lingers on for many generations as a model they feel they ought to live up to, 
without being able to do so. The radiance of their collective life as a nation has 
gone; their power superiority in relation to other groups, emotionally understood 
as a sign of their own higher human value in relation to the inferior value of 
these others, is irretrievably lost. Yet the dream of their special charisma is kept 
alive in a variety of ways – through the teaching of history, the old buildings, 
masterpieces of the nation in the time of its glory, or through new achievements 
which seemingly confirm the greatness of the past. For a time, the fantasy shield 
of their imagined charisma as a leading, established group may give a declining 
nation the strength to carry on. In that sense it can have a survival value. But the 
discrepancy between the actual and the imagined position of one‘s group among 
others can also entail a mistaken assessment of one‘s power resources and, as a 
consequence, suggest a group strategy in pursuit of a fantasy image of one‘s own 
greatness (in Elias and Scotson 1994:xliii-xliv). 
 
As will be argued in the following two chapters, this observation seems particularly relevant, 
when we attempt to assess why and how the United States seems with time to have acquired 
the role of France‘s Significant Other. 
 
4.4 Implications for the Study of French Anti-Americanism 
There is among the scholars who have studied anti-Americanism in some depth a consensus 
on the fact that anti-Americanism has a clear identity dimension (Markovits 2007), which is 
typically described as national or nationalistic (Hollander 1995, Katzenstein and Keohane, in 
Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007). Regarding the particular French variety of anti-
Americanism, Philippe Roger has offered substantial evidence to support his claim that the 
phenomenon can described as an established tradition in France (2005:449). The second part 
of this study will attempt to formulate how this established tradition can be viewed as 
originating from some of the most central elements of France‘s national identity. This chapter 
has advanced a methodological framework, which hopefully can provide us with the 
conceptual basis for studying the particularistic phenomenon of anti-Americanism in one 
nation by analyzing it in relation to the concept of national identity and, more specifically, 
national habitus. Though it is my belief that this approach can be applied to most 
particularistic analyses of anti-Americanism in any particular country, I nevertheless find the 
case for analyzing French anti-Americanism using this optic particularly strong. Given its 
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research objectives, this study will focus on the elements of national identity, which partake in 
shaping the public imagery in relations to other nations and their inhabitants. Needless to say, 
there may be numerous dimensions to for example the French national identity, which are not 
so easily transposable to France‘s relations with Others, and these will largely be left out in 
the present study.  
Much of the scholarly debate surrounding national identity has, as was noted 
above, typically centered around the contentious issue of the birth of the modern nation, yet 
there is ample evidence to suggest that even if the date of birth is set to coincide with the 
French Revolution (the latest date proposed with some authority), it was only in the course of 
the nineteenth century that a sentiment of shared national identity emerged among the 
inhabitants of most Western nations. And though France might have been the first modern 
nation (Hobsbawm, 1990), France was still a ―largely meaningless concept‖ for most of the 
inhabitants of the hexagone until well into the nineteenth century (Gibson, in Bjørn, Grant, 
and Stringer (eds) 1994:177). Both Theodore Zeldin and Eugen Weber have conclusively 
shown that there was outside of the elites a widespread failure to identify with France until the 
beginning of the Third Republic, i.e. as late as until the 1870s (Zeldin 1977, Weber 1979). It 
is in this respect, as Ralph Gibson notes, plausible to assume that ―in order to identify with a 
country, people needed to be told that it was there that they belonged‖ (in Bjørn, Grant, and 
Stringer (eds) 1994:184). Nevertheless, chapter 5 will attempt to demonstrate that the core of 
modern French national identity can be traced to the values and beliefs inherited largely from 
the French Revolution and that some of the most constitutive elements of French national 
identity drawn from this period can in fact be regarded as predisposing the French against 
America, although there is no doubt that these predispositions have only sedimented into the 
broader French national habitus with time.  
This chapter has argued that narratives regarding national identity can largely be 
regarded as evolving around four vectors of national identity; namely the political, cultural, 
religious, and ethnic vectors. It has further been argued that national identities are dialectical, 
i.e. that they must be regarded not only as promoting images of national archetypes, but also 
of stereotypes regarding the Other(s), and that this Other is typically seen as a challenge or a 
threat to the nation in question. Anthony D. Smith has provided us with the following 
example of how French national identity expresses itself ―negatively‖, i.e. in relation to a 
perceived Other: 
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This was expressed in [..] France‘s Gaullist opposition in the 1960s and 1970s to 
NATO and American hegemony, its opposition to American cultural demands in 
the Uruguay round of the GATT discussions, and the antipathy entertained [..] 
towards ‗les Anglo-Saxons‘ and their cultural hegemony. (1995:43) 
 
As can be seen, Smith‘s assertion reads like a (very) condensed history of modern anti-
Americanism in France, and it is significant that he relates these events so closely to the 
French national identity (without, however, offering more than a basic reading of the 
―positive‖ national feelings, ibid.). It is also noteworthy that this account of a French 
expression of its national identity primarily focuses on the need for protection against the 
Other, seemingly validating Lipiansky‘s assertion that ―the defense of French identity‖ has 
become an increasingly central theme in public debates during the second half of the 
twentieth century (1991:255). The rest of the second part of this study will attempt to 
demonstrate that this notion of a defense of French identity has far older antecedents, and it 
will analyze French anti-Americanism using the conceptual framework delineated above, first 
by analyzing the core values of French national identity as especially conducive toward 
presenting the United States as France‘s primary Significant Other, an impression which, it 
will be argued, seems embedded in the French national doxa; second by analyzing French 
policies and actions toward the United States as (at least partly) determined by an anti-
American predisposition, which one might conceive of as a part of the French national 
habitus. Smith has argued that ―national identity comprises both a cultural and a political 
identity and is located in a political community as well as a cultural one‖ (1991:99). 
Therefore, chapter 6 will look more closely at these two communities in the attempt to 
evaluate the degree to which French political and cultural behavior is influenced by ideational 
predispositions against the United States. 
Before progressing with the rest of our analysis, a word of caution might be in 
order: There is no doubt, as Chapman reminds us, that ―The danger with national identity as 
an analytic category is the [..] temptation of projecting into the past our own fin de siècle 
preoccupations with and understandings of national identity and, more generally, identity 
politics‖ (1999:293). Therefore, we should, as Gutiérrez notes, ―bear in mind that national 
identity is, first and foremost, the self-identification of the peoples of the nation-states‖ (in 
Dieckhoff and Gutiérrez (eds) 2001:7). These are relevant observations, which should be 
borne in mind throughout. Yet the impression that national identities can be regarded as 
largely constructed does not entail that we can dismiss them purely with the argument that 
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since they are constructs, they are not real. Regardless of the degree to which national 
identities are constructed (and I largely agree with Gellner, Hobsbawm and others in believing 
that they are), they are felt as real and pervasive by many citizens, who feel bonded by the 
Volksgeist perceived to be shared by the citizens of the nation to which they belong. Max 
Weber has described the nation as ―a community of sentiment‖ (in Hutchinson and Smith 
(eds) 1994:25), and though there is enough evidence to suggest that there are societal forces, 
which have contributed toward the construction of national identities, I do believe that these 
identities can largely be regarded precisely as sentiments. This does not mean that everybody 
shares such identities in equal terms or necessarily has the same conception of the essential 
characteristics, which should be associated with them, or that they are contextually 
independent of change or external developments. As Ignatieff notes, ―National identity is not 
fixed or stable: it is a continuing exercise in the fabrication of illusion and the elaboration of 
convenient fables about who ‗we‘ are‖ (1998:18). The same applies to the images we bestow 
on others. Yet given that these images provide powerful sources of identification and self-
identification, they are likely to partake in shaping our behaviour, indeed, as was argued 
above, to become sedimented into our national habitus. To avoid the risk of (too much) 
tautological inference, it should finally be stressed that national habitus should in relation to 
the present topic be interpreted as either predisposing toward anti-American behavior or 
predisposing toward behavior which might be perceived as anti-American in nature. The point 
here is naturally, as noted also in chapter 1, that actions and narratives may carry with them 
the ‗mark of anti-Americanism‘, even if the motives for such actions are not necessarily 
dictated by anti-Americanism as such. Though it is my belief that the conceptual framework 
delineated above provides us with a solid point of departure for analyzing French anti-
Americanism as originating largely from within the core values on which France‘s national 
identity rests, it is conceivable that I may not be able to fully escape presenting fanciful 
arguments claiming that ―the French are like that‖ (cf. Huntington op. cit.). I nevertheless 
hope that I will be able to give at least a reasoned argument as to why ―the French are like 
that‖. 
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5 Two Nations, Divided by Common Values 
 
A central feature of French anti-Americanism is its longevity. The fact that French anti-
Americanism has existed since well before America became a world power, dwarfing French 
aspirations of playing a leading role on the world stage, is a reminder that other forces, bar the 
rejection of power discussed in chapter 3, play an important role in shaping notions of anti-
ism. This chapter will seek to analyze the deeper factors which are at play regarding French 
anti-Americanism. Though some of the standard discourses on anti-Americanism have had, as 
was discussed in chapter 2, a tendency to demonize the demonizers and as such to portray 
anti-Americanism largely as manifestations of an irrational psychological complex suffered 
by its beholders, there is no escaping that a proper understanding of anti-Americanism cannot 
just focus on the nature and actions of the United States as such. While it seems obvious to 
analyze the fundamental causes of anti-Americanism in relation to general perceptions of 
America, an analysis of anti-Americanism in one society needs to focus as much on the 
specific national features that are potentially conducive to anti-Americanism. Several 
historical accounts of anti-Americanism in France have been published recently, the most 
thorough and ambitious being without doubt Philippe Roger‘s The American Enemy (2005). 
The present study is by contrast not an attempt at presenting a history of French anti-
Americanism in a new form or with new details. I have no pretensions of being able to 
compete in the slightest way with Roger‘s study. Rather I propose, instead of a historical 
account of the manifestations of anti-Americanism throughout the times, such as Roger‘s, an 
altogether different approach, focusing on the elements of French national identity – or more 
specifically of what was termed above France‘s national habitus – which to my mind are 
carriers of a predisposition against America.  
In order to give an impression of the nature and longevity of the phenomenon in 
France, this chapter will begin with a short overview of some of the archetypical anti-
American narratives in France. The intention is to present the reader with a rudimentary 
overview of the main anti-American discourses in France as they have unfolded over the span 
of more than two centuries, rather than a history, however brief, of French anti-Americanism. 
It will be argued that though these narratives are echoed throughout most of Europe, there is a 
particularly French ‗twist‘ to most of these discourses, indeed that in some respects they have 
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distinctive features, which set them apart from other European narratives. Such anti-American 
narratives, however, have older antecedents. When depicting anti-Americanism in France, 
there is often a tendency to portray the phenomenon as more or less isolated from the dealings 
that France has, and has had, with other nations. Yet if, as was suggested in chapter 4, nations 
need to have enemies, or ‗Others‘, against whom they can mirror themselves, it seems 
obvious that preceding the tradition of French anti-Americanism, at least one other anti-ism 
must have been in force. It is the contention of this study that anti-Americanism can largely be 
regarded as a successor-phobia, which, while presenting also some unique features, builds to a 
considerable degree on centuries of Anglophobia in France. As will be shown below, one of 
the most fascinating features of French anti-Americanism is that America largely came to be 
vilified for much the same reasons that France previously had (and to some extent still has) a 
tendency to reject the ‗perfidious Albion‘. Finally, in the main body of this chapter, the 
particularistic French facets conducive toward a nationally tainted anti-Americanism will be 
analyzed as having at their origins the most essential values on which the French national 
identity has been built. These values, republicanism, civilization, and secularism, can be 
regarded as largely situated along three of the four major vectors of national identity 
identified in chapter 4, namely the political, cultural, and religious vectors
61
. These values do 
not just constitute the core of French national identity; they are simultaneously testimonies to 
the universal aspirations of both the French and American nations. They should not be 
regarded as manifestations of anti-Americanism as such, but rather as underlying factors on 
which anti-Americanism feeds in France. It is this last part of the present chapter, which will 
seek to demonstrate that France and the United States can be described as two nations divided 
by common values, concluding with a discussion of whether America can, indeed, be 
represented as France‘s significant Other. 
 
5.1 The Identity Dimension of Anti-Americanism in France and Europe 
Philippe Roger has showed how anti-Americanism was a favorite French intellectual pastime 
well before the creation of the United States: ―French anti-Americanism not only has a 
history, but also a pre-history – one that has been overlooked, forgotten, and buried under the 
successive layers of collective depiction‖ (2005:1). While anti-Americanism has indeed been 
present in France throughout centuries, the impact it has had has been highly diverging 
depending on both circumstances and the degree of contact between French and American 
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societies. Broadly, French anti-Americanism is centered around four types of discourses: A 
naturalist narrative, today mostly a historical curiosity, in which the New World was 
presented as a degenerate continent; a cultural narrative, originally lamenting the artistic 
sterility of the New World, which later turned to decrying the nature and influence of 
America‘s cultural products worldwide; a socio-economical narrative, in which the impact of 
Americanization on other nations is deplored and the ‗American model‘ is rejected; and 
finally a political narrative, in which the increasing power of the United States is deplored and 
not infrequently contrasted with largely unfulfilled French political aspirations. These 
narratives, which will be exemplified below, have fed on each other and are highly 
overlapping. They have in essence remained the repository of most French discourses on anti-
Americanism to this day. 
Such discourses are frequently presented as ‗typically French‘, i.e. as evidence 
that the French harbor some quintessentially Gallic aversion to America, which set them apart 
from other Europeans, if not by the degree of their perceived anti-Americanism, then by the 
special incantations of their anti-American rhetoric. Yet the same narratives can be found 
readily in most European, or at least Western European, nations. The four major narratives 
mentioned above have in fact been part of what Markovits terms the ―identity dimension‖ of 
European anti-Americanism for centuries (2007:81-82), and they have by and large been as 
present in Britain and Germany as in France (ibid: 38-80). It has been argued that they 
represent a specific European anti-Americanism, one which focuses primarily on the identity 
dimension (what America is), rather than on the conduct dimension (what America does), and 
as such has become ―pervasive and not at all country-specific‖ (ibid:81-82). There is some 
truth to this, as some of the most familiar anti-American themes present many similar features 
throughout Europe. Yet it could equally be argued that the identity dimension works both 
ways. It might be, as Markovits argues, that there exists a common ―pan-European‖ anti-
American discourse; it is, however, a gross exaggeration to suggest, as he does, that ―anti-
Americanism features no country-specific tropes and thus indeed is totally pan-European‖ 
(ibid:28). Jean-François Revel has suggested that France is a prime mover in European anti-
Americanism (2002:164). This is probably as much a stereotype as those he seeks to combat. 
The contention of this study is that French anti-Americanism, while representing many of the 
same features and narratives as those found in other European countries, has both distinctive 
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origins, and characteristics which relate to a large extent to some of the core elements of 
French national identity. 
 
5.1.1 Narratives of a French tradition 
In the prologue to his study of French anti-Americanism, Philippe Roger describes how, from 
1749 onwards, the zoologist Georges de Buffon succeeded in constructing a naturalist base 
for anti-Americanism that would prove difficult to overcome for many years to come (2005:1-
29). Buffon‘s image of America was of a continent where everything was small. Species were 
smaller than in the Old World. The animals were more timid. Even the human beings were 
more modest in size. Buffon based his observations on comparisons that today strike us as 
profoundly unscientific: The American tapir was less impressive than the African elephant. 
Though he could not ignore that they did not belong to the same family, he coined the term 
voisinage, suggesting that they were ―neighbors, not relatives‖, implying that it was the 
nearest thing one could come if one wanted to find the elephant‘s American counterpart 
(ibid:9). Another intellectual of the day, the Abbé Raynal, took Buffon‘s arguments even 
further and argued in 1770 that the degenerate American climate corrupted the mind. 
Therefore, Native Americans as well as those transplanted from Europe were as feeble-
minded as they were feeble-bodied. Their intellectual inferiority was no less certain than their 
physical weakness was ―visible‖ (ibid:23. See also Diner 1996:7). However risible these 
‗observations‘ may appear today, they had a profound impact on the view the French elite had 
of the New World, as few other descriptions made their way to a larger public. Zeldin remarks 
that at ―the beginning of the nineteenth century the French still had rather elementary ideas 
about America. They relied on such books as those of the abbé Raynal (1770), Volney (1802) 
and Chateaubriand (1827)‖ (1977:127, see also Furet 1982:199-202). A small minority, 
intrigued by the Franco-American alliance that had led to the independence of the United 
States, turned to books and travel accounts published in England, hoping that these, given 
England‘s linguistic and historical ties with America, could contribute with reliable first-hand 
accounts. René Rémond describes how the French readers discovered a different America 
than the one they had expected: Hoping to read about the novel American example, what they 
found was an almost uniform denigration of the former British colony, one which he largely 
attributes to the resentment following the British defeat in the two wars of American 
independence (1958:268-275). Though anti-Americanism may have, as Roger argues, a 
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particularly long pedigree in France, other nations were clearly road companions in this 
respect. 
As the naturalist attacks on the continent gradually lost their bite, a new 
discourse rose up against America in the nineteenth century: an aesthetic anti-Americanism, 
which in the twentieth century would give way to a cultural anti-Americanism. Building on 
the older notions of the degenerate nature of the American continent and its inhabitants, 
cultural elites in France more or less uniformly lamented America‘s artistic sterility. The 
perceived lack of literary, philosophical and artistic output was decried as proof of a 
democracy that was obsessed with material wealth, but impervious or even hostile to culture 
(Roger 2005:36). The novelist Stendhal described Americans as ―incapable of subtle ideas‖ 
(ibid:52) and the poet Baudelaire would take it several steps further. ―The world is about to 
end‖, he wrote in 1855. America was tolling the bell of sterile decline, man had become 
―Americanized‖ (his term), reduced to commercial enterprise without genius or spirituality 
(ibid:59-63). The core of this cultural anti-American narrative was on the one hand that 
America was a young nation, lacking history and culture. On the other hand, this nation 
heralded a new era, where materialism was the order of the day. The case against America 
became one of idealism versus materialism. Already, the fear of American ‗mass culture‘ 
threatening to prevail over French ‗high culture‘ was beginning to take root. The growing 
impact of American culture in Europe described in chapter 3.4.2 was particularly rejected by 
French intellectuals as being culturally and socially degenerative. When jazz music filled the 
dancing halls and Hollywood films entered the cinemas in the early twentieth century, the 
French got their first real taste of the American way of life. Embraced by many, it was rejected 
vehemently by large sections of the cultural establishment. In the interwar years, the 
intellectual anti-Americanism of the nineteenth century became integrated in a reactionary 
rejection of the erosion of traditional values and customs (Kuisel 1993:2). In an era of 
economic uncertainty and growing nationalism, this new form of anti-Americanism reached a 
much larger audience than it had previously, and the cultural narrative came to represent 
America as ―the antithesis of France‖ (Pells 1997:155, see also Strauss 1978). As opposed to 
the naturalist attacks, the cultural anti-American discourse remains, as we shall see below, 
highly present today, where notions of French cultural exceptionalism have largely centered 
on the need to protect French culture and the French language from American incursions. 
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The American materialism so anathema to the intellectuals did not frighten the 
many immigrants crossing the Atlantic in the pursuit of the American dream. What they 
sought was precisely the promise of material wealth and comfort, which the social rigidity in 
nineteenth century Europe denied them. Of all the significant close-knit groups of European 
immigrants of the period, one is conspicuously absent: Though tens of thousands of French 
people settled in the United States, they all came over as individuals; nowhere was a French 
community established which could present itself as a Franco-American voice capable of 
exerting influence (Duroselle 1978:48)
62
. Lacking a substantial body of naturalized 
‗advocates‘ in the States, the French were relegated to having the American socio-economic 
model presented to them primarily by the established elites at home (Pells 1997:154-155), 
which by and large were more than critical of the ‗materialistic‘ republic. Tocqueville and his 
fellow traveler, de Baumont, had given another, altogether more positive description of 
America. But their works met mixed approval in Paris. A critical reviewer of their studies 
wrote in 1835 that ―America is socially organized egotism and systematic and legalized evil. 
In a nutshell, it is the materialization of the human destiny‖ (Buchez, quoted by Sorman in 
Lacorne, Rupnik, and Toinet (eds) 1990:214). This narrative would prove enduring. In his 
1930 bestseller, Scènes de la vie future, Georges Duhamel presented his vision of tomorrow‘s 
world, in which America sets the tune for the rest of the world to follow. It is an apocalyptic 
vision, where mankind will soon be forced to follow into the footsteps of the Americans, 
bowing to the dehumanizing force of ―industrial and commercial dictatorship‖ in the 
―Cathedral of Commerce‖ (1930:9-21 and 219-232). Word by word, such statements could be 
pronounced today by an anti-globalization protestant. The image of America being the 
world‘s leading capitalist nation, not just in terms of size, but in nature as well, is 
predominant in large parts of French society, where anti-globalization movements are tacitly 
approved of even by conservatives (see 5.2). Richard Kuisel remarks how ―The French 
response to America in the twentieth century derives, in large measure, from an assumption 
that the New World is a social model of the future‖ (1993:ix). It is a social model, which 
many French instinctively oppose, fearing the twin forces of liberalism and globalization 
more than any other Western European nation. As will be seen below, the fear of the ‗Anglo-
Saxon‘ model, more often than not a euphemism for the American social and economic 
model, and the supremacy of this model in world business and politics have been constantly 
resurfacing in France for close to a century.  
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The fourth major narrative, building to a large degree on the cultural and socio-
economic narratives, typically presents America as politically immature, hypocritical, and 
unresponsive to the wishes of its allies. The rapid rise of the United States to pre-eminence in 
world affairs has simultaneously resulted in the erosion of political influence of the former 
great powers, and as such also of France. In this respect, political narratives of anti-
Americanism frequently become tainted with symptoms of lingering phantom pains. The 
political anti-American narrative is probably the one which presents the most original features 
compared with corresponding narratives in other European nations. This is largely, as will be 
exposed in greater length in chapter 5.3, a result of the fact that both modern France and 
America due to their unique heritage have presented themselves as universal models for 
others to follow. Many of the standard attacks on American policies in France take their cue 
from the forms of rejection of American power, and especially of soft power, which were 
presented in chapter 3, lamenting the historical oppression of the Native American Indians 
and the practice of slavery, the later policies of segregation, the practice of capital 
punishment, the unilateralist policies of American administrations etc. These examples of 
political anti-American narratives can be found in all European societies. Yet French political 
narratives of anti-Americanism contain a further streak, which today could be termed Gaullist 
(Ash 2004:64-68), though it has older antecedents. Whereas political anti-Americanism in 
most other significant European countries is primarily, although not exclusively, a left-wing 
phenomenon, it has in France been virtually evenly divided between both the right-wing and 
the left-wing since the interwar period (Pells 1997, Revel 2002, Tinard 2001). The roots go 
back primarily to the historical circumstances following the peace negotiations leading to the 
Versailles Treaty. Here, President Wilson preached moderation, while leading French 
politicians called for revenge on the German aggressor. To the French nationalists, Wilson‘s 
policies threatened to surrender the fruits of a victory that had cost them so dearly. French 
Premier Georges Clemmenceau dryly remarked that ―God gave us his Ten Commandments, 
and we broke them. Wilson gave us his Fourteen Points – we shall see‖ (quoted by Kennedy, 
in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007:53). This perception of American political immaturity 
and naiveté laid the foundations for a conservative anti-Americanism in France that has lasted 
to this day. Though American soldiers were greeted as liberators after their landing in 
Normandy, the honeymoon of public pro-Americanism, then at an all-time high, was short. 
When the former leader of the Free French, General Charles de Gaulle, returned to power in 
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1958, relations between the two countries soured. Few individuals have fuelled the cause of 
political anti-Americanism in France as effectively as de Gaulle. His antagonism of the U.S. 
can easily be traced back to his wartime experiences, where President Roosevelt was long 
more than reluctant to acknowledge de Gaulle as an ally and as the leader of the Free French 
(Chuter 1996:207-213), although, as will be discussed below, it had other, altogether more 
political reasons. Unwilling to accept France‘s role as a weaker partner of the United States, 
de Gaulle set out to create a ‗third force‘ to balance U.S. and Soviet dominance. Though his 
attempts failed, they contributed to reinvigorate French foreign policy with a sense of national 
mission, one which often seemed to the public at home as well as abroad as being more or 
less inherently in opposition to America. As will be discussed in chapter 6, this was not 
necessarily its primary objective, yet there is no doubt that it gave rise to an anti-American 
narrative, which has contributed to the perception, exemplified by the Economist‘s portrait of 
Jacques Chirac cited in the introduction, that French politicians, and especially French 
presidents, are motivated by a deep reluctance toward America and especially the impact of 
American power. Following the Gaullist tradition, France has attempted to present itself first, 
though largely unsuccessfully, as a Western alternative to the United States, most notably in 
Africa and among other non-aligned countries, and later, somewhat more successfully, as the 
leading spokesman of a Europe, which sought to establish itself as a potential counterweight 
to American dominance. Though former French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine‘s 
description of the United States as a ―hyperpuissance‖ (2000:81) in reality could be 
interpreted as an innocent statement of facts, far less opprobrious than the oft-heard 
characteristic of America as a hegemon, it has entered this political narrative as yet another 
example of French anti-Americanism. 
These narratives are archetypical of French anti-Americanism in the sense that 
especially the latter three have set the tone for not just anti-American discourses, but also 
most of the literature on French anti-Americanism, which more often than not tries to analyze 
anti-Americanism largely in relation to one or several of these discourses (see for example 
Strauss 1978, Kuisel 1993, Markovits 2007, Roger 2005, Winock 1990). And while the same 
four narratives, or derivatives of such narratives, can be found in most other European 
countries as well, they appear particularly vibrant in France. 
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5.1.2 More than a European specialty with a French ‘twist’? 
Pierangelo Isernia has noted that ―anti-Americanism in Europe has taken the form of a 
recurrent set of themes, some of them going back to the American Revolution, that have been 
played out over and over again in different tunes and rhythms‖ (in Katzenstein and Keohane 
(eds) 2007:57). The narratives presented above are archetypical of such themes and, as 
Markovits asserts, they can be found throughout Europe. The three common themes of 
European anti-Americanism listed by Josef Joffe (see 2.2.1), in which America is presented as 
morally deficient, socially retrograde, and culturally retrograde (2006:5-8) are in reality but 
variations over the four archetypical narratives delineated above. Quoting among others 
Friedrich Nietzsche (―The faith of the Americans is becoming the faith of the European as 
well‖), Sigmund Freud (―Yes, America is gigantic, but a gigantic mistake‖), Frances Trollope 
(describing Americans as ill-mannered hypocrites), and Charles Dickens (mocking the notion 
that America should arouse envy throughout the world) as evidence (2007:56-73), Markovits 
argues that what is at play is in reality a pan-European discourse of anti-Americanism 
(ibid:28), rather than a country specific one, ―in terms of its form and content, as well as its 
analytical foundation, concepts, and political and social functions‖ (ibid:46). The argument is 
not without merits. First of all, it is evident that Europe has historically enjoyed relations with 
America – itself to a large degree an offspring of Europe – that no other part of the world has 
experienced in a similar manner. The whole concept of the New World versus the Old World, 
irrespective of any values attached to either, originates from Europe and is as such inscribed 
in the deeper narratives of European anti-Americanism (see for example Kennedy, in 
Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007:39-48, and Pells 1997:2-7), to the point where the 
―contradictory trope of modernity as barbarism [has been] a constant of negative European 
perceptions of America‖ (Markovits 2007:46). In this respect it is true that all four narratives, 
including the naturalist narrative (Rémond 1958:268-275, Markovits 2007:39-56), have found 
common ground in Europe, as they build on experiences with America, which are both shared 
by most European nations and particular to Europe. Second, as regards the more 
contemporary anti-American narratives, Europe has during the past decades witnessed a 
resurgence of pan-European ideals, both as a result of the European unification process and of 
the perception of growing transatlantic tensions, whether political or value borne, which have 
given ground to common narratives borrowing from the domestic narratives of the leading 
European nations. Jürgen Habermas‘ and Jacques Derrida‘s open letter to the European 
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publics following the 2003 invasion of Iraq was presented precisely as a pan-European 
rallying call to form a new sense of Europeaness, one which in essence they opposed to 
American values (Habermas and Derrida 2003, see also Ash 2004, Levy, Pensky and Torpey 
(eds) 2005, and Fich, in Ammitsbøll and Boel (eds) 2007). In this respect, it makes perfectly 
good sense to analyze European anti-Americanism as a particular feature of anti-
Americanism; one which focuses as much if not more on the rejection of America‘s soft 
power as on its attributes of hard power. It has even been argued that one of the few values 
shared by Europeans is opposition to America, indeed that to some, the essence of Europe can 
be described as being ―Not-America‖ (Ash 2004:54-94). 
Following Melvin and Margaret DeFleur‘s methodology (DeFleur and DeFleur 
2003), Markovits has described European anti-Americanism as ―surplus‖ anti-Americanism, 
one which focuses on the ―identity dimension‖ of America rather than the ―conduct 
dimension‖ (2007:81-82). Rob Kroes has similarly attempted to distinguish between cultural 
and political anti-Americanism (in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007:105-106), implicitly 
describing the former in ways which appear fairly ‗European‘ in nature. Both concur that the 
two dimensions are highly overlapping and difficult to disentangle, while nevertheless 
arguing that they present distinctive features (Markovits 2007:13, Kroes, in Fabbrini (ed.) 
2006:106). One of the reasons for attempting to distinguish between the two dimensions of 
anti-Americanism probably rests on the assumption, to some degree validated by European 
narratives, that the cultural, or identity borne, anti-Americanism seems particularly present in 
Europe compared with elsewhere. Indeed, the most defining feature of European anti-
Americanism may be that it has consistently been a project of the cultural elites. Philippe 
Roger has described how, in contrast to the widely held image of the New World being linked 
to the ideas of the Enlightenment, ―anti-Americanism was born and prospered in 
philosophical circles. Not only was it contemporary with the Enlightenment at its brightest, it 
was forged and disseminated by men who were unquestionably associated with the program 
and progress of the ‗philosophical spirit‘‖ (2005:2). This was the case in France as well as 
elsewhere (Kroes, in Fabbrini (ed.) 2006:105-106). Markovits notes how ―The allure of 
America, generally succumbed to by the European masses rather than elites, remained a 
permanent mystery and thorn in the side for European critics of the United States‖ (2007:46). 
Katzenstein and Keohane similarly remark that elitist anti-Americanism ―has always been 
centered in Europe, particularly on the Continent‖ (in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 
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2007:36), although they especially single out France as bearer of elitist anti-Americanism, 
remarking that ―French intellectuals are the epicenter of anti-Americanism‖ (ibid:36). Revel 
certainly agrees (2002). Is this a validation of Markovits‘ assertion that there is in essence just 
one pan-European discourse of anti-Americanism, and by implication that French narratives 
merely represent a Gallic ‗twist‘ to a European tale, whether due to the fact that France has 
been, as Revel claims, the breeding house of European anti-Americanism, or due to the 
mediatization which has surrounded French narratives in specific periods? Or could it 
conversely be argued that French anti-Americanism, while representing many of the same 
features and narratives as those found in other European countries, has both distinctive origins 
and characteristics, which justify that they are analyzed as country-specific in their own right? 
This study contends that the latter is the case for two main reasons.  
First, there is ample evidence to suggest that French anti-Americanism in several 
respects deviate from anti-Americanism in other European societies, both as regards its 
strength, its particular features, and the political bias of its beholders. Regarding the strength 
of French anti-Americanism, Pierangelo Isernia has convincingly documented, using a large 
number of polls and surveys covering half a century, how France has been particularly critic 
of the United States compared with Germany, Italy and Great Britain (in Katzenstein and 
Keohane (eds) 2007:58-92). Kroes similarly notes that the French, compared with other 
European nations, have been ―more consistently adamant in making the case for a defence of 
their national identity against a threatening process of Americanization‖ (in Fabbrini (ed.) 
2006:106). Strauss concurs, stating that ―While both the opposition to the United States and 
the defense of traditional values were the common concerns of the European elite, the French 
may be said to have led the way by articulating these positions with a special clarity and 
vigor‖ (1978:282). Regarding its particular features, there is ample evidence to suggest that 
although the four major narratives singled out above can be found in other European societies 
as well, they acquire characteristic ‗French overtones‘ in French political discourses, not least 
with respect to the frequent denunciations of liberalism, capitalism and globalization, 
associated more often than not with the United States (Tinard 2001, Revel 2002, Roger 2005, 
Kroes in Fabbrini (ed) 2006, Meunier, in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007). It is, 
however, especially with regard to the particular political bias of its beholders that French 
anti-Americanism stands out from most other European countries. Rob Kroes has noted that 
cultural anti-Americanism in Europe is typically to be found on the conservative right wing, 
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whereas the political anti-Americanism typically has occurred on the left (in Fabbrini (ed.) 
2006:105). Yet in France, the two dimensions appear virtually indistinguishable. Cultural 
anti-Americanism is as manifest on the left wing as on the right wing, while political anti-
Americanism, to be found readily on both sides of the political divide, has historically been 
associated much more with the Gaullist right wing than with any other political force bar the 
Communist Party (Ash 2004). Furthermore, cultural and political anti-Americanism in France 
appear to be reinforcing each other, achieving almost symbiotic dimensions in French 
political discourses, which have long been focused on the protection of France‘s exception 
culturelle vis-à-vis the perceived threat of Americanization (Pells 1997, Revel 2002, Roger 
2005). These characteristics will be developed further below, yet they seem to indicate that 
there are indeed good reasons to assume that French anti-Americanism displays some 
distinctive features, which merit a more particularistic analysis of the phenomenon.  
Second, it is important to acknowledge that narratives are just that – narratives. 
One of the problems of a study such as the present is that it is all too tempting to portray 
specific anti-American discourses as evidence of more widespread anti-Americanism in a 
given society. Markovits for example attempts to make the point that the anti-American 
themes he identifies in the works of British, French, and German writers are ―also present in 
other European cultures‖ (2007:78). To highlight his point, Markovits recounts how Knut 
Hamsun, the Norwegian Nobel laureate who later became a supporter of Nazism, ―viewed 
America as a land of tasteless and avaricious materialism bereft of cultural or artistic 
achievements‖ (ibid:79). With this one example – the only one he provides of an anti-
American narrative in Norway – and similar quotes from Maxim Gorki and José Ortega y 
Gasset to illustrate narratives in respectively Russia and Spain, Markovits asserts that they 
―serve to highlight the fact that the common themes constituting anti-Americanism existed in 
many European cultures, and that they have remained constant and consistent in their 
emphases to this day‖ (ibid:80), a line of argumentation, which can also be found in other 
works on the subject (e.g. Hollander 1995:391-393). Yet the narrative of one lone Norwegian 
writer, and especially one as politically marginal as Hamsun, does not warrant claims that 
such discourses are in anyway typical of the cultural elite in Norway, nor by implication that 
anti-Americanism can readily be found throughout Norwegian literary circles and much less 
throughout society at large. The same applies to Markovits‘ Russian and Spanish examples, 
where he also seems to regard the narrative of one writer as evidence to the established 
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presence of such narratives in each country. And while Markovits‘ ambition is to reflect on 
the uniformity of European anti-Americanism rather than on its particularistic features in any 
given society, the use of random quotations does not validate his point sufficiently. Indeed, 
such narratives can probably be found in all European societies, but in reality, that tells us 
preciously little. Without a far more thorough investigation of how such narratives are shaped 
by deeper, more structural narratives, or how such narratives shape actual policies, such 
quotations merely give us (a highly partial) insight into the mind of its authors, but hardly 
new knowledge on the phenomenon of anti-Americanism as such. There is, as mentioned in 
the introduction, a serious question of epistemology when attempting to make a qualitative 
analysis of a phenomenon such as anti-Americanism in a particular society. Quantitative 
surveys may provide us with valuable information as regards the level and degree of anti-
Americanism (that is if one accepts the premises), yet they fail to inform us of the roots of 
these sentiments. Qualitative studies frequently attempt to present anti-American narratives as 
evidence to widely held beliefs among the cultural, social, or political elites, the implication 
being that while these can hardly be considered the vox populi, they can be viewed as the 
primary agenda setting agents. Though there is much truth to this, it is not solid enough 
grounds on which to construct an analysis of the deeper forces that contribute to promote 
feelings of anti-Americanism in a society. Even as impressive an inventory of national anti-
American narratives as Philippe Roger‘s only give us a partial insight into why these 
narratives have proved so enduring. In order to get a better understanding of the deeper forces 
at play, we need to relate these narratives to the core elements of the national identity in the 
country we seek to analyze in order to assess why these themes resonate so strongly in a given 
society. 
 
5.1.3 Conclusion 
The narratives depicted in 5.1.1 are often presented as evidence of French anti-Americanism, 
indeed as revealing the inner workings of French mentality vis-à-vis America. Yet depicting 
these narratives only provides an overview of the different aspects of anti-Americanism, but 
not to a sufficient degree an understanding of the deeper, more imbued forces, which have 
contributed to mould French anti-Americanism into being, as this study contends, an integral 
part of France‘s national habitus. Narratives are just narratives, and even narratives as 
enduring as the abovementioned have at their origin some deeper sources. In order to 
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understand the processes that lead to the formation of such narratives, it is not enough to 
amass quotations from literary works or political speeches in order to prove the proliferation 
of these narratives in society. We need to go deeper and analyze the sources which have given 
rise to these narratives. We need, in other words, to explore the inner workings and 
aspirations of French national identity in order to assess why these narratives have found such 
fecund an environment in France. The remaining part of this chapter will attempt to do this, 
first by arguing that French anti-Americanism builds on centuries of Anglophobia with which 
it shares many characteristic features, and second by seeking to determine how the central 
tenets of French national identity may be considered as at least partly conducive to anti-
American sentiments. 
 
5.2 Anti-Americanism as a Successor-phobia? 
French anti-Americanism is not only older than the creation of the United States, it feeds on 
centuries of antagonism between France and England (Meunier, in Katzenstein and Keohane 
(eds) 2007:140) or even Anglophobia, and it has in some respects merged into a rejection of 
what is ‗Anglo-Saxon‘, a term used to describe a cultural and political heritage that continues 
to influence Britain and the United States (Mead 2007:13, Cunliffe 1991:400). Like anti-
Americanism came to be, Anglophobia was both a result of political rivalry and a question of 
bolstering a sense of national identity by delimitating France and its inhabitants from the 
norms, values and habits, which characterized their first ‗significant other‘, namely England63. 
As will be shown below, England was rejected in France first and foremost on the grounds of 
historical clashes between the two nations that have spanned almost a millennium. 
Antagonism on the front bred another kind of animosity, based on French perceptions of the 
excessive commercialism of the English and their perceived disinterest in finer culture. Such 
charges against the English were later transferred to the Americans, largely seen as 
successors, albeit unworthy successors, to the English. The similarities between the 
vilifications of first the English and later the Americans suggest that French anti-Americanism 
is, both in nature and in practice, to a large extent a successor phobia to centuries of 
Anglophobia. 
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The heirs of Joan of Arc 
It is no wonder that the long history of Anglo-French military rivalry, starting with the 
Norman conquest of England in 1066 and culminating with the battle of Waterloo in 1815
64
, 
has given rise to a strong and long-lived Anglophobia in France. Just as France has perceived 
the proverbial perfidious Albion with mistrust, contempt, envy, or even hatred, so has England 
(later Britain) for centuries engaged in denigration of its closest mainland foe and rival 
(Gibson 1995, Tombs and Tombs 2006). During the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
insular Britain had but one foe who could seriously threaten its territory: France. Yet France, 
who throughout its history has had several enemies to choose from depending on which of its 
borders it looked towards (Horne 2004:1, Tombs and Tombs 2006:211), has cultivated a 
special love-hate relationship towards les rosbifs. Though France has faced many other 
enemies throughout history, the rivalry with England stands out. Germany may later have 
become the chief hereditary enemy (e.g. Visby 1992:11-18 and Kedward 2005:50-52), 
starting with the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71, yet Germany never 
acquired the same role as significant other that England did. Partly this has to do with the 
longevity of the mutual antagonism, the two nations‘ prolonged struggle for supremacy, and 
the fact that inhabitants in both countries have had a tradition of regarding each other as 
cultural antipodes. In one of Guy de Maupassant‘s short stories, Le Rosier de Madame 
Husson, published when French revanchisme against the Germans was at another high, his 
narrator declares: 
Malgré ma rancune contre l‘Allemand et mon désir de vengeance, je ne le 
déteste pas, je ne le hais pas d‘instinct comme je hais l‘Anglais, l‘ennemi 
veritable, l‘ennemi héréditaire, l‘ennemi naturel du Normand, parce que 
l‘Anglais a passé sur ce sol habité par mes aïeux, l‘a pillé et ravage vingt fois, et 
que l‘aversion de ce people perfide m‘a été transmise avec la vie, par mon père. 
(1888:14-15)  
 
For the great French historian Michelet, historically ―the war, of all wars, the struggle of all 
struggles‖ was that between France and England (quoted by Fontaine, in Johnson, Crouzet 
and Bédarida 1980:351). In his Histoire de la France (1833, revised in 1861) he further 
asserted that: 
The struggle against England has done France a very great service by confirming 
and clarifying her sense of nationhood. Through coming together against the 
enemy the provinces discovered that they were a single people. It is by seeing 
the English close to, that they felt that they were France. It is the same with 
nations as with the individual: he gets to know and defines his personality 
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through resistance to what is different from himself. He becomes conscious of 
what he is through what he is not (from the 1861 edition, quoted by Bell 
1996:1). 
 
Another French historian, Ernest Lavisse, later remarked more crudely that it was by fighting 
the English that the French learned to love France (Citron 1991:35 and Boll-Johansen 
1992:204). There is some truth to this. No foe has checked French ambitions more 
systematically and over a longer period than England. Historically, England has been France‘s 
bad omen until well into the nineteenth century. From the execution of Joan of Arc on the 
stakes in Rouen to the downfall of Napoleon, England has been the sole opponent able 
regularly to achieve an upper hand in its opposition to French bids for hegemony in Europe.  
The antagonism started long before England became a great power compared 
with other European states. The Hundred Years War (1337-1453) was a bitter dynastic strife 
between France and England over the control of France. Though the English won most of the 
major battles, the war ended with a double French victory: it consolidated the French king‘s 
control of his realm and gave France its most enduring national figure, Joan of Arc. A 
successor to the English leaders who brought about her downfall, Winston Churchill, 
magnanimously describes Joan of Arc as ―an Angel of Deliverance, the noblest patriot of 
France, the most splendid of her heroes, the most beloved of her saints, the most inspiring of 
all her memories, the peasant Maid, the ever-shining, ever glorious Joan of Arc‖ (1956:328).  
Joan of Arc is not only a potent national heroine; she became with time a symbol of French 
resistance to England, a symbol that was revered as a unifying figure for the French people to 
rally around. Churchill even states that ―Indeed, the whole conception of France seems to 
have sprung and radiated from her‖ (1956:331)65. As the British John Bull is portrayed as the 
essence of what is British, so is Joan of Arc regarded as embodying France‘s soul: Courage in 
face of the threat of foreign domination, spirit and devotion in contrast with brute force and 
oppression, civilization as opposed to tyranny. Joan of Arc is feminine, just as la France, la 
patrie and the national symbol, Marianne
66
. Her sacrifice on the fire in 1431 is to some equal 
only to that of Jesus on the cross. He died for the sins of mankind – she died for France. The 
nationalist historian Jacques Bainville has noted that once her mission completed, all that was 
left for her to acquire was martyrdom (1924:100), although he omits to add that it took over a 
century before she was adopted by French historiography as a heroine (Joutard, in Burguière 
(ed.) 1993:528-529). The popular imaginary surrounding such symbols is strong, and ever 
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since the nineteenth century, Joan of Arc has become a rallying call for a multitude of 
political and ideological factions wishing to promote more or less nationalistic policies 
(Winock 1990:145)
67
. Lavisse states that in ―Dans aucun pays, on ne trouve une aussi belle 
histoire que celle de Jeanne d‘Arc‖ (quoted by Citron 1991:46). Indeed, as Bell has noted, 
Joan of Arc has become the ―universally recognised symbol of French nationalism‖, adding 
that ―the enemy she fought was of course the English‖ (1996:6). 
Though the following centuries gave France (and England) other enemies to 
worry about, England proved throughout to be France‘s most tenacious foe. Louis XIV saw 
his bid for European hegemony thwarted by Churchill‘s ancestor, the duke of Marlborough, at 
the battle of Blenheim in 1704 (Gibson 1995:82). The Seven Years‘ War (also referred to 
overseas as the French and Indian War) has been described as essentially the first war to be 
global in nature, as it spanned three continents (Europe, North America and Asia). It led to a 
virulent state-sponsored Anglophobia (Tombs and Tombs 2006:98) that remained a staple of 
conservative political discourse for years. During the Napoleonic Wars, England alone proved 
to be consistently undefeatable, remaining the linchpin for the successive alliances that were 
finally to bring about Napoleon‘s downfall. Some have even called the period from 1689 to 
1815, in which France and England were directly at war for fifty-six years, the ―Second 
Hundred Years‘ War‖ (Meyer and Bromley, in Johnson, Crouzet and Bédarida (eds) 
1980:139-172). England‘s role in the demise of the Napoleonic Empire contributed further to 
make a deep negative imprint in the memories of the French. Victor Hugo was later to 
describe the British led victory at Waterloo as ―le triomphe complet, absolu, éclatant, 
indiscutable, définitif et suprême de la médiocrité sur le génie‖ (quoted by Demetz 2004). As 
if British victory on the battlefield was not enough, the deportation of Napoleon to the remote 
Atlantic island of Saint-Helena was seen as a further affront by his admirers, both 
contemporary and those who later rejoiced in the illusions of grandeur that the Empire had 
nourished better than any other French regime. While to most of the British, Napoleon was a 
tyrant, to many Frenchmen, he remained throughout the nineteenth century a hero (Bell 
1996:3, Cronin 1971)
68
, and he continued to be revered as a savior figure by many French 
(Tulard 1991:328-336). Moreover, his status as hero is not just confined to his exploits in the 
battlefields of Europe, which he succeeded in dominating for more than a decade. He 
arguably shaped French society more profoundly than any other single person, at least until 
the advent of Charles de Gaulle (Agulhon 2000, Lindqvist 2005, Schom 1997, Tulard 1991). 
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But what probably gave rise to much nineteenth century interest in his life was the perception 
that he was a romantic hero. In the century of Romanticism, Napoleon and Josephine were 
favorite subjects for authors in France and elsewhere on the continent, even in countries that 
he had invaded (Tulard 1991:331, Said 1993:117-118, Horne 2004:202-203). He had 
surrendered to his staunchest, and therefore most respected, foe with the words: 
Altesse royale, [..] j‘ai terminé ma carrière politique et je viens, comme 
Thémistocle, m‘asseoir au foyer du peuple britannique. Je me mets sous la 
protection de ses lois que je réclame de votre altesse royale comme du plus 
puissant, du plus constant et du plus généreux de mes ennemis. (Quoted by 
Regenbogen 1998:217)
69
 
 
But Napoleon was not to receive the clement treatment of the Athenian (Hamilton-Williams 
1994:271). The English treatment of Napoleon during his exile in Saint-Helena was seen in 
France as petty revenge, unfit for a great nation. Stendhal, one of the great Napoleon-
worshippers in French literature, described Saint-Helena as ―the reef on which English honour 
has foundered‖ (quoted by Gibson 1995:171). Once more, martyrdom had been created 
(Tulard 1991:330-333), and once again, it was the English who brought about the downfall of 
a French savior myth.  
 
Rome versus Carthage 
But after the Napoleonic wars, the age-old rivalry between France and England became 
supplanted by something else. While many French would probably at the time concord with 
Montesquieu‘s view that ―the French cannot make friends in England‖ (quoted by Zeldin 
1977:107), the Anglophobe sentiments were relegated to a more secondary position. Zeldin 
has argued that ―there grew up, from around 1815, a notion that England and France 
represented liberalism in a world threatened by the despotic governments of Russia, Austria 
and Prussia, and that there was therefore an ideological cause in which they were, more or 
less, brothers.‖ (ibid:101). This was at best only partly the case. France and Britain were 
subsequently to refrain from waging outright war against each other, although numerous 
incidents, such as the Fashoda crisis in 1898, provided good opportunities (See for example 
Bell 1996:9-15, Gibson 1995:230-231, Meredith 2006:493)
70
. To the extent that both France 
and England represented liberalism, it was two very different kinds of liberalism. Napoleon 
once famously called the English a nation of shopkeepers (Paxman 1999:2)
71
. His remark 
built on a common lamentation regarding England: that it was a nation obsessed with material 
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wealth and impervious to finer, more mundane passions. Already Louis XV‘s Foreign 
Minister, the Marquis d‘Argenson, had declared the English system of government corrupt, 
because ―with them, everything is a matter of money: people there think of nothing else‖ 
(quoted by Gibson 1995:89). England was in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
denounced as ‗Carthage‘ to France‘s Rome: ―materialistic, insatiable and duplicitous‖ (Tombs 
and Tombs 2006:99); a ―vampire, tyrant of the seas, ‗perfidious‘ enemy and bearer of a 
corrupting commercial civilization – contrasted with ‗Rome‘, bearer of universal order, 
philosophy and selfless values‖ (ibid:211). The French idea of the English state as ―a 
materialistic conspiracy aiming at economic domination‖ was widely shared by other 
countries, and it became France‘s historic mission ―to lead world resistance against the power 
of English gold‖ (ibid:451): 
The ‗Carthage‘ or ‗nation of shopkeepers‘ theme, powerful before 1815 as we 
have seen, was adopted by the mid-nineteenth-century French Left, and inherited 
by late-nineteenth and twentieth-century nationalists. As early as the 1830s it 
was linked with anti-semitism and anti-Americanism. (ibid:451-452) 
 
This theme of English materialism was recurrently stressed, until it was transferred as an 
accusation against the Americans. In line with Tombs and Tombs, Zeldin notes in this respect 
that ―it is striking that the two countries were disapproved for the same reasons‖ (1977:108). 
It is not the only cause of anti-Americanism that can be traced to its Anglophobic origins. Just 
as France and America were later to represent two versions of civilization (see below), there 
was in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century an ingrained perception that England 
and France represented each their civilizational role: ―Both were tending towards the view 
that they were the joint leaders of civilization, even if they were trying to lead it in different 
directions‖ (Tombs and Tombs 2006:99). Also in this respect, the two nations presented 
different forms of liberalism, both originating from their respective periods of Enlightenment. 
The English Enlightenment was in essence a highly liberal affair and, as Himmelfarb has 
noted, ―a very different Enlightenment from that of the French‖ (2008:3). The English variety 
of Enlightenment concentrated on virtue and rights, the French on reason (ibid:5-6). As such 
England and France also saw each other as philosophical rivals: Both nations claimed to be 
the birthplace of The Age of Enlightenment
72
, yet their roads to modernity (to borrow 
Himmelfarb‘s phrase) took very different courses. The English, inspired by John Locke, 
favored enlightenment based on empiricism, while the French favored rationalism Descartes-
style. It has been crudely, but effectively, summed up as if ―Britain stood for freedom, France 
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for order. Or, [..] that Britain stood for nature, and France for civilization‖ (Tombs and Tombs 
2006:99-100). In essence, this dichotomy reveals two different ways of thought and modes of 
perception. In 1814, Joseph de Maistre remarked that ―In philosophy, wisdom begins with the 
contempt for English ideas‖ (quoted by Zeldin 1977:108). John Stuart Mill more tolerantly, 
yet equally disillusioned, remarked in a 1843-letter to his friend Tocqueville that: ―It is only 
natural that the English should not be able to understand France, just as the French are unable 
to understand England‖ (quoted by Bédarida 1980:361). The dichotomy between the two 
strands of thought may reveal something about the nature and beliefs of the two peoples. Yet 
it has an impact way beyond the realm of philosophy, and its consequences can be felt even 
today, not least within the legal sphere. British Common Law, based on prejudication, 
empiricism and inductive reasoning fundamentally differs from French Civil Law, based on 
codification, rationalism and deductive reasoning. While the British system of Common Law 
has been exported to most of its former colonies, including the United States, the French Code 
Civil, from 1807 also named the Code Napoléon, has been exported to a number of European 
countries and former colonies. As such, the two ways of reasoning have partaken in shaping 
each their part of the world. Himmelfarb notes that the American Enlightenment, which she 
attributes to a large extent to The Federalist Papers, was in essence an ―offspring‖ of the 
English Enlightenment (2008:5). In this respect as well, America can be presented as a 
successor to England.  
Along with the anti-materialist theme and the perception of the nations‘ different 
civilizational roles, another prominent feature of French Anglophobia in the nineteenth 
century was the opposition to cultural imports from Britain. Gibson describes how 
Anglophilia and Anglophobia alternated in France during the nineteenth century (Gibson 
1995:178- 234). To the extent that there existed in that period a certain Anglo-French 
brotherhood, as Zeldin argues (1977:101), it was mitigated by the virulent opposition in some 
quarters against the Anglomania that had seduced much of the French population. The poet 
Pierre-Jean Béranger deplored the arrival of the latest British fashion, boxing, in his sarcastic 
poem Les Boxeurs: 
And now we‘ve got boxers in Paris. Let‘s rush to place our bets – if need be, in 
the presence of a lawyer! In boxing, it‘s a one-to-one contest – which makes a 
change for the English. No, a thousand times no! We don‘t want those punches 
in the face which are all the rage in England. [..] Ah you English! We have to 
copy everything you do: your laws, your fashions, your tastes, even the way you 
wage war. We go on applauding your diplomats and your racehorses. But no, a 
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thousand times no, we don‘t want those punches in the face which are all the 
rage in England. (quoted by Gibson 1995:181) 
 
The familiar material theme became commonly associated with another theme that can also be 
found in French anti-Americanism: that of a lack of interest in culture. Facing the evidence of 
England‘s unquestionable cultural contributions to the world, the claim was projected on the 
English society as such rather than on the abilities of English artists. Victor Hugo, after 
praising Shakespeare as ―England‘s greatest glory‖, cannot resist a snide comment: ―When 
you arrive in England, the first thing you look for is its statue to Shakespeare. You find a 
statue to Wellington‖ (quoted by Gibson ibid:214-215). In France, culture is regarded as 
inseparable from civilization and often presented as the highest manifestation of a nation‘s 
inner qualities. The charge made against the supposed lack of culture in the English society 
thereby implicitly became a charge against England‘s form of civilization as well: that the 
English civilization might have produced a political system envied by many on the continent, 
even by some of France‘s greatest thinkers such as Voltaire, most notably in his Lettres 
philosophiques (Boll-Johansen 1992:202), but which nevertheless lacked the refinery of 
culture, rendering it incomplete and to some even sterile. If culture is one of the great halos of 
civilization, language is another. Here again, a predominant source of modern French anti-
Americanism has its source in Anglo-French rivalry. After French bids for political and 
military supremacy had once again been thwarted by the English, Joseph de Maistre remarked 
that France may not have succeeded in dominating the world by force of arms, but it enjoyed 
―another kind of domination, much more honourable, that of opinion [..] and to exercise this, 
it has a domination language [..] which, even before it made itself illustrious by masterpieces 
of all kinds, was recognized as supreme by Europe‖ (quoted by Zeldin 1977:18).  
The supremacy of the French language was, however, not to last long thereafter. 
Already in 1859, a French critic, J. Lemoine, remarked that ―in our generation, dominance is 
passing more and more to the English language‖ (quoted by Zeldin, ibid:20), apparently even 
influencing the French language as such: In 1845, François Wey complained of ―L‘invasion 
des mots anglais dans la langue française‖, and in 1855, Marcel Viennet complained of the 
way French was being corrupted by English (Thody 1995:14. See also Hagège 1987:17-23). 
In the age of the Enlightenment, the most educated people in Europe where expected to speak 
French, and Antoine Rivarol‘s somewhat Anglophobic (Boll-Johansen 1992:203) Discours 
sur l‟universalité de la langue française (1784) was not regarded as just Gallic posturing, but 
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also as a fairly accurate description of the fact that French had become accepted as the most 
prominent international language. Rivarol claimed that the sentence structure and grammar of 
French made it more logical and hence purer than any other language (Phillipson 2003:47). 
His essay includes the famous sentence ―Ce qui n‟est pas clair n‟est pas français, ce qui n‘est 
pas clair est encore anglais, italien, grec ou latin‖ (quoted by Phillipson, ibid:47-48). Yet, the 
advent of democracy ironically revealed French to be very much a minority tongue. In 
diplomacy, French retained its supremacy as an international language until well into the 
twentieth century, but in other fields, notably in commerce and industry, English became an 
―easily successful rival‖ (Zeldin 1977:19-20). The success of English in these spheres owed 
much to England‘s industrial revolution, and especially the second industrial revolution 
which, in association with Britain‘s rule of the seas, brought merchants throughout the world 
in contact with the English language, making proficiency in it a necessary prerequisite for 
commercial prosperity on a larger scale. What started as what one might call a British 
linguistic victory would later become an attribute of American soft power and as such an 
element of contention in France, jealously defending its language against encroachments from 
abroad, fearing le franglais (Étiemble [1964] 1991) or ―its insidious offshoot, framéricain‖ 
(Rosenblum 1988:418) as the ultimate affront to the national tongue. 
 
America as the new England 
The long history of armed conflict between France and England easily explains why the two 
nations long regarded each other as hereditary enemies. On the battlefields of Europe as in 
their colonial rivalry, they were, in fact, just that: two nations engaged in a century-long 
struggle for supremacy; a struggle that ended with Britain emerging victorious, able to 
ascertain itself as the preeminent world power of the nineteenth century. As such, French 
Anglophobia contains a dimension of historical explicability that seems to elude French anti-
Americanism. Far from having waged war against each other, France and the United States 
are bound together by their mutual sacrifices during the American war of independence as 
well as two world wars. In spite of the two nations being nominally allies since the first hour, 
French anti-Americanism nonetheless builds on centuries of inherited French Anglophobia. 
Anti-Americanism as a successor phobia to Anglophobia builds largely on two dimensions. 
First, the nature of the charges most frequently leveled against England and which have 
consistently engendered and nurtured French Anglophobia. These charges relate to the 
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perceived commercialism of the English, their lack of culture and the encroachment of their 
language on what had hitherto been an undisputed bastion of French influence in the world. 
Such charges were soon transferred to America, vilified by much the same segments of 
society who had denigrated England (Rémond 1958). In these spheres, Anglophobia may 
precede anti-Americanism, but as issues of contention, they have been magnified by the 
formidable power of attraction that America turned out to be, dwarfing French aspirations at 
presenting a viable counterculture. As such, the element of Anglophobia illustrated by the 
Carthage versus Rome theme resembles an almost harmless philosophical predisposition, 
while the same theme applied to the American superpower is more reminiscent of an uneven 
struggle between two models of society; a struggle that in some respects has far greater 
implications for France than its prolonged rivalry with England, namely that of economic and 
cultural irrelevance in the face of American domination. Second, after the euphoria following 
the joint French-American victory over Britain in the American war of independence, there 
quickly settled the impression among French elites that America was turning out to become a 
new England – and a more ‗modern‘ and thus more daunting adversary (Hayward 2007:15-
24). For some, such as Condorcet, the juxtaposition of England and America was an innocent 
statement of facts, referring to a community of interest and outlook that was wholly laudable. 
In his Esquisse d‟un tableau historique des progrès de l‟esprit humain 1794, Dixième époque, 
he optimistically predicted that ―Should not all nations one day aspire to that level of 
civilisation which has been reached by the most enlightened, free, liberated and unprejudiced 
peoples, the French and the Anglo-Americans?‖ (quoted by Francois Bédarida in Johnson, 
Crouzet and Bédarida (eds) 1980:364). Such sentiments were not shared by all his 
contemporaries. Talleyrand, later to become French foreign minister under the Directorate, 
Consulate, Empire, and Restoration, fled the radicalizing French Revolution in 1794 and 
found refuge in the United States. Philippe Roger recounts how Talleyrand took an immediate 
dislike to his new sanctuary:  
His voluminous correspondence gave him the chance to communicate his 
disgust to numerous friends and acquaintances back in Europe. [..] he 
complained to Madame de Staël about America being a place where everything 
annoyed him. [..] [La Rochefoucauld-] Liancourt noted that it was ―impossible 
to have a worse opinion of [Americans] in all regards, or to speak worse of 
them‖ than Talleyrand. The explanation Talleyrand found for this personality 
clash transformed his personal aversion into a political issue: he discovered the 
Englishman hiding inside the American. [..] Talleyrand discovered with surprise 
and alarm [..] that even with all the resentment toward England that had built up 
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during the American Revolution, ―America is nonetheless utterly English‖ 
(2005:39-40). 
 
In essence, Talleyrand was right. Not only was the core language used in America English, 
but independent America built on a strong British heritage:  
American law grew out of, and is still largely rooted in, the English common 
law. American political institutions and ideas – including representative 
government, the limited state, the right of revolt, the stress on individualism, the 
tradition of civil liberties – came largely from the British. They were an organic 
part of the American mind because they grew out of the political struggles in 
England during the Tudor-Stuart period, when America was still part of the 
British Empire. The American Revolution itself made the Americans more 
British, since they were fighting for the ―true British‖ order and heritage that 
were (they felt) being lost in the mother country. (Lerner 1987:20) 
 
It is little surprise that during his two years in America, Talleyrand became persuaded that the 
young United States remained at heart more English than not. As Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
he would later urge Napoleon to prevent America from falling further into the English camp, 
advocating among other the transaction of the Louisiana Purchase, which would double the 
size of the American nation for a mere 15 million dollars – by far the best bargain in 
American history (Horne 2004:196). While it seems obvious to view anti-Americanism as at 
least partly a successor-phobia to Anglophobia, and one that, given the lingering suspicion 
between France and England throughout the nineteenth century, was perhaps not so much a 
successor-phobia as a parallel, phobia-by-extension, Roger cautions us not to overestimate the 
similarities: 
[..] if some of the clichés French travelers brought back from America still 
showed traces of a long tradition of French Anglophobia, it cannot be said that at 
the end of the nineteenth century the United States was only an ―extension of 
England‖ to them. During the Second Empire, [..] warnings about the Anglo-
Saxons made a very clear distinction between Great Britain, an old and sensible 
country, and the United States, a wild and unpredictable power (2005:175). 
 
Beware of the Anglo-Saxons! 
The critiques against America are frequently formulated as a rejection of the ‗Anglo-Saxon‘ 
model (see for example Meunier, in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007:146), elegantly 
joining opposition towards America with opposition towards Britain. The French use of the 
term carries connotations that are much more profound than the mere reference to a 
geographical entity comprising the English-speaking Western nations. Philippe Roger has 
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observed how the term ―Anglo-Saxon‖ made its entry into the French language in the more or 
less opprobrious way it has remained ever since: 
[..] the French discovered in the 1870‘s that the Anglo-Saxon myth had changed, 
not so much in nature as in function: that, after having been ―racialized‖, it had 
been globalized; that it was no longer a simple excuse for dividing and classing 
the different ethnic groups within the United States, but laid the groundwork for 
a planetary redistribution of roles in which the Anglo-American couple would 
evidently be the star (2005:171). 
 
Roger notes that the term Anglo-Saxon also has ―Teutonic‖ connotations, and further remarks 
that 
it is not hard to understand why, in France‘s diplomatic isolation following its 
1870 defeat, the Anglo-Saxon stopped being a colourful and provincial barbarian 
and turned into the terrifying spectre of a community based on blood, customs, 
and language, one from which France would be excluded and by which it would 
soon be victimized. (2005:171) 
 
In this respect, references to the Anglo-Saxon have become an indication of a particular 
French frame of mind – one that acknowledges the existence of an alternative model of 
society, while deploring its success worldwide. John Bowen has remarked that ―the trope is 
less a theory about the United States and Britain than it is a shorthand way to refer to features 
that would be, or are, undesirable in France‖ (in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007:234). 
―If ever there was a mythical beast that stalked the minds of the French in the twentieth 
century it was the ‗Anglo-Saxons‘‖, writes Keiger. ―They continue to be the most ‗imagined‘ 
of ‗communities‘‖ (2001:160). Bell describes the ―triangular relationship‖ between Britain, 
France and the United States, in which ―the French certainly believed in an Anglo-Saxon 
combination against them, in politics, economics and not least cultural matters‖ (1996:2, see 
also Keiger 2001:161). In all three domains, this Anglo-Saxon axis is perceived as rivaling 
France, yet there are great differences as to why its different dimensions have left the French 
elites deploring its impact. Whereas the political dimension can rather easily be explained by 
the relative decline of French power vis-à-vis first Britain and later the United States, and the 
cultural dimension somewhat less easily by a mixture of feelings of cultural superiority and a 
growing realization that this perceived superiority is not adequately translated into cultural 
impact worldwide (both these issues will be treated at greater length in 5.3 and 6.2), the 
economic dimension reveals a fundamental difference in the French national habitus as 
opposed to its Anglo-Saxon counterparts. American cultural imperialism is often decried in 
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France alongside the ―Americanization‖ of consumers and spectators worldwide. It is rare that 
such lamentations are directed against the Anglo-Saxons as such (expect when reference is 
made to the, arguably important, domains of language, music and higher education; see for 
example Horne 2004:389-392, and Meunier, in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007:129-
156). Likewise, in spite of numerous points of political disaccord between France and Britain, 
it is first and foremost the United States that is considered the political other, rather than 
Britain, not to mention some of the other, in this respect oft forgotten, Anglo-Saxon nations. It 
may be that de Gaulle‘s repeated rejections of Britain‘s entry into the European community, 
fearing that Britain would act as an American ―Trojan horse‖ (Fontaine, in Johnson, Crouzet 
and Bédarida (eds) 1980:350), could be described as political opposition towards Anglo-
Saxon influence, or indeed fear of Anglo-Saxon ―hegemonism‖ (Horne 2004:363 and 381). In 
that case (if, indeed, that was the case) it was probably one of the latest demonstrations of a 
deliberate attempt to keep the Anglo-Saxon political model at bay. In spite of frequent French 
frustrations regarding the ‗special relationship‘ between Britain and America, it has since the 
1970s been a consistent French policy to bind Britain as much to the European project as 
possible – not least with a view to present a viable alternative, however much under 
construction, to American hegemony (see chapter 6.1). When it comes to economic matters, 
however, it is as frequently the Anglo-Saxon as the American influence that is deplored. This 
would seem to implicate that it is not just America‘s massive influence in the world economy 
that is deplored, as much as the nature of this influence, namely the Anglo-Saxon mode of 
liberal capitalism. 
It was shown above that the materialistic theme was familiar in the denigration 
of both England and America. The case against materialism is often crudely presented as one 
of culture versus money, not least in France (see for example Roger 2005:36-39). This could 
lead us to believe that faced with a choice between whether to engage in cultural or 
commercial activities, the French would be more likely to choose the former, while the more 
materialistic English and American would opt for the latter. Such a generalization would be 
both absurd and erroneous. First of all, this is not a choice that seriously presents itself to the 
inhabitants in the three nations. In all societies, some engage in culture, some in commerce, 
and some in both – not to mention the multitude of other domains belonging neither to the 
world of culture nor the world of commerce. Regardless of the proportions of the population 
in the respective countries that choose either, it is hardly conceivable that they see it as a 
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choice between culture versus money. Second, this false dichotomy builds on the 
misconception, still prominent even today, that opposed to materialism, we find culture. 
Clearly, that is not the case: opposed to materialism, we find anti-materialism, i.e. opposition 
toward the importance and the use of money. Anybody who has visited France, a wealthy 
nation and still the world‘s capital of fashion and luxury products, would with good cause 
object to the notion that the French were anti-materialist in the sense just described. Yet it is a 
commonplace assessment that the French are uncomfortable with money (more so, arguably, 
than with other material possessions). Alain Plessis describes how, throughout the nineteenth 
century, novelists decried the domination exercised by money on society (in Burguière (ed.) 
1993:226) and how late in the same century, French travelers to the United States were 
appalled by the lack of tact displayed by American nouveaux riches bragging about the 
fortunes they had amassed (ibid:229. See also Roger 2005:157-158). As opposed to many 
Anglo-Saxon countries, in France, it is considered bad taste to talk about money as such 
(Carroll 1987:132); there is in France a strong tradition of regarding money as ―estimable que 
s‘il a été acquis de manière honnête, dans des conditions honorables‖ (Plessis, in Burguière 
(ed.) 1993:229). Inherited money in this respect provides an unimpeachable source of material 
comfort, while moreover testifying to a successful lineage, whereas speculation is considered 
suspect, carrying connotations of stock jobbing or worse, exploitation (ibid:229). Apparently, 
money‘s bad reputation in France dates back to at least the Ancien Régime, where it was seen 
in opposition not so much to culture, but to honor (ibid:232), to such an extent that the 
aristocracy were forbidden to engage in commerce, deemed beneath their dignity (Brunet 
2007:28). Plessis recounts the following priceless dialogue between two noblemen prior to 
their engagement in a duel: ―Moi, Monsieur, je me bats pour l‘honneur. Vous, vous vous 
battez pour de l‘argent‖. To which the other replies: ―On se bat pour ce dont on manque, mon 
cher‖ (in Burguière (ed.) 1993:232). This notion of an antithesis between money and honor 
was later echoed by Stendhal, who noted that ―L‘argent est le dieu des Etats-Unis, comme la 
gloire est le dieu de la France‖ (quoted by Grosser 1978:20). 
Far more important than taste and tact in how to speak of money is, in this 
respect, how to make use of it. In his L‟identité de la France, Fernand Braudel describes how, 
already in the late Medieval period, France became disconnected from the main routes of a 
dawning capitalism that by its modes of transportation and proliferation encircled France 
rather than penetrated it (1986b:146-148). It would seem that this left an important imprint on 
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French society. If money was not an object of conversation, as we have seen, it remained for 
centuries an object of conservation. Conservation in this respect entailed immobility rather 
than circulation. According to the great classic economist Jean-Baptiste Say, in the eighteenth 
century, the monetary mass in France was divided evenly between circulation and immobility, 
and in 1810, Napoleon‘s minister of the Treasury, François Mollien, assessed that ―at most‖, a 
third of the monetary mass was circulated (Braudel 1986c:357). The French preferred to save 
their gold, mistrusting paper money, banks, and investments with almost equal fervor, 
favoring instead literally to bury their savings in the soil (ibid:349-359). In 1756, Ange 
Goudar deplored how gold and silver coins in France had the ―vice‖ of transforming itself into 
expensive tableware rather than being put to use (ibid:358). The result was that in the 
nineteenth century, France alone detained approximately half of Europe‘s monetary mass. 
Around 1905, economist Alfred Neymarck rejoiced in France‘s latent richness: it had become 
the world‘s largest capital reserve (ibid:352). Under other circumstances, this might have been 
a cause for celebration, but the reality behind the huge amount of capital lying dormant in 
France was precisely that: it was dormant and not put to use. This situation contrasted 
markedly with the one in England, where ever since the reign of Elizabeth I, nascent 
capitalism proved to have important beneficial effects on society (ibid:369-370), a 
development that was reinforced later with the establishment of the Bank of England and the 
introduction of bonds and paper money. These policies played an important role in promoting 
the circulation of the monetary mass and in engendering investments throughout England and 
abroad. France would have to wait until the advent of Napoleon Bonaparte before a Banque 
de France was created in 1800 (see for example Horne 2004:197, and Braudel 1986c:408), 
and even then, monetary circulation remained limited compared with other European 
countries (Braudel 1986c:346-421). This was in part due to the fact that the Banque de France 
frequently became an instrument of political infighting between different factions in the 
French society, all of which, scorning the laissez-faire approach then characterizing, at least 
to some extent, the Anglo-Saxon countries, demanded that the state exercised its influence to 
favor one or other segment of society, at the detriment of both transparency and economic 
liberalism (Zeldin 1977:1040-1120). Alain Peyrefitte has remarked that the whole conception 
of economy separates, and has long separated, France and Britain: For the French, commerce 
and industry are means for the power of the state, for the English, it is the opposite: the state 
is at the service of commercial and industrial power (1998:208). The fact that the Anglo-
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Saxon states, which have given their commercial and industrial powers relatively free reins 
compared with the French tradition of dirigisme, have become more powerful as a result, has 
not seriously altered the French skepticism toward liberal capitalism (Tinard 2001:92-99 and 
256-278). 
Braudel concludes that France has not even now become fully penetrated by the 
capitalist model, ―par les passions nécessaires, par le goût éperdu du profit sans quoi le 
moteur du capitalisme ne tourne pas‖ (1986c:420). It may be, as Braudel further writes, ―à la 
fois le charme et le malheur de la France‖ (ibid.), but it is certainly a situation that sets France 
fundamentally apart from especially the Anglo-Saxon countries. French fears of Anglo-Saxon 
dominance resemble a fight against demons, which have haunted the French society for 
centuries, investing it with deeply rooted suspicions against liberal capitalism – the essence of 
the term Anglo-Saxon to most contemporary French. French companies have in the twentieth 
century become highly competitive in a world economy that is first and foremost 
characterized by the Anglo-Saxon mode of capitalism. Indeed, corporate France is one of the 
largest investors and largest foreign sources of jobs in America (Meunier, in Katzenstein and 
Keohane (eds) 2007:151). Yet this does not alter the fact that by and large, great parts of the 
population – on both sides of the political divide – share a deep-set reluctance toward the 
liberal mode of economy. The strong anti-globalization movement in France, not least the one 
represented by ATTAC (see 3.5.2 and 6.2) is frequently presented as a protest against the 
Anglo-Saxon mode of capitalism and draws widespread support even among conservative 
audiences and opinion makers (Revel 2002:72). The French alternative to Anglo-Saxon 
economic liberalism is not anti-capitalism as such, but rather borrows on centuries of state 
intervention, or dirigisme, inherited from Richelieu and especially Colbert, the powerful first 
ministers of Louis XIII and Louis XIV (Horne 2004:115-117 and 135-140, Tinard 2001:256-
257), perfected during the Jacobin and Napoleonic traditions of state power (Kedward 
2005:468), and attaining in the twentieth century distinctively corporatist dimensions (Tinard 
2001:236-241). Over the last half century, France‘s overall most powerful political party, the 
Gaullist party
73
, has been particularly successful in, despite it being predominantly a right-
wing party, avoiding a liberalization of the national economy (Revel 2002:72 and Godin and 
Chafer, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:xxiii-xxiv). Even the most economically liberal 
French President of the Fifth Republic hitherto, Valéry Giscard d‘Estaing, did not attempt to 
significantly alter the tradition of dirigisme (Kedward 2005:467-468). This reluctance to 
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allow the free market to operate in relative freedom is not a uniquely French phenomenon. It 
is found in all societies, indeed also in Anglo-Saxon societies. It is, however, a predominantly 
French phenomenon when compared with most other Western nations (Aron 1969:262, and 
Godin and Chafer, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:xxiii-xxiv), perhaps even, as Tinard 
argues, the central characteristic of a French ―exception‖ in economic matters, dominated by a 
large ―anti-liberal consensus‖ (2001:15). This can be testified to by especially France‘s 
European partners, who frequently have to engage in discussions relating to among other the 
independence of the European Central Bank. In spite of the Bank having since 2003 had a 
French President, successive French governments (not least those headed by Gaullist prime 
ministers) have, although largely unsuccessfully, criticized the Bank‘s independence and 
attempted to impose political conditionalities on the its dealings (Meunier, in Cole, Le Galès 
and Levy (eds) 2008:253). In first GATT and later WTO negotiations, France has consistently 
presented itself as a prime defender of special interests (not least with regard to negotiations 
on the sensitive elements of agriculture and cultural products), while denouncing free trade 
within these fields as insensitive to the social and cultural cohesion of societies – and 
especially, of course, of the French society (Kelly, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:193-206, 
and Revel 2002:63-98 and 291-293). In his 2005 television address to arouse support for the 
French referendum on the European Constitution, President Chirac 
kept playing the anti-American card, arguing that only by being part of a united 
European Union could France have a chance to stand up to the United States and 
that only a united Europe could protect France from the ―Anglo-Saxon‖ 
socioeconomic model. (Meunier, in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007:148) 
 
The combination of dirigisme, suspicion of the free market, and the extensive French welfare 
state with its generous social benefits and high level of protection for the employed (paid for 
mostly by the employers), contribute to make France a country that finds itself permanently 
beleaguered by the Anglo-Saxon logic of economic liberalism (Godin and Chafer, in Godin 
and Chafer (eds) 2004:xxiii-xxiv). It may even be that in this respect, if we are to believe 
Jean-François Revel, the principal function of anti-Americanism becomes, ―has always been, 
and still is, to discredit liberalism by discrediting its supreme incarnation‖ (quoted by 
Meunier, in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007:147). In her neo-marxist (and rather 
apologetic) analysis of French anti-Americanism, Kristin Ross deplores that ―Free-market 
positions and the most inegalitarian values become systematically identified with modernity‖ 
(in Ross and Ross (eds) 2004:144). Such lamentations are shared by many French. In this 
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respect, culture does perhaps after all become the opposite of money and materialism. Not 
culture in the sense of artistic production, but culture as a deep-set predisposition, ―the totality 
of values, beliefs and traditions inherited from the past, which the specific traits of industrial 
civilization‖ cannot eradicate (Aron 1969:263). As such, numerous French find their 
economic-societal doxa challenged by a modernity, which they reject while grumpingly 
having to acknowledge the fact that this modernity, so much at odds with their own version, 
has established itself as incontrovertible on a global scale. The virulent French opposition to 
the pensée unique in economic matters (Ross, in Ross and Ross (eds) 2004:152, Meunier 
2000:111) certainly seems to validate this claim.   
 
Conclusion 
In its manifestations as well as its workings, Anglophobia and anti-Americanism in France 
present such profound and enduring similarities that it seems obvious to regard them as 
related. Anglophobia came first, being to a large degree the result of many centuries of mutual 
antagonism between the two nations. Anti-Americanism gradually succeeded Anglophobia, as 
the United States increasingly seemed poised to overtake Britain‘s role as leading empire, 
politically, economically and culturally. The most prominent similarities are, however, of a 
more ideological or cultural nature, indicating that the themes advanced to denigrate the other 
correspond to deep-set differences in out-look and opinion, indeed to competing civilizational 
models. Sophie Meunier has remarked that ―the United States has replaced England as the 
inimical friend against whom to forge a French national identity‖ (in Katzenstein and 
Keohane (eds) 2007:146), and Jack Hayward similarly notes that 
Just as Britain had been par excellence the counter-identity that enabled the 
French elites to define a partly imagined, changing, contested, self-conscious 
sense of their exceptional identity, after the Second World War the USA became 
the reference point for expressing French hopes and forlorn fears about their 
shrinking prestige and diminishing distinctiveness. (2007:24) 
 
If opposition to England was instrumental in clarifying France‘s sense of nationhood, as 
Michelet asserted almost two centuries ago (see above), opposition to America seems to have 
become an essential confirmation of French national identity in a post-revolutionary era. 
Robert and Isabelle Tombs have remarked on Britain and France that ―each country offered 
the other a mirror in which to examine itself‖ (2006:663). The same can to some extent be 
said for France and America, although with one important qualification: that Americans have 
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long ceased to look in that particular mirror, leaving the French to mirror themselves in a 
nation that sees France neither as particularly kindred nor as a rival.  
While France and Britain have largely reconciled after almost a millennium of 
mutual antagonism, Anglophobic (and on the other side of the Channel, anti-French) 
sentiments persist, although now mostly relegated to the sphere of popular imaginary. 
Stereotypes about English lack of civility and manners have prompted the French to refer to 
filer à l‟anglaise when they mean to take French leave, itself an English idiom intended to 
mock the French. Likewise, when the French say capotes anglaises, the English reciprocate 
with French letters (Paxman 1999:25-26, Zeldin 1983:76, Boll-Johansen 1992:193), 
obviously referring to an item that neither wants to take credit for. The profusion of popular 
ways to name people living on the other side of the English Channel, based on their food 
habits, such as froggies or frogs to designate the French, or rosbifs to designate the English, 
have acquired an air of folklore. Such pejorative expressions are like fossils, traces of times 
past, reflecting the ideological look that the two nations once cast on their former enemies and 
that have been kept in the language without, many times, any thought of seriously offending 
anyone anymore (Garreau 2002). In 1973 Maurice Druon, novelist and then French Minister 
for Cultural Affairs, observed regarding Anglo-French sym- and antipathies that ―The elites 
tend to admire one another and the peoples to despise one another‖ (quoted by Gibson 
1995:313). Bell seems to agree:  
British and French elites [..] each admired something different in the other 
country; but they shared a sense of belonging to a common civilisation, a 
cultured and liberal society, believing in progress and humanity. [..] Outside the 
elites there prevailed other stereotypes and persistent ideas, mainly of a sombre 
hue. The antagonism between the two countries had been long and bitter, and 
has left its mark on the history books (not least those used in schools), and often 
on popular opinion and folk-memory. (1996:2-3).  
 
In this respect, French Anglophobia contrasts markedly with French anti-Americanism, where 
there tends to be almost the opposite tendency, where in spite of the non-negligible anti-
American rhetoric used by leading members of the political and cultural establishments, the 
French as such do not seem overly antagonistic toward the United States compared to the 
inhabitants in other European countries (see the surveys reproduced in chapter 3.1). As was 
hinted in 5.1 and as will be elaborated further in chapter 6.2, anti-Americanism in France has 
throughout the times been very much the project of the elites. Though French anti-
Americanism feeds on the Anglo-Saxon legacy bequeathed by centuries of Anglophobia and 
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shares many of its distinct features, there is nonetheless an important difference between the 
two, notwithstanding the fact that England has been a traditional foe, while America has been 
a historic ally: Anglophobia was to a large extent a reaction to a rival nation exposing and 
promoting values that were in many ways radically different, or at least perceived as such on 
the other side of the Channel, from those of the French. Anti-Americanism, by contrast, is, as 
will be discussed below, in many ways as much a reaction to the only nation that has 
successfully embraced many of the same values as France, although with highly different 
outcomes. George Bernard Shaw once famously remarked that England and America were 
two nations separated by a common language
74
. It may be that one could just as poignantly 
remark that France and America are two nations divided by common values. Indeed, that was 
the message given by then presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy while delivering a highly 
pro-American speech in Washington in September 2006; a message that was shortly thereafter 
rectified to fit with the wording of the original manuscript, which read ―united by common 
values‖ (The European Institute 2006). This Freudian slip, baffling as it must have seemed to 
the audience at the time of delivery, nevertheless contains an essential truth: that France and 
America given their historical heritage share some values that are uniquely rare in the world, 
that these values set them apart from virtually all other nations, and that the two nations‘ 
individual promotion of these values – related, even kindred in nature, and yet utterly distinct 
in their manifestations – have led not just to mutual suspicion, but also to an uneven 
competition to present the world with each their universalist model of modernity. 
 
5.3 The Case of Competing Universalisms 
The slogan ―liberté, égalité, fraternité‖, i.e. liberty, equality, fraternity75, is often referred to 
as the motto for the French Revolution of 1789. Although its legacy goes back to the Age of 
Enlightenment and is associated especially with the writings of Fénelon, it became one of 
several mottoes in use during the Revolution
76
. This motto has been adopted by the series of 
―Republics‖, i.e. constitutions with republican values, that have succeeded each other (or 
other, less republican) constitutions
77
, although it was first formally established under the 
Third Republic. Keiger describes how, ―For 200 years the French nation has imagined and 
projected itself as the custodian of the universalist principles of the French Revolution 
encapsulated in the revolutionary triptych liberty, equality and fraternity and radiated by the 
French language‖ (2001:1). Yet were we to find a motto that could serve to characterize the 
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essence of French national identity, the notions of liberté, égalité, fraternité might at best give 
us an indication of the willful aspirations of France as a nation. Although this motto is 
formally inscribed as that of the French Republic in article two of the current French 
constitution, a far more appropriate motto would be ‗république, civilisation, laïcité‘, i.e. 
republic, civilization, secularism. Indeed, this would correspond better to the text in article 
one of the constitution, which states that ―La France est une République indivisible, laïque, 
démocratique et sociale. Elle assure l‘égalité devant la loi de tous les citoyens sans distinction 
d‘origine, de race ou de religion. Elle respecte toutes les croyances.‖ (Formery 2000:7). Better 
than any other words, république, civilisation, and laïcité capture the true nature of French 
national identity as it has been constructed (see chapter 4) since the days of the Revolution. It 
is hardly an overstatement to claim that modern French national identity relies on these three 
central tenets: its revolutionary heritage, which has formed its republican present, its 
perception of representing the national embodiment of universal civilization, and a specific 
view of secularism that sets France apart from most other nations. In all three domains, albeit 
to various degrees, America stands out as both a likeminded nation, founded on principles that 
were also to inspire the leaders of the French Revolution, and a challenger in the making to 
French aspirations to be a model for other nations to follow.  
 
5.3.1 The republican ideal 
The birth of modern France can be dated quite exactly: it took place on July 14
th
, 1789, when 
an angry mob stormed the Bastille, a symbol of royalist repression, and liberated its seven 
remaining prisoners, thus sparking the French Revolution
78
. Though France can boast of a 
long and impressive history, the French society today is marked more by the Revolution than 
by any other historic event. Already Taine remarked that the Revolution was the origin of 
contemporary France (Julliard 1999:177), just as centuries later, Jean-Jacques Chevallier 
could safely state that ―the French Revolution founded a society‖ (quoted by Conac in 
Chevallier and Conac 1991:xxvi). From its administrative structure with more than 36,000 
communes and 100 départements to the very values that lie at the core of the current Fifth 
Republic, they virtually all originate from the rebirth of the French nation that took place 
slightly more than 200 years ago. Roger Chartier and Madeleine Rebérioux have convincingly 
argued (in Burguière (ed.) 1993) that many of the deeper mental structures in France were 
inherited from the Ancien Régime. Indeed that was one of the central arguments made by 
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Tocqueville in his L‟Ancien Régime et la Révolution (Rebérioux, in Burguière (ed.) 1993:397, 
Furet, in Furet and Ozouf (eds) 1988:1072-1083), yet with the benefit of two centuries of 
hindsight, the events of 1789 undoubtedly augured a new era in France. In Raymond Aron‘s 
words, the Revolution cut France‘s history in two (1945:209). Naturally, even such an 
ambitious break with the past as the one represented by the French Revolution
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 could not 
eradicate all the traditions that had previously governed the French society. It is certainly true 
that though Revolutionary France rebelled against the two major institutions and sources of 
power of the Ancien Régime, the society of privileges (of royalty as well as of nobility) and 
the Church, it inherited a number of major bequests: the territory of France, the French 
language(s), a long and rich history, a tradition for dirigisme, a penchant toward Anglophobia, 
and a philosophical doxa most recently expounded in the writings of the French philosophes. 
The most obvious physical bequest was naturally the French territory, a territory that was 
populated by inhabitants with highly heterogeneous identities (Braudel 1986a:72). Though the 
revolutionaries inherited the French territory as such, it was, as Theodore Zeldin has 
remarked, ―only in 1789 that the unity of the country was proclaimed, after the different 
estates and regions renounced their privileges in ‗a heroic suicide of particularism‘‖ (1977:5). 
As regards the French language, this was by no means a common language of the French. 
Though highly influential in the circles in Paris, where the Revolution started, it was, as will 
be discussed in 5.3.2, minoritarian on the French territory as such. And though revolutionary 
France inherited a long and rich history, its teaching became virtually banned during the 
Revolution with the argument that ―une histoire des rois‖ would serve nothing, save 
maintaining the remains of ―barbarie féodale‖ (Joutard, in Burguière 1993:539). Even when 
order was restored during the Consulat, it was asserted that ―Nous n‘avons à proprement 
parler une Histoire de France que depuis la Révolution‖ (ibid.), and throughout the nineteenth 
century, there has been a tendency to look for inspiration in the ideals inherited from the 
Revolution whenever there has been attempts at installing more liberal political regimes in 
France, scorning the inherited traditions of the Ancien Régime as reactionary (Miquel 1976:5-
6). Also in this sense was 1789 considered the birth of modern France. A further bequest was 
the notions of centralized government and dirigisme. As was seen in 5.2, the tradition for 
dirigisme in the French state apparatus can be traced back to Richelieu and especially Colbert. 
Indeed, the term colbertisme is frequently used to characterize the tradition for state 
intervention in economic affairs, still highly visible in modern day France. This tradition was 
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if anything strengthened under the influence of the Revolution‘s quest for a unitary republic. 
Furthermore, the age-old rivalry with England and later the British Empire described above 
did not end with the Revolution that deposed the king of France, endemically the 
representative of England‘s staunchest enemy throughout centuries. Quite the contrary. In 
spite of its liberal traditions, England persistently opposed both the nature and form of the 
revolutionary republic that grew up across the Channel, offering refuge to the many noblemen 
and others who fled from the excesses of the Revolution. Finally and probably most 
importantly in this respect, the revolutionary ideals that were to shape both the first years of 
the Revolution and later the notions of universality that the Revolution reinforced and 
remodeled, built, as we shall see below, on a philosophical doxa shared by the intellectual 
elites throughout France, originating (at least) with Descartes and later expounded especially 
by the philosophes in the decades prior to the Revolution. With the Revolution, these mental 
structures did however acquire a new form and especially a sense of purpose. The new France 
that was born out of the ravages of the revolutionary period is, in this respect, not older than 
the United States. As the Americans revere their founding fathers, so can the French celebrate, 
if not with equal admiration their revolutionary leaders (who had a tendency to condemn each 
other to the guillotine), then at least the principles on which their Revolution was based.  
The idea that the French Revolution was indeed a break with the past and the 
beginning of a new era was meant quite literally. Not only was the deposed king, Louis XVI, 
beheaded in January 1793 in a highly symbolic gesture that demonstrated the commitment to 
building the new republic on a tabula rasa. The leading French revolutionaries were so 
determined to break with the past that they had taken to calling 1789 ‗year 1 of the era of 
freedom‘ (an 1 de la Liberté), as opposed to the previous, ‗common era‘ (l‟ère vulgaire). 
Subsequently, they even created a new calendar, le calendrier républicain or calendrier 
révolutionaire, whose starting date was September 22
nd
 1792, the day when the Republic was 
officially proclaimed, which became renamed the 1
st
 vendémiaire year I
80
. The decision to 
create a new calendar was quite literally the expression of the idea that the Revolution leading 
to the republic was a new starting point on which the new nation was born (Horne 2004:179). 
Though this calendar, with the names of the months beautifully named after the changing 
seasons, was given up in 1806, it was a magnificent testimony to the urge to distance the new 
republic from not only what would later be termed the Ancien Régime (Tocqueville [1856] 
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1928), but also the majority of the European states, who were characterized by the twin all-
pervasive forces of more or less enlightened absolutist rule and obedience to the Church.  
The importance of the French Revolution for the construction of modern French 
national identity cannot by overestimated. Indeed, as Raymond Aron has remarked, ―The 
French Revolution belongs to the national heritage‖ ([1955] 2001:42) and is as such revered 
as the constitutive moment of modern France. In the context of this study, it is furthermore of 
special interest for three reasons: First, the Revolution that marked the rebirth of the French 
nation took place at virtually the same time as the United States was born as an independent 
American nation. In their origins, modern France and the United States have more in common 
with each other than with any other nation. This is an important point for the understanding of 
French anti-Americanism: that it is in many ways a reaction to the only other nation to have 
successfully taken a path similar to that of France. Second, the American and French 
Revolutions gave rise to the first two major republics in modern times. In the minds on the 
founding fathers on both sides of the Atlantic (although the term naturally applies best to the 
American Founding Fathers), these republics represented political modernity – the political 
fulfillment of the most radical promises of the Enlightenment, and the revolutions have since 
remained ―at the heart of the Western representation of modernization‖ (Touraine, in 
Featherstone (ed.) 1990:121). Third, these unique revolutionary origins and the sense of 
representing modernity in a world otherwise ruled essentially by more or less ancient 
dynasties imbued the two nations with aspirations that are if not similar, then at least 
comparable. These aspirations are of a universalistic, messianic nature, which has had the 
effect of installing in the two nations the belief that they are examples for others to follow. As 
such, much French anti-Americanism has at the core a competition of universalisms; a 
competition which is frequently not acknowledged, but nevertheless quite pervasive. 
 
Common revolutionary origins 
Over the span of just twenty years, the world witnessed a major upheaval that was to change 
both the course of world politics and the destinies of many nations. From the Declaration of 
Independence was proclaimed in 1776 over the 1783 Treaty of Paris, in which Britain 
formally accepted the terms of secession of the United States to the election of George 
Washington as the first president of the United States in 1789, the same year as the French 
Revolution broke out, the international system of the late eighteenth century became 
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fundamentally changed. The mighty British Empire lost one of its most promising colonies 
while the most populous European nation and strongest military power challenged the age-old 
norms of dynastic rule on the continent. Seen from the perspective of the monarchies of the 
day, France and America had become rogue nations well before the term was coined (though 
the later American policy of non-entanglement with European affairs relegated it to a 
somewhat lesser threat to international peace than France). There is an eerie similarity to the 
establishment of the United States and modern, revolutionary France. Yet though, as will be 
shown below, there was clearly evidence of elements of mutual inspiration – the Founding 
Fathers having been influenced by French enlightenment philosophy (Lerner 1987:364) and 
the revolutionary leaders in France having been at least partly inspired by the American 
example (Greene 1993:135-161 and Furet and Ozouf, in Furet and Ozouf (eds) 1993:7-16) – 
the two revolutions were distinct in both origin and nature. The American quest for 
independence came in reaction to a British rule that was regarded as distant and aloof, perhaps 
even oppressing to some. ―No taxation without representation‖ was the rallying call of the 
settlers who objected not so much at first to the British colonial rule per se as to the way this 
rule was enforced upon them, denying them the right to political representation that they felt 
they deserved as free men (Berkin 2002:12). The French Revolution had more fundamentally 
social origins, coming after periods of famine and neglect from the royal authorities (Furet 
1988). Though the causes of the French Revolution were very different from those that 
prompted the American Revolution, they resembled each other in one respect: both 
revolutions were rebellions against a king who was seen directly or indirectly to neglect his 
subjects (Fredrickson, in Kastoryano (ed.) 2005:44). 
It is common schoolbook knowledge that France was the only ally of the 
American colonists fighting for independence. French support was instrumental in the 
creation of the United States as an independent nation
81
, and the two nations were destined to, 
within slightly more than a decade, becoming the two only revolutionary powers in a world 
otherwise reigned almost exclusively by kings and emperors. By the time George Washington 
was elected the first president of the United States in 1789, France was embarking on its own 
Revolution. When, on 14 July, the people of Paris stormed the Bastille to seize arms to use 
against the royal troops, they formed militias that took the name National Guard. Lafayette, 
the young French marquis and general who had fought alongside Washington even before the 
1778 treaty, was immediately named commander-in-chief of this National Guard. Lafayette 
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had personally urged George Washington, in a letter written in January 1788, to accept 
nomination as the first president of the United States, ―in the name of America, of all 
mankind, and of your own fame‖ (Duroselle 1978:35). Now he was eager to import the spirit 
of the American Revolution to France. Not opposed to monarchy as such, he wanted to rally 
the king to the cause of the Revolution and the Constituent Assembly to the idea of a 
powerful and active executive (Lefebvre, in Lefebvre, Guyot and Sagnac 1930:42). At the end 
of August 1789, a Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen was adopted. The 
document was partly inspired by the American Declaration of Independence, although, as will 
be shown below, it would lead to fundamentally different notions of human rights. For the 
drafting, Lafayette had consulted its author, his friend Thomas Jefferson, American envoy to 
France since 1784 (Duroselle 1978:33). Just before he left France in October, Jefferson wrote 
to James Madison assuring him that it would not be possible to wish for a friendlier attitude 
toward the United States than that expressed by the Constituent Assembly. At every turn, he 
wrote, the Assembly was adopting actions taken in America as its models (ibid:35). Never 
have the two nations been closer. At that precise moment in history, France and the United 
States could count only each other as true allies. They were united by strong military, political 
and cultural ties. Men such as Lafayette, Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Paine were revered 
in both countries as favorite – or at least affiliated – sons (Vincent, in Furet and Ozouf (eds) 
1993). When Benjamin Franklin died in 1790, the French Constituent Assembly went into 
mourning (Duroselle 1978:35, Schiff 2005:403). 
One might think that such similar national destinies would lead to close political 
co-operation. Yet that was not the case. The ruling federalists in the United States mistrusted 
France and favored closer ties with Britain, which remained the most important trading 
partner (Schiff 2005). The French Revolution succumbed to internal divisions culminating in 
the Terreur and ultimately in the advent of Napoleon Bonaparte as Emperor of the French. 
The revolutionary spirit once shared took different directions. Throughout the nineteenth 
century, the two nations drifted further apart. The United States retreated into isolationism. 
France, while suffering from numerous regime changes throughout the century, sought 
primarily to consolidate its great power status on the European continent and in its African 
and Asian possessions. Its remaining possessions on the North American mainland, Louisiana 
and French Canada, had been either sold or lost to Britain. Though the American Revolution 
sparked genuine interest in France, where many philosophers saw it as the manifestation of 
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the reason of mankind that they had preached throughout the eighteenth century, it would be a 
delusion to romanticize France‘s siding with the colonists during the War of Independence. 
King Louis XVI was no believer in revolutions. Rather, France‘s support was motivated by 
power-political considerations. Since the loss of large parts of its American possessions in 
1763, France had waited for an opportunity to strike a blow at Britain. The American 
Revolution was the ideal opportunity. Likewise, while Thomas Jefferson‘s early positive 
attitudes towards the French Revolution were undoubtedly motivated by idealism, the early 
American governments hardly went out of their way to come to the aid of their old ally. 
The common revolutionary origins did not lead to a Franco-American alliance of 
republics against the forces of monarchical rule which they had rebelled against. A treaty of 
friendship between the two nations was signed in 1801, its preamble reading: ―There shall be 
a firm, inviolable and universal peace and a true and sincere friendship between the French 
Republic and the United States of America‖ (quoted by Lofts and Weiner 1968:41), but 
though the treaty has remained in force to this day, it had little practical effect, as the two 
nations progressively drifted apart. Yet though the romance between the two revolutionary 
powers might only have lasted the time of a short honeymoon, the implications of their shared 
aspirations were to determine their future fates. Hannah Arendt has remarked that ―the French 
Revolution, which ended in disaster, has made world history, while the American Revolution, 
so triumphantly successful, has remained an event of little more than local importance‖ 
(1965:56). It is true that when regarded with the distance of two centuries, the American 
Revolution has come to represent the legitimate, enlightened uprising against a colonial 
power, an uprising that would furthermore come to be seen as a model for other colonized 
people to follow and as such as the first successful manifestation of a collective wish for 
independence and self-government. The French Revolution in comparison presents pictures of 
a violent, internecine struggle in a deeply divided society – a struggle which would lead to 
further ideological, political and military clashes throughout most of the nineteenth century. 
In this respect, the French Revolution in reality came to last a century (Furet 1988), ending 
―somewhere between 1871 and 1905‖ (Duhamel 1993:22). The reason why the French 
Revolution, according to Arendt, made history is probably that it seemed at the time to a 
much larger extent than the American Revolution to represent a watershed in European 
politics: ―It was the French and not the American Revolution that set the world on fire‖ 
(1965:55). The French Revolution gave birth to a new concept in Europe, the nation-state, 
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which replaced the traditional dynastic state of the Ancien Régime
82
. ―In political terms, 
France was one of the first ‗nation-states‘ in Europe‖, Zeldin notes, though he adds that ―for 
long its unity was felt consciously more by its rulers than by its people‖ (1977:4). As such, 
the French Revolution came to be seen as a precursor to the monumental changes that were to 
transform the European political landscape in the nineteenth century. By contrast, the creation 
of the United States was not regarded by the largely Eurocentric observers across the Atlantic 
as nearly as path breaking; to the European courts of the day, its foremost impact must have 
seemed to be the weakening of the British Empire. More lucid observers, such as Tocqueville, 
would later display a keen eye for the long term implications of the American experience (see 
chapter 3), yet their voices would long prove to have a relatively limited impact within the 
Eurocentric teaching of history where, as the contemporary critic Manfred Henningsen noted, 
―The ‗rising of the sun‘ in France led to a total eclipse of America‖ (quoted by Diner 1996:9). 
In spite of the difference in importance attached at the time to the two revolutions in 
contemporary Europe, there is little doubt that they both fundamentally represented a break 
with the world of established monarchies, heralding a new era, which to some must have 
seemed a threatening erosion of the values on which societies throughout the ages had been 
built, to others, the promise of modernity. 
 
The end of history and the promise of modernity 
To some contemporary observers, the French Revolution must have seemed to augur ―the end 
of history‖ (Van Kley, in Van Kley (ed.) 1994:102-107). The events of June 1789, in which 
King Louis XVI attempted to side with the aristocracy to counter the growing demands of the 
Third Estate, ―effectively discredited the thesis of a natural alliance between king and 
commoners – and with it the reading of French history as illustrative of that alliance‖ 
(ibid:105). The King‘s actions had, to the revolutionaries, discredited the royal institution as 
such – an institution which had ruled and formed France for eight hundred years83. The 1789 
Revolution marked the willful attempt to end that history. Exactly two hundred years later, 
Francis Fukuyama would use the same notion of the end of history, this time in an altogether 
positive way to describe the triumph of liberal democracy at the eve of the peaceful 
revolutions which sparked the fall of the Berlin Wall (1992:xiii, see also the discussion in 
chapter 3). It is tempting to assume that to the revolutionary leaders of the day, it must have 
seemed as if the French Revolution indeed did herald ‗the end of history‘ of the Ancien 
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Régime as well as the beginnings of a new era. French history was, in the hopes of the 
revolutionary leaders, henceforth to be shaped by the people, rather than by the kings, by the 
ruled rather than the rulers (essentially, although it is an admittedly simplistic parallel, this 
was to some extent the same Hegelian vision presented by Fukuyama two centuries later). In a 
contemporary liberal perspective, it would probably not be an exaggeration to regard the 
Revolutions of 1776 and 1789 as ‗the beginning of the end of history‘. Hegel, who reacted 
strongly against the excesses of the Revolution, nevertheless described it as ―a superb sunset‖ 
in universal history, as it heralded subjectivity and reason in the political sphere (Ferry, in 
Furet and Ozouf (eds) 1988:974).  
Both the French and American Revolutions heralded a new ‗modernity‘, erecting 
republics to supplant feudal or pseudo-feudal monarchies. Though the philosophers might 
have illuminated what Gertrud Himmelfarb has termed ―the roads to modernity‖ (2008), it 
was with the establishment of republics in America and France that this modernity acquired 
its proper political manifestation. To Condorcet
84
, America had given the world an example of 
how the modern ideals of the Enlightenment could be carried out (Muravchik 1992:83). 
Turgot described in 1778 how Americans, by setting themselves up as the champions of 
liberty and enemies of oppression, had made themselves ―the hope of the world‖ (quoted by 
Greene 1993:139). The American example was in the words of Benjamin Franklin ―a great 
political experiment‖ with global consequences, and it would be perceived among 
progressives on both sides of Atlantic as Utopia and realization combined (Rémond 
1958:532-533), an argument, which is still echoed today, even by those relatively critical of 
the ―utopia achieved‖ (Baudrillard 1988:77). The French Revolution at first seemed the 
fulfillment of the same promise in Europe. In terms of political, cultural, and philosophical 
aspirations of modernity, the French Revolution represented the ―archetypical modernistic 
action‖ (Boll-Johansen 1992:117):  
Giving us the notion of a total and decisive break with the past, the French 
Revolution virtually invented the related notions of ―nation‖ and the ―citizen‖, 
adopted and discarded four of the world‘s first written ―constitutions,‖ and 
promulgated three sets of declarations of rights. (Van Kley, in Van Kley (ed.) 
1994:6) 
 
The inscription on the Republic‘s Great Seal at America‘s birth as a united nation: Novus 
Ordo Seclorum, A New Order for the Ages (Lieven 2005:33), could just as easily have been 
formulated in France. For those yearning for an end to more or less authoritarian monarchical 
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regimes, the French and American republican experiences represented the manifest proof that 
the old order did not rest on divine providence and that alternative models of society were 
readily available to eschew. And though the ―myth of the revolution‖, as Raymond Aron 
asserts, ―benefited from the prestige of other ideas and fetishes more often borrowed than 
authentic‖, it certainly also ―benefited from the prestige of aesthetic modernism‖ ([1955] 
2001:43). In spite of the later excesses of the French Revolution, the image of the republic as 
a new political vision (although admittedly one with ancient roots, see 3.4.1) was to spread as 
an image of modernity in large parts of Europe.  
Yet it was not just the republican ideal that became associated with modernity as 
a result of the revolutions. Indeed, Paine described the new times as the Age of Reason, 
implying that the time had come for the liberation of man from the oppression of yesterday‘s 
dogmas, not least those imposed by the Church (Himmelfarb 2008:93 and 102-103). In 
France, the notion of reason had long been elevated by the philosophes as the essence of what 
should found a new era of modernity (ibid:149-163). With the French Revolution, these 
aspirations became part of the revolutionary quest to reshape society. Tocqueville later 
described the ideal set forth by the French Revolution as ―not merely a change in the French 
social system but nothing short of a regeneration of the whole human race‖ (quoted by 
Himmelfarb ibid:185-186). Mona Ozouf notes that this idea of regeneration was a key 
concept of revolutionary discourse: ―bientôt on ne parlera plus que de la régénération, un 
programme sans limites, tout à la fois physique, politique, moral et social, qui ne prétend à 
rien moins qu‘à créer un « nouveau people »‖ (in Furet and Ozouf (eds) 1988:821). This 
French modernity had essentially two inaugural sources: Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the 
Revolution. Throughout the nineteenth century they would both come to haunt France leaving 
deep imprints that have lasted to this day (Julliard 1985:17-18 and 241-247). Whether these 
aims at regenerating the people were successful is highly doubtful. In one respect though, did 
the regime that propagated the concept of nationhood more than any other present a novel 
interpretation of the national citizen: that the citizen was he (or she) who adhered to the values 
and principles of the nation. Whereas nationhood became in most nineteenth century countries 
of Europe associated primarily with descendency through bloodlines (jus sanguinis), the 
perception of nationhood in France following the Revolution was very similar to the practice 
in the United States: citizenship was the privilege of those born in France or those who by a 
willful act chose to settle there permanently (jus soli). The effects of this are still felt today: 
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Whereas the German, Italians or Spanish recognize each other first and foremost in terms of 
race or language, the French are not so much born French as they become French via culture 
and education
85
. The same applies to the Americans, which is a natural result of the nation‘s 
history as a society built largely on immigration. As opposed to most other nations, France 
and the United States are, in this respect, two nations founded on social contracts (Sorman, in 
Lacorne et al. 1990:213). Far from introducing the regeneration of man, the Revolution 
introduced something different, yet totally compatible with the revolutionary aspirations: a 
universalist conception of nationhood, in which citizenry was in principle open to those 
embracing the nation as the embodiment of their aspirations. A central tenet of the political 
nation-state established under the Revolution became the concept of France as ―la terre 
d‘asile‖, the land of asylum for political refugees irrespective of their ethnic or national 
origins (Holm 1993:19-21). This universalist notion clearly had an American parallel. Prior to 
the French Revolution, Condorcet had remarked how the American emphasis on natural rights 
made it possible for ―any man, whatever may be his religion, his opinions, or his principles 
[..] to find refuge‖ in the new nation (quoted by Greene 1993:141). Likewise, to Turgot, ―The 
asylum they open to the oppressed of all nations should console the earth‖ (ibid:140). At the 
end of the eighteenth century, mankind had in theory two universal nations to which they 
could choose to belong. 
 
Competing universalisms 
Right from the beginning of their Revolutions, the universalist aspirations of the two nations 
were visible. It was described in chapter 3.4.1 how America was born as a universal nation 
with a messianic quest to embrace the whole of mankind with universally applicable values 
(Lieven 2005:34). The same applies to the new France that was born out of the 1789 
Revolution (Lévy, in Finkielkraut and Lévy 2006:84). From the onset, the revolutionary 
leaders were persuaded that they were legislating on behalf of humanity itself, since their 
actions were inspired by ―la perspective des progrès de l‘esprit humain‖ (Chevallier and 
Conac 1991:xx). In this sense, they were ―les missionnaires de la philosophie des lumières‖ 
(ibid.). Zeldin has noted that the notions of liberté, égalité, and fraternité progressively 
became transferred onto the world to span humanity as such (1983:475). Certainly, the word 
fraternité carries connotations of a brotherhood that is not necessarily exclusive to the French 
nation. As such, the universalist pretensions were visible right from the beginnings of the 
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Revolution. Just as the American Revolution started in earnest with the proclamation of the 
American Declaration of Independence with its assertion that ―all men are created equal‖, the 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789 – ―the French Revolution‘s 
best known utterance‖ (Van Kley, in Van Kley (ed.) 1994:6) – gave the French Revolution a 
universal dimension right from the onset. Or rather, it gave France a new universal dimension: 
Yesterday, ―fille aînée de l‘Église depuis le baptême de Clovis en 496‖, since 1789 ―patrie des 
Droits de l‘Homme [..], proclamant même, par la voix de Danton, à la face de l‘univers, la 
liberté universelle‖ (Gilder and Salon 2004:22). The French Declaration is certainly the 
Revolution‘s most universalist project, one purporting to liberate not just the citizens of 
France from oppression, but potentially also mankind. Indeed, the Declaration ―was 
specifically intended to be universal in its application‖ (Chuter 1996:19). As was noted above, 
the French declaration had foreign sources of inspiration to draw from. Both the Magna Carta 
and the American Declaration of Independence ―were already there for the French to emulate, 
eschew, or surpass in 1789‖ (Van Kley, in Van Kley (ed.) 1994:6). Yet Van Kley notes that 
Very conscious of breaking from the American experience [..], the French 
deputies of the Estates General reborn as the National Assembly of 1789 tried 
hard, in the words of one of their number, not to receive lessons from others but 
rather ―to give them‖ to the rest of the world, not to proclaim the rights of 
Frenchmen but those ―for all times and all nations‖. (ibid.) 
 
The universal dimension of the American Declaration of Independence was not acknowledged 
by several of the revolutionary leaders most involved in the drafting of the French declaration. 
Keith Michael Baker‘s reading of the papers of the Abbé Sieyès, the French Revolution‘s 
most influential constitutional theorist, provides interesting insights into what Baker terms 
―the history of declarations of rights before 1789‖ (Baker, in Van Kley (ed.) 1994:158). In 
Sieyès‘s analysis, the American Revolution might have been  
the first to break with the traditional pattern in that it overthrew the entire yoke 
of despotism rather than merely alleviating it. But the break was not complete. In 
drawing up their bill of rights, the Americans continued to regard the 
governments they were establishing in the same spirit of suspicion with which 
they had confronted the power they had overthrown: they wished, above all, to 
guard themselves against abusive authority. [..] It was a profound mistake, 
Sieyès thought, for the Americans to persist in conceiving a declaration of rights 
in the traditional manner, as a direct response to immediate injuries. Declarations 
drawn up on this assumption could only be particular in their articles, as each 
people recalled its most bitter grievances. But particularistic declarations of this 
kind, insisted the French theorist, must ever be the symptom of incomplete 
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revolutions. A people regaining its complete sovereignty needs only the 
universal. (ibid:158-159) 
 
That was exactly what the drafters of the French declaration set out to produce: a universal 
declaration of the rights of man. ―Unlike the American declarations‖, i.e. the American 
Declaration of Independence and the individual states‘ various declarations and bills of rights, 
―concerned above all to make individual rights and civil society immune to power, the French 
Declaration‘s main purpose was to use abstract individuals and their rights as the constituent 
elements of a new and unlimited power‖ (Van Kley, in Van Kley (ed.) 1994:9)86. As such,  
the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen refers only once 
to ―the French people‖ [in its opening sentence, describing the National 
Assembly as constituting the ―representatives of the French people‖], only once 
to ―the nation‖, and several times, but only in an abstract generic sense, to 
―society‖ (or its members). The collectivity from which the document is 
ultimately held to derive is virtually effaced by the abstract form of its appeals to 
universality. (Baker, in Van Kley (ed.) 1994:160) 
 
The Constituants drafting the French Declaration were conscious of what Marcel Gauchet has 
termed ―la contrainte de l‟universalité‖ (in Furet and Ozouf (eds) 1988:689) and declared that 
only a ―déclaration des droits pour tous les homes, pour tous les temps, pour tous les pays‖ 
(Duport, quoted by Gauchet, ibid.) would give it the necessary universal authority. And 
though there is little doubt that to the drafters of the French Declaration ―le modèle américain 
est dans toutes les têtes, [et] c‘est explicitement ou implicitement par rapport à lui que les 
Constituants français se posent et pensent‖ (Gauchet, ibid:686), the French Declaration was in 
reality inspired as much by the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau as by the American 
example. Indeed, as Himmelfarb has noted, the Declaration ―included references to the social 
contract taken almost verbatim from Rousseau‘s book‖ (2008:183)87. Rousseau, described by 
Robespierre as ―the precursor‖ of the French Revolution (quoted by Himmelfarb ibid:186), 
was by far the most influential of the Enlightenment philosophes at the time of the 
Revolution. His ―refiguration of natural rights theory in terms of the ‗general will‘‖ (Wright, 
in Van Kley (ed.) 1994:232), had an important impact on his disciples
88
. Sieyès, who revered 
Rousseau, declared in his famous pamphlet What is the Third Estate?, published at the eve of  
the Revolution, that ―The nation is prior to everything. It is the source of everything. Its will is 
always legal; indeed it is the law itself‖ (quoted by Himmelfarb 2008:183). This emphasis on 
the common will sets the French Declaration fundamentally apart from the American. 
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Whereas in America, leading Federalists ―saw the principal dangers to individual rights 
coming from the tyranny of the majority‖ (Bell, in Van Kley (ed.) 1994:239), in revolutionary 
France, many deputies  
saw the principal danger to individual rights coming not from government per 
se, but from self-interested minorities, whether aristocracy or ―agents of 
despotism‖. From this point of view, the democratic legislature itself, 
incarnating the nation, and not simply a faction, logically represented the best 
safeguard of individual rights. Thus the two tendencies detected by the French 
theorists in the Declaration of Rights – on the one hand the protection of 
individual rights, on the other the strengthening of state authority – did not 
necessarily contradict each other. The more powerful the state, it could be 
reasoned, the less chance for any malicious minority to usurp its authority and 
violate individual freedoms with impunity. (ibid.) 
 
Bell further notes that the Declaration of Rights thus came to have ―as a principal aim the 
strengthening, not the weakening of state power‖ (ibid:238). It is little surprise then, that the 
French Declaration led to ―the construction of a sovereignty so collective as to effect an 
identification of citizenry with their government archaically reminiscent of the virtual identity 
of Old Regime nation with its king‖ (Van Kley, in Van Kley (ed.) 1994:9).  
This account of the creation of the French Declaration prompts two observations 
of importance for this study. First, though both America and France may compete for the title 
of the first nation to present a universal declaration of human rights to mankind (Fredrickson, 
in Kastoryano (ed.) 2005:44), their respective declarations differ significantly. The American 
Declaration is first and foremost concerned with endowing citizens with rights, which are 
―unalienable‖, confirming its status as a liberal document born out of especially the British 
Enlightenment tradition with its focus on natural rights guaranteeing ―the negative freedoms 
of classical liberalism‖ (Wright, in Van Kley (ed.) 1994:233). Though the French Declaration 
is unquestionably also imbued with liberal aspirations announced both in the preamble and 
several of its articles, in fact to such an extent that it can be read as an axiomatic document, 
which takes as its point of departure the notion of liberté (Herslund et al, forthcoming), it 
nevertheless balances the freedom of its individuals with the concept of ‗general will‘, a 
notion which confers a significant role on the state as the embodiment of this general will. 
The importance accorded to the state in France has, as was also mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, been a constant feature of French history since well before the Revolution. The 
preeminent role attributed to the state also explains the somewhat more limited emphasis 
placed on the individual as compared with the tradition in Anglo-Saxon nations. According to 
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Himmelfarb, all the philosophes had in common the tendency to elevate ―the whole of 
mankind‖ over the ―individual‖ (2008:174). Diderot for one decidedly placed less emphasis 
on the individual than the general will:  
Individual wills are suspect; they can be good or evil. But the general will is 
always good. It is never wrong, it never will be wrong [..] It is to the general will 
that the individual must address himself to know how far he ought to be a man, a 
citizen, a subject, a father, a child, and when it is suitable to live or to die. It is 
for the general will to determine the limits of all duties. (Quoted by Himmelfarb 
ibid:168) 
 
Himmelfarb notes that following Diderot‘s lead, ―the theory of the general will was a 
surrogate for the enlightened despot‖, having ―the same moral and political authority as the 
despot because it, too, was grounded in reason, a reason that was the source of all legitimate 
authority‖ (ibid.). This certainly applied to the Revolution‘s leading despot, Robespierre, who 
declared that ―The people is always worth more than individuals [..] The people is sublime, 
but individuals are weak‖ (ibid:184). If the American and French Revolutions with each their 
sets of declarations of human rights can be regarded as the origins of the two nations‘ claim to 
offering a universal vision for the world to embrace, it seems obvious to conclude that their 
visions differ in nature. As such, the case of two competing universalisms is indeed one of 
two different universalisms. This was already clear to one of the earliest and staunchest critics 
of the French Revolution, Edmund Burke. Although highly sympathetic toward the American 
Revolution, which he approved on the grounds that its emphasis on rights gave it a moral 
legitimacy (ibid:79-85), he was fervently opposed to the Rousseauan notion of general will 
extolled by the leading French revolutionaries
89
. In his Reflections on the Revolution in 
France ([1790] 1986), he scorned the abstract notions of reason and rationality central to the 
new political edifice being erected following the Revolution, which he found to be oblivious 
to the complexities of human nature. Though Burke did not explicitly compare the two 
Revolutions (as Himmelfarb notes, ―to the great regret of historians‖, 2008:85), his writings 
implicitly contrast the two: ―Unlike the American Revolution, which was a political 
revolution, the French Revolution, he insisted, was nothing less than a moral revolution, a 
total revolution, a revolution of sentiment and sensibility penetrating into every aspect of life‖ 
(ibid:91)
90
. Tocqueville‘s later assessment of the ideal set forth by the French Revolution as 
―nothing short of a regeneration of the whole human race‖ (quoted by Himmelfarb ibid:186) 
essentially follows the same Burkean logic. If we accept these premises, it seems clear that the 
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two universalisms were not just different in kind, but also in their aspirations. The American 
universalism was one in which a new model of political society was presented to the world; 
the French universalism had a higher ambition: to present the world with a new perception of 
mankind itself, or as revolutionary leader Billaud-Varenne wrote in his 1794 report on the 
theory of democratic government, to ―recreate the people in order to give it its freedom‖ 
(quoted by Julliard 1985:148). As Pierre Chaunu comments, such notions of ―the universal 
man‖, which continued to be put forward well into the nineteenth century, were essentially a 
euphemism for the Frenchman pure and simple (in Chaunu and Mension-Rigau 1996:284). 
Second, while the American Declaration precedes the French by more than a 
decade, Americans rarely portray themselves as the inventors of either the concept or the 
specific content of human rights. The American Declaration of Independence is rather seen as 
part of a vast complex of American values, to which also the Constitution of the United States 
belongs (see Lerner 1987:442, on what he terms the ―Constitution cult‖ in America), which 
makes America an exceptional nation and indeed a universal republic (see chapter 3.4.1). 
French political and cultural elites by contrast frequently refer to France as la patrie des droits 
de l‟homme, ―the most popular of political slogans‖ (Furet, in Furet, Julliard and Rosanvallon 
1988:58), seemingly oblivious to the fact that also America could contend for the title. Dale 
Van Kley has reported how, facing a largely Anglo-Saxon audience in 1975, French historian 
Jacques Godechot described the French Declaration of Rights as ―the principal vehicle of the 
ideas of liberty and equality around the globe‖ (in Van Kley (ed.) 1994:7). Though such 
claims may seem somewhat preposterous given the audience, it is a fact that the French 
Declaration‘s universal pretensions have been fulfilled, at least in part, by the imprint it has 
made on numerous declarations and constitutions in Western Europe as well as in former 
French colonies of Africa and Asia and, most importantly, the United Nations‘ Declaration of 
Human Rights (ibid.). That, however, is hardly justification enough for the title of patrie des 
droits de l‟homme. It is a fact that the American Declaration of Independence is frequently 
referred to by many as the first human rights declaration in the world (Hansen 2005:195), and 
alongside the French Declaration, it too was a source of inspiration for the UN Declaration 
(ibid. p. 205). It was described above how leading constitutional theorists in France, chief 
among them Sieyès, did not consider the American declarations properly universal, and it is 
certainly true that apart from the preamble, the Declaration of Independence reads as a rather 
particularistic document, framed in a specific historic and political context. Yet there is no 
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doubt that the American Declaration was a source of inspiration to the drafters of the French 
Declaration. One of the French Constituants, Montmorency, clearly stated that the goal 
should be to ―perfectionner le grand exemple de l‘Amérique‖, though he claimed for ―cet 
hémisphère l‘avantage sur l‘autre d‘invoquer plus hautement la raison et de lui laisser parler 
un langage plus pur‖ (quoted by Gauchet, in Furet and Ozouf (eds) 1988:687). Though both 
declarations have clearly been inspired by thoughts and actions from the other side of the 
Atlantic (see for example Raynaud, in Furet and Ozouf (eds) 1988:847-870), leading forces 
among the French elites soon attempted to discard the universal importance of the American 
Declaration. Similarly, references to the American republican example have among the 
French political elites primarily been made in order to oppose the American democratic 
tradition, ―imprégnée d‘esprit religieux et juridique‖, to the French ditto, ―tout entier dirigé 
vers la recherche de l‘intérêt général‖ (Raynaud, in Furet and Ozouf (eds) 1993:57). As the 
French revolutionary heritage became consolidated as a central part of the French national 
identity, the American example was discarded, and there grew up, according to François 
Furet, the belief that the French Revolution incarnated ―elle et elle seule, la liberté et l‘égalité, 
le grand commencement de l‘émancipation des hommes. Il n‘y a pas de place dans la pensée 
jacobine pour deux nations pilotes‖ (1982:209). It is an impression that has to a large extent 
survived until this day. 
 
Conclusion 
The common revolutionary ideals of the two nations have to a large entered into their peoples‘ 
―social imaginary‖ as Charles Taylor terms it, i.e. the ―common understanding that makes 
possible common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy‖ (2004:23). This sense of 
legitimacy is used frequently and extensively by the political leaders of the two nations and 
usually taken at face value by their citizens precisely because they represent shared values, 
inherited over the centuries. Building on these values, ―both nations preach a credo of 
universalism‖ (Thouaille, in Neumann et al 2006:62). In 2001, Condoleezza Rice, then 
foreign affairs adviser to President George W. Bush, stated that ―The rest of the world is best 
served by the USA pursuing its own interests because American values are universal‖ (quoted 
by Phillipson 2003:75). Quoting from President Bush‘s 2002 State of the Union address, that 
―America will lead by defending liberty and justice because they are right and true and 
unchanging for all people everywhere‖, Sardar and Davies note that the President ―takes it for 
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granted that American ideas of liberty and justice are the only ones that there are‖ (2002:201). 
Their criticism reflects an exasperation common to many foreign observers of the United 
States, one which feeds on the perception of American aspirations toward a hegemony of 
values. Yet that is the essence of universalism: that certain values, while purportedly 
originating in one pilot nation, are perceived by their proponents as common for mankind to 
expound, as sublime manifestations of the wishes and aspirations of all men. As has been 
shown above, this phenomenon is by no means unique to America. In a 1967 New Year‘s Eve 
address, President de Gaulle declared that ―Our action is directed toward goals which are 
connected and which, because they are French, reflect the desire of all men‖ (Grosser 
1980:184). In reality, both the American and the French universalisms are testimonies to an 
essential part of their national habitus: the aspiration of presenting mankind with each their 
model of civilization. 
 
5.3.2 The vanguard of civilization 
From the days of the Enlightenment, French philosophers associated the notion of civilization 
with Europe and in finis with France. In this respect, it is only befitting that the word 
civilisation itself was a product of both the Enlightenment and of a French writer, the Marquis 
de Mirabeau
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 (Elias [1939] 2000:33-4, Wilson and van der Dussen (eds) 1993:63). Like 
nation, it was a new word, first used in 1766, and admitted into the dictionary of the French 
Academy in 1798, the same year in which the word nationalisme was first used in France 
(Zeldin 1977:6, see also Febvre, in Rundell and Mennell (eds) 1998:160-183). From then on, 
it quickly caught on. Though neither Montesquieu nor Voltaire used the word, preferring the 
adjective civilisé, their works did in effect center on this very notion. Voltaire‘s Essai sur les 
moeurs et l‟esprit des nations was probably the first attempt to produce a general history of 
civilization (Wilson and van der Dussen (eds) 1993:63). Civilization became associated with 
the belief in social, cultural and political progress made popular during the Enlightenment. 
Elias has remarked that the term civilization was ―at the moment of its formation, a clear 
reflection‖ of the enlightened ideas of the Physiocrats ([1939] 2000:38). The concept of 
civilization essentially fused two ideas: On the one hand, it was a counter concept to the 
notion of barbarism. On the other, it was seen as a process that was to be taken further: 
That was the new element expressed in the term civilisation. It absorbed much of 
what had always made court society believe itself to be, as compared with those 
living in a simpler, more uncivilized or more barbaric way, a higher kind of 
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society: the idea of a level of morals and manners, including social tact, 
consideration for others and many related complexes. But in the hands of the 
rising middle class, in the mouth of the reform movement, the idea of what was 
needed to make society civilized was extended. The civilizing of the state, the 
constitution and education, and therefore the liberation of broader sections of the 
population from all that was still barbaric or irrational in existing conditions, 
whether it were the legal penalties or the class restrictions on the bourgeoisie or 
the barriers impeding a freer development of trade, this civilizing must follow 
the refinement of manners and the internal pacification of the country by the 
kings (ibid:41-42) 
 
The rising French bourgeoisie originally saw civilization as a process as well as a state, and 
though it inherently contained a challenge towards ancient notions regarding socially inherited 
privileges, the aristocracy‘s cultural norms were largely upheld. Civilization was in this 
respect from the onset imbued with notions of a both restraint and the familiar emphasis on 
culture versus material wealth. Elias describes how, according to Mirabeau, genuine 
civilization ―stands in a cycle between barbarism and a false, ―decadent‖ civilization 
engendered by a superabundance of money. The task of enlightened government is to steer 
this automatism so that society can flourish on a middle course between barbarism and 
decadence‖ (ibid:39). Here, as he further remarks: 
the whole range of problems latent in ―civilization‖ is already discernible at the 
moment of the concept‘s formation. Even at this stage it was connected to the 
idea of decadence or ―decline‖, which has re-emerged again and again, in an 
open or veiled form, to the rhythm of cyclical crises. (ibid.) 
 
Contrary to popular folklore surrounding the French Revolution, complete with images of 
sans-culottes and Phrygian bonnets, it was by and large a middle-class project led by a 
relatively small intelligentsia, although it fed on widespread dissatisfaction throughout society 
(Furet 1988). And though the term civilization never became a revolutionary slogan, it soon 
after became a rallying cry as the Revolution grew more moderate and the bourgeoisie 
cemented their stronghold on power. During the Napoleonic era, it was used to justify French 
aspirations to national expansion (Elias [1939] 2000:43). In the early nineteenth century, 
others followed suit. Elias notes that: 
Unlike the situation when the concept was formed, from now on nations came to 
consider the process of civilization as completed within their own societies; they 
came to see themselves as bearers of an existing or finished civilization to 
others, as standard-bearers of expanding civilization. (ibid.) 
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As such, the concept quickly became tinged with notions of French, or at least European, 
cultural superiority. Considering the Eurocentric nature of the Enlightenment‘s call for 
universal values, this was hardly surprising. Indeed, Nicolas Baudeau, another French 
Physiocrat, used the expression ―European civilization‖ as early as in 1766 in a work on 
French colonies in North America. Here, Baudeau recommended that the American Indians 
be converted ―non seulement à la foi chrétienne, mais encore à la civilisation européenne‖ in 
order to ―en faire à peu près de vrais français par adoption‖ (Wilson and van der Dussen (eds) 
1993:64). Condorcet‘s Esquisse d‟un tableau historique des progrès de l‟esprit humain (1794, 
published posthumously in 1795) articulated the revolutionary aspiration to liberate the 
oppressed outside France and to eradicate the backwardness beyond Europe‘s borders. 
Condorcet‘s theory of social development was essentially linear, and accordingly, one could 
―trace humanity‘s advance from simplicity and moral backwardness to technical 
sophistication and ever greater humanity and moral and aesthetic subtlety‖ (Pitts 2005:169). 
To the elites of the time, it was France, more than any other nation, which had achieved the 
highest level of civilization: ―The French were agreed about civilization: they owned it‖ 
(Johnson 1996:142). Indeed, at the time, ―The first and most influential theory about France 
was that it stood for ‗civilisation‘‖ (Zeldin 1977:6, see also Chuter 1996:22 for a similar 
assessment). It was a theory that would engender another: that France had a mission to 
civilize the world. 
 
France‟s mission civilisatrice 
The Swiss-Italian theorist Roberto Michels has suggested that every nation has two dominant 
myths: the myth of origin and the myth of mission (Lerner 1987:26. François Furet has made 
similar claims, see Lipiansky 1991:169). For the nineteenth century historian Michelet, it was 
thanks to the Revolution that France became a chosen nation and its endeavors those of 
mankind itself (Joutard, in Burguière (ed.) 1993:543). Keiger asserts that  
unlike other powers, with the possible exception of the USA, France has had a 
unique way of looking at the world based on the notion that it had a mission to 
extend the fruits of its superior civilization and values, borne of the Revolution, 
to other nations – the ‗civilizing mission‘. (2001:2) 
 
Though such assertions prompted the novelist Gustave Flaubert to ironically define the 
French as the ―premier peuple de l‘univers‖ in his Dictionnaire des Idées reçues (Flaubert 
[1881] 1966:79, 127 and 277), this notion of civilizational superiority was by and large shared 
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by the elites of nineteenth century France. During the Second Empire, every instance of 
progress in society became depicted as proof that France was ―the advanced sentinel and first 
soldier of civilisation‖ (Zeldin 1977:8). In truth, this notion of civilizational superiority had 
ancient antecents. David Chuter recounts how it built on pre-revolutionary myths of origin 
and mission, not least a long tradition of depicting the King of France as ―the most Christian 
King‖ and by association the French nation as ―the Chosen people of the New Testament era, 
as the Israelites had been of the Old‖ (Chuter 1996:16), or even, borrowing from Antiquity, to 
depict the Frenchman as the ―son of Hector‖, implying that the French were in fact 
descendents of Troy (ibid:18)
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. The Revolution, Chuter further notes,  
did not sweep all these theories away: rather, its theorists, practitioners and 
hagiographers took all these themes and remodelled them for a secular world. 
This is why the special sense of France did not disappear with the coming of the 
Republic: the soldier of God simply became the soldier of Humanity. (ibid.)
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To Michelet, post-revolutionary France was the new universal fatherland and French history 
essentially the history of the world. France had ―continued the work of the Romans and of 
Christianity, and the Revolution had performed what the church had only promised, in the 
Second Coming of 1789‖ (ibid:21, see also Citron 1991). Though such thoughts were 
advocated more forcefully by Michelet than by any other, they were far from original to him. 
A contemporary historian, Guizot, declared in his 1828 Sorbonne lectures on The General 
History of Civilization in Europe that ―France has been the centre, the home of civilisation in 
Europe‖ (quoted by Zeldin 1977:7). It is from France, he further remarked,  
as from a second, more fecund and richer fatherland, that [civilizing ideas] have 
launched themselves to conquer Europe. There has been hardly any great idea, 
any great principle of civilization, which, seeking to spread everywhere, has not 
first passed through France. (ibid.) 
 
The example of the Revolution and the military and political domination of Europe attained 
under Napoleon gave the French elites a consciousness of their own superiority, and 
especially, as they became colonial conquerors, came to serve ―as a justification of their rule‖ 
(Elias [1939] 2000:43). This ―certainty that French values were so superior that they had to be 
communicated to others‖ possessed even, according to Zeldin, ―the most liberal thinkers‖ 
(1977:9). The republican Edgar Quinet for example asserted in 1832 that France alone had 
the instinct of civilization, the need to take the initiative in a general way to 
bring about progress in modern society. [..] It is this disinterested though 
imperious need [..] which makes French unity, which gives sense to its history 
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and a soul to the country. This civilizing force, this desire for external influence 
is the best part of France, its art, its genius, its happiness (ibid.).  
 
Zeldin further remarks how civilization came to imply a whole ―social, economic and political 
programme, to be carried out in co-operation with like-minded citizens and, inevitably, 
against those whom one would label as obscurantist and reactionary‖; a program, which ―was 
egalitarian, but also elitist. It was universal, but also nationalist‖ (ibid:8). This civilizational 
program, reminiscent of what Winock has termed ―republican nationalism‖ (1990:13-17 and 
especially 37-40), was intended for both internal and external use and reached its apogee 
during France‘s heyday as colonial empire. In 1906, Etienne Clémentel asserted that ―Among 
all nations, France seems predestined [..] her mission imposes itself so clearly, so imperiously, 
that she sees it less as the work of her own genius than as the expression of eternal laws‖ 
(quoted by Chuter 1996:22). This notion of mission civilisatrice can be easily found in other 
colonial nations of the day, yet it would appear that in France, it remained a central feature of 
French thinking, inspiring all succeeding generations. Thus, for the last two centuries, France 
has, as Godin and Chafer note, 
seen itself as the depository of values inherited from the Enlightenment and the 
French Revolution. Its mission is to diffuse them universally. From the 
Napoleonic conquests to colonial expansion, from the Gaullist refusal of the cold 
war divide to the development of Francophonie, France has presented itself as a 
model to follow for the rest of the world. (in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:xv) 
 
Mette Zølner similarly states that ―a common string‖ of the Republican narratives of France 
throughout the times is the depiction of  
a France that, as carrier of civilisation, has a messianic mission to liberate the 
world from oppression and ignorance by bringing, to the rest of the world, 
values that have universal bearing, such as liberty, freedom, equality, fraternity, 
human rights and democracy. Thus, French specificity and grandeur is to be the 
carrier of a universal civilisation, believed to be the only one to all times and for 
all peoples. (2001:5)  
 
It is certainly a narrative that can be readily found in the declarations made by successive 
French presidents. One of the best known advocates of France‘s modern day mission 
civilisatrice, Charles de Gaulle, once described France as “la lumière du monde”, the light of 
the world, and following his creation of the Fifth Republic in 1958, declared that 
France must fulfill her mission as a world power. There is no corner of the earth 
where, at any given time, men do not look to us and ask what France has to say. 
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It is a great responsibility to be France, the humanizing power par excellence. 
(quoted by Rosenblum 1988:4-5) 
 
Although such rhetoric is first and foremost associated abroad with de Gaulle, his successors 
have largely followed suit. Though the more liberal Giscard d‘Estaing preferred to speak of 
France‘s rayonnement rather than using the noun grandeur, too associated with de Gaulle, 
Giscard‘s successor, the socialist Mitterrand – a longtime political opponent of de Gaulle and 
yet arguably in style and manner the most Gaullian of his successors – characteristically 
returned to expounding France‘s grandeur in numerous speeches (Boll-Johansen 1992:63-64). 
Following the postwar decolonization process (particularly painful for France who fought, 
and lost, two bitter wars of independence, first in Indochina (Vietnam) and then in Algeria; 
see for example Horne 2004), the mission civilisatrice became imbued with notions of culture 
and value promotion rather than with the increasingly problematic notions of conquest and 
colonization. It became, in short, a purposeful attempt to use and if possible augment France‘s 
soft power, not least vis-à-vis the threat of ―Anglo-Saxon‖ cultural hegemony (Godin and 
Chafer, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:xxi). Two tenets of French civilization have as such 
remained central to the French identity since well before the Revolution: culture and 
language. These have been at the forefront of France‘s postwar mission civilisatrice.  
As was seen in 5.1 and 5.2, the importance put on culture – and not least the way 
in which France has throughout modern times portrayed itself as the world‘s cultural nation 
par excellence, has had a profound influence on how the French see themselves and not least 
how they perceive others. Since at least the days of Louis XIV, the political powers ruling 
France ―have established themselves as patrons of the French arts‖, and in the following 
century, ―the philosophers of the Enlightenment, by their attempts to democratise the arts and 
culture and encourage enlightened despotism, made a significant contribution towards linking 
the political and social development of the nation and the development and acquisition of 
‗culture‘‖ (Rollet, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:170). Throughout the nineteenth century, 
these practices were carried on by the successive regimes, whether imperial, royalist, or 
republican. Meanwhile, the artist, formerly employed and admired almost exclusively by the 
social elites, became revered as the embodiment of the national genius, as culture 
progressively became a common feature of social life (Prochasson, in Burguière (ed.) 
1993:453). There is often a tendency to regard France‘s cultural hegemony, which lasted well 
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into the nineteenth century, as primarily a result of its artistic and architectural 
accomplishments. Yet as Christopher Coker reminds us,  
Like the United States in the twentieth century it was rated almost as highly for 
its technical know-how. And in an age in which nations still held each other in 
respect in terms of their military proficiency one of the things for which it was 
most respected was its military art. (in O‘Brien and Clesse (eds) 2002:327) 
 
France‘s preponderant soft power at the time was clearly linked to its hard power, a point 
which Coker further stresses when he recounts how France‘s cultural predominance began to 
wane immediately after its defeat to Prussia in 1871: ―Almost overnight, France ceased to be 
la Grande Nation [..]. It lost its reputation as a warlike nation for good and also that long 
certainty of national greatness, which had possessed it since the late seventeenth century‖ 
(ibid:328). Under Napoleon III, Paris had reached its apogee as the cultural capital of the 
world. It was, however, ―a strange centre of culture [..] for it was both modern and unmodern 
at the same time – it was both populist and elitist‖ (ibid:326). Paris itself had under the 
direction of Baron Haussmann undergone a complete overhaul, thoroughly modernizing the 
old city and turning it into ―a splendid testament to the Parisian architectural style that was to 
dominate the continent‘s cityscapes for the next 30 years‖ (ibid:327). Paris was not just 
culture, it was also modernity, and under the Second Empire, the two would go hand in hand. 
When in 1852, Le Bon Marché was transformed into the first department store in the world 
(Miller 1987, Brunet 2007, Coker, in O‘Brien and Clesse (eds) 2002), it set new standards for 
mass consumption, standards which would soon be copied throughout the western world, as 
in 1858 with the opening of Macy‟s in New York. Clearly, at least part of the modern 
phenomenon of mass consumerism originates as much from France as from America. As 
Wagnleitner notes, although ―modernization and consumption [..] have taken on an 
increasingly American look in twentieth-century Europe, they are mostly of European origin‖ 
(in Hogan (ed.) 1999:473). In his Au Bonheur des Dames, Zola described Le Bon Marché as 
‗une cathédrale de commerce‘ ([1883] 1970), an epitaph which was meant absolutely 
positively. This sense of French modernity was echoed by the French writers, who were 
considered the avant-garde throughout most of Europe. Yet the defeat in the Franco-Prussian 
war entailed an erosion of Paris‘ and by extension France‘s eminent position as the world‘s 
cultural capital. As the nineteenth century was drawing to an end, Paris increasingly became 
seen by foreign observers as ―a museum of the ancient régime, the close of a particular era in 
European history‖ (Coker, in O‘Brien and Clesse (eds) 2002:327). This impression was 
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concealed to most by the fact that France was still occasionally able to demonstrate its 
capacity for bold modernity, as with the construction of the Eiffel Tower for the Universal 
Exhibition in 1889. The Eiffel Tower, which would remain the highest man-made structure in 
the world until it became dethroned by the Chrysler Building in New York in 1930, was an 
impressive display of engineering, know-how and not least boldness, and it became vilified 
by large sections of the more traditional establishments as a hideous example of everything 
that esthetically seemed to augur modernity. The boldness of French engineers such as 
Gustave Eiffel was matched by that of the new school of impressionism, which set new 
standards in painting, predictably provoking large segments of the strong bourgeoisie. Yet as 
the world‘s capital of culture, France‘s days were numbered. It was not so much a case of one 
ascending cultural hegemony dethroning another, as it was – at least for the coming decades – 
the case of a dilution of France‘s hitherto cultural hegemony, in which the most important 
nations of the day, France, Britain, and increasingly America, interchanged in setting the 
standards in art and culture. French culture still had a powerful attraction on other European 
nations, yet as the era of mass culture approached, France‘s cultural stronghold began to 
wane. From the beginnings of the twentieth century, the luster of French culture increasingly 
became associated with yesterday‘s culture – the imposing palaces of the Ancien Régime, the 
magnificence of Haussmannian Paris, the writings of the philosophers, the French school of 
impressionism, the art of gastronomy etc. Though the century would see the inauguration of 
several large-scale cultural and especially architectural projects, frequently imposed by the 
head of state in person (Boll-Johansen 1992:75-77), France‘s self-proclaimed status as the 
world‘s cultural nation acquired an air of adjuration. The pretense of cultural eminence was 
essentially one that built on a glorious past, in which France had arguably been the leading 
cultural nation in the Western world. As such, though French designers may continue to reign 
supreme in the world of fashion (although they, too, are today facing increasing competition 
from abroad), France‘s cultural hegemony has long been relegated to the past. Still a powerful 
cultural nation, able to attract visitors from afar, France is but one cultural nation among 
several – albeit a considerable one. France, however, still finds that is has an important 
mission civilisatrice in cultural matters and often points to its cultural heritage as evidence of 
its cultural grandeur (Morrison 2007). Though this grandeur is essentially inherited from the 
time when France was indeed the cultural capital of the world, it is a heritage that continues to 
impress and inspire way beyond France‘s borders. There is a real mission in preserving and 
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restoring some of mankind‘s most illustrious works of art and cultural achievements, and it is 
a task that France has embraced with pride and admirable efficiency. The French Minister for 
Culture disposes of a budget that is the envy of his European colleagues, and he or she usually 
enjoys a very high standing within any French government. Indeed, France was the first 
nation in the world to establish a Ministry of Culture, when in February 1959 President de 
Gaulle appointed the novelist André Malraux as his Minister of Culture. The rationale behind 
was not least to boost France‘s cultural grandeur abroad, a mission that was only, however, 
partly successful (Todd 2005:347-380). In reality, France had had ―une politique culturelle 
extérieure avant d‘avoir une politique culturelle intérieure‖ (Kessler 1999:370), a tradition 
which dates back to the Ancien Régime, and which was even more forcefully pursued after 
the Revolution, as exemplified in General Bonaparte‘s expedition in Egypt (ibid.) Yet while 
France has consistently cast itself as a great cultural nation, it has in reality had a relatively 
limited cultural impact in the second half of the twentieth century. While for example French 
cinema set new standards in the 1950s and 1960s with la nouvelle vague (Haberski 2001:109-
111), these were largely highbrow films unable to attract large audiences outside of France. 
This naturally does not provide solid evidence as to the erosion of France‘s former status as a 
cultural Leviathan, yet it indicates that France is challenged on two cultural fronts: First in 
terms of mass appeal. To the extent that modern France has been able to enhance its soft 
power by promoting its culture abroad, French cultural products may have been 
enthusiastically adopted by social and cultural elites, but rarely by the masses world wide. 
Second in terms of artistic quality. Though modern French culture has many fans, both within 
and outside the hexagone, France no longer seriously represents a cultural avant-garde on a 
global scale. An article in the American Time magazine entitled The Death of French Culture 
caused furor in France in 2007 when it remarked that though ―nobody takes culture more 
seriously than the French‖, France, ―Once admired for the dominating excellence of its 
writers, artists and musicians‖ is today  ―a wilting power in the global cultural marketplace‖ 
(Morrison 2007). The article clearly hit a raw nerve in France. Novelist and former Minister 
of Culture Maurice Druon dismissed it as the result of ―une fièvre antifrançaise‖, which 
supposedly hits the United States at regular intervals (2007), and remarked that 
La culture n‘est pas déterminée par le box-office de la semaine. La culture 
s‘exerce sur la durée. Il n‘y a pas dix ans que Buffet est mort, et ses tableaux 
sont dans tous les musées de la planète. Sartre et Malraux sont encore nos 
contemporains. Et que tous les créateurs du monde soient accueillis par la 
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France n‘est pas un fléchissement, mais la preuve que cette terre est, depuis 
des siècles et, espérons-le, pour des siècles encore, celle de la culture. (ibid.) 
 
There is no doubt that the tendency to measure the impact of culture in terms of revenues is 
deeply noxious to the French elites, as the debate in France over Morrison‘s article showed. 
Yet it is noteworthy that in his defense of French culture, the former minister could name only 
dead artists and authors as testimonies to its continued influence (ibid.). This of course does 
not validate Morrison‘s assessment, and it remains a fact that France compared with other 
nations can still be termed an eminently cultural nation, which can boast more Nobel laureates 
in Literature than any other nation
94
, the latest being Jean-Marie Gustave Le Clézio, who was 
awarded the prize in 2008. Yet there is no escaping that French culture does not have anything 
remotely reminiscent of the dominating position it used to, a fact which should be attributed 
not so much to a perceived artistic decline in France, but rather to the fact that other nations 
have proven equally successful. In the domain of culture, France is quite simply no longer the 
superpower it used to be. 
Unable to impose its cultural values and products to the world, France has 
instead practiced a protective cultural policy centered on the notion of exception culturelle, a 
notion which is only few decades old. Faced with the growing impact of American cultural 
products worldwide and not least their penetration in France as well as in other French-
speaking countries, France has (as will be developed further in chapter 6) asserted itself as the 
main opponent to what is perceived as American cultural hegemony. As such, the French 
mission civilisatrice within the realm of culture has largely given way to a new, protective 
mission that seeks to promote a counter-model to the cultural dominance of the Anglo-Saxon 
world. Michael Kelly has noted that the emphasis on cultural exceptionalism has become so 
firmly embedded in French political discourses that by the turn of the millennium, ―the notion 
of l‟exception, cultural or otherwise, had become an established feature of French national 
identity‖ (in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:194). And while it is certainly a fact that the notion 
of French exceptionalism can be applied to a wide range of domains, not least within the 
sphere of global economy (see for example Tinard 2001), most of the importance put on 
exception culturelle relates to the protection of the French language. 
According to Guizot, France was at the head of European civilization, ―because 
its instincts for sociability, its sympathy for generous ideas, the clarity of its language, made it 
best capable of understanding its goals and explaining them to others‖ (Zeldin 1977:8). If it is 
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true, as Elias notes, that ―Language is one of the most accessible manifestations of what we 
experience as ‗national character‘‖ ([1939] 2000:94), then France‘s national character may 
appear to the outsider both excessively proud and zealous. Zeldin has remarked on the almost 
―divine status‖ accorded domestically to the French language (1983:326). Indeed, Fernand 
Braudel asserted that ―France is the French language‖ (quoted by Rosenblum 1988:8). Alfred 
Grosser has similarly noted that ―l‘ambition mondiale de la France est prioritairement 
culturelle, la langue devant constituer le support indispensable de la culture‖ (1989:221). It is 
certainly a fact that few other nations guard their language with the diligence of the French, 
for whom the language is ―à la fois le moyen et le symbole de l‘unité nationale, [..] et le 
témoin de l‘universalisme français‖ (Gilder and Salon 2004:85). Since 1635, the Académie 
Française has been the foremost preserver of the French language
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. Over the last decades, its 
main function – to edit the official dictionary of the French language – has attracted somewhat 
less attention than its role as guardian of the French language against foreign encroachments. 
Here, the chief enemy has been the Anglicization of the French language, where the 
Académie has been diligent to combat the use of loanwords from English, proposing instead – 
with mixed success – alternatives derived from French linguistic origins. This diligent 
mission to combat le franglais has not been the exclusive domain of the ‗immortal‘ 
Académiciens; successive French governments have attempted to legislate to safeguard the 
national language from outside contamination. This should come as little surprise: ―de 
François I
er
 au général de Gaulle en passant par Louis XIV, c‘est une tradition solidement 
établie, en France, que de voir dans la pureté de la langue l‘image de la grandeur de l‘État‖ 
(Hagège 1987:109). The best known contemporary example is that of former French Minister 
of Culture and Francophonie Jacques Toubon, whose attempt to ban the use of foreign (and 
especially English) words and idioms in official communication (la loi Toubon) was widely 
ridiculed, even in France, earning him the nickname Mr. Allgood (tout bon = all good). The 
Minister nevertheless insisted that language was ―une affaire d‟Etat‖ (quoted by Brulard, in 
Perry and Cross (eds) 1997:37). In a 1996 conference, a former counselor to Jacques Toubon 
at the time of the 1994 drafting of the law, remarked on its background that French was a 
minority language and as such in need of protection so as to resist the ―most oppressive 
language, I mean English‖ (quoted by Phillipson 2003:46). 
The impression that French is a minority language is very much a recent 
phenomenon. As Robert Phillipson notes, French has, compared with other European 
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languages, ―a longer, richer history of celebration of past glories, and a more elaborate 
ideology of linguistic superiority, than other languages‖ (2003:47). Already at the end of the 
thirteenth century, a Venetian chronicler remarqued that ―la langue française court le monde‖ 
(quoted by Hagège 2006:17), and since then, although the position of French as the 
preeminent language in Europe was occasionally rivaled by that of other rising powers, it was 
never seriously challenged until well into the nineteenth century (ibid:16-25)
96
. A 1926 
textbook for fourth graders declared that ―French is the auxiliary tongue of all civilized 
peoples. Among Europeans, it remains the preferred language of cultivated society‖ (reprinted 
in Rosenblum 1988:9). The influential linguist Antoine Meillet noted in 1918 that French may 
have derived essentially from Latin, but reflected ―universal reason‖ (quoted by Phillipson 
2003:48). Yet it is a fact that the French language was by no means a unitary language in 
France proper until well into the nineteenth century. Braudel asserts that though there was 
―without any possible discussion‖ certainly at the highest levels of society ―one‖ elitist French 
―civilization‖, the local French communities where divided into at least two large 
civilizations, each with their linguistic realm: the civilization of langue d‟oïl, ―victorious‖, 
and the civilization of langue d‟oc, which became ―relegated almost to the destiny of a 
colony‖ (1986a:72). In this respect, France‘s mission civilisatrice as regards the spread of the 
French language has as much been a matter of an internal civilizational process intended to 
unite a nation divided ―physically, economically, and socially‖ (ibid.) as well as linguistically. 
This background explains the diligent protection of the French language, as well as the efforts 
to expand its usage, far better than the incessant trepidations about the incursions of the 
franglais: French linguistic policies have been an instrument in forging a common French 
identity, centred not just around republican values, but indeed around the promotion of a 
unitary language. The importance attached to this unitary language can be witnessed by the 
fact that it is inscribed in the French constitution that ―La langue de la République est le 
Français‖ (Loi constitutionnelle du 25 juin 1992, see Formery 2000:8), an article which would 
seem superfluous were it not for the background of linguistic rivalry that characterized the 
nation until well into the nineteenth century
97
. With the Revolution of 1789, a unified system 
of administration was established throughout the nation, in which the use of (Parisian) French 
was imposed. The revolutionary leaders saw regional languages as undermining the newfound 
unity of the Republic and furthermore argued that the use of patois was keeping the peasant 
masses in obscurantism. These views were expounded in the Abbé Grégoire‘s 1794 report 
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“sur la nécessité et les moyens d‟anéantir les patois et d‟universaliser l‟usage de la langue 
française”, in which he deplored that in the most advanced country in the world, less than 
half of its 25 million inhabitants in fact spoke French (Hagège 2006:214, Phillipson 2003:42). 
His report resulted in the adoption of two laws stating that the only language tolerated in 
French public life and in schools was French. The French language had become the symbol of 
national unity as well as of the universal potential of the new republican tradition (Holt, in 
Gubbins and Holt (eds) 2002:104, Phillipson 2003:42). It would however take almost a 
century to impose French as a language spoken by the vast majority of the nation‘s citizens, 
due to an ineffective implementation of the language policies until Jules Ferry‘s school 
reforms of the 1880s, and it was in reality only after the First World War that French became 
thoroughly implanted as a common language throughout the whole nation (Hagège 
2006:214). As Phillipson has noted, states have frequently ―tended to consolidate their 
political power by codifying and standardizing a single language within their territory‖ 
(Phillipson 2003:25), yet the French diligence in the matter stands out: even after French had 
been imposed as a common language throughout the nation, the use of regional dialects and 
languages remained forcefully discouraged. In 1925, Anatole de Monzie, Minister of public 
education, stated that ―pour l‘unité linguistique de la France, il faut que la langue bretonne 
disparaisse‖ (Abalain 2000:44-45). As late as in 1972, President Georges Pompidou declared 
that ―Il n‘y a pas de place pour les langues et cultures régionales dans une France destinée à 
marquer l‘Europe de son sceau‖ (Breillat 2001:697). The reluctance to recognize the 
existence, or at least the status, of regional languages and dialects on the French territory has 
been a constant for more than two centuries
98
. In this respect, Raymond Aron‘s remark that 
the homogeneity of a people has always been the work of centuries, which, more often than 
not, equals the work of force (1969:201), clearly holds true with respect to language as well 
(ibid:277). 
The universalistic aspirations attached to the French language seem as present 
today as they were at the time of the Revolution, at least rhetorically. In France and some 
Francophone countries, it is customary to refer to French as not just a language with a global 
reach, but indeed as a universal language, enjoying a position in the world surpassed only by 
the English language in terms of ―political importance‖ (Laval University 2008). Such claims 
are justified by the frequent assertion that Francophones are the only which, together with the 
Anglophones, are present in all continents (Poissonnier and Sournia 2006:13)
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. Yet, as 
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Olivier Milhaud has noted, the impact of French in Latin America, Asia and Oceania is rather 
―residual‖ (2006a). Even if the argument of the presence of French on all inhabited continents 
is accepted, the numbers of Francophones worldwide is somewhat less impressive than it is 
often presented as. According to Ethnologue‘s reference work on the languages of the world, 
some 65 million people speak French as a first language and some 50 million as a second 
language (Gordon 2005)
100
. Though such estimates are by nature somewhat inaccurate, 
especially concerning the number of secondary speakers, they point in the same direction: that 
although French by some accounts may hold the title as the ninth most used language in the 
world (according to La documentation Française 2008)
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, it is still only spoken, whether 
fluently or partially, by around 200 million people worldwide, totaling roughly 3% of the 
world‘s population. And though such figures exclude the large number of people worldwide 
with very limited, meaning extremely rudimentary, knowledge of French (Valentin (ed.) 
2007:15-20), it is clear that the claims for universality do not lie in the number of 
Francophones as such, at least not compared with languages such as Mandarin, Hindi, 
Spanish, and Arabic, not to mention the ever looming English, frequently, though incorrectly, 
described as the globalized world‘s lingua franca (see 3.5.1). As a language used on the 
internet, French comes in fifth after English, Chinese, Spanish, and Japanese (Internet World 
Stats 2009). The pretence at universality might resemble wishful thinking when confronted 
with such statistics. Yet it is not wholly unfounded. French enjoys the status of an official or 
co-official language in some 34 countries (Laval University 2008), and is one of six official 
languages of the United Nations, although, as Jean-Marc Léger notes, ―c‘est à une voix de 
majorité que le français fut choisi comme l‘une des langues officielles des Nations Unies, en 
dépit de l‘opposition de Washington‖ (1987:164). It should furthermore be stressed that as 
opposed to French, languages such as Mandarin, Hindi, or Japanese are still eminently 
regional languages. While the impact of French on several continents might, following 
Milhaud, be characterized as rather residual, it still enjoys a substantive impact on especially 
two continents: Europe and Africa. The prominence of French in Europe, although today 
dwindling in comparison with the increasing impact of English, is due primarily to the 
importance attached to the language at the time when France was at the peak of its cultural 
influence in Europe: 
Throughout Europe from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, French 
served as an elite link language. It was spoken at courts from Spain to Russia. It 
was unchallenged as the language of ‗unity‘ of a continent plagued by dynastic 
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rivalries, wars and domestic uprisings, and competition over territory, colonies, 
and markets. French was the sole language of international diplomacy until the 
end of the First World War, when the presence of the Americans at the 
conferences elaborating the peace treaties ensured that parity was given to 
English. As recently as 1971, the President of France, Georges Pompidou, 
declared in a BBC interview that ‗French is the natural language of the peoples 
of Europe, English that of America‘. (Phillipson 2003:47)  
 
President de Gaulle‘s immediate successor might here have echoed a familiar French refrain 
(ibid.); it was, however, sadly out of tune with realities. As will be explored further in chapter 
6, the post-war process of European integration may have given the French language a 
renewed impetus in Europe, at least within the European institutions, yet it is doubtful 
whether it seriously increased the number of Francophones in Europe as such. On the 
contrary, the influence of French in Europe has been in decline throughout the twentieth 
century, especially compared with the bête noire of the most impassioned Francophiles, 
English. 
Phillipson further notes that revolutionary languages such as ―French of 
republicanism‖ came to be regarded ―as instruments of empire and conquest with a clear 
cultural mission‖ (ibid). Zeldin describes how, following the nationalist phase, in which the 
unification of the French nation, complete with the will to create the French citizen as 
opposed to the regional populations of the multilingual French state, came an internationalist 
phase, where the notions of liberté, égalité, and fraternité were transferred onto the world as a 
model of a civilization that was deemed to span humanity as such (1983:475). It is certainly a 
fact that once France‘s unitary language had been firmly established within the hexagone of 
metropolitan France, the linguistic mission civilisatrice was transferred overseas to the 
territories ruled or dominated by France. A central tenet of French colonial policy became to 
spread not just French values, but especially the French language. Even the early twentieth 
century socialist leader Jean Jaurès could still describe language as ―the necessary instrument 
of colonization‖ (Milhaud 2006a). Phillipson notes that the ―mission civilisatrice of the 
French, at home and abroad, was inconceivable in any language other than French‖ (2003:49), 
while Edward Said, commenting on the cultural dimension of France‘s imperial designs, 
remarks that it ―perfectly reflects the social structure of French knowledge‖ (1993:118). After 
the demise of the French colonial empire, this mission was carried out under a new banner: 
that of la francophonie or la Francophonie with a capital F, as its institutionalized version is 
termed. The notion was first coined by the geographer Onésime Reclus in 1880 during 
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France‘s expansive colonization process to name the space where people speak French as a 
linguistic and geographical group (Milhaud 2006a, Degn 2003, Tétu 1988). Yet the term did 
not achieve much attention until well into the 1960s (Degn 2003:5-6) when it became 
equivalent with a new, more modern, version of France‘s mission civilisatrice, namely that of 
post-colonial clientelism based on linguistic ties (see also chapter 6.1). It was, incidentally, at 
the initiative of several former French colonies that the notion of Francophonie again took 
hold. Poet-President Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal, one of the most influential African 
leaders to have embraced and promoted the creation of la Francophonie (ibid:10-11), felt that 
in order to construct Africa in the twentieth century, ―the best of the European spirit, and 
especially the best of the French essence‖ was needed (Senghor 1972:95). After some initial 
hesitations (Salhi (ed.) 2002:14, Wauthier 1995:77-81), French leaders came to the conclusion 
that such thoughts rhymed well with the French sense of purpose that had been somewhat 
lacking since the German occupation and the painful process of decolonization that marked 
the early post-war years. Though the project of Francophonie originated in former French 
colonies, Paris did not hesitate long before taking the notion as well as its implied potential in 
possession. In a world, which had become increasingly Americanized, the notion of 
Francophonie carried the promise of offering once more a message of French universalism. 
Addressing leaders from the French-speaking world in a festival of Francophonie in February 
1986, President Mitterrand had no qualms in reminding his audience that together, they were 
―carriers of a culture that can have the ambition of being universal‖ (quoted by Rosenblum 
1988:13). As will be seen in 6.1.4, the policies of both francophonie and Francophonie soon 
became instruments in upholding France‘s international grandeur vis-à-vis the threat of 
expanding American influence. 
 
Two models of civilization 
While the French mission civilisatrice had few serious European rivals, it soon came at odds 
with the growing influence of an America, which by its history and competing universal 
values challenged the exclusivity of the French civilizational identity. Already the 1776 
American Declaration of Independence with its ‗self-evident truths‘ regarding mankind may 
by some be perceived as undermining the French pretension of being ‗la patrie des droits de 
l‟homme‟, a self-image inherited from the first days of the Revolution, which would prove to 
be one of the most enduring bequest in terms of France‘s mission civilisatrice. In the early 
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nineteenth century however, America was not seen in France as a rival in civilizational terms, 
but rather to a large extent as devoid of a proper civilization (see also 5.1), an assessment that 
was to endure well into the twentieth century. Commenting on ―the smug tone of French 
cultural superiority‖ as late as in the interwar years, Kuisel has remarked that ―In its most 
extreme form America was denied a civilization of its own‖ (1993:11). French Prime Minister 
Georges Clémenceau once observed that ―America is the only nation in history which 
miraculously has gone directly from barbarism to degeneration without the usual interval of 
civilization‖ (quoted by Mead 2007:66). To the extent that the term civilization was used in 
relation to America, it was frequently used to denote the ―barbarian image‖ of the young 
nation (Lerner 1987:937). Yet in the nineteenth century, the image of America in France 
―changed from being the land of the eighteenth-century noble savage into one of commercial 
power. But as it was studied more, criticism increased and people began to see the two nations 
as representing opposing kinds of civilization‖ (Zeldin 1977:128-129). There came a dawning 
realization that America was a nation born out ―of the three shaping forces of the modern 
Western world – industrialism as a technology, capitalism as a way of organizing it, and 
democracy as a way of running both‖ (Lerner 1987:39). What accentuated the fears of this 
rising civilization was the extraordinary dynamism of the American experience (ibid:47). 
Charles and Mary Beard, authors of The Rise of American Civilization later wrote that ―No 
idea, such as democracy, liberty, or the American way of life, expresses the American spirit 
so coherently, comprehensively, or systematically as does the idea of civilization‖ (quoted by 
Lerner ibid:59-60). Yet to nineteenth century French elites, and indeed this was the case well 
into the twentieth century as well, the notion of ―American civilization‖ was largely an 
oxymoron, ―the absolute negation of the values humanity was founded on‖ (Roger 2005:374). 
Needless to say, these values where believed to be of uniquely European origin, originating 
from a continent which had assigned to itself the virtue of representing the highest level of 
civilization yet achieved. To the European nations at the time, the American example 
represented an unprecedented historical phenomenon: Never in history had a civilization risen 
to world power in so short a span (Lerner 1987:36), and never before had a civilization 
outside Europe successfully presented an alternative, or even higher, vision of modernity
102
. 
The rise of American civilization had not only been extraordinarily swift, it was also a 
civilization, which had at its origins and ―part of its mythology‖ the rejection of Europe, one 
which could be described, as Lerner does, as ―the rebellion against the father‖ (ibid:26). 
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Philippe Roger recounts how, whereas France‘s mission civilisatrice was never 
considered as seriously threatened by the mighty British Empire, ―the same was not true of 
‗the descendants of her sons‘! If Great Britain represented the good side of the Anglo-Saxon 
‗civilization lever,‘ North America embodied its aggressive propensity to destroy other 
civilizations‖ (2005:88). Already in 1782, Hector de Crèvecœur had asked ―What then is the 
American, this new Man?‖ (in his Letters from an American Farmer, quoted by Lerner 
1987:62, see also Kroes, in Katzenstein and Keohane 2007:106 and Schiff, 2005:1). In the 
following century, there arose on both sides of the Atlantic a growing sense that the American 
represented indeed the New Man. This notion that the American was ―the New Man‖, or, if 
not new, then ―there was at least in him the densest distillation of universal humanity‖ was, 
according to Max Lerner, present in the American mind from the origins of the birth of 
America (1987:29). On the other side of the Atlantic, the New Man born out of the New 
World, seemingly poised to acquire increasing influence throughout the world, was however 
widely rejected by the social and cultural elites. The revolutionary French ideal of 
―regenerating‖ man described in 5.3.1 had been largely unsuccessful. To the French elites, the 
New Man represented not the regeneration, but the degeneration of man. It was a 
degeneration, which signaled the abandonment of the norms and traditions on which older 
civilizations were built in favor of a materialistic promise devoid of historical and cultural 
ties. Baudelaire‘s 1855 lamentation that Man had become Americanized (see 5.1) expressed in 
essence the fear that European civilization was about to be overtaken and as a result deeply 
marked by the rising American civilization. The vision ―of America as a cornucopia of well-
being and freedom‖ was, according to Lerner, imbedded in the minds of European immigrants 
―from the first settlers to the latest‖ (1987:23). This ―metaphysic of promise‖ was a crucial 
element in the American civilization (ibid:24), and it attracted millions of Europeans. 
Whereas the French mission civilisatrice built on notions of exporting France‘s civilizational 
values such as language and culture, America originally did not need to export its values: they 
were readily subscribed to by the many immigrants eager to pursue the American Dream. It 
was, in Max Lerner‘s somewhat lofty prose ―a conquest of the world‘s imagination, never 
before achieved without arms and colonization‖; a ―proof of an inner harmony between 
America and the modern spirit‖ (ibid:62). The promise of modernity represented by the 
French Revolution had by comparison long been dwarfed by the American experience, carrier 
of a vision of modernity whose tangible symbols at the start of the twentieth century became a 
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seeming abundance of material wealth and technical innovation. The American civilization 
indeed represented the new ages; its rise also summoned the decline of the European 
civilizations. The fact that the decline of European civilizations in the twentieth century was 
as much a result of two world wars, which in essence started as European civil wars (Leclerc 
2000:284), did not necessarily mitigate the European rejection of the victorious American 
civilization. In 1933, Daniel-Rops and Denis de Rougemont described it as ―the worst 
degradation a ‗civilization‘ has imposed on man‖ (quoted by Roger 2005:374). As late as in 
1947, novelist Georges Bernanos described the ―abominable‖ American ‗civilization‘ (in 
inverted commas, naturally) as ―machine civilization – which one might well call ‗Anglo-
American‘ without offending anyone‖; a civilization that ―threatens not only the works of 
man but man himself‖ (quoted by Roger ibid.). How offending it must have been to especially 
the French elites that this ―machine civilization‖ would throughout the twentieth century 
come to embody the triumph of American universalism. 
 
Conclusion: From universalism to exceptionalism 
The notion of mission civilisatrice represents the willful attempt to universalize a nation‘s 
values. The French mission in this respect has been manifest since at least the Revolution. 
The American mission may have been less manifest, at least at the onset, but no less present 
and certainly no less successful. It is an irony of history that France, which since the 
Revolution has attempted to present itself as a universal nation, has retreated into protection 
of its exceptionalism, while America, born as an exceptional nation, has presented the world 
with the most successful version of universalism to date. 
There appears at first to be a fundamental dichotomy between the notions of 
universalism and exceptionalism. Whereas universalism entails the belief that values and 
ideas can be exported to benefit mankind, indeed that these are universal in nature and as such 
not particular to any society, exceptionalism denotes exactly what differentiates one society 
from others. As Michael Kelly rightly notes, exceptionalism is an ―inherently ambiguous 
notion, located within the interplay between identity and difference. An exception can only 
exist if there is some rule or norm with which it is identified, but from which it diverges in 
some significant respect‖ (in Godin and Chafer 2004:195). Naturally most, if not all, nations 
can claim to be ‗exceptional‘, given that they can present a unique history and characteristics 
that are particular to their own nation (Zølner 2001:4, Chuter 1996:13). Yet the 
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exceptionalism commonly associated with America (though primarily by Americans 
themselves) is of an altogether different nature than the unique features one could associate 
with every nation of the world. In this respect, though inhabitants of every nation might feel 
that their nation stands out from the rest in one way or the other, it would be wrong to imply 
that each nation has its own version of exceptionalism. Exceptionalism should be conceived 
as not just some features that are proper to a nation, but as a phenomenon whereby these 
features set the nation in question fundamentally apart from other nations. In some cases, the 
notion of exceptionalism carries with it the promise of universalism. The American 
exceptionalism, with its image of the United States as the nation of futurity, does this. The 
French mission civilisatrice, born (or reborn) largely out of its unique revolutionary 
experience and the ideals it engendered, is a rival contender to the aspirations of speaking on 
behalf of the rest of the world. As such, both France and America have their own version of 
exceptionalism, and for both nations, their exceptionalism is imbued with notions of 
universalism. There are, however, great differences in how they see themselves as 
exceptional. American exceptionalism carries with it pretensions of a special legitimacy that 
makes the American nation primus inter pares compared with other nations (cf. chapter 3). 
Jack P. Greene has rightly insisted that any analysis of the concept of American 
exceptionalism should recognize that it rests on two important propositions. First, the idea 
that America is an ―exempt nation‖, i.e. ―born modern without a deeply entrenched traditional 
socioeconomic and political structure and [that it] did not, therefore, ever have to undergo a 
wrenching transition to modernity‖ (1993:201). This was in essence what Tocqueville 
referred to, when he observed that ―the position of the Americans [was] quite exceptional‖ 
(quoted by Greene ibid:4). Second, the assumption of an ―American ‗national superiority‘ 
contained in the idea of the United States as an ‗exemplary nation‘‖ (ibid:201). This second 
proposition, which arose after the American Revolution, represented America ―as a social and 
political model and thereby, always implicitly and sometimes even explicitly, to claim for it 
superiority over the Old World‖ (ibid:207). This exemplary nation, it was hoped, would serve 
―as a model for Europeans, the first step in a process that would transform the Old World into 
one resembling the New‖ (ibid.). As such, American exceptionalism and American 
universalism are inseparable, representing two sides of the same coin: America, the great 
nation of futurity, is carrier of a universal mission because of its exceptionality. It is precisely 
America‘s exceptionalism which is the nation‘s prime claim to presenting the world with its 
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vision of universalism, a universalism which is not in itself presented as exceptional as much 
as originating in an exceptional nation. It is furthermore a claim, which has been present ever 
since the creation of the American nation (ibid:6).  
French exceptionalism, by comparison, is a relatively new notion and has 
altogether different connotations. One might regard the revolutionary experience as giving 
birth to notions of French exceptionalism, but that would most likely be subsequent 
rationalization. The Revolution was imbued with universalist rather than particularistic 
connotations. The notion of French exceptionalism was advanced only when it became clear 
that the universalist aspirations of the French nation had failed to be fulfilled. Whereas the 
American universalist ambitions have to a large degree been fulfilled, the French universalist 
ambitions have been challenged by the Anglo-Saxon model; a model which, under American 
leadership, has been largely victorious. French exceptionalism in this respect represents not 
the basis for universalism, but rather the tacit admission that France‘s universalist designs 
have been thwarted by those of America. In his war memoirs, Charles de Gaulle described 
how France had ―une destinée éminente et exceptionnelle‖ (1954:1), but by then, France‘s 
exceptional destiny was in reality no longer to lead, and much less to fashion, the world. De 
Gaulle‘s own destiny became to lead France from political chaos and lethargy to a nation with 
a highly centralized and efficient executive. A central tenet of his design, evident already in 
his Bayeux speech of 1946 was that in order for France to regain its ―rank‖, a powerful 
executive was needed (Duhamel 1993:27). He succeeded more than a decade later in 
establishing the Fifth Republic according to his wishes, yet it proved impossible for him as 
well as for his successors to regain ‗France‘s rank‘, at least compared with the role France had 
played previously (see chapter 6). Though de Gaulle proved a forceful advocate of French 
universalism (Cerny 1980:33), reality was that France had become relegated from previously 
enjoying the position as a ‗universal nation‘ to having to content itself with the role of being 
an ‗exceptional nation‘ – a nation which, while still purporting to represent a universal vision, 
no longer enjoyed neither the geopolitical nor the psychological means to do so. France‘s hard 
power attributes were dwarfed by those of the superpowers and its soft power attributes were 
much less considerable than they had previously been. At some point in the twentieth century, 
whether one dates it to the interwar years or the post-war years, France in essence became an 
ordinary power. Still a world power, doted with a relatively strong military, a relatively 
important role as an industrial nation and not least one of the five permanent seats on the U.N. 
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Security Council, France nonetheless became relegated to second position in the international 
system. After the Second World War, France was simply no longer, for the first time in 
centuries, a nation able to convincingly portray itself as Humanity‘s soldier. As such, modern 
day French exceptionalism can be explained to a large degree by the fact that France, unable 
to impose its universalist mission in a world that has largely succumbed to the American 
model, presents an alternative, minoritarian, indeed exceptional, version of universalism. To 
borrow from Jack P. Greene‘s description of American exceptionalism, one might say that 
France has never felt exempt, but always exemplary. This feeling of being an exemplary 
nation did not originally lead to feelings of exceptionalism, but rather to notions of 
civilizational superiority, indeed to almost militant universalism. To Michelet, France was the 
embodiment of the universal revolution, of ―living brotherhood‖, even in itself ―a religion‖ 
(quoted by Winock 1990:14-15). Modern day French exceptionalism is the realization that 
French universalism, while still present in the French mind as an ambition to strive for, is 
seriously rivaled by another universalism, one which has been far better at imposing itself on 
the world stage. French exceptionalism therefore becomes not just the protection of French 
values, but indeed becomes heavily tainted in all domains, whether political, economic, 
cultural or linguistic, in opposition to the victorious Anglo-Saxon model (Tinard 2001). When 
Garrison portrays the United States as the successor to the British Empire as the preeminent 
global power (2004:76), it borders on the understatement, as he refers primarily to the 
attributes of hard power. The United States can just as well be said to be the successor to the 
France that was previously the undisputed cultural capital of the world. The global 
rayonnement that France could boast of previously, has largely been supplanted by an 
American hegemony in terms of promotion of values, cultural impact and language. The 
republican ideal, once shared, is now promoted more forcefully by America, while the notion 
of representing a mission civilisatrice to the world has been overtaken by the largely material 
success of America. Only in one respect can France still claim to hold the vanguard with 
respect to America. The French mission civilisatrice may have been overtaken in most 
respects by the American steamroller. The notions of republicanism, democracy, and human 
rights might all be challenged by the praxis set forth by the United States. Yet France has one 
remaining civilizational ace up its sleeve, which is being produced now and again: the notion 
of secularity. A central feature of French notions of having a mission civilisatrice is the notion 
of breaking with the un-illuminated past of non-scientific theological doxa. This sets France 
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and America fundamentally apart. The French emphasis on reason, irrespective of the fact that 
France is itself a nation deeply imbued with Catholic traditions, gives it a claim to 
representing modernity and a new mission civilisatrice as opposed to an America seemingly 
besotted with religious cults. While to some, as Rauhut has argued (1953:83), civilization has 
come to be considered in certain respects as a secularized form of the concept of 
Christendom, to many French, secularism has become the last vanguard of if not civilization, 
then at least modernity.   
 
5.3.3 Two visions of secularism: Laïcité versus religious freedom 
Whereas the other legacies of the common revolutionary past, i.e. republicanism and 
messianic universalism embodied in the term mission civilisatrice, are tributes to values and 
aspirations once partly shared in nature, the third tenet, secularism, sets France and the United 
States firmly apart. The French notion of laïcité and the American notion of religious 
freedom
103
 are both expressions of secularism and have as such shaped the two societies 
profoundly. As Gunn has noted, the two terms ―are often described in effusive language as 
founding principles of the republics, as unifying principles that bring citizens together, and as 
exemplifications of the admirable characteristics that make the nations role models for the rest 
of the world‖ (2004:422). Yet, though the first two modern republics in the world were also 
the two first nations to separate the church from the state
104
, both the premises and the effects 
were very different. 
The American secularism is limited to the formal separation of church and state 
and is as such inscribed in the Constitution of the United States
105
. This separation was from 
the onset intended to protect religions and religious practitioners from both state interference 
and the preferential treatment of one religion over the others. José Casanova states that ―the 
United States was born as a modern secular state, never knew the established church of the 
European caesaro-papist absolutist state, and did not need to go through a European process 
of secular differentiation in order to become a modern secular society‖ (2006). As such, 
America‘s colonial history was almost from the beginning one of religious pluralism. There 
were essentially two sources that gave rise to the pluralization of religious life in early 
America: the ethnic diversity in the colonies and the evangelical activism that both 
transformed existing churches and led to the formation of new ones. The effect was to make a 
classical church-state pattern such as that of the Church of England outmoded, progressively 
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leading to a pattern of religious ―disestablishment‖, although it was by no means self-evident 
to the American colonists at the time (Wilson and Drakeman (eds) 2003:1, 37, and 53). 
Furthermore, with inspiration from the philosophers of Enlightenment, many federalists 
increasingly came to see religion as a private matter. This was not least the case for Founding 
Fathers such as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, who advocated strongly for an 
independence of church and state (ibid:53-54). In Madison‘s Memorial and Remonstrance, he 
argued against ―attempts on the rights of conscience‖ and declared freedom of religion a 
―natural right‖, implying that the establishment (of an Anglican) church would be ―a signal of 
persecution‖ (ibid:63-66): 
We hold it for at fundamental and undeniable truth, ―that Religion, or the duty 
which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can be directed 
only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence‖. The Religion, then, of 
every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is 
the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate. This right is in its 
nature an unalienable right. It is unalienable, because the opinions of men, 
depending only on the evidence contemplated in their own minds, cannot follow 
the dictates of other men: It is unalienable also, because what is here a right 
towards men is a duty towards the Creator. It is the duty of every man to render 
to the Creator such homage, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to 
him; this duty is precedent, both in order of time and in degree of obligation, to 
the claims of civil society. (Madison 1785, quoted by Wilson and Drakeman 
(eds) 2003:64) 
 
The codification of religious freedom as an unalienable right has had a profound influence on 
the American society. Yet while the effect of American secularism has been to lay the 
foundations of a society where the diversity of religions and cults have thrived to such an 
extent that the nation can be termed a deeply religious society (albeit characterized by a 
multitude of religious practices), the French version of secularism has had the almost opposite 
effect. 
Founding myths 
France is not just a secular nation: it is laïc, a term that is virtually impossible to translate, but 
which couples the formal separation of church and state with the idea that religion should be 
relegated to the private sphere and thus virtually absent from the public domain. Zylberberg 
notes that as a doctrine, laïcité is a phenomenon exclusively linked to French republican 
history and the unitary production of a citizenship informed by a rational and republican 
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project (1995:37). As René Rémond has noted, both the meaning of the notion of laïcité and 
its role in the French society have changed profoundly over the last two centuries (1995:7-16). 
Though the term laïcité only entered the French vocabulary around 1871 (Gunn 2004:420, 
Laborde 2002:167-183), the first revolutionary republic quickly became in effect as laïc as the 
modern Fifth Republic, albeit with different connotations (Rebérioux, in Burguière (ed.) 
1993:397-398, Gunn 2004:432-433). A highly symbolic testimony to this fact was the 
establishment of the republican calendar. It was born out of a wish to distance the New France 
from not just l‟ère vulgaire, but also from the Gregorian calendar installed by the Catholic 
Church. The new calendar abolished Sundays, the naming of days after saints and all 
Christian holidays in favor of new holidays celebrating Reason, science, nature, poetry, 
ideology and utopia. Indeed, Philippe Ardant has argued that the official republican values 
should rightly be a quartet rather than a trilogy, reading: liberté, égalité, fraternité, laïcité 
(1995:5). The first building block of what would shape the French tradition of laïcité was the 
notion of religious freedom advocated by philosophers of the Enlightenment such as Voltaire 
in his Lettres philosophiques (Rémond 1995:8). But whereas America was characterized 
precisely by a religious pluralism that rendered the establishment of a state church difficult 
(and undesirable for many), France was at the time of its Revolution a society where the 
Catholic Church held a dominant position. For the revolutionaries, this posed a twin problem: 
First, the church was firmly associated with the monarchy. Indeed, the motto of the French 
monarchy was un roi, une foi, une loi (one king, one faith, one law). As such, the subjects of 
the king were required to a double allegiance, irrespective of their own beliefs: to the king as 
well as to the church. The church, in this respect, was the church to which the king paid 
allegiance, i.e. the Catholic Church
106
. Disposing of the monarchy was not just a challenge to 
the established social classes of the Ancien Régime, but also to the church (Bergounioux 
1995:19). Second, the presence of a strong, established church was rightly considered a rival 
to the authority of the republican state. Philosophical notions of religious freedom here 
clashed with concerns over the unity of the state. Whereas religious freedom can be 
considered to have been essential for upholding the unity of an America characterized by its 
plurality of religions; in France, national unity became perceived as threatened by the 
Catholic Church (Rémond 1995:8-11). As such, laïcité quickly came to contain strong 
elements of anti-clericalism, whereby secularism not only entailed the formal separation of 
church and state, but also the exclusion of the church as a factor in public life. A good 
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example of this is the non-recognition by the French State of religious rites such as for 
example marriages. According to French law, whose origins in this respect date back to 1792, 
marriages only acquire legal status when registered by the civil authorities (ibid:12 and 
Rebérioux, in Burguière (ed.) 1993:404). In many cases, the practice of laïcité goes further 
than the non-recognition of the church: while religion is denied any formal influence over 
public life, the state is not denied the right to interfere in the activities of the church. Already 
during the Revolution, steps were taken to force the clergy not just to recognize republican 
values, but indeed to actively support them (Gunn 2004:433-437). Sometimes, these steps 
were carried to extremes, as when priests became ―systematically‖ forced into marriage by the 
republican authorities (Rebérioux, in Burguière (ed.) 1993:398). In short, while both France 
and the United States are secular nations, their versions of secularism are, if not opposed in 
nature, then at least very different in meaning as well as in effect: America‘s version of 
secularism, religious freedom, was and is intended to protect religion from state interference. 
France‘s version of secularism, laïcité, has formally the same aim, that is to grant religious 
freedom to its inhabitants, but also reflects a strong wish to protect the state from religious 
interference
107
. As Gunn reminds us, laïcité did not in its formative phases ―embody the high 
principles of tolerance, neutrality, and equality; rather, it emerged from periods of conflict and 
hostility, most of which targeted the Roman Catholic Church‖ (2004:419). 
It may be, as Gunn further argues, that irrespective of popular beliefs, France‘s 
notion of laïcité and the American version of religious freedom operate more ―in ways that 
are akin to founding myths‖ rather than as actual founding principles that have united the 
citizens (2003 and 2004:422). Gunn is certainly right in asserting that ―neither doctrine 
originated as a unifying or founding principle‖ (2004:422). Although Jefferson would later 
rank his Act for Establishing Religious Freedom (1786) as one of his most significant 
achievements, it was only adopted after years of intense debates in the Congress (Wilson and 
Drakeman (eds) 2003:68). And though the principle of religious tolerance might not be 
seriously challenged in modern America, the place of religion in public affairs, and not least 
within the public educational sector, continues to be an issue of contention (Baker 2005; 
Green, Guth, Smidt and Kellstedt 1996; Hunter 1991, and Zylberberg 1995). Noah Feldman 
even argues that ―no question divides Americans more fundamentally than that of the relation 
between religion and government‖ (2005:5. See also Kaufmann 2002). In France, laïcité only 
became firmly codified in 1905 as a cornerstone of the republic after more than a century‘s 
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ideological strife, and even then, it did not emerge as a unifying principle but was rather the 
case of an anti-clerical ideological victory. Indeed, it has been argued that laïcité is the only 
value to have durably separated two Frances, each with its conception of the world 
(Bergounioux 1995:17). Hervieu-Léger has noted that it was only after the Second World War 
that ―laïcité of compromise‖ replaced ―laïcité of confrontation‖ (in Berger (ed.) 1998:46). As 
such, laïcité has retained an almost militant dimension in the French society: religious 
symbols are banned from the public realm and relegated to the private domain. In public 
schools, overt displays of religious symbols such as the Muslim veil or conspicuously large 
Christian crucifixes are banned
108
. In politics, references to the personal adherence of 
politicians to religious communities are rare
109
. Defense of the principles of laïcité is a virtual 
prerequisite for a public career within mainstream political parties. This does not entail that 
religion is not debated publicly or that it is actively discouraged by the state. But it is virtually 
always debated in connection with the protection of the principles of laïcité. Like in many 
other European countries, France is currently experiencing strong public debates on the nature 
of Islam and the integration of Muslims in the French society. But whereas in many countries 
Islam is regarded as a challenge to the established religious communities, in France, which 
has a considerable and increasing number of Muslim inhabitants, Islam is seen not so much as 
a challenge to traditional values, originating at least partly from Christianity, but much more 
to the republican values of secularism and equality of the sexes (Roman, in Dewitte (ed.) 
1999)
110
. It should however be stressed that France is not as such anti-religious. Large 
numbers of Frenchmen are still practicing members of a religious community, although the 
number of avowed atheists is substantial compared to the small proportion of avowed atheists 
in the States (Norris and Inglehart, in Banchoff (ed.) 2007:34-45. See also Franchi 1995, and 
Stark and Bainbridge 1985). Prominent members of the religious communities, such as for 
example the Abbé Pierre
111
, are often referred to as voices of compassion and have been given 
substantial and privileged access to both media and politicians. Official France is nonetheless 
thoroughly skeptical of religion. While some of the skepticism can be attributed to the long 
tradition of anti-clericalism and the historical opposition to a Catholic Church deemed too 
powerful (and meddlesome) in French society, the skepticism has subsequently been enlarged 
to covering a large number of religious movements and not least the growing number of sects. 
France has Europe‘s strictest anti-Sect law, purportedly enacted in order to protect potential 
members from mental manipulation (loi n°2001-504 du 12 juin 2001, article 1)
 112
. This 
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legislation, which has attracted sharp criticism from abroad and not least from the United 
States, has been highly applauded by both sides of the political divide in France, where it has 
been regarded as the modern expression of the philosophical ideal of emancipating minds 
―from the influence of beliefs deemed to be in stark contradiction to reason and autonomy‖ 
(Hervieu-Léger 2001:252). The French anti-Sect law is probably the most manifest example 
of laïcité with a strong anti-American bias. In the first annual report of the Interministerial 
Mission to Combat Sects (MILS), an organ which acted as a precursor to the anti-sect law, the 
United States was described as a ―sanctuary‖ for dangerous sects, and the actions of the 
Church of Scientology depicted as ―clandestine operations launched against France from a 
foreign nation‖ (LeBlanc 2001). In its next report, the Interministerial Mission went further, 
insisting that France‘s Declaration of Human Rights, ―voted on two years prior to the 
adoption of the First Amendment in the American Constitution‖, is superior to the First 
Amendment, since as opposed to the latter, it truly ―protects human rights which are 
threatened by modern forms of obscurantism‖ (ibid.)113. There is no doubt that the anti-sect 
law, by banning religious movements such as Scientology, has presented the practice of 
French laïcité as not just different from, but even fundamentally opposed to, the American 
version of religious freedom. 
The French tradition of laïcité may be a founding myth rather than a founding 
principle, but it is nevertheless a myth that resonates so deep in modern French society, that it 
―has itself become a kind of religion‖ (Moïsi 2009:85). Like Thomas Paine did more than two 
hundred years ago ([1794] 2003:246), the French today by and large reject ―the adulterous 
connection of church and state‖114. They have also grown accustomed to rejecting expressions 
of religious beliefs in matters related to public affairs. In this respect, the myth has become a 
principle. Though it is a principle that sets France apart from most of the world (Bergounioux 
1995:17; Zylberberg 1995:37), this only serves to bolster a feeling of French avant-gardism or 
even exceptionalism (Rebérioux, in Burguière (ed.) 1993:404-406 and 416). Like the notions 
of republicanism and civilization, laïcité has acquired defining proportions that relate to the 
aspiration for modernity that characterizes part of the French national identity. In a widely 
publicized speech, former President Jacques Chirac described laïcité as a ―pillar‖ of the 
French Constitution, adding that: ―Its values are at the core of our uniqueness as a Nation. 
These values spread our voice far and wide in the world‖ (quoted by Gunn 2004:428). 
Irrespective of the fact that the French version of secularism has been copied by precious few 
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nations
115
, there is in France a genuine perception that laïcité is a universal ideal, which 
France should promote. This perception also opposes French universalism to American 
universalism.  
While for France, their universalism is virtually devoid of notions of religion, 
focusing instead on the philosophic arguments that were at the core of the Declaration of 
Human Rights, American universalism merges the values on which the American nation was 
founded with a religiously tainted messianic streak, which to some is akin to new 
millennialism. Whereas France portrays itself as a role model based on it being not just a 
vanguard of civilization but also of reason, many Americans believe that their nation is 
blessed by God, indeed that it is, as it is sometimes crudely put, ―God‘s Own Country‖ 
(Galtung, in Chay (ed.) 1990:123). The notion of American exceptionalism has distinctly 
religious connotations, endowing America with a moral mission, in prolongation of its 
manifest destiny, to spread its values to the world. Reinhold Niebuhr once described how 
Americans have ―a religious version of our national destiny which interpreted the meaning of 
our nationhood as God‘s effort to make a new beginning in the history of mankind‖ 
(1949:31). That is still largely the case (Schlesinger 1986, Lipset 1996, Baker 2005). In this 
respect, as Chesterton observed, America is ―the only nation in the world that is founded on a 
creed‖ (quoted in Lipset 1996:31). Nonetheless, José Casanova argues that it would be 
―ludicrous to argue that the United States is a less functionally differentiated society, and 
therefore less modern, and therefore less secular, than France or Sweden‖ (2006). Yet this 
charge is often advanced against America, not least in France. The strong role of religion in 
American society is frequently vilified in France, where Jakobsen and Pellegrini‘s assertion 
that ―the religion/secularism opposition is fundamentally implicated in claims about reason‖ 
(2000) holds particularly true. In this respect, the two opposing visions of secularism 
presented by France and the United States highlight that their competing universalisms are not 
just a matter of whose vision should be a model for futurity, but also which model should 
predominate.  
 
Science and sensibility 
The French secular tradition may stem from the Revolution but, as the Revolution itself, it has 
older sources of inspiration, not least those originating from the Enlightenment period 
(Rebérioux, in Burguière (ed.) 1993:397-398). Tocqueville later remarked that the French 
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philosophers of the Enlightenment, following Descartes‘ lead, had one penchant above all 
other: reason (Himmelfarb 2008:152). This has had a profound influence on the way religion 
is viewed by some in France. For the philosophes, the ―idea of reason had as its converse the 
idea of religion‖ (ibid.). Diderot defined the Encyclopédie as the instrument of ―a reasoning 
age‖, declaring that ―Reason is to the philosopher, what grace is to the Christian. Grace moves 
the Christian to act, reason moves the philosopher‖ (quoted by Himmelfarb ibid.). As 
Himmelfarb comments,  
reason was not just pitted against religion, defined in opposition to religion; it 
was implicitly granted the same absolute, dogmatic status as religion. [..] And 
reason illegitimized not only the Catholic Church but any form of established or 
institutional religion, and beyond that any religious faith dependent on miracles 
or dogmas that violated the canons of reason. (ibid.) 
 
Some entries in the Encyclopédie were thoroughly anti-religious, such as those by the Baron 
d‘Holbach on ―Priests‖ or ―Theocracy‖, which suggested that ―religion was an invitation by 
clever clerics who imposed it on the ignorant and intimidated masses‖ (ibid:153). Voltaire 
similarly remarked that ―Le plus absurde des Despotismes, le plus humiliant pour la nature 
humaine; le plus contradictoire, le plus funeste, est celui des prêtres; et de tous les empires 
sacerdotaux, le plus criminal, est sans contredit celui des prêtres de la religion chrétienne‖ 
(Voltaire 1762:4-5). In a letter written to Diderot, he argued that religion ―must be destroyed 
among respectable people and left to the canaille large and small, for whom it was made‖ 
(quoted by Himmelfarb 2008:155). Later, laïcité came to be seen as a vehicle for the 
liberation of the ignorant masses to the virtues of reason (ibid:154-155), while religion 
increasingly became presented as contrary to both reason and science (Rebérioux, in 
Burguière (ed.) 1993:397-412). While America has in the course of the twentieth century 
overtaken France (and virtually every other nation) in terms of scientific achievements, the 
notion of science itself does probably not command the same awe throughout the American 
society as it does in France. According to Madeleine Rebérioux, post-revolutionary France is 
deeply imbued with a ―scientistic culture‖, in which ―reason‖ is rated much higher than 
―faith‖ (ibid:406-412). Especially during the nineteenth century there arose a strong reaction 
among leading scientists such as Lamarck against the Christian version of the origins of the 
world (ibid:407-408), and as the disputes between clericalists and anti-clericalists ravaged 
society, Charles Darwin‘s Origins of the Species and August Comte‘s notions of scientific 
positivism became the preferred arguments of the anti-clericals, scorning the Biblical version 
225 
 
of Genesis as obscurantist while expounding science as the harbinger of modernity (ibid:406-
412). The opposition between not just religion and science, but also religion and modernity 
was confirmed from a unexpected source when Pope Pius X in 1907 condemned modernity as 
the ―synthesis of all heresies‖ (quoted by Rebérioux, ibid:409). The dichotomy between 
religion and science or religion and modernity has endured in France to this day. As laïcité 
gradually came to be accepted during the second half of the twentieth century as a 
fundamental value uniting the French (or at least the vast majority of them), it has consistently 
been presented as yet another proof of achieved modernity and thus as a testimony to the 
mental maturity of the French (ibid:409-412). It is therefore no surprise that the interest for 
Intelligent Design or Creationism, prominent in religious circles in America, is, while largely 
rejected throughout most of Europe, especially vilified in France. The religiously based 
rejection of what is considered scientific evidence, most prominently of course Charles 
Darwin‘s theories of the origins and development of species, is often presented as yet another 
proof of American ‗immaturity‘, leading to a widely shared perception that the United States 
is more ‗backwards‘ in terms of rationality than France116. In this respect, France does not 
deviate significantly from most Western European nations; if anything, France represents the 
purest or most extreme form of European secularism. Dislike of religious extremism, 
conservatism, or religion in general has contributed to anti-American attitudes in Europe 
based on a perception that in this respect, the United States is generally more ‗regressive‘ than 
other First World nations, in the sense that it has kept old attitudes and values alive which are 
largely being phased out in Europe as belonging to another age. Katzenstein has remarked 
how  
A secular liberalism is deeply ingrained in the self-understanding of most 
Europeans [..]. Not long ago it was an article of faith, so to speak, among most 
scholars of religion and of Europe that secularization was the dominant trend in 
modernization. (Katzenstein, in Byrnes and Katzenstein (eds) 2006:7) 
 
Stark and Bainbridge similarly note how ―comparisons of ‗secularized‘ Europe with ‗still-
pious‘ America too often seem intended primarily to reaffirm European claims to greater 
cultural maturity and enlightenment‖ (1985:476). Casanova likewise asserts that ―the general 
secularization of Europe is an undeniable social fact‖ (in Byrnes and Katzenstein (eds) 
2006:83), and describes how  
secularization became a self-fulfilling prophecy in Europe, once large sectors of 
the population of Western European societies, including the Christian churches, 
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accepted the basic premises of the theory of secularization: that secularization is 
a teleological process of modern social change; that the more modern a society 
the more secular it becomes; that ―secularity‖ is ―a sign of the times.‖ (ibid:84).  
 
There is no doubt that religion, especially in its more conservative forms, is much stronger in 
America, this ―the most religious country in Christendom‖ (Lipset 2000), than in most of 
Europe. A 2002 survey by the Pew Research Center noted that among wealthy nations, the 
United States stood alone in its embrace of religion. With 59% answering that ―religion plays 
a very important role in their lives‖, the survey concluded that in terms of religion, 
―Americans‘ views are closer to people in developing nations than to the publics of developed 
nations‖ (Pew 2002:2). The survey also showed that secularism was particularly prevalent 
throughout Europe and not least in France, were only 11% found religion to be very important 
(ibid.). It may be, as Casanova argues, that it is Europe, which in this respect is both 
exceptional and distinctive compared with the rest of the world (in Byrnes and Katzenstein 
(eds) 2006:83-90). Scott Thomas has similarly argued that the notion of secularization as an 
inherent feature of modernity applies to Europe, but hardly to the rest of the world, and that in 
religious matters Europe stands out as exceptional (2005:49-50). Wayne Baker on the other 
hand, has argued that a comprehensive ―religiosity scale‖, analyzing different measures of 
religious beliefs and practices, ―demonstrates that America remains one of the most religious 
nations on earth‖ (2005:41). Yet, while the different emphasis on the importance of religion 
on the two sides of the Atlantic are marked, it is not so much America‘s devotion to religion 
itself, which is decried in Europe, as the role played by religion in politics. It is a fact that 
religion, and even religious fundamentalism, has long played and continues to play a 
prominent role on the American political scene, first under the banner of the Moral Majority 
and later by the Christian Coalition (Feldman 2005:13). Lipset notes that a majority of 
Americans report that ―God is the moral guiding force of American Democracy‖ (1996:63). 
The theory of Intelligent Design mentioned above would probably draw only little interest 
among most Europeans, were it not for the impact of religion on politics in America. Kevin 
Phillips, an erstwhile Republican strategist, has deplored how the  
mingling of theology, popular culture, and theocracy has already brought about 
aspects of an American Disenlightenment, to employ a descriptive antonym. 
Effects can be seen in science, climatology, federal drug approval, biological 
research, disease control, and not least in the tension between evolution theory 
and the religious alternatives – creationism and so-called intelligent design. 
Some commentators have pictured the greatest religious threat to science since 
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the Catholic Church in 1633 put Galileo under house arrest for heresy in stating 
that the earth revolved around the sun. (2006:217).  
 
It is when this European secularist perception of American ―immaturity‖ becomes coupled 
with the impression that policy decisions are or risk being based on religious beliefs rather 
than on scientific evidence or rational reasoning, that the importance put on religion in the 
United States becomes regarded as less than harmless, and even as potentially dangerous. This 
is especially the case in France, where what finally cemented the victory of the anti-
clericalists after more than a century‘s infight with the clericalists was not so much the 
triumph of rationalist arguments in favor of Darwinism or notions of modernity, as it was the 
growing opposition toward the continuous influence of the Church on political affairs, 
culminating during the vehement polemics surrounding the Dreyfus affair
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 (Rebérioux, in 
Burguière (ed.) 1993:402, 405 and 420). The role played by the Church during the Dreyfus 
affair delegitimized it as a political factor in the eyes of the republicans just as effectively as 
the trial of Galileo had centuries earlier discredited the Vatican (ibid:412). Seen from Europe, 
and especially from France, religious arguments play a role in American politics which has 
long been abandoned in most of Western Europe. The continuing political and religious strife 
in America over the famous Roe vs. Wade ruling of 1973, in which the Supreme Court held 
that women had a constitutional right to abortion, on the basis of citizen‘s right to privacy in 
their personal lives (Lockhart 2003:106-107), is a source of puzzlement to many Europeans 
for two main reasons. First, abortion is seen in most of Europe largely as the result of 
technical progress, facilitating the surgical or chemical removal of a fetus without undue 
hazardous risks. It is also, to the vast majority of European women, seen today as an 
established right. To many Europeans, technical modernity here meets societal maturity, 
providing women with the right to choose and thus providing liberation from unwanted 
motherhood. Second, irrespective of the views harbored toward abortion, it is hardly 
considered in Europe (except in highly religious societies such as Ireland and Poland) an issue 
of such importance that it justifies being one of the main topics of politics. Noting that the 
―issue of abortion is almost as prominent today as it was thirty years ago‖, Feldman argues 
that ―the main reason the controversy has not faded [in America] the way it did, for example, 
in Europe, is that [it has been] raised [..] to the level of a central American moral-political 
question‖ (2005:194). The fact that an American presidential election may be decided largely 
as a consequence of whether the candidate is ‗pro-choice‘ or ‗pro-life‘ is seen by many 
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Europeans as exaggerating an issue, which to them would hardly be among the most 
important political issues. This view naturally underscores the largely secularist character of 
European politics, but to Europeans it is both a source of wonder and of concern given the 
importance on world affairs of any American president. In France, abortion became legalized 
shortly after Roe vs. Wade, in 1975, and though originally highly contested, the virtual 
elimination of religious argumentation in the political sphere has ensured that this legalization 
hardly risks being overturned once passed
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.  
Regardless of religious faith, Europeans by and large feel that religion and 
politics mix badly. No country probably feels so strongly about this as France. In a 2005 Pew 
survey, France ranked highest among the polled countries who felt that America was ―too 
religious‖ (61% of the respondents, Pew 2005:6). And it is a fact ―a supermajority of 
Americans (70 percent) in 2004 claimed it was important to them that their presidents possess 
‗strong religious beliefs‘‖ (Berggren and Rae, in O‘Connor (ed.) 2007a:92). Former President 
George W. Bush‘s displays of active religiosity in his conduct of foreign policy were deeply 
disturbing to many Europeans, who generally resent hearing Americans preach an American 
moral superiority over the rest of the world, especially when it is imbued with religious 
connotations such as when President Bush describes himself as a ‗messenger from God‘ 
carrying out ‗God‘s will‘ (Woodward 2004). This is not just a matter of different rhetorical 
styles on the two sides of the Atlantic; such statements were regarded by many Europeans as 
revealing the inner motivations driving American foreign policy. There is in France as 
elsewhere in Europe a fear that especially the religious right has far too much influence on the 
policies of especially Republican administrations. This has led some do decry America as a 
―theocracy‖, in which theology has ―moved from church pulpits into the decision-making 
circles of the nation‘s capital‖ (Phillips 2006:236); a process far removed from the ideals of 
separation of Church and State that the founding fathers advocated. Johan Galtung has 
described U.S. foreign policy as ―manifest theology‖ (in Chay (ed.) 1990:119-139), arguing 
that there is a strong tendency in America to see the United States as the ―country closest to 
God [and] God‘s representative on earth‖, sharing the same three characteristics: 
―omniscience, omnipotence, and beneficience‖ (ibid:127). He further remarks that 
If the United States is similar to God and the guiding light for other nations, then 
Americanization, meaning making other nations similar to America, would be 
the logical way of implementing the world order of which the United States is 
already emblematic. (ibid:134) 
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In foreign policy, the French may deplore raison d‟Etat, especially when it runs counter to 
French interests, yet it is essentially accepted as a policy based on notions of reason. Ronald 
Reagan‘s policies toward the Soviet Union were, in spite of the surrounding rhetoric of 
combating an ‗evil empire‘, by and large accepted as legitimate in France, even if they were 
frequently deplored as dangerous. The impression that the administration of George W. Bush 
led a crusading foreign policy, neo-conservative in name, yet essentially also religious in 
nature, was shared by some Americans as well: ―By 2001 theology – the yardstick of belief, 
not judgement – began to displace the logic and realpolitik in official Washington, especially 
within the Republican party‖ (Phillips 2006:237). This has led to a massive rejection of such 
policies, especially in Europe, leading Katzenstein to remark that ―important religious 
undercurrents [have] exarcerbate[d] an unprecedented wave of anti-Americanism spreading 
across Europe in the aftermath of the Iraq war‖ (Katzenstein, in Byrnes and Katzenstein (eds) 
2005:32). Though a 2005 survey showed a striking affinity between the opinions of people 
who attended religious services frequently (irrespectively of their religion) and the foreign 
policy positions of the Bush administration (Yankelovich 2005:10), Scott Thomas argues that 
whatever ―the personal religious views of President Bush or even the foreign policy positions 
of the religious right‖, most Americans do not rely on religion ―for their views on foreign 
affairs‖ (in Fabbrini (ed.) 2006:198). Nevertheless this remains an impression, which can 
frequently be found in Europe, and not least in France, where the modernization theory, i.e. 
the belief that modernization and secularization go together (see for example Davie 2002), is 
particularly present. The combination of an American President who described himself as a 
―born again Christian‖ at the head of a deeply religious society was a far cry from French 
notions of sensible modernity (Adams 2007:72), even if, as O‘Connor argues, an ―over-
reliance on stereotypes about Bush‘s evangelism overshadows debate on the reality that 
Bush‘s religious views are projected into his politics‖ (in O‘Connor and Griffiths (eds) 
2007:6).  
 
Conclusion 
While the effect of American secularism has been to lay the foundations of a society, where 
the diversity of religions and cults have thrived to such an extent that the nation can be termed 
a deeply religious society, secularism in France has had the almost opposite effect. Grace 
Davie has remarked that France ―is the European society where the Enlightenment has been 
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most obviously configured as a freedom from belief‖, while in ―the United States, the 
Enlightenment becomes something very different: a freedom to believe‖ (2006:32, see also 
Berggren and Rae, in O‘Connor (ed.) 2007a:93). In terms of evaluating the two versions of 
secularism as universal models, the results are mixed. As was seen above, there is no doubt 
that the two versions differ fundamentally. Though European secularism has historically been 
at least partly influenced by the French example, it has other sources as well, especially in 
Protestant countries, and is anyway – a fact that cannot be stressed enough – far from 
homogenous (ibid.). The European religious situation has been characterized as ―believing 
without belonging‖ (Davie 1994) or conversely as ―belonging without believing‖ (Hervieu-
Léger 2003:101-119), both befitting descriptions of the practices in different countries. In this 
respect, European secularism, to the extent that it can be referred to in singular terms, might 
indeed represent an exceptionalism when compared with attitudes toward religion worldwide 
(Casanova 2006, Davie 2006). However, the same can be said for the American tradition of 
religious freedom, much more liberal than the one practiced in the majority of highly religious 
societies around the globe, yet deeply religious, indeed sometimes even fundamentally so, 
when compared with the situation in most First World countries (Pew 2002, Baker 2005). 
José Casanova has remarked that ―When it comes to religion, there is no global rule‖ (in 
Beyer and Beaman (eds) 2007:114), while Raymond Aron has argued that the 
―heterogeneous‖ nature of values between societies is a serious obstacle to any universalist 
aspiration, not least those seeking to promote secularity (Aron 1969:249-280). As such, 
attempts to portray secularism as a universal value are bound to encounter serious limits. As 
was seen above, France has consistently attempted to present its version of secularism, laïcité, 
as universal in both inspiration and practice, while the American version, religious freedom, is 
not presented as much as a specific model of secularism (indeed, it is rarely presented as an 
example of secularism at all), but rather as an integral part of the vast complex of American 
freedoms which are part and parcel of American notions of universalism. Yet as Aron reminds 
us, regardless of which version of secularism we contemplate, it remains the weakest tenet of 
the two nations‘ claim at representing themselves as universal nations. Religion, in this 
respect, is simply too divisive to be fertile ground for universalism – and the same goes for 
secularism. This does not imply that the attempt is not made, and that the two versions of 
secularism cannot be presented as competing philosophical notions. Though Katzenstein is 
probably right in asserting that ―Religion continues to lurk underneath the veneer of European 
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secularization‖ (in Byrnes and Katzenstein (eds) 2006:33), there is no escaping that Western 
European elites have frequently described America as ―the religious Other to Europe‖ (Jakelić 
2006:138). This is, however, as much a testimony to the growing religious rhetoric in 
American politics over the last few decades as to the secularization of Europeans. It does 
however confirm a sense of otherness, deeply felt by the still very Cartesian French, in their 
perceptions of America. 
 
5.3.4 Conclusion  
Did the Revolution stand father to modern France? The argument has been opposed by for 
example Tocqueville, writing after the Restoration of the monarchy, when the Revolution 
might be regarded as a disruptive interlude in the long history of France, and the argument 
still has some, though probably few, opponents (Rebérioux, in Burguière (ed.) 1993:397). 
There is however no escaping that the political influence of the Revolution has been 
momentous, and it keeps being referred to by many as the origin of a rebirth of the French 
political and institutional society, a society which as a result of the Revolution became 
fundamentally and durably transformed (Chevallier and Conac 1991, Julliard 1999, Keiger 
2001). In terms of mentality and national identity, the Revolution likewise occupies a massive 
role as the constitutive event, which more than any other has fashioned French society for two 
centuries, irrespective of the periods of monarchical restoration or imperial rule. Yet as was 
shown above, there is no doubt that another prominent agent of change has been the 
inheritance from the French Enlightenment philosophers. Though the Enlightenment precedes 
the Revolution by decades, it was only with the Revolution that the Enlightenment ideas – or 
at least some of them – became adopted as constitutive elements of modern France on a 
broader level. This chapter has argued that as a result of Enlightenment ideas being put (at 
least partly) into practice following the Revolution, the central tenets of France‘s national 
identity could be analyzed in terms of republicanism, civilization and laïcité. In conjunction, 
these have formed the core of France‘s universalist aspiration of presenting itself as a role 
model for the world to follow. This argument is naturally debatable. Chartier and Rebérioux 
(in Burguière (ed.) 1993) as well as Braudel (1986a-c) have rightly pointed to a number of 
elements anterior to the Revolution, which have had a constitutive effect on modern French 
mentality as well. It is the contention of this study, however, that these were either 
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refashioned or largely overshadowed by the sense of purpose given to the French nation as a 
result of the Revolution. 
It has furthermore been argued that these universalist aspirations can be regarded 
as both rivaling and rivaled by similar aspirations held by the great nation of futurity. In this 
respect, France and America might be regarded indeed as two nations, divided by common 
values, though as was shown, these values differ greatly when contrasted more thoroughly. 
These values have been presented above as largely competing values. It should be stressed 
though, that this competition has primarily been of a subconscious nature, frequently pitting 
perceptions of national identity against each other without necessarily acknowledging the 
similarities in the universalist pretensions of both nations. When Serge Halimi notes that 
―Seldom has the development of the whole of humanity been conceived in terms so closely 
identical and so largely inspired by the American model‖ (1998), it is a reflection of not just 
victorious American universalism, but also the fact that modern France has failed to inspire 
the world with similar success in spite of its competing universal model. If France and 
America have been engaged in an unacknowledged competition of presenting the world with 
each their set of universal values, it seems plausible to characterize anti-Americanism as the 
unacknowledged companion of modern French national identity. As such, it has become 
embodied in France‘s national habitus; a habitus, which builds on the more conscious 
elements of the national identity while being imbued unconsciously with a set of 
predispositions relating to how the elements of national identity can best be fulfilled. The fact 
that France‘s claim to have a competing mission civilisatrice is largely ignored in the United 
States (and, increasingly, elsewhere) does not mitigate its impact on French national identity; 
if anything, it is, as Richard Pells has pointed out (2007), a further factor contributing to 
French anti-Americanism.   
 
5.4 Conclusion: Is America France’s Significant ‘Other’? 
This chapter has attempted to present one main argument concerning French anti-
Americanism: that it can be analyzed as originating essentially from within the central tenets 
of French national identity. The French tradition of anti-Americanism, as Roger terms it 
(2005:449), builds solidly on the foundations of the core values of the Republic, values which 
are both largely shared by the United States and yet so distinct from the American creed that 
the two nations can be described as being divided by common values. It was asserted that 
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French anti-Americanism could be regarded in this respect as the reaction to a nation, which 
not only has presented the world with a competing universalism, but indeed with a 
universalism which has proved more successful than the French ditto. The anti-American 
narratives presented in 5.1 may at first resemble similar narratives in other European 
countries, yet given their origins, they have acquired a quintessentially French dimension, 
which sets them apart from most other narratives. It was noted in 5.2 how centuries of 
Anglophobia have revolved around some of the same themes that would later be raised 
against America and that in this respect, French anti-Americanism could be regarded also as a 
successor-phobia to Anglophobia. However, while Anglophobia and anti-Americanism in 
their French versions present striking similarities, so much that the two phenomena are 
sometimes merged into a rejection of the ‗Anglo-Saxon‘, what has most likely fashioned the 
French tradition of anti-Americanism more than anything else is the revolutionary heritage, 
which has been elevated as the founding myth of modern France. The core values inherited 
from the Revolution and the Enlightenment have consistently been presented as embodied in 
France‘s national identity, and they have formed a narrative which has been venerated 
throughout two centuries. It is a narrative, which has consciously been nurtured by those 
agents best poised to influence the public mind: the educators, who have over the centuries 
presented a version of France and French history, which have proved both enduring and 
consistent in its main themes (see chapter 4). 
History is no mere innocent recapitulation of past events; it can act as a powerful 
agent shaping the social imaginary of a nation, i.e. the ―common understanding that makes 
possible common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy‖ (Taylor, op. cit.). Keiger 
has described history as ―a reflex of the collective consciousness of the French‖ (2001:2). 
Suzanne Citron has showed in her highly critical study how the nineteenth century republican 
elites in France used history to construct a sense of Frenchness, making works by historians 
such as the revered Michelet and the less revered, but no less influential Lavisse
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compulsory reading in schools with the intention to invent history as a ―catéchisme d‘une 
religion de la France‖ (1991:25). This France was indiscriminately the France of first kings 
and emperors and later the French people, yet France was throughout depicted as an entity of 
almost holy dimensions. In this France, ―good kings‖, regardless of any personal 
characteristics, were those achieving an expansion of French territory and who thereby came 
to embody France and French aspirations, while the rulers that were criticized (usually for 
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losing their wars) were presented as damaging France by their failure to defend or expand its 
territory. Throughout, however, France as such remained beyond reproach (ibid:33-40). As 
Zeldin has noted, the idea of France having a common personality and interest – as distinct 
from its all being the possession of one king – did not emerge till the eighteenth century, 
when the word nation first came to be used in a combative sense, to mean the sovereign 
people, as opposed to its despotic rulers (1977:4). The major theme of these history school 
books, however, is the defense of the realm against the enemy and against ‗foreigners‘ (Citron 
1991:45 and 266-267). As such, French national history has largely, according to Citron, 
become a ―une manipulation du passé par les élites au service ou à l‘appui des différents 
pouvoirs‖ (ibid:279), and ―Une historiographie apologétique de l‘État est devenue le substrat 
de notre imaginaire national‖ (ibid.). Though similar constructivist complaints regarding the 
role of history in framing national identities are raised by critics in most Western nations, 
Citron‘s argument is that the French example is particularly telling given the centralized 
nature of the education system and the large impact of a highly standardized curriculum 
(ibid:254-287. See also Joutard, in Burguière (ed.) 1993:516-567). As such, history has left an 
imprint in the popular French conscience that has contributed enormously to shape the 
outlook of not just its inhabitants, but also generations of its leaders such as de Gaulle, 
―intellectuellement formé [..] à la grande époque de[..] Lavisse‖ (Agulhon 2000:126). The 
central tenets of French national identity depicted above, republicanism, civilization, and 
laïcité, have consistently been presented as both French in their origins and simultaneously 
universal in their aspirations. To nineteenth century positivists such as Auguste Comte, the 
universality of the French ideational values represented nothing less than the scientific proof 
that these values were bound to become exported to the rest of the world (Todorov 1989:44-
49). It is hardly surprising that a national creed as strong as the French will find it difficult to 
be subjected to competition, especially when the rivaling creed appears so eminently 
successful and if not admired, then at least highly emulated.   
As was seen in 5.2, Michelet remarked almost two hundred years ago that 
England had ―done France a great service by confirming and clarifying her sense of 
nationhood‖ (quoted by Bell 1996:1). It would seem that also in this respect can America be 
described as a successor to Britain: as the nation against which France measures itself – 
indeed, and not least because of America‘s successful universalism, as the only nation that it 
falls natural for France to measure itself against. Which other nation, bar the great nation of 
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futurity, could contest with the universal aspirations of France? Kuisel has remarked how, 
during the middle and late twentieth century,  
America functioned as a foil that forced the French, especially after the Second 
World War, to assert what was distinctively French. Beginning in the interwar 
years and reaching a climax in the first postwar decades, America served as the 
other that helped the French to imagine, construct, and refine their collective 
sense of self. (1993:6) 
 
In his reading of the works of some of the most influential French novelists of the twentieth 
century, Lipiansky similarly remarks that it is the English and the Americans, which are used 
as ―pole of comparison‖ with the French, and rarely the Germans (1991:248). Markovits has 
remarked how ―For hundreds of years now, Europeans and Americans have created imagined 
versions of each other that have served all kinds of purposes, not least of which was to 
delineate a clear ‗other‘ for themselves‖ (in Levy, Pensky and Torpey 2005:199). It can 
naturally be debated whether it is the Anglo-Saxon which is France‘s significant other or the 
American. In some respects, it is a largely meaningless distinction. Whenever the Anglo-
Saxon model or the Anglo-Saxon world is rejected, it is its prime representative, America, 
which is the favorite target. One might say, following Triandafyllidou (2002), that whereas 
England has historically been France‘s significant neighboring Other, America has in a later 
phase of French history become that other type of significant Other, namely the one who is 
perceived as threatening France‘s sense of uniqueness and authenticity (see chapter 4.2). The 
observation that the United States can be regarded as France‘s significant Other is not in itself 
particularly original and has been advanced before (e.g. by Marcussen and Roscher, in Stråth 
(ed.) 2000:329), just as others have noted that not just the French, but Europeans as a whole 
increasingly consider America as their ‗Other‘ (Ash, in Lindberg (ed.) 2005:129). The 
concept may, as Timothy Garton Ash further notes, belong to the ―dread jargon of identity 
studies‖ (ibid.), but a sensitivity to the forces of othering still strikes me as a fundamental 
prerequisite for understanding the forces which participate to promote anti-Americanism in 
France. If it is true, as Volkan states (1988), that the ‗enemy‘ has to resemble us, it makes 
sense to see America as France‘s ‗chosen enemy‘: They share a revolutionary past and 
universalistic aspirations that set them apart from all other nations with whom they can 
compare themselves. But whereas America‘s influence has been steadily rising, France‘s has 
been waning. Borrowing from René Girard‘s notions of mimetic rivalry, Scott Thomas argues 
that the United States can largely be viewed as ―the mimetic model of modernity‖ (in Fabbrini 
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(ed.) 2006:206). To France, this presents a dilemma: The French national creed has at its core 
the same aspirations as America at presenting a model of modernity for others to imitate, yet 
its aspirations in that respect have remained largely unfulfilled. On the other hand, France is 
among the Western European nations probably the one, which most adamantly rejects to 
imitate the political, socio-economic, and cultural model put forward by the United States 
(Tinard 2001). Perhaps then, America really has become France‘s ‗other‘ – the nation against 
which it perpetually measures itself, knowing that it is fighting a loosing battle and rejecting 
Americanism even more ferociously for it. In his 1796 farewell address, George Washington 
remarked that ―The nation which indulges toward another an habitual hatred or an habitual 
fondness is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection‖ (quoted by 
Roger 2005:453). If America is indeed France‘s other, one might wonder whether the French 
have become slaves of their anti-Americanism. It would seem, as will be shown in the next 
chapter, that France has throughout the last half century developed policies, which can be 
characterized as at least partly directed against the United States. 
 
 
237 
 
 
6 The Anti-American Republic?  
 
The seeds which would ferment into an anti-American tradition have been a constant 
companion of France‘s national habitus for more than two centuries. Yet it would be 
erroneous to suggest that anti-Americanism in France has been a constant as such. As both 
René Rémond and Philippe Roger have showed, periods of enchantment have alternated with 
periods of disaffection throughout the centuries, reflecting moods, political developments or 
personal relationships between the leading political and cultural forces of the two nations 
(Rémond 1958, Roger 2005). Chapter 5 presented an attempt at identifying the parts of 
French national identity that were most constitutive of France‘s national habitus and present 
various proposals as to why, in relation to these elements of national identity, one might claim 
that America came to be regarded early on as France‘s other. Though the underlying premise 
is that the French national habitus embodies a predisposition toward the United States due to 
the values on which both nations are built – values, which are both shared and yet through 
their different implementation opposed to each other – this does not entail that France can be 
described as inherently anti-American. A predisposition is just that, and not evidence of 
neither manifest anti-American sentiments nor conscious political rivalry as such. It would 
therefore be wholly inaccurate to depict France over the last two centuries as a nation 
profoundly characterized by anti-Americanism, although this claim has sometimes been 
advanced (e.g. Miller and Molesky 2004). Rather, the rise of America as a world power has 
presented a challenge to especially France, since America‘s universalist mission has rivalled 
that of France. Though some manifestations of French anti-Americanism carry with them a 
deep imprint of ill-will toward the United States, the predisposition is more akin to a 
lingering, yet powerful, uneasiness that at times may or may not erupt into rejection of the 
various attributes of American power. Conversely, there have been times, when the shared 
revolutionary origins and universal aspirations led to Ameriphilia rather than Ameriphobia, to 
use Simon Schama‘s term (2003). In the years leading to the revolution of 1848, progressive 
political and intellectual circles in France regarded the young America as the ―continent de 
l‘avenir‖ and its political institutions as a ―grande expérience de république démocratique‖ 
(Renouvin 1954:246-247). René Rémond even describes how the French revolution of 1848, 
much more so than the revolutions of 1789 or 1830, saw the attempt at remodelling France‘s 
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political institutions on the American example, an attempt that was openly and proudly 
admitted to by the revolutionary leaders (1958:832-835), and probably due largely to the fact 
that Toqueville as member of the expert commission, which elaborated the new Constitution, 
forcefully extolled the virtues of the American model (Mélonio, in Furet and Ozouf (eds) 
1993:394). Lady Liberty, arguably the monument which best captures the ideals and promises 
inherent in the American national credo, was a gift from the French people, and large parts of 
the bourgeoisie were so eager to subscribe to these very ideals that they contributed 
economically to give it a potent monument. Yet such events, significant as they were at the 
time, cannot hide the fact that throughout most of the nineteenth century, the two nations had 
little or scant contact (Kuisel 1993:1-2). This left the playing field of anti-Americanism open 
to influential forces within the intellectual elites such as Stendhal and Baudelaire, who were 
eager to denounce the materialist, cultureless republic (Roger 2005, Strauss 1978), which 
seemed to augur the new modernity. The watershed in French anti-Americanism came for real 
with the Spanish-American war, which had massive reverberations in France. ―If we were to 
give French anti-Americanism a baptismal certificate, it would have to be dated 1898‖, writes 
Roger with reference to that occasion (2005:130). He describes it ―as a threshold, in that from 
this moment on, French anti-Americanism was stabilized‖ (ibid.). Antoine Deram concurs, 
and his reading of the key diplomatic correspondence from that period demonstrates that it 
was characterized by a Gallo-centric intellectual debate, which centered on ―la hantise du 
déclin‖ vis-à-vis the rising American power (Deram, in Melandri and Ricard (eds) 2003:36). 
As we shall see below, 1898 also represented the advent of the intellectuel in France, soon to 
be an ardent advocate of anti-Americanism. 
It has been noted by several observers that especially the inter-war years saw a 
noticeable rise in anti-American outbursts in France (Kuisel 1993:2, Roger 2005:339-371), 
indeed that it marked the apogee of French anti-Americanism to this day, at least measured by 
its virulence. Yet to the contemporary observer, it is first and foremost with the advent of 
Charles de Gaulle as President of France that French anti-Americanism acquired a forceful 
political potential. Michel Winock has noted that anti-Americanism as a specifically political 
phenomenon is fairly recent, emerging as a major force only during the Cold War (1990:51). 
In this respect, regardless of the long pedigree of anti-Americanism in France prior to 1958, 
the Fifth Republic installed by de Gaulle might almost be termed ‗the anti-American 
Republic‘, as anti-Americanism came to be regarded by many, especially on the other side of 
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the Atlantic, as an integral and almost institutionalized element of French thinking, whether in 
politics or in cultural life. Writing in the aftermath of the French opposition to the American-
led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Timothy Garton Ash notes that ―You can‘t begin to understand 
the emotions behind the French position in the early twenty-first century crisis of the West 
unless you appreciate the full trauma of [their] loss of political and cultural centrality‖ 
(2004:68). This trauma originates from well before General de Gaulle was recalled to power 
in 1958, but the core of his legacy has been precisely to resist the erosion of France‘s political 
and cultural standing. If the Fifth republic can be characterized as the anti-American Republic 
(and as will be shown below, this can only be done by stretching the notion of French political 
anti-Americanism), France can equally be characterized as the Republic of High Culture, 
perpetually engaged in a stand-off with the Republic of Mass Culture. In terms of the 
perceived anti-American bias of de Gaulle‘s foreign policy – as well as that of his successors 
– it is rooted in a particular Gaullist vision of national sovereignty that with time has come to 
be regarded as a quintessentially French tradition in Europe (Ash 2004). On the other hand, 
notions of French particularism in terms of foreign and security policy need to be balanced 
with what one might call the Western imperative, i.e. the realization that regardless of a 
marked French preference for political independence vis-à-vis the United States, the logic of 
realpolitik dictated that there were limits to the degree of independence that France both could 
achieve and wanted to pursue. Unable to rival American dominance of the West by itself, 
France has instead attempted to retain Africa as a zone of special French influence and to 
construct Europe as an instrument to challenge American hegemony. The ambition from de 
Gaulle to his successors has not been so much to rival the United States, but rather throughout 
to present France as a power of the first order; i.e. to achieve a degree of parity with America 
rather than to oppose it as such. On the cultural front, the situation has been markedly 
different. While political anti-Americanism in France has been largely motivated by a desire 
to be treated as an equal to the United States, cultural anti-Americanism has, while 
simultaneously lamenting the predominance and impact of American culture, rejected that 
American culture could claim parity with European, and especially French, culture. It is 
highly conceivable, as Alfred Grosser suggests, that the French emphasis on cultural 
superiority vis-à-vis the United States is an attempt to compensate for French notions of 
inferiority in the political and economic spheres (1989:222). This would explain why the 
cultural dimension of French anti-Americanism seems to have acquired renewed impetus over 
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the past decades, while the political dimension, bar sporadic resurgences due largely to 
situational factors, has decreased in importance as the Fifth Republic has increasingly had to 
come to terms with its position as an important, but not pre-eminent, power in the 
international system. 
 
6.1 The Politics of Anti-Americanism 
With the Fifth Republic, anti-Americanism came of age as a political factor of the first order 
in France. Richard Kuisel has remarked how, unlike the preceding Fourth Republic, the Fifth 
―adopted an overtly anti-American foreign policy‖ (1993:134), both in substance and in style 
(ibid:136). This is a view that is widely shared, yet the politics of anti-Americanism in France 
are not so easily reduced to the Fifth Republic set up by Charles de Gaulle, although the 
General would largely come to personalize the difficulties in the Franco-American 
relationship for his generation and beyond. The first part of this chapter will seek to analyze to 
what extent the Fifth Republic can be characterized as the anti-American Republic in terms of 
political anti-Americanism. In this respect, it is important first of all to acknowledge the 
importance, which the cultural and political discourses on America had in the interwar years, 
as these laid some lasting foundations for the anti-American discourses in the follow decades. 
Also, the relationship between the Fourth and the Fifth Republics is complex, and though the 
Fifth Republic is often perceived as a radical break with the Fourth Republic, this apparently 
was mainly the case regarding the rearrangement of the French political institutions. As will 
be shown below, the foreign policies of the Fifth Republic would largely come to build on 
those pursued by the leaders of the Fourth Republic, although they received an added sense of 
purpose and direction under de Gaulle. There is, in short, a large degree of continuity in the 
foreign policies conducted by successive French regimes; a fact which should be borne in 
mind when assessing whether the Fifth Republic has been particularly motivated by anti-
American considerations. Second, while the policies of national independence pursued by de 
Gaulle have frequently been presented as some of the most potent examples of French 
political anti-Americanism, there is good evidence to suggest that while they were 
undoubtedly dictated by a strong wish to reject American political hegemony, they were 
nevertheless carried out with a keen eye for the strategic international environment, consistent 
with de Gaulle‘s political realism in international affairs. Though de Gaulle undoubtedly 
acquired the status as the most reluctant of Washington‘s partners and as such frequently 
241 
 
became regarded as the primary spokesman for political anti-Americanism in the West, there 
are good grounds to question the extent to which his actions and statements were motivated 
by anti-Americanism as such. As will be shown, de Gaulle rejected American power 
whenever he deemed this power to undermine French national independence or to run counter 
to French national interests, yet it would appear that he never sought to undermine American 
power when this could have seriously upset the delicate East-West balance. However 
reluctant, he would prove a dependable ally in all major crises during the Cold War. Third, 
though the heritage of de Gaulle would prove to leave its overwhelming mark on his 
successors, they too would seek to balance the ambitions for French political grandeur with 
the constraints of the international order, while advancing towards a subtle rapprochement 
with the United States. As such, there is an irony to the fact that among the successors to 
Charles de Gaulle, the one who attempted most forcefully to bridge the transatlantic gap and 
restore France‘s position as an unequivocal American ally by promoting France‘s full 
reintegration into the Atlantic Alliance, namely Jacques Chirac, would later be presented as a 
―global spokesman for anti-Americanism‖ (The Economist, op. cit.). This shows that though 
the years under de Gaulle might have marked the apogee of French political anti-
Americanism, the tendency to present French foreign policies as dictated at least in part by 
anti-Americanism remains strong. Even the advent of the openly pro-American Nicolas 
Sarkozy as president of France may not be enough to quell the impression that France will 
remain for years to come a difficult, if not reluctant partner to the United States. Fourth, 
though the core of France‘s rejection of American hegemony might have been focused on the 
predominant role of the United States within the Atlantic Alliance, France has consistently 
attempted to find arenas in which it could unfold its universalist ambitions. Unable to achieve 
equal status with the United States within the Atlantic Alliance, France has attempted to build 
on its considerable influence in Africa and its preeminent role in Europe in order to establish 
if not an alternative to American hegemony, then at least a vehicle in which it could carry out 
its downscaled ambitions of limited universalism. Throughout the history of the Fifth 
Republic, a dual concern has thus been at the core of French foreign policies: The quest for 
independence and the wish for national grandeur. These two considerations, eminently 
linked, may be regarded as evidence to a deep-set resistance to American hegemony; there is 
no doubt that they frequently took the form of opposition to American power. While it is, as 
will be shown below, doubtful whether the Fifth Republic can be termed the anti-American 
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Republic in political terms, the policies carried out by the successive presidents of the Fifth 
Republic nevertheless frequently contributed to nourishing that impression.  
 
6.1.1 The heritage of anti-Americanism in modern French politics 
Anti-Americanism in France has not only a history, but a pre-history as well (Roger 2005). 
The same can be said for de Gaulle‘s rejection of America. The prehistory is not just the oft 
quoted history of de Gaulle‘s wartime experiences with President Roosevelt, although as we 
shall see below they undoubtedly played an important role. Probably as important were his 
experiences from the interwar years, experiences which were shared by many in France and 
which contributed to fertilize the grounds for anti-Americanism in post-war France. 
Culturally, the interwar years had been characterized by the most virulent anti-Americanism 
to date. Philippe Roger has described how, in the interwar years, ―French anti-Americanism 
produced a decisive reference base: the intellectual Americanophobia of the 1920s and 1930s 
remains, even now, the unsurpassed crest of French anti-Americanism‖ (Roger 2005:273). 
Though many prominent agents of French anti-Americanism during the interwar years such as 
Céline and Brasillach would later fall into disrepute due to their open or tacit support for 
either Nazism, the Vichy-regime or both, they had sown the seeds of a value-based 
conservative rejection of the United States which was largely shared, although for different 
reasons, by the growing left wing movements in French politics. A further aspect, today 
largely irrelevant as a factor in modern French anti-Americanism, was the importance 
attributed to notions of race in the interwar years. In France, the interwar years saw a 
resurging preoccupation with the ‗Anglo-Saxon threat‘. French critics of the United States 
argued that the contrast between France and America was as much a contrast between Latin 
and Anglo-Saxon orientations; orientations which were depicted in terms of race and which, 
given their nature, could difficultly be reconciled (Strauss 1978:244-249). The roots had been 
laid already with the rising nationalism of the nineteenth century, in which ―anti-
Americanism, expressed in the form of the antithesis between French and American 
experiences‖ had come to the fore (ibid:37). In the interwar years, such notions of antithesis 
acquired racial overtones. André Siegfried deplored how as a result of a crusade by the 
Anglo-Saxons, ―the individual of Latin origin suffers in the United States from constant 
persecution of his personality‖ (quoted by Strauss ibid:168). This emphasis on racial and 
cultural differences became translated into preconceived ideas regarding political differences. 
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Bernard Faÿ for example regarded America as the cultural expansion of England and 
remarked of its President that ―Franklin Roosevelt is Anglo-Saxon. [..] he is the descendent of 
a race in which the Anglo-Saxon element has been dominant. The American people elected 
him because he was an Anglo-Saxon‖ (quoted by Strauss ibid:246.). On the other side of the 
Atlantic, racial explanations found equal resonance, dividing the nation between those ready 
to accept Israel Zangwill‘s 1908 play The Melting Pot as a befitting image of the United 
States, and those who demanded tighter immigration laws in order to protect the inhabitants 
of Anglo-Saxon origin from degeneration (Johnson 1996:203-208). In a letter from F. Scott 
Fitzgerald to Edmund Wilson, the celebrated novelist wrote:  
God damn the continent of Europe. It is merely of antiquarian interest. [..] The 
Negroid streak creeps northward to defile the Nordic race. [..] Raise the bar of 
immigration and permit only Scandinavians, Teutons, Anglo-Saxons and Celts 
to enter. France made me sick. Its silly pose as the thing the world has to save. 
[..] I believe at last in the white man‘s burden. We are as far above the modern 
Frenchman as he is above the Negro. Even in art! [..] We will be the Romans in 
the next generations as the English are now. (Quoted by Johnson ibid:215) 
 
Such was the predominance of the notions of a Franco-American antithesis and a schism 
between Latins and Anglo-Saxons among interwar France‘s cultural elites that they are bound 
to have influenced their generation profoundly (Chuter 1996:62). It is certain that for de 
Gaulle, the specter of Anglo-Saxon dominance, whether culturally, economically or 
politically, was never far away (Newhouse 1970). 
While the virulent manifestations of cultural anti-Americanism in the interwar 
years contributed to foster a climate of ambivalence or even animosity toward the United 
States, the isolationist nature of America‘s foreign policies in the interwar years compounded 
such feelings by America‘s omission to participate in combating the rising tides of 
authoritarianism in Europe. At the time when European democracies felt increasingly 
threatened by authoritarian dictatorships blossoming on the continent, whether labeled 
communist, fascist or national-socialist, America chose to remain distant from the dangers 
facing the Old World (Grosser 1980:4-11) in what the French still refer to as le splendide 
isolement (Cogan, in Melandri and Ricard (eds) 2003:23), a further testimony to the 
perseverance of the link between Anglophobia and anti-Americanism. Grosser describes how 
these factors ―left a profound impression on men who would play a leading role in the 
political and intellectual life after 1945 [..] Americans will never truly understand the force 
which even after 1945 emanated from this current of the 1930s‖ (1980:9). A prevalent view 
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among French political and military leaders was that during the First World War, ―France had 
sacrificed herself massively and bled herself white, not just for her own sake but for the sake 
of Western civilisation as a whole‖ (Chuter 1996:53). This sacrifice, it was felt, was repaid 
with ingratitude. It was bad enough that American administrations following the signature of 
the Versailles Peace Treaty had consistently refused to support French demands for further 
German reparations while simultaneously maintaining that French war debts toward the 
United States should be settled
120
, thus both weakening France economically and politically 
and with time allowing a revanchist Germany to rearm. This left little room for French 
gratitude for America‘s (late) involvement in the First World War: ―What an injustice if now, 
after the money to clothe our soldiers has been lent us, we should be asked to repay the price 
plus interest for every single coat in which they died‖ was a common lamentation (quoted by 
Grosser 1980:6). American tourists visiting Paris were even harassed by an angry mob in 
1926 after yet another attempt at settling outstanding French war debts to America had failed 
(Costigliola 1984:135-136), and the debt disputes prompted a French writer to assert that 
―Uncle Shylock and American imperialism look so strangely alike as to appear to be one and 
the same person‖ (Chastanet, quoted by Strauss 1978:93). When the consequences of these 
policies, as seen from Paris, later materialized in the advent of Adolf Hitler as leader of a 
belligerent Germany (Cogan, in Melandri and Ricard (eds) 2003:26-29, Chuter 1996:59-64), 
Washington refused to offer more than token support to their erstwhile allies. Henry Kissinger 
has described the Versailles Treaty as a ―fragile compromise between American utopianism 
and European paranoia‖ (1994:240), which in geopolitical terms left vanquished Germany 
better placed to dominate Europe than she had been prior to the war (ibid:245). The latter was 
certainly a feeling shared by the French political and military elites, who ever since France‘s 
defeat in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71 had felt that its geopolitical position was so 
vulnerable that they had relentlessly sought to bring about alliances, which could secure 
France from what they feared was an imminent military threat from Germany. The 1904 
Anglo-French Entente Cordiale had only partly assuaged French fears in this respect, and 
following the Allied victory in 1918, the French found themselves once again yearning for a 
British or American commitment to maintaining peace and security in Europe. France was, as 
David Chuter has noted in this respect, ―less conscious of having won a great victory than of 
narrowly avoiding a catastrophic defeat‖ (1996:61). With regard to any such commitments 
from its former allies, the French largely yearned in vain. The only American attempt to 
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contribute to security assurances to its ally was linked to the ratification of the Versailles 
Treaty by the U.S. Senate, where it was defeated by a majority of the senators (Cogan, in 
Melandri and Ricard (eds) 2003:28, Chuter 1996:70-73). America‘s interwar retreat into 
isolationist policies contributed to promote an ingrained distrust of America‘s commitment to 
European peace and security. France simply felt that it could no longer count on its erstwhile 
ally, indeed that far from having engaged in a common cause in 1917, ―the United States had 
waged the war in its own interest‖ (Grosser 1980:6). Even as threatening clouds gathered over 
Europe in the 1930s, America remained largely detached from the preoccupations of their old 
allies, delivering only the smallest of aid and invariably with severe conditionalities: 
Between 1935 and 1937, Congress passed four neutrality acts which forbade the 
shipment of arms to any warring country. And while other material could be 
sold, it was on the twofold condition that it be paid for in cash (within three 
months, at the latest) and that American ships not be used for its transport. On 
November 4, 1939, a fifth act was passed which, while lifting the embargo, 
retained the cash-and-carry demand. (ibid:12) 
 
By then, it was virtually too late for France. As the French army suffered defeat in face of the 
German panzer divisions advancing through northern France in the spring of 1940, Charles de 
Gaulle, a two-star general and former Undersecretary of State for War, took upon him to 
continue French opposition against the German foe from London. As victorious German 
troops paraded through Paris following the French capitulation, adding insult to humiliation, 
de Gaulle launched his Appel du 18 Juin. As self proclaimed leader of the Free French, he 
urged his compatriots to continue the resistance against the occupying forces. Readily 
accepted by Prime Minister Winston Churchill as the legitimate representative of France, it 
would take de Gaulle years to obtain the same recognition from President Roosevelt (Aglion 
1988, Hoffmann 1974, Grosser 1989, Keiger 2001). De Gaulle‘s wartime experiences with 
the American President have been extensively analyzed and are frequently referred to as 
laying the foundations for de Gaulle‘s later supposedly anti-American policies (see for 
example Jouve 1967:596-601). Even Eisenhower, highly sympathetic toward de Gaulle, was 
convinced that the treatment the General had received from Roosevelt had given him an ―anti-
American complex‖ (Ferro 1973:432). Raoul Aglion, uniquely well placed to judge in the 
matter, as he served as one of General de Gaulle‘s first representatives to the United States, 
has noted that it  
was astonishing that the relations between Roosevelt and de Gaulle began as 
badly as they did. It is still more surprising, however, that the relations between 
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the leader of the free world and the leader of a national movement of resistance 
against totalitarianism worsened instead of improved, even as the war progressed 
toward an Allied victory. (1988:x) 
 
The accounts of the relationship between de Gaulle and Roosevelt make fascinating reading. 
It is no secret that de Gaulle on numerous occasions was exasperated by Roosevelt‘s 
continuous reluctance to accept him as the legitimate leader of Free France and not least his 
maneuvering in favor of de Gaulle‘s rival in that respect, general Giraud, ―an escaped war 
hero of no general appeal whatever, but with the advantages of being malleable and not being 
de Gaulle‖ (Chuter 1996:210. See also Aglion 1988, Grosser 1980, Keiger 2001). Even after 
President Roosevelt had given in and de facto recognized de Gaulle as France‘s moral leader, 
the American President made it during a 1944 meeting clear to de Gaulle that  
France was not to share in the postwar responsibilities assigned to the Big Four 
(Britain, China, Russia, and the United States), that she was to lose her overseas 
empire, and that some French territory would have to serve as United Nations 
bases under American military control. (Dallek, in Paxton and Wahl (eds) 
1994:59) 
 
De Gaulle responded that if those were the circumstances, ―France must count only on 
herself‖, which Roosevelt conceded was true (ibid.). Roosevelt‘s subsequent opposition 
toward inviting de Gaulle to participate in the Yalta and Potsdam conferences that were to 
settle the fate of Europe following the Allied victory soon to come (Clemens 1970, Grosser 
1989) confirmed de Gaulle‘s impression that France was treated as less than an equal ally. It 
left such a large imprint in the Gaullist heritage that French political leaders have since felt 
free to denounce the mythical l‟ordre de Yalta as evidence to the Manichean nature of the 
future superpowers, and – albeit to a much lesser extent – of the perfidious Albion: ―Yalta 
demeurera en France le symbole et la reference d‘un système mondial dominé par les deux 
Supergrands‖ (Grosser 1989:30. See also Grosser 1980:40).  
It is thus highly conceivable that de Gaulle‘s wartime experiences left him even 
more opposed to the United States than he had been before. It does not take much 
psychological insight to accept that the treatment he was subjected to at the time by the 
American administration (or rather felt he was subjected too – by all accounts, de Gaulle 
himself was no easy customer) could have left him with a strong préjugé, even animosity, 
toward the United States. Keiger is probably right in asserting that the wartime legacy ―soured 
de Gaulle‘s long term view of the USA‖ (2001:177). Yet in spite of what has frequently been 
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seen as de Gaulle‘s anti-American posturing, the General remained throughout a realist in 
international affairs (Hoffmann 1974:191, Aglion 1988:212). His grand design was to recreate 
France‘s grandeur, which she had lost in 1940 and under the Vichy regime (Hoffmann 1974, 
Vaïsse 1998). ―It was the nature of de Gaulle‘s design that led to his misunderstanding with 
Roosevelt, who mistook his emphasis on the political essence of his action for petty personal 
ambition‖ (Hoffmann 1974:188). The American president never fully understood the political 
imperatives driving de Gaulle‘s posturing. Hoffmann further notes that 
Roosevelt‘s blindness to this fundamental goal, his willingness to deal with the 
Vichyites, his assumption that France was finished and was anyhow more 
adequately represented by her easygoing prewar leaders than by this General 
who ―had nothing of a usual Frenchman‖ – this is what so infuriated de Gaulle. 
As he told [Roosevelt‘s chief diplomatic advisor] Harry Hopkins [..] America‘s 
policy, whether it was right or not, could not but alienate the French. (1974:192) 
 
André Béziat takes a similar line, arguing that it ―was Roosevelt‘s greatest failure to have 
generated a climate of suspicion between his country and France for the years to come‖ (in 
Melandri and Ricard (eds) 2003:85). This suspicion was not without foundations. The 
American administration initially opposed de Gaulle‘s attempts to set up a provisional French 
government after the Liberation, believing instead that ―France was to be treated not as a 
liberated nation, but as a former adversary, to be occupied and run by an Allied military 
government‖ (Chuter 1996:210). Even worse, American objectives for France appeared not 
just to the French, but also to the more sympathetic British, to be to ―reduce it from the status 
of a great power and to impose various indignities, such as forcible disarmament, the creation 
of a Flemish bufferstate on her territory and the loss of much of her empire‖ (ibid:211). 
Anthony Eden was persuaded that Roosevelt ―wanted to hold the strings of France‘s future in 
his own hands so that he could decide that country‘s fate‖ (quoted by Clemens 1970:43). No 
wonder if de Gaulle was somewhat apprehensive regarding the motives of his American ally.  
Duff Cooper once famously described how de Gaulle in his relations with 
Roosevelt as well as with Churchill was ―ever on the look-out for an insult‖ (1953:317). It is 
certain that Roosevelt on numerous occasions offended de Gaulle‘s vanity, which was not 
negligible, and at times even left him somewhat estranged, confirming de Gaulle‘s perception 
that he – and by extension France – did not see eye to eye with America on a number of 
foreign policy issues, chief among them France‘s role in the international system (Aglion 
1988). Yet it would be a banal overstatement to conclude that de Gaulle‘s perceived anti-
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Americanism stems primarily from his wartime experiences with a President Roosevelt who 
was disinclined to accept him as the voice of France in her hour of need. First of all, as was 
shown above, the interwar years had installed in many French leaders a reluctance toward the 
United States and a suspicion toward the motives guiding its policies, which may well be 
characterized as at least partly anti-American. De Gaulle‘s difficult relationship with 
Roosevelt can in this respect largely be seen in terms of a continuation of two decades of 
awkward Franco-American relations. During a meeting in Paris in early 1945 between de 
Gaulle and Roosevelt‘s closest advisor, Harry Hopkins, the latter deplored that Franco-
American relations had turned sour since 1940. In response, de Gaulle proceeded to give a 
detailed analysis of how the United States had failed to understand French motives and 
aspirations since 1917 (de Gaulle 1959:389-392). It was France, which to de Gaulle had been 
misunderstood by successive American administrations, and therein laid in his view the major 
cause of discord between the two nations. Second, though de Gaulle would as leader of the 
Provisional Government of the French Republic from 1944 to 1946 miss few opportunities to 
deliver a rebuff to the American presidents
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, the core of his policies at that time can hardly 
be characterized as inherently anti-American. De Gaulle‘s allegiance was to France first; the 
interests of allies, and even of the higher allied war objectives, took second place. On more 
than one occasion, he declared that ―Free France intends to march alongside her allies with 
the express understanding that they in turn will march alongside of her‖ (quoted by Aglion 
1988:207). Given France‘s precarious position (as a nation first humiliatingly defeated in war, 
then under the Vichy regime collaborating with the occupying forces, and finally accepted in 
extremis as an allied power), this dictum was hardly surprising, though it met with intense 
opposition from Roosevelt (ibid.). Third, it is true that Franco-American relations during the 
Fourth Republic were manifestly less problematic than they would later become under de 
Gaulle‘s Fifth Republic. Yet de Gaulle‘s acknowledged opposition to American supremacy 
during his years in power has had a tendency to overshadow the many contentious issues 
characterizing Franco-American relations prior to his return to power in 1958.  
The prehistory to the supposedly anti-American policies of the Fifth Republic is 
not just confined to the interwar experiences with an America seen as indifferent or even 
hostile to the needs of its erstwhile ally, nor to de Gaulle‘s personal wartime experiences in 
dealing with a reluctant President Roosevelt. Though the Fourth Republic as such proved 
relatively loyal toward the United States – indeed, given the importance of the Marshall aid to 
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the reconstruction of France, it had little choice but to do so – French anti-Americanism 
nevertheless reached a new threshold in the years following the liberation. As will be 
discussed below, much of it was due to a resurgence of cultural anti-Americanism in France 
in the postwar years. However, there were clear political causes as well. Harrison has 
remarked how the leaders of the Fourth Republic ―tenaciously pursued the role of the most 
recalcitrant and dissident of the United States‘ major Western partners‖ (1981:6), reacting ―to 
its own blunders and incompetence with a sullen and sometimes spiteful resentment that 
confirmed the impression of France as an unstable, unruly, and ungrateful ally that was not 
worthy of American confidence and support‖ (ibid:45). It is true that there were monumental 
blunders which contributed to souring relations between France and the United States. The 
most important of the Fourth Republic‘s blunders was no doubt its actions leading to the Suez 
crisis of 1956, which would come to leave a deep imprint in the minds of French political 
leaders over the coming decades. When Egypt‘s president, Colonel Nasser, as a reaction to 
America‘s reversal of its previous decision to participate in the construction of the Aswan 
damn, in July 1956 announced his intention to nationalize the Suez Canal, France and Britain 
saw it as a direct attack on their interests, legitimizing their intervention in a part of the world, 
which had only shortly before been under their tutelage. Since 1888, La Compagnie 
internationale de Suez, owned almost exclusively by the two nations, had had a concession on 
traffic through the canal; a concession, which would expire in 1968 (Grosser 1989:135). In 
secret conjunction with Israel, France and Britain launched a military operation against Egypt, 
ostensibly to separate the two parties of the escalating Israeli-Egypt crisis. The operation was 
carried out without pre-consultation with the United States, where President Eisenhower was 
in the final stages of his reelection campaign, and it met with forceful American 
disapprobation and even ―brutal financial pressure‖ from the American government (ibid:135-
137). Eventually, France and Britain were forced to pull back their troops in favor of a UN 
peace keeping force. The Suez crisis gave a severe lesson to both Britain and France: The two 
erstwhile imperial powers, who just decades before had ruled in conjunction over the vast 
majority of the globe‘s territories, could no longer act independently of the United States in an 
increasingly post-colonial world. Though the two nations shared the same painful lesson in 
1956, they drew opposite conclusions. Britain concluded that it could no longer act alone 
without American political support; France concluded that it could not trust its American ally 
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(Lloyd 1980; Keiger 2001, Gordon and Shapiro 2004). For the French, the analysis was 
simple:  
Les Américains, responsables du déclenchement de la crise par le retrait de leur 
offre de financement du barrage d‘Assouan, ont ensuite abandonné leurs alliés 
engagés dans le même combat contre le dictateur égyptien. Cette absence de 
solidarité, manifeste au cours de la phase diplomatique de l‘affaire, est devenue 
un veritable ―lâchage‖ lors de la crise ouverte et guerrière. Un diplomate français 
le remarque: ―Au cours de cette crise, ils ont choisi de nous faire échouer‖. 
(Vaïsse 1998:17) 
 
In Britain, the Suez crisis led to the fall of Anthony Eden as Prime Minister, whereas in 
France, where the operation had been massively approved by the National Assembly as well 
as in polls (Grosser 1989:137), it would complicate attempts to resolve the unfolding Algerian 
crisis even further. As such, the American reactions of 1956 came to be seen also as 
hampering France‘s attempts to maintain the unity of her national territory (Lloyd 1980). 
Most importantly, the Suez crisis persuaded the leaders of France that it was vital that she 
regained her ability to act independently. 
Apart from the blunders of the Fourth Republic, there were, however, also clear 
differences of opinion with the United States on a number of policy issues of importance for 
France. The most contentious of them invariably related to France‘s role in the international 
system and in the Western alliance. With respect to the latter, France had initially embraced 
the new security structures set up in Europe with the establishment of NATO in 1949. Though 
conscious of the fact that the military strength of the new transatlantic security structure 
reposed primarily on the deterrence of America‘s formidable arsenal and not least its nuclear 
deterrent, French leaders hoped, even expected, that their nation would acquire a prominent 
position as co-leader, reminiscent of the role which France, along with the United States and 
Britain, enjoyed as an occupying force in the parts of Germany not under Soviet control. The 
French expected ―to receive acknowledged first rank within the Alliance and, more 
specifically, they anticipated an expansion of the Anglo-American duumvirate into a 
triumvirate bearing responsibility for the global management of Western security interests‖ 
(Harrison 1981:12). In Washington, such expectations met with little understanding. The 
attitude here was that the French had ―basically only European and North African 
responsibilities and inadequate strength to play any role in other theaters and therefore [were] 
not entitled to participate in consideration of global strategy‖ (ibid:13); an attitude which, as 
Harrison notes, ―would determine American policy throughout the Fourth and Fifth Republics 
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and be the source of much discontent‖ (ibid.). To the extent that the ruling oligarchy within 
NATO was not purely American, it remained, much to the dismay of France, ―Anglo-Saxon‖, 
as the United States consistently preferred to privilege Britain over its other partners (Vaïsse 
1998:112). Added to – and related to – this serious impediment was the question of France‘s 
nuclear ambitions. For the leaders of France, whether de Gaulle or the leaders of the Fourth 
Republic, France had a legitimate role as a nuclear power, either in its own right or in 
conjunction with its allies: Was it not, after all, Henri Becquerel who had discovered 
radioactivity in 1896, Pierre and Marie Curie radium two years later, and not least Frédéric 
Joliot and his wife Irène Curie who discovered artificial radioactivity in 1934, thus marking 
the true starting point toward realizing nuclear fission? Was it not a French team, who in 
March 1940 managed to transport heavy water from Norway to first France and later Britain, 
an ingredient which would prove decisive for the later manufacture of the first nuclear 
armaments? Had French scientists not contributed in the final years of the war to produce the 
first atomic device? (Grosser 1989:28). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, was France not 
an equal allied power to the United States, Britain and Canada, the three powers who jointly 
controlled the development of this new technology, which seemed full of promise in the non-
military field as well? Not according to the American administration, which flatly rejected 
France‘s pleas (ibid.), determined, as it was seen in France, to retain an Anglo-Saxon nuclear 
monopoly as long as possible. The Fourth Republic‘s promotion of the nuclear question was 
both an attempt to reap the rewards of a labor in which France had participated, to ensure that 
it finally acquired proper means of military protection – means which it had felt lacking in 
sufficient nature for almost half a century – and to achieve the status so dearly coveted of 
equal partner. American opposition to share the nuclear technology with France was a severe 
blow, and it was felt that ―Rather than being in a position to enhance control of her own 
security, a nonnuclear France seemed bound to sink further into dependence as a mere 
protectorate of the United States‖ (Harrison 1981:37). 
Finally, there was the contentious issue of France‘s colonies. The history of the 
Fourth Republic can be read as that of an interim regime faced with many challenges, of 
which one took precedence over all other. It would turn out to be a challenge, which it could 
not effectively meet, and one which would eventually seal its fate (Bernstein 1993:243). A 
fundamental fact about the Fourth Republic ―was that it was constantly at war, first in Indo-
China and then in Algeria‖ (Chuter 1996:275). Its ―determination to avoid decolonization was 
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a problem that dominated its internal and external politics, finally destroying the regime and 
ushering in the Gaullist era‖ (Harrison 1981:37). All the other issues dominating Franco-
American relations during the Fourth Republic had a connection to this one overriding 
determination. The Suez crisis was linked to the war in Algeria, as the French government 
was persuaded that Colonel Nasser was supplying arms to the FLN, the Algerian Front de 
Libération Nationale (Grosser 1989:135).  French discontent within the Atlantic Alliance was 
crystallized by the reluctance of its allies to back France‘s engagement in first Indo-China and 
later Algeria (Harrison 1981:37). France‘s insistence on acquiring either its own nuclear 
deterrent or co-decision on the use of NATO‘s deterrent was seen as a necessary prerequisite 
for strengthening France‘s standing internationally and thus also vis-à-vis the territories 
formally subjected to French rule (ibid.). These ambitions all ran into one major stumbling 
block, or so it seemed from Paris: Washington. France had come out of the Second World 
War with its empire formally relatively intact, but with neither the authority, nor the means to 
preserve it as such. As soon as victory over the Axis powers had been achieved, France faced 
the problem of the status of its colonies and overseas territories. The first crisis occurred in 
French Indo-China. Already in 1943 Roosevelt had ―expressed the opinion that Indo-China 
should not go back to France but that it should be administered by an international trusteeship 
[..] France has milked [Indo-China] for one hundred years. The people of Indo-China are 
entitled to something better than that‖ claimed Roosevelt (quoted by Grosser 1980:21). To the 
French leaders of the Fourth Republic, the United States in this respect became ―an ally that 
outmaneuvers an ally in the name of anti-colonialism; [..] a power that intervenes in other 
regions of the globe and thus again exposes itself to the reproach of wishing to replace an old 
by a new rule‖ (ibid.). After a prolonged war culminating with the fall of Dien Bien Phu in 
May 1954, the situation was almost reversed. A new French government headed by Pierre 
Mendès-France became the first one since de Gaulle‘s resignation in 1946 ―to place French 
interests before the question of relations with Washington‖ (Wall 1991:304), and it swiftly 
negotiated a peace which would terminate French rule in Indochina. Washington deeply 
opposed the resulting Geneva accords, and especially the principle of free elections, which 
they feared would bring the Communists to power. In the end, ―Washington had no choice, 
and found itself in the unusual situation of playing second fiddle to an ally [..] The gap 
between France and the United States yawned much wider as a result‖ (Chuter 1996:286). 
Bad as the situation in French Indo-China had been, it was nothing compared to the debacle 
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that would hit France as the Algerian crisis unfolded. Whereas Indo-China was undoubtedly 
regarded as a colony, Algeria was in the minds of the leaders of the Fourth Republic an 
integral part of la France métropolitaine. In his capacity as Minister of the Interior, François 
Mitterrand asserted in 1954 that ―Algeria is France‖ (quoted by Chuter ibid:288). The 
following year, French Governor General Jacques Soustelle pronounced in the Algerian 
Assembly that ―La France ne quittera pas plus l‘Algérie que la Provence ou la Bretagne. Un 
choix a été fait par la France. Ce choix s‘appelle l‘intégration‖ (quoted by Grosser 1989:131). 
It was a choice, which would prove impossible to implement. The crisis escalated 
considerably over the life of the Fourth Republic and ended traumatically with first the fall of 
the regime and subsequently the granting of independence to Algeria under the Fifth 
Republic. To the leaders of the Fourth Republic, they were engaged in a struggle to defend 
not just the integrity of the national territory, but also ―on behalf of the whole world‖ (Chuter 
1996:289) in a fight against advancing communism, which was engaged in a vast flanking 
movement through ―China, the Far East, the Indies, the Middle East, Egypt and North Africa, 
with the aim of encircling Europe‖, as General Allard, then French commander in Algeria, 
told SHAPE in 1957 (quoted by Chuter, ibid.). The French did not receive the backing of their 
allies, and they ―complained bitterly that their support for the United States over Berlin and 
Korea was not being reciprocated‖ (ibid:291). The Suez crisis was the final blow to French 
aspirations for American support for its activities in North Africa, and it ―propelled French 
distrust for the United States to even greater heights‖ (ibid.).  
It is hardly an exaggeration to state that Franco-American relations during the 
decades that preceded the birth of the Fifth Republic were both complicated and characterized 
by a high degree of mutual mistrust, frequently leading to misunderstandings, and often to 
outright exasperation, especially in France. If the Fifth Republic can be regarded, as Kuisel 
asserts, as more or less inherently anti-American (1993), then there is no escaping that it build 
on a massive legacy of contentious relations with the United States. It may be that both sides 
where equally to blame for this sorry state of affairs, the United States never fully realizing 
the precariousness of the French position, and France never acknowledging that the United 
States was forced to pursue policies, which were not necessarily in line with French interests. 
In terms of analyzing these developments as evidence of, or contributing factors toward the 
growth of political anti-Americanism in France, it matters little whether the policy actions of 
the two nations were sensible or even defendable at the time. What matters is how the 
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relationship was perceived and what intentions were attributed to the other, rather than what 
the ulterior motives of the other in reality were. Edgar Furniss remarked soon after the fall of 
the Fourth Republic that 
The influence of anti-American sentiments on the political operations of the 
Fourth Republic was not a negligible one. At crucial moments French 
governments used anti-Americanism to create sympathy and rally support within 
the National Assembly. Weak governments were more prone to invoke the 
slogan of French independence from ―American dictation‖. [..] The deliberate 
manipulation of this antagonism for domestic political purposes sometimes 
verged on irresponsibility and irrationality, especially since France was 
simultaneously looking to the United States as its deus ex machina. France 
sought equality with the United States and wanted to lessen its dependence in 
order to attain this status, yet it deliberately confused hostility with 
independence, while looking to the United States to rescue it from the 
consequences of its own actions. (1960:302-303) 
 
As the Fourth Republic was drawing its last breaths and de Gaulle prepared himself to once 
more come to the rescue of his beleaguered nation (Teyssier 1995:10), the Algerian War, 
controversies over nuclear weapons, and Alliance strategy had exacerbated French discontents 
toward America, contributing to an insecurity and antagonism that would set the stage for 
future French dealignment (Harrison 1981:37).  
If the Fourth Republic had been a troublesome ally to the United States (Furniss 
1960), the Fifth would prove an even more reluctant ally (Harrison 1981). As opposed to the 
leaders of the Fourth Republic, de Gaulle would set out to develop an integrated French 
foreign policy design; one which often would be at odds with the interests of the American 
ally. De Gaulle‘s ambition of recreating France‘s grandeur invariably entailed an emphasis on 
greater independence vis-à-vis the United States. It was these aspirations, which more than 
anything contributed to the anti-American image of Gaullist policies. Yet, as we shall see 
below, though France may under de Gaulle have acquired the reputation of a reluctant ally, it 
was not necessarily disloyal, in spite of frequent accusations to the contrary from the other 
side of the Atlantic.  
 
6.1.2 National independence and the Gaullist legacy 
Throughout his public life, General de Gaulle had one overreaching ambition, which took 
precedence over all others: to restore France to her proper rank and to recreate her grandeur. 
It is the concept most associated with de Gaulle, and frequently the most misunderstood. On 
the first page of his Mémoires de guerre, de Gaulle refers to France‘s grandeur: 
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la France n‘est réellement elle-même qu‘au premier rang; [..] notre pays, tel qu‘il 
est parmi les autres, tels qu‘ils sont, doit, sous peine de danger mortel, viser haut 
et se tenir droit. Bref, à mon sens, la France ne peut être la France sans la 
grandeur. (1954:1) 
 
To de Gaulle, France was a ―great people, made for example, enterprise, combat, always the 
star of History‖ (quoted by Hoffmann 1974:231). He saw ―France both as the nation par 
excellence, and as the servant of what during the war he called ‗la querelle de l‟homme‘ – the 
cause of freedom, equilibrium, generosity in a world threatened by mechanization‖ (ibid:231-
232). For de Gaulle, 
Grandeur meant an attitude of the will and soul rather than a specific doctrine, 
and grandeur for France meant a state of mind and resolve, a rejection of 
pettiness, an ambition rather than a specific program. It was an ambition, more 
cultural and moral than political, to preserve certain values that are like a blend 
of Christianity‘s and the Revolution‘s. (Hoffmann 1974:232) 
 
This notion of grandeur bears an unmistakable reference to the core values of French national 
identity and not least France‘s universal mission described in chapter 5. Daniel Mahoney 
describes how de Gaulle regarded France as an ―elected‖ people ―whose destiny is of 
universal significance‖ (1996:16). His rhetoric of grandeur ―in fact constituted a kind of 
national cement, joining together in determination and sentimental belonging a morally 
disillusioned and internally torn nation‖ (de Ménil 1977:178). Far from representing a break 
with French traditions, de Gaulle on the contrary embodied their continuity and turned them 
into the central tenet of his policies. As such, though the notion of grandeur has more 
connotations than is often assumed, it has become ―a condensation symbol for a wide range of 
stimuli and responses which form a complex value system‖, and it has been ―used by 
supporters and critics alike as a shorthand for summarising the ideological content of Gaullist 
foreign policy‖ (Cerny 1980:3). Not that the substance of French foreign policy changed 
fundamentally with the advent of the Fifth Republic – as Harrison notes, the continuity in 
goals and policies between the two regimes is remarkable (1981:46) – but the nature and 
world view underlying it changed profoundly (Grosser 1980:183). With de Gaulle, French 
foreign policy gained a sense of purpose, which had hitherto been either lacking or 
overshadowed by the tremendous difficulties that the leaders of the Fourth Republic had to 
face. Due not least to de Gaulle‘s incessant insistence (and Churchill‘s active support), France 
had eventually come out of the Second World War with the ―formal, if not effective 
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recognition of her Great Power status‖ relatively intact (DePorte 1968:280): She was counted 
among the Allied powers, recognized as one of the ―big five‖ with a permanent seat on the 
United Nations‘ Security Council, where French was retained as an official working language 
with the same rights as English (Grosser 1989:29). Yet France had undeniably lost its moral 
and political standing as one of the truly great nations, at fact which became painfully clear as 
the Fourth Republic stumbled from defeat to defeat. One of the prime attributes of France‘s 
rank after the Liberation had been its colonial empire, which although under intense pressure 
still gave France a world role. Yet the loss of Indo-China and the morass in Algeria had 
greatly diminished the political and economic advantages offered to France of retaining an 
empire. De Gaulle, who had previously strongly maintained that the colonies were an 
essential tribute to France‘s grandeur, understood when he returned to power in 1958 that ―the 
old benefits of colonization had turned into burdens‖ (Hoffmann 1974:286. See also Chuter 
1996:297). This explains his unsentimental solution to the Algerian problem: the granting of 
full independence to France‘s former possession. De Gaulle‘s ambitions to recreate France‘s 
grandeur were instead translated through the two primary objectives of his foreign policy: 
―pour la France d‘abord, elle vise à l‘indépendence nationale, fondée sur un État fort et un 
outil militaire adapté; à l‘extérieur, elle se propose de changer le statu quo international‖ 
(Vaïsse 1998:35). Inherent in the Gaulle‘s attempt to recreate France‘s grandeur was what 
Stanley Hoffmann has termed ―a global revisionism of a special kind‖ (1974:287): 
What was special about de Gaulle‘s revisionism can best be understood by 
following Arnold Wolfers‘ distinction between possession goals and milieu 
goals. Ordinarily, a revisionist power aims above all at increasing its possessions 
– for instance, at recovering territories lost in war, or gaining areas that can 
supply it with raw materials and markets, or annexing populations of the same 
ethnic origin. [..] When de Gaulle came to power, a radical redefinition occurred. 
Possession goals were not discarded but were, so to speak, moved from outside 
France to inside France. Security was now sought through purely French efforts 
(cf. the nuclear deterrent) rather than through NATO. [..] A growing economy 
and the end of financial dependence on allies would give France another prize 
possession – a strong currency and a vast stock of foreign reserves. The attempt 
to hold on to colonies would be abandoned. Possession goals were important as 
bulwarks of independence, secondarily as means with which to weigh on the 
international milieu. But the originality of de Gaulle‘s revisionism was his 
emphasis on milieu goals: his ambition was to transform the milieu. France was 
greedy for a role; the reshuffling he sought, ironically enough, was one that 
would have increased France‘s role by depriving others of their possessions. 
(ibid:287-288)   
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De Gaulle did not waste any time in pursuing these goals. In September 1958, he sent a secret 
memorandum to President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan, in which he demanded 
complete equality with Great Britain and even with the United States. Stating that the 
―indispensable cooperation in the taking of decisions and the bearing of responsibilities does 
not correspond to the solidarity in the risks that have been assumed‖, he asserted that  
The French Government finds itself in a position to draw certain consequences 
and to make certain suggestions. [..] It is true that we originally agreed that the 
unquestionably decisive nuclear weapon would remain a monopoly of the 
United States for a long time, and this may have appeared as justification for 
practically conferring on the government in Washington all decisions concerning 
questions of national defense. But here also it must be recognized that such a 
state of affairs, though accepted in the past, no longer corresponds to the actual 
situation. [..] It therefore seems to France that an organization comprising the 
United States, Great Britain and France should be created and function on a 
world-wide political and strategic level. [..] The French Government considers 
such an organization of security indispensable. As of now, it will make all 
further development of its present participation in NATO contingent on it and 
intends, should that become necessary, to invoke the revision procedures of the 
North Atlantic Treaty (quoted by Grosser 1980:187). 
 
The gauntlet had clearly been thrown. Naturally, the American answer proved less than 
forthcoming (Bernstein 1993:162; Grosser 1980:187-188; Dreyfus 1982:198), but de Gaulle 
had unmistakably stated the course he was embarking on. As can be seen, his demands were 
in essence similar to those advanced by the leaders of the Fourth Republic more than a decade 
before. De Gaulle had scorned the Fourth Republic‘s ―heritage of renunciation and 
dependence‖, yet it is clear that he would ―borrow a surprising number of its aspirations, 
themes and ambivalences as unattributed material for his own grand designs‖ (Harrison 
1981:46). It was not a question of turning France into a superpower. De Gaulle was a realist; 
he knew that she did not have the necessary means to do so (Vaïsse 1998:51). It was rather a 
forceful attempt at enhancing France‘s relative power by acquiring the means necessary for 
weighting sufficiently on the international stage. The most symbolic of such means was 
nuclear capabilities: ―Le Général était pressé d‘avoir la bombe parce qu‘elle constituait un 
instrument diplomatique qui devait lui permettre de s‘asseoir à la table des Grands‖ (ibid:47). 
His reaction after the successful first French nuclear explosion in 1960 was characteristic: 
―Hourra pour la France! Depuis ce matin, elle est plus forte et plus fière‖ (quoted by Vaïsse, 
ibid.). In truth, the groundwork toward acquiring a nuclear device had been carried out under 
the Fourth Republic, but it bolstered de Gaulle‘s prestige that the first explosion took place 
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out less than two years after his return to power: France had finally joined the exclusive club 
of nuclear powers (Bernstein 1993:167-170). La bombinette, as it was derogatorily called, 
was a powerful symbol of France‘s political revival under de Gaulle, but it was also much 
more than that. For the first time since 1870, it was felt that France was henceforth in a 
position to defend itself independently of the goodwill or resolution of its allies, a position 
which had so painfully eluded it in 1940 (Chuter 1996:310). The status as a nuclear power 
thus permitted France to embark on a course of relative independence from its western 
partners and not least from the United States. Once the Algerian crisis solved, de Gaulle felt 
free to challenge the status quo and to pursue a set of policies that would increasingly estrange 
Paris from Washington. France‘s departure from NATO‘s integrated military structures in 
1966 would arguably prove the greatest Franco-American crisis since the Second World 
War
122
 (Cogan, in Melandri and Ricard (eds) 2003:31), yet it followed after a prolonged 
period with both mounting differences of opinion between the two nations and the progressive 
distancing of France from the military structures of NATO (Bernstein 1993:160-164); a 
distance, which was further augmented in 1967, when France adopted a nuclear doctrine 
called tous azimuts, meaning that its nuclear arsenal could be targeted in all directions, i.e. 
theoretically including American interests (Miller and Molesky 2004:220). There were no 
doubt real divergences between the two powers, yet it is probably right as Hoffmann asserts 
that what separated France and America under de Gaulle related as much to perceptions as to 
more tangible political issues: 
Shapers of American policy perceived the United States as being, by necessity 
and by vocation, the one nation that carried world responsibilities in [the] battle 
for order. Only the United States had the combination of power, values, 
institutions, and interests that made for leadership all over the globe [..]; they 
saw the United States as the secular arm of an ideal of universal value, and they 
considered America‘s involvement in world affairs to be a necessary and proper 
substitute for the frequent failure of other nations to share the burden. [..] French 
perceptions of international affairs clashed with America‘s at every point. 
French leaders – and especially de Gaulle – saw world politics as a multiple 
contest in which efforts to divide the contenders into two camps were both 
dangerous and futile [..] In such a world, the French expected the dominant 
powers to seek to preserve and extend their sway, and to rationalize or disguise it 
under a cloak of ideological Messianism or altruistic universality. (1974:334-
335) 
 
One might add that France, with its long history of messianic universalism, was uniquely well 
placed to make such an assessment, especially after having failed to impose itself as the 
259 
 
primary universal power. The result, however, was that American administrations came to 
regard French actions under de Gaulle ―as wicked, measured against the kind of world order it 
deemed in the interests of humanity‖ and French foreign policy ―as a capricious if systematic 
demolition of everything that seemed promising in postwar Western policy‖ (ibid:336). It is 
easy to see how such perceptions can lead to the impression that behind every policy act there 
are more sinister, anti-American intentions at play. De Gaulle‘s recognition of mainland 
China in 1964, his tour of Latin America the same year (where he stressed their Latin cultural 
superiority and called on them, without naming the United States, to reject hegemony), his 
open criticism of America‘s involvement in Vietnam, his siding with the Arabs during the 
Six-Day War, and not least his public proclamation of ―Vive le Québec libre!‖, all these 
events contributed to reinforce the perception that the nature of the policies of the Fifth 
Republic under de Gaulle were in essence anti-American (Keiger 2001:181; McMillan 
1992:166). Some of his criticisms of the United States were shared by other European leaders. 
As Grosser argues, ―de Gaulle often merely said out loud what his partners did not dare 
express‖ (1980:228. See also Hoffmann 1974 and Giauque 2002). It is certainly the case that 
the Kennedy administration‘s commitment to abandon the strategy of massive retaliation in 
favour of a flexible response strategy was controversial throughout Europe, where the motives 
of the American administration were deeply distrusted as an effort to ―de-nuclearize‖ Europe 
(Gavin, in Melandri and Ricard (eds) 2003:104, see also Keylor 1992:345-348). Other 
criticisms were motivated by a particularly French wish to reduce the hegemonic impact of 
the United States on the West, and they were not confined to matters of security policy. 
France resented the privileges the Bretton Woods system bestowed on the dollar much more 
than other European nations (Gavin, in Melandri and Ricard (eds) 2003:103), and de Gaulle 
actively, but unsuccessfully, initiated a ―war against the supremacy of the dollar [which] 
aimed at nothing less than a drastic reform of the Bretton Woods system and a rejection of the 
gold exchange standard‖; a standard which de Gaulle felt had developed into a ―dollar 
standard‖ (Hoffmann 1974:303). Throughout, de Gaulle pursued a policy of national 
independence and forcefully resisted any attempt by others to encroach on what he considered 
France‘s national sovereignty. It was, however, a policy of relative, rather than absolute, 
independence, a fact which, as Chuter rightly points out, has often been overlooked: 
There is a tendency in Anglo-Saxon criticism of de Gaulle to argue that he 
pursued some kind of ideal and purist notion of national independence that 
simply refused to acknowledge the influence of other states at all, and that his 
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influence on France, and on the Alliance generally, was correspondingly 
damaging. It would be surprising if de Gaulle, with his experience in the 1940s, 
ever thought like this. What independence means in this context is the greatest 
independence of decision-making possible. (1996:326) 
 
De Gaulle‘s ambition to transform the milieu was bound, as Hoffmann remarked, to entail the 
deprivation of the acquired possessions of others, and in this respect most notably of the 
United States. This French revisionism could not but anger and frustrate Washington, yet as 
Francis Gavin argues, ―when it came to fundamental issues, Franco-American differences 
may not have been as sharp as we have been led to believe‖ (in Melandri and Ricard (eds) 
2003:103). First of all, France was not alone in feeling that the United States enjoyed an 
overwhelming political superiority, largely at the detriment of its partners, although, as 
Grosser notes, the French desire not to be tied down was usually ―considered a creative 
attitude neither by its allies in Europe nor by its American partner‖ (1980:329). Second, in 
spite of the high-profiled opposition de Gaulle on numerous occasions displayed toward 
America, France remained loyal toward the Western Alliance whenever it was deemed 
seriously threatened. During the Berlin crises of 1958 and 1961, de Gaulle had unequivocally 
supported the American ally (Giauque 2002). In his memoirs, Eisenhower recalls how after a 
difficult exchange about the U-2 incident in 1960, de Gaulle touched him on the elbow and 
said ―Whatever happens, we are with you‖ (Grosser 1980:185). The Kennedy administration 
found out during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 that among all the major European powers, 
France had been most unwavering in its support (ibid.). Even at the height of the Franco-
American discord, when de Gaulle announced his decision to withdraw France from NATO‘s 
integrated military structures, his letter began with the assurance that France would remain an 
active member of the western alliance determined ―to fight at the side of her allies in case one 
of them will be the object of unprovoked aggression‖ (quoted by Schwartz, in Melandri and 
Ricard (eds) 2003:154). This was the essence of de Gaulle‘s notion of independence: 
unwavering commitment to the allies in case of severe crisis, freedom of action whenever the 
international situation permitted it. As Serge Bernstein notes,  
an attitude that spoke to the desire for national independence in no sense marked 
a reversal of alliances. Though France withdrew from the military organisation 
of the Atlantic Alliance because it did not treat her as an equal partner, she 
stayed firmly within the political alliance. While refusing to be a protectorate of 
the United States, she agreed to be their ally. And de Gaulle showed himself in 
this sphere a partner of exemplary firmness. (1993:163) 
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The importance placed on national independence would remain the guiding principle of 
successive French administrations, even if they each defined independence in ways, which 
seemed less absolute and certainly less strident than under de Gaulle. Until the end of the 
Cold War, all successive French administrations have, independently of their political 
affiliations, been forced to balance the Gaullist heritage with what one might call the Western 
imperative. The Gaullist heritage described above was institutional, political, and national, if 
not nationalist: Institutionally, the constitution of the Fifth Republic was largely designed by 
and for de Gaulle, and it gave and continues to give the president the prerogative of shaping 
and conducting foreign policy. In terms of the powers conferred to the president, it easily 
matches the American constitution
123
. Even in periods with cohabitation, where the president, 
unable to dispose of a majority in the Assemblée Nationale, is forced to appoint a government 
that is hostile to him, he continues to have overall responsibility for the conduct of foreign 
policy, a charge, which he carries out in concertation with, but not political subordination to, 
the government
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. Foreign policy may under such circumstances be not quite the president‘s 
domaine réservé as it was during de Gaulle; it nonetheless remains one of his most important 
prerogatives. As such, French presidents under the Fifth Republic have all been foreign policy 
presidents, able and willing ―to dominate the foreign policy arena‖ (Sampson, in Hermann, 
Kegley, and Rosenau (eds) 1987:399). Much like their American counterparts, French 
presidents have embodied their nation‘s foreign policy. The political heritage, with its dual 
focus on independence and a relatively strong defence, has largely been continued by the 
General‘s successors. What de Gaulle bequeathed to his successors was in fact nothing less 
than a national paradigm in terms of foreign policy; a paradigm, which although largely in 
line with French aspirations since at least the Liberation, was heavily marked by the General‘s 
imprint. It took the form of a set of foreign policy orientations, which commanded broad 
support among the French, and from which no French president could seriously depart. These 
policy orientations had one aim, which was rarely acknowledged publicly, but which 
nevertheless provided a leitmotiv for successive presidents and administrations: to combat any 
notion of France‘s relative decline in international affairs. This notion of decline has haunted 
French leaders for a century, and it is frequently linked to its perceived antithesis, i.e. the 
simultaneous rise of American power: 
Sans cesse affirmées, la puissance et le rang de la France dans le monde sont une 
source permanente d‘angoisse pour les responsables. Si Washington craint 
l‘excès, la France est terrorisée par le manque ; et si les Etats-Unis ne veulent 
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pas être le gendarme du monde, la France regrette de ne pouvoir remplir ce rôle. 
(Boniface 1998:11) 
 
Here, the political heritage and the nationalist heritage become one. The policy of grandeur 
advocated by de Gaulle and his successors contains a strong nationalist streak in the sense that 
is a reaffirmation of the notion of France‘s national genius; a manifest desire to bolster the 
impression of France‘s mission civilisatrice at home and abroad. It was intended as a project 
to galvanize ―national ambition‖ (Hoffmann 1974:231), and though the purpose was 
essentially political – for de Gaulle as well as for his successors, foreign policy remained 
essentially an instrument of domestic policy (Teyssier 1995:333) – the nationalist overtones 
were clearly present. As Stanley Hoffmann argues, French political leaders consistently 
―showed the will to preserve freedom of action for the nation-state in the world and 
considered it the supreme form of social organization, which is the essence of nationalism‖ 
(Hoffmann 1974:403). Maurice Duverger has argued that this nationalism was neither special 
nor abnormal, and that despite appearances to the contrary, France under de Gaulle was no 
more nationalistic than other Western states and certainly no more so than the United States. 
Rather, its ―nationalism is expressed in a different manner because it has to be so expressed – 
that is all‖ (Duverger, in Macridis 1966:xxiv).  
At the same time, and this was increasingly the case after the departure of de 
Gaulle in 1969, French leaders, aware that they were operating in an increasingly 
interdependent international system, could not act independently of its allies and partners. 
While France continued to promote a policy of relative national assertiveness, the logic of the 
Cold War dictated that France was forced to acknowledge the ‗Western imperative‘, namely 
that France as a quintessentially occidental power had its natural place among the other 
western nations and that the leadership of the Western Alliance had befallen unequivocally on 
the United States. It was argued above that de Gaulle‘s France, while asserting its national 
sovereignty, remained a fundamentally loyal partner of – if not always within – the Atlantic 
Alliance, in the sense that France‘s commitment to safeguarding Western Europe from a 
military onslaught remained unchanged in spite of France‘s vocal rejection of American 
tutelage. De Gaulle might not have been quite the ―implacable ally‖, which Roy Macridis 
portrayed him as (Macridis 1966)
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; he nevertheless remained fundamentally loyal, if not 
always unwaveringly faithful, to the West. His successors would largely follow suit.  
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6.1.3 The Western imperative 
The General‘s successors may not have possessed his demeanour, yet the basic tenets of 
Gaullist foreign policy remained largely unchanged over the following decades (Soutou, in 
Andrews (ed.) 2005). There were, however, important shifts, not just in style, but also in 
policy. President Pompidou, elected partly on a mandate to repair Franco-American relations 
(ibid:104 and 122), initially attempted to normalize relations with NATO and the United 
States, removing ―unnecessary points of friction in Alliance matters‖ (Harrison 1981:170) and 
establishing an unexpectedly cordial relationship with President Nixon (Kissinger 1979:989). 
Yet Franco-American tensions resurfaced when U.S. State Secretary Henry Kissinger 
launched his ―Year of Europe‖ initiative in 1973, rekindling ―moribund fears of unwarranted 
American interference in European affairs‖ (Harrison 1981:171). What Washington had 
envisioned as an imaginative updating and refurbishing of the NATO alliance, capped with a 
new Atlantic Charter, instead became the year in which Washington's relationship with its 
European partners struck a new low. To its main instigator, the initiative ―foundered on the 
old rock of Gaullist opposition‖ (Kissinger 1994:618) though France was not the only 
European nation to consider the Kissinger-Nixon initiative inappropriate. As Harrison notes, 
the notion ―seemed to raise the possibility of enhanced European independence and a new 
relationship of equality between the two Atlantic poles‖, but in reality, the exercise was 
―designed to insure that the rhetorical American vision did not materialize into a serious West 
European [..] challenge to the United States in vital issue areas‖ (Harrison 1981:172). 
Pompidou‘s sarcastic response that ―for Europeans, every year is The Year of Europe‖ 
highlighted the patronizing connotations inherent in the American phrase (Morewood, in 
Wakeman (ed.) 2003:21), and reconfirmed the impression that France remained if no longer a 
reluctant, then at least a ―partial‖ ally to America (Harrison 1981:164-193). Relations 
improved under Valéry Giscard d‘Estaing, who enjoyed a close personal friendship with 
President Gerald Ford. Yet Giscard d‘Estaing, ―the leader of the pro-American part of the 
French bourgeoisie‖ (Soutou, in Andrews (ed.) 2005:105), was dependent on a Gaullist party 
to which he did not belong, and was neither able nor willing to fundamentally alter the 
orthodoxy of the Gaullist foreign policy orientations, which remained in force with only small 
alterations.  
Until the French presidential elections of 2007, which resulted in the election of 
the openly pro-American neo-Gaullist Nicolas Sarkozy, it would be a Socialist president, 
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François Mitterrand, who was to prove the most forthcoming of French presidents vis-à-vis 
the United States, at least on a continuous basis. There is a certain irony to the fact that at a 
time when détente was drawing to an end and ideological tensions between East and West 
came once again to the fore, Socialist-led France and Republican-led America should find 
more common ground than under the previous administrations, which at first glance seemed 
to have more in common. Not only was Mitterrand presiding over a government, which 
included four ministers from the still very Moscow-friendly French Communist party; his 
American counterpart, Ronald Reagan, had campaigned on a staunchly anti-Communist 
program. On a personal level, the two leaders seemed to have virtually nothing in common: 
Mitterrand has typically been depicted ―as a sphinx-like figure, mysterious, obscure and 
ancient‖ or even ―a Machiavellian prince‖ (Cole, in Maclean (ed.) 1998:248). Conversely, 
Reagan, frequently derided in France at the time as a second-rate Hollywood actor turned 
politician (Brunet 2007:169), showed no particular intellectual capacities and no penchant 
toward ‗European style thinking‘. As opposed to Mitterrand, who ―At gatherings of heads of 
state, [..] loved to explain with examples how history could help us interpret current events‖ 
(Bush, in Bush and Scowcroft 1998:76),  ―Reagan knew next to no history, and the little he 
did know he tailored to support his firmly held preconceptions. He treated biblical references 
to Armageddon as operational predictions‖ (Kissinger 1994:734). Nevertheless, Franco-
American relations improved markedly during their presidencies in spite of the fact that the 
two men were never close (Bush, in Bush and Scowcroft 1998:74). While it is true, as 
Lawrence Kaplan notes, that Mitterrand‘s Socialist governments ―lacked the anti-American 
glue that bound the Gaullist party‖ (in Melandri and Ricard (eds) 2003:259), the most obvious 
reason for the improvement of the bilateral relationship was probably due to the international 
developments occurring in the 1980s. With the end of détente and faced with a more assertive 
Soviet Union vis-à-vis developments in Europe, Mitterrand felt compelled to change French 
attitudes toward the Soviet Union. In a private meeting with George H.W. Bush in June 1981, 
Mitterrand assured the American vice-president that French relations with the Soviet Union 
would be ―cooler than under his predecessors – not only because the objective situation called 
for it, but also because a Left government with Communist participation had a point to prove 
to its domestic opposition and its allies‖ (Friend 1989:198-199; see also Teyssier 1995:330). 
The point to prove toward its allies was, however, not motivated by ideology as much as by 
realpolitik: 
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Gaullist foreign policy since the mid-1960s had operated on the unspoken 
premise that since West Germany was utterly loyal to the United States, France 
could afford to dance out of line, remaining loyal to the Atlantic alliance but in 
its own independent and idiosyncratic way. In the early 1980s a distant prospect 
of a possibly neutralist West Germany appeared as a new nightmare to the 
French. [..] Mitterrand‘s basically pro-American line can thus be explained by 
the major changes in the international situation since the Cuban missile crisis of 
October 1962, when Gaullist principles were formulated. Gaullist thinking had 
thereafter made light of the Soviet threat – until it appeared in the late 1970s as a 
renewed menace. (Friend 1989:199) 
 
It was under the dual impression of a mounting Soviet threat directed at Western Europe and 
uncertainty regarding the position of the German SPD government that Mitterrand chose to 
align France more closely with Washington (Wiznitzer 1991:53-61). During the heated 
debates regarding the stationing of American missiles in Europe in response to the Soviet 
deployment of SS 20 missiles in Eastern Europe, ―Mitterrand emerged unexpectedly as the 
chief European supporter of the American plan to deploy intermediate-range missiles‖ 
(Kissinger 1994:777). In a widely publicized speech in the German Bundestag, Mitterrand 
declared that ―Anyone gambling on uncoupling the European continent from the American 
would, in our view, jeopardize the balance of forces and therefore the maintenance of peace‖ 
(quoted by Kissinger ibid.). Mitterrand‘s active support for Washington on such a delicate 
matter was instrumental in maintaining Alliance unity over an issue, which clearly was 
straining transatlantic ties (Teyssier 1995:330). It has been noted that when Mitterrand entered 
the Elysée in 1981, few would have ―anticipated that a new policy would be characterized by 
a more supportive stance toward NATO‖ (Cameron, in Keeler and Schain (eds) 1996:334). 
Yet Mitterrand‘s position should not have been altogether unexpected: A careful reading of 
French foreign policy during the Fifth Republic reveals that beneath the veneer of Gaullist 
and post-Gaullian rhetoric, successive governments have adopted consistently pragmatic, 
even realist, positions with regard to the delicate balance of power between the two 
superpowers. Mitterrand did not depart from that pattern – on the contrary, it is highly 
conceivable that de Gaulle might have acted in much the same way. It was the circumstances, 
which had changed, not the basic tenets of French foreign policy. This was confirmed during 
the first Gulf War against Iraq. After some hesitation, in which Paris – consistent with its role 
as the most pro-Arabic Western nation – attempted to impose itself as a mediator between 
Washington and Baghdad by marking out ―France‘s special role in the crisis in some way and 
[thus ensuring] that its weight was evident in international relations‖ (Bell 2005:148), 
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Mitterrand concluded that the intransigence of Saddam Hussein left him no alternatives, and 
he forcefully aligned France with the American-led operation to free Kuwait from Iraqi 
occupation, arguing that France as one of the great powers of the world had to live up to its 
obligations (Boniface 1998:10). France not only participated, it provided the second largest 
European contingent, 18,000 troops, which initially operated independently under French 
national command and control, but in January 1991 were placed under the tactical control of 
the US XVIII Airborne Corps (Crocker 2006:386). Compared with the American contingents 
to the 500.000 troops strong allied forces, French participation was, however, largely 
symbolic (Bell 2005:149). Mitterrand‘s decision to support the American led war was not 
without domestic reverbations, as he faced some opposition both from the dwindling number 
of arch-Gaullists and from within his own government, where Defense Minister Jean-Pierre 
Chevènement was forced to resign in opposition to the war (Cole 1994:135, Teyssier 
1995:455). French participation in the First Gulf War was nonetheless a confirmation that in 
spite of the occassional outbursts of anti-American rhetoric from both sides of the political 
spectre, Franco-American relations had if not normalized, then at least substantially improved 
since de Gaulle‘s days (see for example the very positive account by Bush, in Bush and 
Scowcroft 1998:338-339). At the same time, France‘s participation in the Gulf War and its 
subsequent military frustrations in Bosnia ―demonstrated to the world just how small a 
colossus France really is‖ (Howorth, in Keeler and Schain (eds) 1996:384, see also Lacorne, 
in Cohen (ed.) 1998:321-346) and repudiated any thought that Europe might in the near future 
be able to provide an alternative to American power.  
As such, the quest for national independence in foreign policy and defence 
matters remained balanced with a recognition of the Western imperative, but the paradigmatic 
nature of French foreign policy inherited from de Gaulle was subtly recalibrated to the 
changed international circumstances of the times, without Mitterrand thereby accepting any 
notion of French political decline vis-à-vis the United States. The same applies to 
Mitterrand‘s policy of gradual rapprochement to NATO in the early 1990s, which has been 
characterized as both  ―circumstantial (when it became impossible to do otherwise) and 
conditional (when French autonomy was not impeded)‖ (Boniface 1997). There is no doubt 
that Washington was well aware that in spite of the improved relationship, ―the US and 
France had significantly differing views of the future of Europe and [America‘s] role in it‖ 
(Scowcroft, in Bush and Scowcroft 1998:268). During Mitterrand‘s second term, primarily 
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devoted to promoting European integration, including in security and defence matters, Paris 
nevertheless came to realize that it was increasingly difficult to advocate the necessity of a 
European defence identity without investing in the Alliance itself, although, as Pascal 
Boniface probably rightly asserts, the idea throughout remained ―not to reinforce American 
influence but to contain it‖ (Boniface 1997). Mitterrand was in fact rather attached to the 
Atlantic Alliance; his political roots were ―undeniably to be found in the Fourth Republic‖, 
and he had been a staunch critic of de Gaulle‘s 1966 decision to leave the integrated structures 
(David, in Maclean (ed.) 1998:113). He initiated a policy of measured rapprochement 
between France and NATO, while simultaneously remaining faithful to the basic tenets of the 
Gaullist logic of independence. The result was that by the early 1990s a broad political 
consensus emerged in France on NATO; a consensus, which rested on the principle that on 
the one hand, France would work actively within the Alliance to improve cooperation with its 
allies, and not least with the United States, with a view to developing a European defence 
pillar, while on the other hand, the option of full reintegration into the military structures 
remained discarded (Boniface 1997). Stanley Hoffmann once described the foreign policies 
pursued under Mitterrand‘s first term as ―Gaullism by any other name‖ (in Ross, Hoffmann 
and Malzacher (eds) 1987:294). As the Mitterrand years were drawing to an end a septennat 
later, it nevertheless seemed that Mitterrand and the Socialist party had become even more 
attached to the Gaullist tradition than the Gaullist party itself (David, in Maclean (ed.) 
1998:117). As France‘s rapprochement with NATO accelerated under the second period of 
cohabitation in 1993-95, Mitterrand scoffed from the sidelines at what he perceived as the 
Gaullist-led government‘s tendency to ―fall into line‖ with NATO (Balladur 1995:82). 
Though Mitterrand on several occasions asserted the familiar Gaullist penchant 
toward foreign policy independence, often to the annoyance of Washington, as for example in 
1986, when he refused to give ―permission for American bombers to overfly France to bomb 
Gaddafi‘s headquarters in Libya‖ (Bell 2005:121), there is no doubt that he had initiated a 
subtle, but durable softening of France‘s stance toward its American ally. His successor, 
Jacques Chirac, in contrast seemed at first to present a much more radical break with both the 
arch-Gaullist tradition and the newly established consensus on France‘s relations with NATO. 
Whereas nothing in the manner or style of Mitterrand would have seemed to predispose him 
favourably toward the United States, Jacques Chirac at first appeared to personalize a French 
president who was much less Gallic than the intellectual Mitterrand and much more in tune 
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with his American allies (Bush, in Bush and Scowcroft 1998:76). He had first hand 
experiences of the United States, having studied and worked there in his youth (Frémy 
1987:623), and on several occasions professed a deep admiration for the country (Ward (ed.) 
2003). There is a certain irony to the fact that this president, culturally much more inclined 
toward the United States than any of his predecessors, should later come to be regarded as the 
standard-bearer of global political anti-Americanism. This is even more surprising given the 
fact that Chirac from 1995 to 1997 attempted to perform a much more symbolic 
rapprochement with the United States than the ones undertaken under Mitterrand: the full 
return of France into NATO‘s integrated military structures. No political decision could better 
illustrate a break with Gaullist orthodoxy and the image of French political anti-Americanism, 
and Chirac predictably attracted much criticism for his manoeuvring, both from within his 
own neo-Gaullist party as well as from the Socialist party, now converted into the staunchest 
defenders of the Gaullo-Mitterrandist heritage (Boniface 1998). Chirac‘s attempts were 
motivated by essentially two considerations: first, as will be further explored below, French 
attempts at establishing a distinct European defence and security identity outside NATO had 
proved largely fruitless; and second, Paris had come to realize that the benefits of being able 
to operate forcefully with its close-knit allies in military operations such as the first Gulf War 
outweighed the costs of insisting on the formal independence and full control of its armed 
forces (ibid:74-75). In fact, French participation in the Gulf War had ―revealed the ill-adapted 
nature of the largely conscript French army and its lack of equipment, as well as stretching the 
professional section of the army to its limits‖ (Bell 2005:149). Furthermore, ―the ‗nuclear ace‘ 
of the Cold War years [had] been substantially devalued, and along with it the diplomatic 
―rank‖ to which all French presidents have attached such importance‖ (Howorth, in Keeler 
and Schain (eds) 1996:384), though, as was seen during the debacle over France‘s resumption 
of nuclear tests, Chirac long ―failed to realize that the possession of nuclear weapons no 
longer conferred either grandeur or (still less) respect‖ (ibid:393, see also de Wailly 2004). In 
return for France‘s reintegration into the military structures, Chirac expected NATO to reform 
so that a European defence identity could be created inside of the Alliance structures as 
opposed to outside. Washington had hitherto successfully opposed French attempts at creating 
a distinct European defence identity (Kissinger 1994:820), yet under the Clinton 
administration, a major foreign policy change occurred in this respect, and the United States 
turned to supporting the creation of a stronger Europe, ―including in the defence and security 
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sphere, which had long been seen by Washington as the sole preserve of NATO‖ (Daalder 
2001:6). Chirac realized that were a European defence identity to see the light of day, it would 
have to be established in such a way that the other European allies were not forced to chose 
between a Transatlantic security structure, which had provided them with tangible security 
guarantees throughout the Cold War, and a new European security structure, which, lacking 
effective military means and structures, as yet had little to offer but declarations of mutual 
solidarity. In view of the highly symbolic nature of an eventual French re-entry into NATO‘s 
integrated military structures, Chirac could find ready support in a white paper on national 
defence, commissioned by the Gaullist-led Balladur Government just a year prior to Chirac‘s 
election. The Livre blanc sur la défense 1994, the first such document to be elaborated since 
1972, provided the necessary alibi: It clearly stipulated that in order to create a viable 
European Security and Defence Identity, France would have to ―rénover le lien 
transatlantique, en poursuivant l‘adaptation de l‘Alliance au futur contexte stratégique et à ses 
nouvelles missions, afin d‘assurer la nécessaire permanence de l‘engagement américain en 
faveur de la sécurité et de la stabilité de l‘Europe‖ (Gouvernement français 1994:59). It 
furthermore reminded its readers that ―the highest authorities‖ of France ―n‘ont jamais 
manqué de rappeler le souhait de notre pays, lié aux Etats-Unis depuis toujours, que 
l‘engagement américain en Europe soit maintenu‖ (Gouvernement français 1994:65). Chirac‘s 
ambition to reintegrate France into NATO at first seemed to come at a propitious time. In 
January 1994, the NATO-summit in Brussels had adopted a Declaration of the Heads of State 
and Government, which stipulated that they gave their 
full support to the development of a European Security and Defence Identity 
which [..] will strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance while reinforcing 
the transatlantic link and will enable European Allies to take greater 
responsibility for their common security and defence. (North Atlantic Council 
1994, paragraph 4)
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The heads of state and government had furthermore declared themselves ―ready to make 
collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic 
Council, for [..] operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common 
Foreign and Security Policy‖, while underlining that their support encompassed ―the 
development of separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to European 
requirements and contribute to Alliance security‖ (ibid, paragraph 6).  
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Although both Washington and Paris thus looked poised to embark on a renewal 
of their strategic alliance, Chirac subsequently overplayed his hand. Attempting to achieve 
what he felt would be a position equal to France‘s weight; he demanded that France be given 
one of NATO‘s major commands, preferably the command of the South European sector, 
located in Naples (Kaplan, in Melandri and Ricard (eds) 2003:261; Soutou, in Andrews (ed.) 
2005:112, Kassim, in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008:268). Could it not come under 
French command, Chirac alternatively suggested that it could be rotated between France, 
Italy, and Spain. This command had always been held by an American, and with the southern 
theatre also covering access to the Middle-East, Washington promptly refused (Boniface 
1997). What originated as a bold attempt at improving Franco-American relations and 
normalizing France‘s position within NATO ended in acrimony, with Paris even at one point 
threatening to link their demands for a reform of NATO‘s structures to their acceptance of an 
enlargement of the Alliance (ibid.). This issue was a top priority for Washington, but one 
which Paris only gave its most lukewarm support, fearing that an enlargement would diminish 
France‘s influence (Kaplan, in Melandri and Ricard (eds) 2003:260). Instead of representing a 
renewal of France‘s transatlantic policies, Chirac‘s botched attempt at promoting the 
reintegration into the military structures became his first major foreign policy defeat. The 
defeat was further compounded when in 1997 he called and lost a snap general election, 
leaving him to cohabit with a Socialist government after just two years in office. Chirac spent 
the next five years as essentially a lame-duck President, or as the then editor of the influential 
daily Le Monde sarcastically termed him, ―Resident‖ of the Republic (Colombani 1998). 
Meanwhile, the notion of a presidential domaine réservé in foreign policy matters had come 
to be regarded as increasingly antiquated given the precocity of the president‘s popular 
legitimacy and the relative inactivity he displayed in this domain compared with his 
predecessor (ibid:163-184, Boniface 1997). The new government, more faithful to the Gaullo-
Mitterrandist heritage, was thus able to halt any further progress with regard to France‘s 
reintegration into NATO for the remaining of Chirac‘s first term (Boniface 1997). 
In view of later developments, it is however interesting to note the degree to 
which Chirac was portrayed at the time as an Atlanticist, indeed almost pro-American French 
political leader even well before he succeeded Mitterrand as president. Already during the 
first difficult cohabitation of 1986-88, where Chirac served as Prime Minister under his 
political opponent, Chirac consistently pursued Atlanticist positions, while Mitterrand, in a 
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successful attempt at destabilizing his neo-Gaullist prime minister, countered such policies 
with increasing Gaullist orthodoxy (Bell 2005:119-125). 1995-1997 had provided Chirac with 
a window of opportunity for transforming Franco-American relations, although the attempt 
failed. After his re-election in 2002, the situation had changed markedly. President Clinton, 
generally well liked by the European public, had been succeeded by a George W. Bush who, 
even before the transatlantic relationship turned sour, was regarded with a certain 
apprehension in Europe (Daalder 2001). And though 9-11 had prompted Le Monde to publish 
its famous editorial, ―Nous sommes tous américains‖ (Colombani 2001), it soon transpired 
that there were serious transatlantic differences of opinion concerning the handling of the ‗war 
on terror‘. It is ironic that Chirac became so vilified on the other side of the Atlantic for 
opposing the Iraq War, while George W. Bush‘s successor, Barack Obama, would later owe 
much of his presidential election to his steadfast opposition to the very same war. A banal 
observation in this respect, which does not make it any less true, is that in politics, timing is 
everything. More interestingly for the purposes of this study is, however, to note how it was 
France and Chirac, which became castigated as the main opponent to the U.S.-led invasion of 
Iraq, irrespective of the fact that several nations, including Germany and Russia, were as 
adamant in voicing their dissent as France. Let us briefly recapitulate the reasons for the fall-
out: In 2003 France refused to endorse a follow-up resolution to UN Security Council 
resolution 1441, which had called on Iraq to ―comply with its disarmament obligations‖127. 
The second resolution was intended to provide the international community with a clear 
mandate to invade Iraq on the charges of its alleged possession of weapons of mass 
destruction. Other nations were also openly opposed to the plan, notably Germany, Russia, 
and China. France and Russia, both permanent members of the Security Council with veto 
power, warned as the negotiations unfolded that they would oppose the proposed new UN 
resolution authorizing a preemptive strike against Iraq. Since it is probable that a majority of 
other members of the Security Council would have opposed the plan in case of a vote, the 
proposition was cancelled (Rubin 2003). The United States, backed by a handful of countries, 
most notably Britain, had to carry out the invasion without the legitimacy offered by a 
Security Council resolution. The disagreements over the course to adopt toward Iraq led to 
intense antagonism between the Bush administration and those foreign leaders, who refused 
to back an invasion of Iraq, chief among them Jacques Chirac and his Minister for foreign 
affairs, Dominique de Villepin. Although there was a general feeling in the West that Iraq did 
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not in full live up to the conditions laid out in UNSCR 1441, there was disagreement as to the 
solution (Gordon and Shapiro 2004:8) as well as a substantial amount of scepticism in Europe 
toward the motives driving the U.S. campaign to secure a second resolution. This scepticism 
was compounded by a  
sense that Washington was determined to go to war regardless of what Saddam 
did. Perhaps this suspicion was due to Bush‘s shifting justifications for war; 
perhaps it was due to his failure to engage comprehensively and consistently 
enough with key friends and allies. (Rubin 2003) 
 
Furthermore, ―the Bush administration‘s rhetoric and style alienated rather than persuaded 
key officials and foreign constituencies, especially in light of Washington‘s two-year history 
of scorn for international institutions and agreements‖ (ibid.). According to Elizabeth Pond, 
―The rupture was a real test of the new Pax Americana and the new hegemonic style of the 
United States – but that style itself was the biggest single variable in the schism‖ (2004:1). 
The decision of George W. Bush to define the war as ―part of a struggle between good and 
evil and as an example of a new American doctrine of ‗preemption‘ changed the debate from 
one about how to deal with Iraq to a debate about international order and America‘s 
management of it‖ (Gordon and Shapiro 2004:10. See also Landau 2003 and Hanahoe 2003). 
This could only increase the already substantial apprehension among America‘s allies. To 
many of America‘s allies, the war in Iraq came to look less like a way to uphold UN Security 
Council resolutions than like the manifestation of the new American approach of preemptive 
strikes; an approach, which had featured prominently in last September‘s National Security 
Strategy, where the concept had been broadened to encompass not just the use of force in 
order to prevent an imminent attack, a notion accepted as legitimate under international law, 
but also preventive war, in which ―force may be used even without evidence of an imminent 
attack to ensure that a serious threat to the United States does not ‗gather‘ or grow over time‖ 
(O‘Hanlon, Rice, and Steinberg 2002). As James Rubin rightly notes: 
If gaining support for action against Iraq was truly Washington‘s highest priority 
in the fall of 2002, it is hard to imagine a more counterproductive step than to 
initiate a debate over whether the United States has the right to attack whomever 
it wants, whenever it deems it necessary. (2003) 
 
The American emphasis on its right to launch preemptive strikes combined with the abrasive 
new hegemonic style of diplomacy clearly stood in the way of negotiating a second 
resolution. According to James Rubin, a second resolution would have ―required some 
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compromise on substance‖, yet Washington was not willing to endorse such an approach 
(ibid.): ―Had the Bush administration shown some flexibility in early March, however, it 
would have been France that ended up on the losing side of the tally, not the United States‖ 
(ibid.). In Washington, the conclusion was that it was Chirac, who had ―embarked on a 
determined campaign to undermine American power‖ (Ward (ed.) 2003): 
from the White House‘s perspective, Chirac had already crossed the line. In a 
phone call with Bush, Chirac told him, ―I am convinced there is no immediate or 
urgent threat,‖ but Bush insisted that Iraq ―threatens the American people.‖ 
Rightly or wrongly, the administration believed that vital U.S. interests were at 
stake and thus regarded Chirac‘s veto threat as profoundly unfriendly. (Rubin 
2003) 
 
Yet contrary from what was the prevailing view in Washington at the time, France‘s motives 
for threatening to veto a military action against Iraq was most likely ―not the inevitable result 
of reflexive French resistance to American hegemony‖, nor, as was widely alleged (see for 
example Timmerman 2004) ―the results of French commercial interests‖ in Iraq (Gordon and 
Shapiro 2004:11): 
Rather, the fierce French opposition to the war resulted from a combination of 
factors that all pushed France in the same direction: a genuine belief that the war 
was a strategic mistake, an unwillingness to give the United States a blank check 
for the management of world affairs, and a desire to reestablish Franco-German 
leadership of the EU by taking a stand that was highly popular with public 
opinion throughout Europe. (ibid.) 
 
As foreign minister de Villepin put it, ―the struggle was less about Iraq than it was between 
‗two visions of the world.‘ The differences over Iraq were not only about policy. They were 
also about first principles‖ (Kagan 2004:1). Irrespective of the motives prompting Paris and 
Washington to head for confrontation over how to address the potential Iraqi threat, the clash 
was also a result of the poor statesmanship displayed by both sides. The difference in how the 
two Gulf Wars were handled by the involved presidents of both countries is glaring: During 
the first Gulf War, Washington felt that it was important to secure the backing of its main 
allies in drafting a Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force were Iraq not to 
leave invaded Kuwait before a specified deadline. At a private dinner at the Élysée Palace 
between Presidents George H.W. Bush and François Mitterrand, the latter remarked that 
―Such a resolution is hard to draft, [..] but we will take part in the process and vote for it if it 
is well drafted‖ (Bush, in Bush and Scowcroft 1998:406). Mitterrand subsequently suggested 
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some changes to the text, which the White House included, prompting Mitterrand to remark to 
Bush that ―France remains totally committed to moving in the same direction that you are‖ 
(ibid:475). Had George W. Bush displayed the same kind of diplomatic endeavour in order to 
secure the support of America‘s allies as his father had done little more than a decade before, 
it is doubtful whether the Second Gulf War would have had as one of its main casualties a 
deeply divided transatlantic community following ―the worst US-European clash in half a 
century‖ (Pond 2004:1). There is no doubt that the diplomatic style of the Bush 
administration, and especially that of Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, bears a lot of the 
blame for the developments in early 2003 (Pond 2004, Rubin 2003). Rumsfeld‘s ―blunt 
language may have won him a few laughs in domestic settings, but his every gaffe and insult 
was greeted with disgust throughout Europe. Public diplomacy is supposed to persuade, not 
infuriate‖ (Rubin 2003). Yet French diplomacy was far from adroit either. Especially the 
flamboyant performance by Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin at a crucial meeting of 
the Security Council was considered particularly unhelpful and contributed to further acerbate 
relations between the two countries (ibid.). Chirac, not content with just opposing the war, 
―launched a high-profile campaign to try to stop it‖ (Gordon and Shapiro 2004:11), seriously 
misjudging ―how long American anger toward him would last‖ (Rubin 2003). The fact that 
France had until then cooperated closely with Washington in the war on terrorism after 9-11 
(Ward (ed.) 2003) and that even ―during the height of the name-calling in the two camps, 
France and the US continued to cooperate deeply on the most pressing issues, above all 
counter-terrorism‖ (Meunier, in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008:244) mattered little in 
that respect. Irrespective of whether French positions toward resolving the Iraq problem 
hardened during the debacle, leading France to renege on commitments previously given to its 
American ally (as suggested by for example Trachtenberg 2004:2), the reaction of 
Washington to the opposition experienced from France over the Iraq issue was unexpectedly 
harsh. Even more so was the reaction among the American media and public (Boniface 2003, 
de Wailly 2004). 
France was easily singled out as the main opponent to America over the Iraq 
issue, and American criticism of France took surprising forms. Defence Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld famously denigrated France and Germany as ―Old Europe‖ while referring to the 
many Central European countries which pledged diplomatic backing of the U.S.-led war as 
―New Europe‖ (Rubin 2003). T-shirts and bumper stickers were produced which jokingly 
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called for the United States to invade: ―Iraq first, France next!‖, and ―First Iraq, then Chirac!‖ 
On March 11, 2003, the cafeteria menus in the three United States House of Representatives 
office buildings changed the name of French fries to freedom fries in a culinary rebuke of 
France. French toast was also changed to freedom toast (Loughlin 2003). During the First 
World War, in a similar move, attempts were made to replace the word sauerkraut with the 
term liberty cabbage, hamburger replaced with Liberty Sandwich, and frankfurter with hot 
dog, in menus and in popular speech; only the latter was successful. Most Europeans, and a 
sizable number of Americans, dismissed these name changes as gimmickry. Nevertheless, 
between ―February 2002 and Spring 2003, the number of Americans with favorable views of 
France fell from 79 to 29 percent‖ (Gordon and Shapiro 2004:3). These reactions have an air 
of folklore about them. Yet the wave of French-bashing in America seemed oddly out of 
proportion with the French ‗offence‘ of not supporting a war that they deemed dangerous and 
misguided (Hoffmann 2004). Chirac was castigated as the arch-typical French anti-American 
and French opposition to the Second Gulf War was presented as an essentially anti-American 
action. It is highly doubtful whether Chirac‘s policies were motivated by anti-Americanism as 
such (see for example Meunier, in Cole, Le Galès and Levy 2008:246); the reaction on the 
other side of the Atlantic to the French position on Iraq was, however, pure anti-French (Ash, 
in Lindberg (ed.) 2005). French opposition to the Iraq War sparked the publication of a 
number of books, especially in the United States, on the ―disastrous‖ Franco-American 
relationship (see for example Timmerman 2004, and Miller and Molesky 2004). Not even de 
Gaulle‘s decision to withdraw from NATO‘s integrated structures in 1966 had given rise to 
the same level of American vilification of France and vociferous charges of French anti-
Americanism (Hoffmann 2004). 
Whereas Chirac has frequently been portrayed as the arch-Gaullist anti-
American (see for example the portrait given by the Economist, quoted in the introduction), 
his successor, Nicolas Sarkozy, has been characterized as the rarest of things, an openly pro-
American French president. This became clear already during the presidential campaign, 
when the opposition Socialist Party issued a much debated publication entitled Les 
inquiétantes ruptures de M. Sarkozy, whose opening lines where:  ―La France est elle prête à 
voter en 2007 pour un néo-conservateur américain à passeport français?‖ (Besson, in Besson 
(ed.) 2007:4). The tract alleged that this crypto-American presidential candidate in reality 
represented an ―ultra-liberal, communitarian, Atlanticist, and neo-conservative‖ break with 
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French political traditions (Besson (ed.) 2007, title page). The publication could be read as a 
catalogue of both all the well-known grievances against the United States and its political 
system and all the ills that would befall France were Sarkozy – ―the clone of Bush‖ (Bayard, 
in Besson (ed.) 2007:115) – to be elected president. In the foreign press, it was described as 
an atavistic piece of pure anti-American propaganda and a reaffirmation that anti-
Americanism still played an important role in a country that presented the United States as 
―anti-France‖ (Cohen 2007). Reality was, naturally, more complex. First, denouncing Sarkozy 
as a Bush-clone was neither a very imaginative piece of political attack, nor exclusively 
French in nature. In the 2004 U.S. presidential campaign, the Democrat candidate, Senator 
John Kerry, was frequently referred to by Republican leaders and commentators as ―the 
French candidate‖ (Fritz and Nehan 2004, Adams 2007). In the first televised debate between 
President Bush and his challenger, the President denigrated Kerry‘s proposal to submit future 
decisions to invade foreign countries to a ―global test‖ with these words: ―The use of troops to 
defend America must never be subject to a veto by countries like France‖ (Zakaria 2004, 
Adams 2007). The choice of France in this context was hardly accidental. It naturally referred 
to the debacle over Iraq, but it was also meant to oust Kerry as pro-French. Kerry was, as John 
Moser notes, most ―likely the first American presidential candidate since Thomas Jefferson to 
be attacked as pro-French‖ (in O‘Connor (ed.) 2007c). Ever since one of George W. Bush‘s 
advisors remarked to a New York Times reporter that John Kerry ―looked French‖ (Neier 
2004:1018), Republicans tried to link Kerry to France and to present him as a ―French‖ 
candidate. Commentator Mark Steyn from Chicago Sun-Times wrote in a review of a spring 
election rally that ―Kerry sounded awfully much like America‘s first French President‖ (Fritz 
and Nehan 2004). It would seem that during presidential elections, each of the two nations can 
readily offer the other as an example not to be followed. Second, as Stéphane Rozès noted at 
the time, the attack on Sarkozy‘s supposedly pro-American sympathies largely went amiss, 
since ―America is an ambivalent rather than negative image for many in France‖ (quoted by 
Cohen 2007). Sarkozy‘s own reaction to the allegation was a characteristic ―Je m‘en fous‖ 
(Fich 2007). Like all serious contenders to the highest office in the Fifth Republic, Sarkozy 
had previously published a book laying out his visions for France. In this Témoignage, 
Sarkozy also presented some rather banal statements on the necessity to cultivate the close 
bonds between France and America, and he concluded with the words: ―I am not fascinated 
by the American example. But if I had to choose, I feel closer to American society than to 
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many others across the world‖ (2006:182). Hardly a statement likely to raise many eyebrows 
in most Western nations, yet in France, it made headlines. Characteristically, it was the last 
sentence, which became highlighted by pundits as evidence to Sarkozy‘s pro-Americanism 
and ultra-liberalism, and not the reservations inherent in the first part of the statement. It 
would seem that if America is an ambivalent image for most of the French, Sarkozy did little 
to quell these ambivalences. Third, and most important, if the French voters reacted to these 
charges in any way, it did not reflect significantly on the results. In the first round of the 
presidential election, Nicolas Sarkozy obtained 31.2 % of the vote, and easily beat his 
opponent, the Socialist Ségolène Royal, in the second round with a comfortable 53.1 % of the 
vote (Cautrès and Cole, in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008:30-37). The 2007 elections 
were thus an affirmation both that the anti-American card could still be used to denounce a 
political opponent, and that this trump card had lost any significant value it might have had 
previously. If anything, the attacks backfired. Les inquiétantes ruptures de M. Sarkozy came 
to be regarded as largely anachronistic, displaying a Socialist Party bent on fighting 
yesterday‘s fights. This became even more blatant when its editor and main author, Éric 
Besson, shortly after defected from the Socialist Party and subsequently was appointed to 
serve in the new government by none other than the object of his defamation, Nicolas 
Sarkozy.  
The newly elected president nevertheless did seem to augur a more pro-
American line, and he wasted little time in mending the cracks in the Franco-American 
relationship seemingly caused by his predecessor. In a speech to the United States Congress 
on November 7, 2007, the French President professed his eagerness to present an ―ambitious, 
clear-sighted France [..] A France that comes out to meet America to renew the pact of 
friendship and the alliance that Washington and Lafayette sealed in Yorktown‖. 
Acknowledging the bilateral difficulties of the past, he stated that  
At the same time, and equally forcefully, since I'm well aware of my country's 
political history, I want to affirm my attachment to NATO. I say it here before 
this Congress: The more successful we are in the establishment of a European 
Defense, the more France will be resolved to resume its full role in NATO. I 
would like France, a founding member of our Alliance and already one of its 
largest contributors, to assume its full role in the effort to renew NATO‘s 
instruments and means of action and, in this context, to allow its relations with 
the Alliance to evolve concurrently with the development and strengthening of a 
European Defense. (Sarkozy 2007) 
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Nicolas Sarkozy‘s speech to the Congress was hailed as that of a true friend of the United 
States, receiving standing and enthusiastic acclamation from the members of Congress. Yet 
despite the numerous references to examples of past solidarity, the French president did not 
depart from the basic tenet of French foreign policy throughout half a century: ―Finally, I 
want to be your friend, your ally and your partner. But I want to be a friend who stands on his 
own two feet, an independent ally, a free partner‖ (ibid.). In reality, the proposed 
rapprochement to NATO differed little from what his predecessor, Jacques Chirac, had 
proposed a decade earlier, and neither did the necessary sine qua non. Even the method, 
commissioning a white paper on national defence to give his political design an aura of 
impartial necessity (Gouvernement français 2008), seemed by now to have become an almost 
standard operating procedure.  It has been argued that in view of the fact that France could 
already boast ―an extensive presence in NATO structures, from commanding operations to 
contributing actively to the NATO Response Force‖, reintegrating into NATO amounts ―to an 
important political symbol, but a modest reality‖ (Vaisse 2008:6). Yet, as Stanley Hoffmann 
has reminded us, perceptions are of essence in foreign policy (1974:332). The fact that 
Sarkozy seems to take pride in being labelled pro-American or Atlanticist, regardless of the 
fact that he is basically following a path largely charted to him by his predecessors, and 
perhaps even more so the fact that he seems to openly delight in maintaining a very cordial 
relationship with the White House (Meunier, in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008:253) is 
evidence to the importance of perceptions: Sarkozy is pro-American primarily because 
everybody says so – himself, his opponents, his allies, and especially medias eager to present 
another picture of French foreign policy than the rather stale one characterizing Chirac‘s last 
years in office. As Justin Vaisse notes, 
So why the hype about Sarkozy breaking with French Gaullist tradition and 
aligning himself with Washington? The first reason is that the French president 
himself has spoken of it, as part of his posture of ‗rupture‘ with the past. Another 
reason is simply that Sarkozy is not Chirac: in the minds of many observers, 
Jacques Chirac‘s foreign policy has been reduced to his 2003 opposition to the 
Iraq War, while his wide-ranging 2004-07 rapprochement with America has 
been underestimated or ignored. (2008:7) 
 
Yet symbols and perceptions matter. It may be true, as Vaisse asserts, that many of Sarkozy‘s 
beliefs can be described as inherently Gaullist and that like the General, he is a pragmatist at 
heart (ibid:5). In this, he does not significantly differ from any of his predecessors. There is no 
doubt, however, that by openly professing admiration for the United States to a much larger 
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degree than any of his predecessors, he has come to symbolize a break with the French 
tradition of political anti-Americanism – whether that too, was a matter of perceptions or not. 
Yet as Sophie Meunier notes,  
deep down, the objectives of French foreign policy are still the same. The main 
goal is to get France to be taken seriously again and to enable it to project its 
power and values throughout the world, like in de Gaulle‘s time. Sarkozy 
declared to the New York Times in September 2007, ‗if France doesn‘t take the 
lead, who will?‘ Like so many presidents before him, Sarkozy believes that 
France is in a unique position to steer world affairs, that French values are 
universal and therefore ultimately destined to radiate throughout the world. (in 
Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008:257) 
 
While Sarkozy has, in the first two years of his presidency, demonstrated a hitherto 
unprecedented wish for Franco-American rapprochement, culminating with France‘s decision 
to reintegrate into NATO‘s military structures prior to the Alliance‘s 60th anniversary summit 
in April 2009, this does thus not suggest that France has abandoned all pretentions at 
universalism. Sarkozy can be said to have followed the course toward a gradual normalization 
of the bilateral relations, which had been charted to a large degree by his predecessors, 
although as opposed to Sarkozy they failed to pursue this course to its logical conclusion. 
There is, however, no indication that he has any intentions of abandoning the central foreign 
policy tenets of the Fifth Republic as they were formulated by de Gaulle in the late 1950s. 
Sarkozy may be more Atlanticist than his predecessors, yet as Vaisse noted above, he is not 
necessarily any less Gaullist. Rather, Sarkozy seems to have come to the same conclusion as 
Chirac did before him: that France no longer has anything to gain by remaining partly 
detached from a political and military alliance, which has come to span a large part of Europe. 
De Gaulle may have nurtured dreams that France could act as a third force between the two 
superpowers. With one of these superpowers gone and the other elevated to the rank of 
hyperpower, any such aspiration is evidently a thing of the past. Therefore, France no longer 
has any interest in pursuing its universalist aspirations by remaining aloof from the world‘s 
most important military alliance. This, however, does not mean that France has given up its 
universalist ambitions, but rather that they have been scaled down to more modest size and 
transferred to other arenas. 
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6.1.4 Balancing the hegemon: African and European policies 
Though the strategic transatlantic partnership has often set the scene for political clashes 
between France and the United States, these clashes seem to have been motivated essentially 
by clashing interests and perceptions regarding their respective roles. This does not entail that 
France has not sought to challenge or even balance the American hegemon, but rather that this 
has primarily been carried out in other arenas than the transatlantic one. Unable to acquire the 
coveted equal status with the predominant power of the transatlantic alliance, France has 
instead attempted to use the African and European, and to a lesser extent Middle Eastern, 
arenas to promote its universal aspirations. These universal aspirations have, as was shown in 
chapter 5, been a constant companion of French national identity. Yet ever since the fall of 
Napoleon III, ―France has lacked the power to impose the universalist aspirations it inherited 
from the French Revolution, or the arena to find an adequate outlet for its missionary zeal‖ 
(Kissinger 1994:120). While the universal aspirations have remained intact, France has 
increasingly felt compelled to downscale its ambitions, adopting a strategy of limited 
universalism in the geographical areas where its influence remained strong. According to 
Kissinger, ―a constant factor in French foreign policy‖ has been ―France‘s penchant for 
associating with countries ready to accept its leadership‖ (ibid.). This has led France to 
intensify its endeavours to create more limited networks of influence as substitute arenas for 
the universal arena that France once aspired to mark. Kissinger sarcastically remarks that 
―considering junior status incompatible with its notions of national grandeur and its messianic 
role in the world, France has sought leadership in pacts with lesser powers‖ (ibid.). This, 
according to Kissinger, explains why France did not ally itself more closely with the United 
States, as ―geopolitical logic‖ should have dictated: ―French pride, however, prevented this 
from happening, leaving France to search, sometimes quixotically, for a grouping – 
occasionally almost any grouping – to balance the United States‖ (ibid.). The choice of arenas 
is however not coincidental, and Africa and Europe can hardly be described as ―any 
grouping‖; rather, both arenas were obvious choices given on the one hand France‘s strong 
presence in Africa as a result of its past as a colonial power ruling over large parts of the 
continent, and on the other hand France‘s previous position as the strongest and most 
influential European power. Furthermore, both arenas have presented France with different 
opportunities for exerting an important influence as a world power: Its influence in Africa has 
through the policies of Francophonie bolstered both France‘s physical presence in the world 
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and the linguistic predominance of French over vast parts of the continent. Yet however 
considerable French political influence in Africa has been and remains, it hardly permits 
France to acquire the status of superpower or near-superpower capable of balancing American 
hegemony. The construction of Europe, on the other hand, has permitted France as one of the 
leading European nations to present itself if not as a superpower, then at least as the 
representative of a superpower in the making. These two arenas remain the most prominent 
outlets for French universalistic aspirations; aspirations which are frequently presented as the 
only ones capable of rivaling the dominant American hegemony: ―[Les États-Unis] 
découvrent progressivement maintenant l‘existence d‘universalismes autres que le leur, tels, 
en particulier, l‘universalisme européen et l‘universalisme francophone qui est nord par son 
héritage français et sud par l‘apport des pères fondateurs de la Francophonie politique‖ 
(Guillou 2005:119). In Africa, France has consistently attempted to impose itself as the 
primary spokesman, arbiter, and sometimes even policeman, and it has resisted any notions of 
American encroachment on what Paris has seen as its ‗pré-carré‘. In Europe, France has 
attempted to impose itself as the natural leader of a continent engaged in a unification process, 
which could well render it a potential rival to American hegemony.  
 
France as an African power 
Among all other former colonial empires, France enjoys a uniquely strong position in Africa. 
In line with their strategy of limited universalism (whether acknowledged or not), successive 
French governments have undertaken to graft a domain of foreign policy in which France 
could maintain a leading role and present itself as spokesman for a large part of the world‘s 
population: Using its influence in post-colonial Africa, France has come to consider the 
French-speaking African nations as its pré-carré, ―an African version of the Monroe doctrine, 
claiming that francophone African states belong to the French traditional sphere of influence‖ 
(Huliaras 1998:600). Here, France has acquired the role as an ―African power‖, enjoying a 
dominant position politically, economically, historically, and culturally (Bagayoko-Penone 
2003:11). The aspirations that led to the establishment of France‘s colonial empire are in 
essence similar to the justifications given for the extensive French presence in Africa today. 
Both are tangible manifestations of France‘s mission civilisatrice, and both have sought to 
enhance France‘s power on the world stage. Jules Ferry, best known as the founding father of 
the French tradition of laïcité, was also an ardent advocate of French colonial expansion. He 
described how the duty and responsibility of the ―Grande Nation‖ was to ―réveiller au sein des 
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autres races les notions supérieures dont nous avons le dépôt‖ (quoted by Ageron 1978:66), or 
even ―qu‘il y a pour les races supérieures un droit, parce qu‘il y a un devoir pour elles. Elles 
ont le devoir de civiliser les races inférieures‖ (quoted by Girardet 1983:13-14). This was not 
an uncommon justification for colonialism in nineteenth century Europe, neither in France, 
nor among the other colonizing powers, as was famously illustrated by Kipling‘s notion of 
‗The White Man‘s Burden‘. Yet as the process of decolonization began in the 1950s, such 
references to a mission civilisatrice became abandoned by the former colonial powers – 
except by France, which not only fought long and hard to retain its empire, but which also 
regarded the empire as an essential part of its universal identity. Even after the colonial 
empire had been dismantled, France did not give up its mission to civilize. In 1984, Jean-
Pierre Cot, briefly a deputy Minister in charge of Co-operation and Development in the first 
government appointed by François Mitterrand, declared with reference to France‘s role in 
Africa that 
Que nous le voulions ou non, toute notre Histoire et le génie propre de notre 
nation nous portent à l‘idéalisme. La France n‘a jamais été mieux écoutée, 
mieux respectée, que lorsqu‘elle adressait un message et s‘élevait par-delà ses 
intérêts immédiats pour atteindre l‘universel. (1984:218) 
 
There are no racial overtones in Cot‘s statement, yet he has essentially the same mission 
civilisatrice in mind as Jules Ferry had a century before: that France, with its universal creed, 
has a duty to export its values to other nations and that herein lie its chief claim to world 
power status. In this respect, France‘s engagement in Africa has persistently been presented in 
terms of altruistic messianism, and embraced as such by both sides of the political divide, as 
here the same year in the Gaullist Party‘s program regarding North-South relations: 
Notre tradition républicaine des droits de l‘homme nous oblige plus que d‘autres 
à une attitude généreuse, qui seule peut s‘identifier au profil qui est le nôtre à 
l‘extérieur. [..] L‘impact, l‘influence de la France à l‘étranger sont bien 
supérieurs à son poids économique ou démographique dans le monde 
d‘aujourd‘hui. Cela est probablement dû au rayonnement de notre culture, mais 
n‘est certainement pas séparable du fait que nous soyons la patrie de la 
Déclaration des droits de l‘homme. Dans le domaine de la politique vis-à-vis du 
Tiers monde, et plus qu‘en d‘autres peut-être, « France oblige ». (Guillou 
1984:25) 
 
France‘s historic engagement in Africa was however motivated as much by power 
considerations as by idealism. The mission civilisatrice soon became a mission of expansion, 
and the empire created by means of colonization contributed greatly to giving France a role as 
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a global power, long rivalled only by that of Great Britain. Like its colonial rival, it faced the 
difficult task of managing an empire in decomposition after the Second World War. But 
unlike Britain, who unquestionably emerged from its wartime experience as one of the 
victorious great powers with a leading, if increasingly waning, role in shaping the post-war 
international system alongside the United States and the Soviet Union, France had but one 
serious trump card to play in order to impose itself as a power of the first order: its empire. 
The empire not only allowed France to present itself as an important power in terms of its 
geographical presence in Africa, Indochina and Oceania, it had also permitted Free France to 
present itself as one of the allied powers engaged in the common fight against the Axis-
powers. This was based on the fact that not all of France had been occupied or otherwise 
subjected to German rule. In his Appel du 18 juin, de Gaulle had as leader of the Free French 
stressed that the French defeat was neither total, nor definitive: ―Car la France n‘est pas seule! 
[..] Elle a un vaste Empire derrière elle. Elle peut faire bloc avec l‘Empire britannique qui 
tient la mer et continuer la lutte‖ (1954:267). Though a large number of France‘s overseas 
territories remained loyal to the Vichy regime, enough sided with de Gaulle for him to present 
himself as not just a moral leader in exile but indeed as the acknowledged leader of a de facto 
government with authority over both territory and its inhabitants (Wauthier 1995:20-24). As 
such, le ‗recours à l‘Afrique‘ gave the French empire an important dimension other than the 
purely colonial: It became a vital temporary substitute for the lost homeland, and one which 
furthermore allowed Free France to make more than a token contribution to the allied war 
effort. In a speech in Brazzaville following the Liberation, de Gaulle, now formally the leader 
of the Liberation government, justly remarked that it was ―dans ses terres d‘outre-mer et dans 
leur fidélité [que la France] a trouvé son recours et sa base de départ pour sa libération‖ 
(1956:184). General de Gaulle‘s exasperation when faced with Roosevelt‘s plan that France 
should be stripped of its empire following the end of the war is thus fully understandable, just 
as Roosevelt‘s preference for dealing with first the Vichy regime and second the malleable 
General Giraud rather than with the troublesome de Gaulle was undermining the general‘s 
credibility in the parts of the empire, which had acknowledged him as the legal representative 
of France (White 1979:80-91). This contributed, as was noted above, to souring relations 
between de Gaulle and Roosevelt, and it instilled in successive French leaders a deep 
suspicion regarding the motives of the United States in relation to its support for the 
decolonization process, a suspicion reminiscent of the one directed toward Britain in the years 
284 
 
leading up to the Liberation: the fear that one empire might take advantage of the situation to 
take over the possessions of another (Wauthier 1995:22-24).  
Following the Liberation, the empire was formally replaced by the Union 
française, modelled on the British Commonwealth, yet the empire essentially remained intact, 
the most noticeable change being the abolition of the ‗indigenous‘ status of the colonies. As 
such, the destinies of France and its overseas possessions remained closely linked. And 
though de Gaulle would later claim that the establishment of the Union française ―s‘est 
produit du seul gré de la France, au moment où sa puissance renaissante et sa confiance 
ranimée la mettent en mesure d‘octroyer ce que nul n‘oserait encore prétendre lui arracher‖ 
(1956:185), the decolonization process soon gained in momentum, forcing France to 
relinquish its former empire little by little. Following de Gaulle‘s return to power in 1958, the 
Union française was abolished in favor of the short-lived Communauté française, which held 
out the prospect of future independence for the colonies. But though France could not long 
uphold a penchant to the British Commonwealth, in which the French President was formally 
the head of state in the associated states, France proved eminently able at retaining a much 
less symbolic, yet far more substantial presence in its former colonies (White 1979:188-258). 
The loss of France‘s colonial empire did not signify the loss of French influence in especially 
Africa. The newly independent post-colonial nations soon found themselves dependent on the 
good offices of their erstwhile colonial master. In the Élysée palace, Jacques Foccart had been 
appointed by de Gaulle to head a small unit responsible for African affairs. This ―man of the 
shadows‖ (Péan 1990), sometimes even referred to as the second most powerful personality of 
the republic (Verschave 2000a, Péan 1990) would over the following decades build an 
extensive network of influence with especially West African leaders, which contributed to 
give France a preponderant influence in its former colonies. At times, it even seemed as if a 
number of African leaders were dependent on French support in order to stay in power 
(Bayart 1984, Verschave 2000a and 2000b, Wauthier 1995, White 1979). As Gérard Prunier 
notes, ―Alone among the former colonial powers that once ruled Africa, France has kept the 
will [..] to use military power whenever it feels the need to add muscle to its policies‖ 
(1995:102). In essence, this allowed France to continue to play the role as an African power 
based on clientelism, instrumentalizing it into a system which has derogatorily been termed la 
Françafrique (Verschave 1998, Durand, in Melandri and Ricard 2003:118).  
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There is no doubt that in spite of the numerous references to France‘s historic 
and moral obligations based on its universal values, France‘s African policies were just as 
much motivated by national interests. These national interests were both material, giving 
France privileged access to supplies of vital raw materials such as oil (Lonsi Koko 2007:131-
136), and immaterial, as they contributed to bolstering France‘s policies of national grandeur 
(Verschave 2000b:557). In this respect, they also became an issue of contention between 
France and the United States. De Gaulle had initially been hesitant toward the establishment 
of a community of French-speaking states, fearing that it could be interpreted as a sign of neo-
colonialism (Salhi (ed.) 2002:14, Wauthier 1995:77-81). He nevertheless soon came to the 
conclusion that a French-speaking movement could be ―conçu comme un instrument du droit 
des peuples à disposer d‘eux-mêmes et du refus de l‘hégémonie américaine‖ (Gallet 1995:7). 
De Gaulle‘s successors would even more warmly embrace the institutions of la Francophonie 
(see 5.3.2), which allowed them, long after the decolonization process had been completed, to 
retain ―une certaine prééminence, voire une tutelle déguisée‖ (Wauthier 1995:646) in 
Francophone Africa and thus enhancing France‘s world role. In line with traditions inherited 
from the heydays of the French colonial empire, the presidents of the Fifth Republic have 
both regarded Africa as their privileged presidential domain (Bayart 1984, Verschave 2000b) 
and adopted an eminently geopolitical approach toward the continent (Marchal, in Marchesin 
(ed.) 1995, Wauthier 1995, Verschave 2000a). In December 1998, Georges Serre, advisor on 
African affairs to Minister for foreign affairs Hubert Védrine declared that ―De même que les 
États-Unis ont leur arrière-cour en Amérique latine, la France a besoin d‘avoir son arrière-
cour en Afrique‖ (quoted by Verschave 2000a:17). It was, furthermore, a backyard into which 
France would not accept interference by the United States. During the Cold War, a division of 
labor between France and America had essentially ensured that France retained relatively free 
hands in Francophone Africa (Bagayoko-Penone 2003:27-51, Huliaras 1998:603), even if the 
two nations frequently disagreed as to which means should be taken (Adda and Smouts 
1989:13-14, Bagayoko-Penone 2003:595-598). Sometimes, the Franco-American truce over 
Africa was barely visible, as in the 1960s, where the two nations clashed violently over 
Gabon, an episode which the then American ambassador to Gabon described as ―a little cold 
war‖ between France and the United States (Durand, in Melandri and Ricard 2003:119-121). 
It was a cold war, in which France systematically – and given its preeminent influence in the 
country, successfully – sabotaged the American political and economic presence in Gabon; a 
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sabotage which was so effective, that it eventually led to the expulsion of the American 
ambassador (ibid:117-138). Though Gabon proved the most extreme case of the worsening 
Franco-American relations during de Gaulle‘s presidency spilling over on the two nations‘ 
dealings with Africa, the United States soon discovered that this was far from an isolated case. 
In several African countries, they found that France was systematically, ―sometimes in little 
scheming ways and sometimes in ways not so little, [..] working against the United States, to 
frustrate and diminish American policies and influence‖ (ibid:117). It is no exaggeration to 
state that a constant fear in Paris long remained that of an American encroachment on 
France‘s African pré-carré: 
L‘influence anglo-saxonne a toujours en effet été perçue par les Français comme 
une menace pour leur propre influence dans leurs anciennes colonies africaines : 
symptôme d‘un véritable « syndrome de Fachoda », la mobilisation face à cette 
menace anglo-saxonne en Afrique est une constante de la diplomatie française. 
(Bagayoko-Penone 2003. p. 29) 
 
The most visible – and infamous – example of this is probably the role played by France 
during the events that led to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. According to Gérard Prunier, the 
motivation driving France‘s support for the regime of then Rwandan President Habyarimana, 
whose assassination in 1994 prompted one of the worst genocides on the African continent, 
was the fear that Anglo-Saxon countries were attempting to force French influence and 
especially the French language out of the African continent (1995). In this respect Prunier has 
remarked that: ―the casual observer imagining that money is the cement of the [Franco-
African] relationship would have the wrong impression. The cement is language and culture‖ 
(ibid:103). The ruling Hutus were Francophones, whereas the leaders of the rebel Rwanda 
Patriotic Front (RPF) were trained and organized in English speaking Uganda.  
In the eyes of the Mitterrand regime, this Ugandan support assumed the 
dimensions of an Anglophone conspiracy to take over part of francophone 
Africa, and the defence of Habyarimana [..] became part of a more general 
defence of francophonie and the French role in Africa, to an extent that to an 
anglophone observer seems quite bizarre. (Clapham 1998:199) 
 
Prunier has described France‘s policies in Africa as a result of the deeply embedded Fashoda 
syndrome: ―According to the Fashoda syndrome, the whole world is a cultural, political and 
economic battlefield between France and the ‗Anglo-Saxons‘‖ (1995:105):  
From that point of view, the invasion of Rwanda on 1 October 1990 by a group 
of rebels coming from Uganda was a typical test-case – an obvious ‗Anglo-
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Saxon‘ plot to destabilise one of ‗ours‘, and one we needed to stop right away if 
we did not want to see a dangerous spread of the disease. (ibid:106) 
 
When in 1996, ―the scene of ‗anglosaxon invasion‘ moved to Zaïre, Franco-American rivalry 
reached a new peak‖ (Huliaras 1998:595). It would seem that the disease had spread in spite 
of the French efforts, and Paris came to see the new developments as ―evidence of an 
‗anglosaxon conspiracy‘, part of a plot to develop an arc of influence [.. with] a hidden agenda 
‗to oust France from Africa‘‖ (ibid:594). Like Prunier, Huliaras asserts that the Fashoda 
syndrome ―significantly contributed to French misperceptions of events‖ (ibid:603). These 
misperceptions were apparently dominant on both sides of the political spectrum. Shortly 
after his election, Jacques Chirac denounced ―the Anglosaxons [who] dream of pushing 
France out of its position in Africa‖ (The Economist 1995:37). Huliaras concludes that 
―French policy towards post-genocide Rwanda and Zaïre was mainly determined by pre-
constructed beliefs, psychological insecurities and bureaucratic resistance. Only to a minor 
extent was it the result of rational calculations‖ (Huliaras 1998:609). The fear of mounting 
Anglo-Saxon influence in Africa clearly seems to have played an important part in the French 
political imaginary in the 1990s (see for example Harbulot and Pichot-Duclos 1999:51). Even 
if this fear cannot necessarily be characterized as a manifestation of anti-Americanism as 
such, it nonetheless underlines another dimension of France‘s rejection of America‘s power 
and influence. In its African policies, France has throughout remained determined to defend 
its African turf against any threat of ‗Anglo-Saxon‘ and lately especially American 
encroachment. In 1998, former Minister for Cooperation Bernard Debré came close to 
acknowledging that France‘s modern day mission civilisatrice builds on little more than the 
defense of French national interests in the face of France‘s loosing battle with the increasing 
influence of the United States, when he lamented that 
In less than ten years, Africans will speak English, the technology they use will 
be American, their elites will be educated in the United States, and we will be 
cut off from our African roots, huddled up over a Europe which feels the cold 
and is incapable of being a power that anyone listens to. (Quoted by Kom 2000)  
 
For long, its presence and influence in Francophone Africa permitted France to present itself 
first as a world empire and later as the political leader and benefactor of a continent, which 
otherwise had but a relatively limited voice in world affairs. This gave a certain credibility to 
French claims of being an alternative to American universalism. As late as in 2005, Michel 
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Guillou could still claim that France needed not only a ―Europe-Puissance pour marcher à 
l‘équilibre et affirmer son identité et ses valeurs: c‘est une « Francophonie-Puissance » qui lui 
manque pour enrayer le déclin‖ (Guillou 2005, back cover). Yet in reality, France seems to 
have discovered the limits of even limited universalism. France‘s role in Africa is in decline, 
not necessarily as a result of an Anglo-Saxon conspiracy, though it is a fact that English is 
spreading on the continent, but largely because the benefits of the French policies of 
clientelism no longer outweigh the costs (Bayart 1984, Verschave 2000a). On a moral level, 
the actions of France in especially Rwanda have led to condemnation even by prominent 
French intellectuals. In a resounding critique of French policies toward Africa under the Fifth 
Republic, Erik Orsenna, a member of both the Académie française and the Haut Conseil de la 
francophonie, concluded that ―Avec tout l‘argent du monde, on ne s‘achète pas un visage‖ 
(quoted by Wauthier 1995:644. See also Verschave 2000a and 2000b). On an economical 
level, the benefits are seriously mitigated by the subsidies offered by Paris, and on a political 
level, the status enjoyed by France as an unofficial spokesman for the non-aligned world 
during de Gaulle‘s presidency is unquestionably a thing of the past (Wauthier 1995). France 
still retains important influence and leverage in Francophone Africa, and this undoubtedly 
contributes to France‘s political power on the world stage, but the system of Françafrique is 
slowly decomposing as France progressively becomes a more ‗normal‘ world power. The 
days of French tutelage over Africa are slowly drawing to an end and with them the limited 
universalism it once offered France. 
 
Europe: a potential counter power in the making? 
French presence in Africa has certainly bolstered France‘s universal aspirations, yet in spite of 
the fact that the Francophone community encompasses more than sixty nations on five 
continents (Guillou 2005), it does not have the potential to balance the American hegemon in 
any terms of power and influence. Europe on the other hand, throughout centuries by far the 
dominant continent, doubtless has that potential. Henry Kissinger has noted that France has 
had a propensity to act at times ―as a kind of parliamentary opposition to American 
leadership, trying to build the European Community into an alternative world leader and 
cultivating ties with nations it could dominate, or thought it could dominate‖ (1994:120). Just 
as France‘s African policies build on both France‘s mission civilisatrice and power political 
considerations, France‘s European policies have build on both an earnest desire to unite the 
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European continent after the ravages of two world wars, and the assumption that only a united 
Europe under French leadership could assert itself as a power of the first order, capable of 
balancing first the two superpowers and later what former Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine 
famously termed the American hyperpower.  
The idea of European unity and integration has been a recurrent theme for 
several centuries, chiefly among French intellectuals and political leaders (Gladwyn 1969:11-
12). Already in 1620, the Duc de Sully launched the idea, or ―Grand Design‖ as he termed it, 
that Europe should form a political union of states (Pagden, in Pagden (ed.) 2002:14 and 54). 
In 1867, Victor Hugo predicted that in the twentieth century, an ―extraordinary‖ nation would 
see the light of day: ―The name or this extraordinary nation will be Europe, and its capital will 
be Paris‖ (New York Times 1867). As such, the notion of European unity and integration has 
gathered in momentum as America rose to become a world power, and though undoubtedly 
also influenced by the rapid rise of America, it was rarely presented as a necessity borne out 
of rivalry with the United States, but rather as the fulfilment of Europe‘s cultural and political 
destiny (Pagden, in Pagden (ed.) 2002). Pan European projects proliferated in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, but rarely acquired neither public nor political attention of much 
importance. In the interwar years, Austrian Count Coudenhove-Kalergi made some headway 
with his Pan European Movement, and from 1925, French Prime Minister Edouard Herriot 
had openly spoken about the need to create a ―United States of Europe‖ (Dinan 2004:3, 
Duroselle 1965:275). The first serious political attempt at promoting European integration by 
peaceful means occurred in September 1929 when French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand 
launched his project for European Union (d‘Appollonia, in Pagden (ed.) 2002:173-186, 
Duroselle 1965:274-280, and Rocard, in Vercors 1993:xvi). This project, intended to 
coordinate economic policies and promote political union (Dinan 2004:3), failed in the end, 
due both to especially British opposition and not least bad timing, with the Wall Street crash 
of October 1929 effectively sealing its fate (Duroselle 1965:275-280). It would take another 
world war for the project of European unity to gain the momentum needed to set up durable 
institutions of integration. Once again, the impulse came primarily from France. The 1950 
Schuman Plan, elaborated essentially by Jean Monnet, would subsequently prove the starting 
point of the European integration process, though this outcome at the onset looked highly 
uncertain (Grosser 1989:83-85). Under the Fourth Republic, the integration process would 
accelerate in spite of serious setbacks, such as the French National Assembly‘s refusal to 
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ratify the European Defence Community in 1954 (ibid:87-89, 98-99 and 106-117, and 
Mahoney 1996:130). While the European policies pursued under the Fourth Republic were 
motivated both by a wish for reconciliation with Germany (and an accompanying fear of 
future German rearmament and reassertion) and by a desire to augment France‘s role in 
Europe as well as on the international stage (Bjøl 1966), it was only with the advent of de 
Gaulle as leader of the Fifth Republic that France‘s European designs came to be regarded as 
seriously aimed at presenting Europe as a world power in the making and possibly even a 
counter power to the two superpowers (Giauque 2002). If the alliance policies of the Fifth 
Republic can be largely seen as a continuation of the policies carried out under the Fourth 
Republic, albeit with an added purposefulness, which reached its almost logical conclusion 
with the French withdrawal from NATO‘s integrated structures in 1966, French policies 
toward European cooperation underwent a fundamental shift after de Gaulle‘s return to power 
in 1958. On four important dimensions of French policies toward European cooperation, de 
Gaulle came to represent either a radicalization of objectives, which had only been timidly 
adhered to by the successive leaders of the Fourth Republic, or a volte face vis-à-vis the 
positions held by his predecessors. These dimensions were 1) France‘s role as the leader of 
continental Europe; 2) the construction of European cooperation as a potential counter power 
to American hegemony over the West; 3) the contentious issue of Britain‘s role in European 
integration, and 4) the nature of the European project as such. Developments within these four 
dimensions were interlinked, and French repositioning on these issues came to have an 
important impact on both the development of the European integration process and on the 
Franco-American relationship. 
First, regarding the dimension of France‘s role in Europe, it is important to 
realize that when Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet launched their project for closer 
European cooperation, France was not particularly well placed to present itself as leader of 
Europe. In reality, the first phase of European cooperation took place under British leadership 
and with strong backing and sponsorship from Washington, resulting in the establishment of 
the OEEC, later transformed into the OECD, whose main task was to coordinate economic 
recovery plans for Europe and not least the implementation of the Marshall Plan (Gladwyn 
1969:14-15, Giauque 2002:11-46). The 1950 Schuman Plan essentially attempted to carry the 
cooperation further, by merging the supervision of the coal and steel production of the six 
participating nations under one supranational authority and thus removing the use of these 
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strategic resources from national control (Gladwyn 1969:15-16). Though Paris may have 
cultivated hopes that this deepening of European cooperation could with time result in an 
enhanced position for France in Europe, the leaders of the Fourth Republic consistently 
attempted to persuade Britain to join the new structures in order to balance what they 
perceived as the threat of potential German supremacy in continental Europe (Giauque 
2002:11-46). As such, though notions of French leadership of Europe were far from absent 
from the minds of the leaders of the Fourth Republic, any aspiration towards French pre-
eminence was subdued by the perceived need for broad and viable European structures 
capable of leading Europe towards recovery. It should come as no surprise that de Gaulle‘s 
vision of France‘s role in Europe lacked any such notion of national restraint. Although de 
Gaulle had originally been opposed to Monnet‘s supranational vision of Europe, he was in 
favour of building a ―united‖ European community (Mahoney 1996:131), believing that in a 
Europe of Nations, France could impose itself as its natural leader. David Chuter has 
described the unity of Europe as  
a consistent objective of de Gaulle‘s thinking since the 1940s, and in this he was 
typical of his time. Typical also was the assumption that there was no conflict 
between European unity and French national interest, since France was, and had 
been for hundreds of years, the natural leader of Europe. European interests 
were, by definition, French interests, and as Europe became stronger and more 
united, France would benefit accordingly. (1996:316) 
 
From 1942 onwards, the European theme had been evoked in the General‘s public speeches, 
although it long remained unclear as to which form closer European cooperation should take 
(Jouve 1967:5-8). It was however clear that France should play a leading role: In July 1948, 
the national committee of the Gaullist RPF (Rassemblement du Peuple Français) declared that 
―Dans l‘Europe organisée, la première place doit revenir à la France grâce à sa position 
géographique, sa tradition historique, son idéal, ses amitiés‖. As such France had ―un droit au 
leadership‖ in Europe (ibid:92). There was real truth in Harold Macmillan‘s 1961 remark after 
his conference with de Gaulle: ―He talks of Europe and means France‖ (quoted by Mahoney 
1996:132). Kissinger has remarked that what de Gaulle had in mind was ―a Europe organized 
along the lines of Bismarck‘s Germany – that is, unified on the basis of states, one of which 
(France) would play the dominant role, with the same function that Prussia had had inside 
imperial Germany‖ (1994:606). In post-war Europe, France could find but one serious 
contender for the role as primus inter pares. With divided Germany suffering from less than 
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full sovereignty and haunted by the guilt complex as a result of the Nazi-era, the only possible 
other short-term contender for the role was the United Kingdom. Though it was Churchill, 
who in his famous 1946 Zurich speech had called for the establishment of a United States of 
Europe (Mahoney 1996:130), Britain had refused the invitation to participate in the Monnet-
Schuman project on the grounds of its supranational structure, most likely to the great relief of 
not least Gaullist circles in Paris (Grosser 1989:84). As will be seen below, de Gaulle was as 
opposed to the supranational dimension of the European project as the British, yet rather than 
finding common cause across the Channel, he persistently opposed Britain‘s entry into the 
European structures, thereby ensuring that France retained the role as primary spokesman for 
Europe. As Giauque notes, ―Unlike previous French leaders, who had envisioned France 
exerting its influence as part of some larger European concert, de Gaulle‘s France would 
maintain its identity and represent the rest of Europe‖ (2002:35). 
Second, there has been a tendency on both sides of the Atlantic to forget that the 
project of European cooperation was from the onset designed within the framework of 
broader transatlantic cooperation, and that as such, it had received the enthusiastic support of 
especially the Eisenhower administration (Giauque 2002). It was American demands for the 
rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany, which had led to the ill-fated attempt at 
establishing a European Defence Community (Grosser 1989). The Eisenhower administration 
recognized that ―Western Europe had the economic and human resources to become a global 
superpower alongside the United States and the Soviet Union‖, and though the American 
president ―believed that a unified Europe would inevitably act with a high degree of 
independence from the United States [he] welcomed this prospect‖, convinced that Europe 
―would remain a close American ally, if for no other reason than the weight of common 
interests‖ (Giauque 2002:14). This vision was broadly shared by the leaders of the Fourth 
Republic who, while keen to advance European cooperation also in order to escape what was 
perceived as American tutelage over Western Europe, remained convinced that maintaining 
the Atlantic partnership was a necessary sine qua non (or, as Lord Gladwyn put it, ―a slightly 
disagreeable necessity‖ 1969:19) for any move toward the rearmament of Germany. As such, 
the early 1950s saw strong American support for the European integration process 
accompanied by a consistent American preference for French policies vis-à-vis the 
institutional set up of European unity over British manoeuvrings in favour of looser structures 
(Giauque 2002). The 1956 Suez crisis, compounded by the resurgent Soviet threat against 
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Western Europe caused by the brutal repression of the uprisings in Budapest the same year, 
led to a reappraisal in Paris of the need for a more autonomous organization of European 
cooperation. Though France had been the main proponent of European integration under 
Schuman, successive leaders of the Fourth Republic had proved reticent as to the creation of 
especially a Common Market. Suez meant, in the eyes of then Prime Minister Guy Mollet and 
most French leaders, that in ―order to protect their interests on the continent and beyond, the 
Europeans needed to organize‖ (ibid:26). Suez and Hungary thus provided the impetus needed 
to overcome the sense of immobilisme in the European integration process provoked by the 
French National Assembly‘s rejection of the European Defence Community in 1954, and 
eventually paved the way for the Rome Treaty (Giauque 2002, Gladwyn 1969). The American 
State Department described the newfound European unity as ―not directed toward the creation 
of a neutral third force or really a third force at all, but rather directed toward increasing 
Europe‘s strength and voice within the Atlantic Alliance [and] European influence in the 
United Nations and in other areas of the world where the Europeans feel they must be heard 
with some authority‖ (quoted by Giauque 2002:32). The author of this somewhat 
condescending assessment could not have foreseen either the advent of de Gaulle or the 
impact he would have on the European integration process. Though the seeds of future French 
designs for European integration as a vehicle for greater autonomy vis-à-vis the United States 
had been sown in the minds of French political elites largely as a result of the impact of the 
Suez crisis, these designs were present to General de Gaulle from the onset. Deploring the fact 
that Europe was subordinated to the United States both ―economically‖ and in terms of 
―defence matters‖ (Jouve 1967:588-596), de Gaulle felt that in order to put an end to this 
subordination, it was necessary for Europe to acquire a common project (ibid:602): 
In July 1958 he informed his subordinates of his intention to build up Europe as 
the foundation for France‘s global power to replace its crumbling empire: ―The 
primary objective of French policy is the construction of a solid Franco-African 
political and economic bloc. This bloc must be solidly linked to a Western 
Europe where France plays a major, if not preponderant, role‖. [..] De Gaulle 
hoped to use this European power base not only to maintain French influence in 
Africa, but also to force the United States and Britain to reform the Atlantic 
alliance and establish a tripartite leadership arrangement (Giauque 2002:34) 
 
As we saw above, Washington rejected any notion of such a triumvirate, and de Gaulle in turn 
set out to promote European integration as an alternative to American hegemony. From the 
onset, de Gaulle had ―planned to use European unity to reduce American predominance‖, but 
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faced with the American refusal to grant France a special status within the transatlantic 
alliance, de Gaulle elevated the goal of reducing American influence ―from a long-term goal 
to an immediate priority‖ (ibid:44-45). Over the coming years, it would become clear that de 
Gaulle saw himself, and by extension France, as the proponent of ―a united, politically 
vigorous Europe [which] would be an ally of, but not subservient to or dependent on, the 
United States‖ (Mahoney 1996:137). 
Third and intrinsically related to the two former dimensions, de Gaulle went to 
great lengths to keep Britain out of the European cooperation process. This marked a 
complete reversal of the policies pursued by the Fourth Republic. The leaders of the Fourth 
Republic had consistently attempted to engage a reluctant United Kingdom in the European 
integration process, pursuing an ‗open door‘ policy vis-à-vis Britain even in the face of the 
consistent British attempts at obstructing the whole process (Giauque 2002, Bange 2000). In 
the close of Franco-British collaboration during the Suez crisis and under the impression of 
the slow progress in the negotiations of the Six, French Prime Minister Guy Mollet even 
made a breathtaking offer to the British. Mollet called for the formation of a 
Franco-British union of the sort proposed in 1940 by Winston Churchill to 
prevent France from signing an armistice with Nazi Germany. [..] The 1956 
Mollet proposal called for common citizenship, economic union, French 
admission to the British Commonwealth, and close Franco-British cooperation 
all over the world. (Giauque 2002. p. 29) 
 
This attempt at reviving the Entente Cordiale met with little interest in London, but it shows 
how desperate the leaders of the Fourth Republic were for entering in a political constellation, 
which would both offer them securities against future German rearmament and a proper 
platform for maintaining a world role. It also shows that the Fourth Republic continued to 
regard Britain as an essential partner for the European project. De Gaulle, who incidentally 
had supported Churchill‘s 1940 proposal as the best means of securing France from its 
ignominious defeat in 1940 (ibid.), had a very different conception of Britain‘s place in 
Europe. De Gaulle had never forgotten Churchill‘s words, spoken in 1944: ―Sachez, général 
de Gaulle, que chaque fois qu‘il nous faudra choisir entre l‘Europe et le grand large, nous 
serons toujours pour le grand large‖ (quoted by Jouve 1967:186). As such he never 
considered the English properly European, and he felt confirmed in this by Churchill‘s 
statement (Schlesinger 1966:192). In his memoirs, de Gaulle described how Europe could 
only regain its balance and influence through closer cooperation between ―Slaves, Germains, 
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Gaulois et Latins‖ (Schlesinger 1966:191). Though de Gaulle thus had a wider geopolitical 
conception of Europe than the one confined to the Six, it seemed to exclude the British. The 
exact scope of another of de Gaulle‘s famous phrases, in which he called for a ‗Europe from 
the Atlantic to the Ural‘ has often been questioned, especially as the General himself 
remained rather vague on whether this incorporated Britain, situated in the Atlantic, or the 
Soviet Union, in which the Ural Mountains were. In essence, de Gaulle sought to remind his 
audience that Europe 1) was divided as a result of the Yalta agreement between the great 
powers – and as such without neither the participation nor the approbation of France, and 2) 
would not, and could not, remain indefinitely divided (Jouve 1967:146-171, Melandri, in 
Barnavi and Friedländer (eds) 1985:90). What is clear, however, is that de Gaulle consistently 
sought to exclude Britain from the European integration process. On two accounts did de 
Gaulle veto British membership of the European Community. De Gaulle‘s first no to Britain 
came in January 1963 shortly after the Anglo-American accord at Nassau, which paved the 
way for British-American nuclear cooperation, while simultaneously aiming ―at preventing 
any separate Franco-British nuclear arrangement‖ (Giauque 2002:115, see also Grosser 
1989:190). Though a similar arrangement was offered to France, de Gaulle rejected it and 
instead used the Nassau agreement as a pretext for both a frontal assault on the Kennedy 
administration‘s idea of an Atlantic Community (Giauque 2002:117, see also below) and 
Britain‘s entry into the European Community (Bange 2000, Prittie 1972:293-297). The logic 
behind de Gaulle‘s veto against British entry into the European Community, repeated in 1967, 
in essence sought to consolidate both the primacy of France within the Community by 
preventing a potential rival for European leadership into the organization and to reduce the 
influence of the United States in Europe; a motive which he openly acquiesced to with his 
famous denouncing of Britain as an American ―Trojan horse‖ in Europe (Jouve 1967:185-
188, Gozard 1976:183). In a press conference in January 1963, in which de Gaulle both 
rejected nuclear cooperation and British entry into the EEC, he also delineated how he 
foresaw Europe‘s future: 
it would be less dominated by the Americans; made more powerful by economic 
and political cohesion; it would thus become more independent and on a more 
equal footing with the two superpowers; it would also have to be a smaller 
Europe, and a Europe led by France as the guardian of its political spirit, in order 
to prevent any watering down of that goal; last but not least it would be a 
confederal Europe, because the nations – at least for the time being – were the 
prime source of allegiance, and a strong allegiance of the people was needed to 
build this powerful Europe. (Bange 2000:234) 
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De Gaulle‘s consistently intergovernmental approach to European integration constitutes the 
fourth major dimension of France‘s repositioning vis-à-vis European cooperation. Though the 
leaders of the Fourth Republic were either divided or ambivalent regarding the desirability of 
the elements of supranationality inherent in the structures of both the ECSC and to a lesser 
extent the EEC, they had largely accepted it as the only possible way forward (Bjøl 1966, 
Giauque 2002). De Gaulle was however staunchly opposed to any notion of supranationality, 
which to his mind contravened the primacy which he attributed to the nation state. For him, 
the Common Market was nothing but the concrete basis for another European project; one 
which he had been the proponent of since the early 1950s: ―celle d‘une ‗Union des Etats 
européens‘ affirmant peu à peu son identité face aux Américains‖ (Melandri, in Barnavi and 
Friedländer (eds) 1985:96). As such, he consistently rejected any further move toward 
supranationality, most famously through the use of the ―Empty Chair‖ tactics (Calvocoressi 
1991:209), though this did not prevent him from justifying his obstruction of British entry 
into the European structures with the argument that Britain was not ready to accept the 
supranational elements of the European Community (Bange 2000, Giauque 2002). As 
opposed to the three other dimensions, de Gaulle‘s emphasis on intergovernmentalism did not 
per se carry any anti-American connotations, yet often became merged into a discourse, 
which sought to link the process of European unity with notions of independence from the 
United States. De Gaulle frequently stressed that 
Une Europe soumise aux règles de la supranationalité ne serait pas seulement 
une menace intolérable pour l‘indépendance du peuple français. Elle serait une 
Europe sans intérêt, parce qu‘y triompherait le point de vue de partenaires pour 
lesquels la protection des Etats-Unis restera encore longtemps la considération 
prioritaire. A une telle « Europe atlantique », le Général a toujours témoigné une 
opposition systématique (Melandri, in Barnavi and Friedländer (eds) 1985:89) 
 
The French repositioning on these four dimensions would come to fundamentally influence 
the European integration process over the coming decades and simultaneously underline a 
basic ambiguity inherent in the Gaullist design for Europe; an ambiguity, which would 
prevent Europe from seriously acquiring the potential to balance the notion of American 
hegemony. This can best be illustrated by comparing the two ―Grand Designs‖ for Europe set 
forth by respectively the United States and France (Keylor 1992:347-348); these rival 
versions ―reflected their wider struggle over the future shape of Western Europe and its 
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relations with the United States‖ (Giauque 2002:99), and both would in the end fail to 
materialize in the forms originally intended. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, growing fears 
of an independent European ―Third Force‖ prompted Washington to gradually develop the 
idea of an ―Atlantic Community‖, which could contain and channel European unity, while 
enabling the United States to intervene more effectively in European affairs (ibid:98). After 
prolonged negotiations characterized by French opposition throughout, President Kennedy 
presented these thoughts in a more consolidated form, stipulating that they should include  
the establishment of a political and economic partnership between Western 
Europe and the United States, a Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF), the creation 
of a wider Europe via expansion of the Common Market to include Britain, 
American trade liberalization legislation, and a round of GATT tariff reductions 
to check protectionism and isolationism on both sides of the Atlantic. (ibid:113-
114) 
 
The Kennedy administration‘s proposals met with fierce French opposition on every account. 
Rightly assessing that the proposed Atlantic Community failed to offer an equal partnership to 
the Europeans (ibid:124), de Gaulle acted as the main spoiler of the proposals, which he 
viewed as means to ―camouflage‖ the American hegemony (Peyrefitte 1994:282). The only 
major part of Kennedy‘s design to be enacted would be within what came to be known as the 
‗Kennedy Round‘ of the GATT negotiations. De Gaulle‘s own ‗Grand Design‘, the Fouchet 
Plan, did not fare much better. The 1961-62 Fouchet Plan, named after its chief French 
negotiator, has been characterized as ―the ultimate expression of de Gaulle‘s vision‖ (Giauque 
2002:126). The plan consisted in establishing on the basis of the EEC a political union 
between the participating Western European nations, which according to its first draft should, 
on an intergovernmental basis, formulate common foreign, defence, economic, and cultural 
policies (Melandri, in Barnavi and Friedländer (eds) 1985:96, Grosser 1989:189). At first, de 
Gaulle remained vague as to the possible participation of Britain as well as to whether this 
new arrangement could co-exist with the existing European and transatlantic structures, but as 
the negotiations proceeded and a compromise seemed within reach, his positions hardened, 
and he torpedoed his own design rather than risk a watered down version, more palatable to 
his European partners (Giauque 2002, Calvocoressi 1991). Both ‗Grand Designs‘ were 
characteristic of how France and America each sought to consolidate their predominance in 
Europe in the early 1960s, and both were, as a result, flawed: 
de Gaulle‘s political union had shifted from an innovative means to provide the 
Six with greater cohesion in foreign policy and other areas into a crude attempt 
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at French hegemony, and de Gaulle‘s smaller partners rejected it as a result. 
Similarly, the Atlantic Community failed in large part because American leaders 
ultimately interpreted it as a means to isolate France and cement American 
predominance in Europe rather than to make Europe a more equal partner of the 
United States. (Giauque 2002:226) 
 
There is no doubt that the French repositioning on Europe would come to have an important 
impact on the development of the European integration process over the following decades, 
yet ironically, it also had as an unintended consequence that de Gaulle‘s aims at transforming 
Europe into a potential ‗Third Force‘ to balance the United States and the Soviet Union was 
essentially bound to remain unfulfilled. There are two main preconditions for understanding 
the logic driving de Gaulle‘s actions with regard to Europe: First, it is important to remember 
that at the time, the European integration process was in its infancy and that as a consequence, 
there was no fixed blueprint for how to proceed. A number of organizations competed for the 
role as institutional frameworks for European cooperation. Chief among them were the 
Council of Europe, the OEEC, the WEU, the EEC and the rival EFTA; all of these 
organizations had, at one point or another, an ambition to provide Europe with the unity that 
the leaders of the European nations called for in public (Giauque 2002). The European 
integration process in the late 1950s and early 1960s was characterized by intense 
manoeuvrings among the leading nations, chief among them France, Britain, Germany, and 
the United States, the latter actively leaning on the various European powers in order to 
achieve the kind of European cooperation favoured in Washington. There was disagreement 
over the geographical, political, economic, and institutional scope of European cooperation, 
each of the four countries favouring their own particular ‗blend‘, and each fearing above 
anything else to be left isolated from the rest. As such, the road toward European integration 
came to resemble a traditional balance of power game for domination over Europe. It is in this 
light that the events occurring in the first years of de Gaulle‘s presidency should be viewed. 
De Gaulle‘s approach to European unity was essentially geopolitical, and as such it became a 
consistent goal of his policies to exclude Britain from participating in the European 
cooperation structure, which Paris felt it could dominate. Second, de Gaulle‘s European 
policies can be viewed also as to a large extent a fall back position given his earlier failure to 
obtain the coveted status as part of a tripartite leadership within the Atlantic Alliance. There is 
ample evidence to suggest that de Gaulle‘s early European policies were in fact designed 
primarily to force the United States and Britain into granting France a co-leadership role in 
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the Atlantic structures (ibid.). As such an invitation proved less than forthcoming, de Gaulle 
instead turned to refashion the EEC as an instrument for achieving his aims of presenting 
France as a power of the first order: could France not be accepted as an equal partner, it would 
have to carve out a role for itself as spokesman for Europe. As Nicolas Sauger notes, France‘s 
support for European cooperation has throughout ―derived from a strong sense of a lack of an 
alternative‖ (in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008:62). It is on the basis of these conditions 
that we should assess the young Fifth Republic‘s subsequent European policies. With regard 
to France‘s relations with the United States and the French aspirations to minimize American 
influence in Europe and promote Europe as a potential balancing power, the Gaullist policies 
nevertheless contained some important ambiguities, which would handicap French designs for 
decades. First, by excluding Britain, France limited the geographical scope of the Europe it 
intended to create as a counterforce to America, thus seriously weakening its potential to 
acquire any sort of power or influence necessary toward achieving those aims. Though it is 
true that Britain was closer to America than to continental Europe on a number of issues, the 
French veto to British accession simultaneously meant a halt to all further expansion of the 
EEC (Giauque 2002), which could theoretically have rendered it an important balancing 
power. Second, de Gaulle‘s rejection of supranationalism had the effect of limiting the 
formulation of common policies to the lowest common denominator, as any participating 
nation – usually France – would be able to veto the process towards new and more fruitful 
areas of cooperation. Third, though de Gaulle‘s heavy handed tactics of cajoling both partners 
and adversaries initially proved a success in the first years of his presidency, it eventually 
backfired, leaving France relatively isolated even among its European partners. For the 
European Community, this meant that institutional progress remained extremely limited from 
1963 until the General‘s resignation in 1969. For de Gaulle, it meant that he was forced to 
find other outlets for his attempts at giving France a predominant international role: 
With his efforts to transform the Atlantic Alliance frustrated by the United States 
and his plans for reorganizing Western Europe blocked by Britain and the Five, 
and with no realistic prospect for change in either area, de Gaulle gradually 
turned to a unilateral foreign policy designed more to irritate the United States 
and demonstrate French freedom of action in the world than to lead any 
constructive developments in European or Atlantic relations. Consciously or 
unconsciously, de Gaulle seems to have realized that there was no longer any 
prospect for new arrangements in the Western camp as long as he remained in 
power. As a result, he turned toward the developing world and the Soviet bloc in 
the hope that he could facilitate movement in both and that changes outside of 
Western Europe would eventually lead to movement there as well. By promoting 
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improved relations with the East, de Gaulle hoped to break up the bipolar world 
and reduce American influence in Europe indirectly. (ibid:231-232) 
 
Though de Gaulle‘s European policies far from achieved their aim, his legacy has, as in all 
other dimensions of French foreign policy, left its mark on his successors. Despite the 
setbacks his policy caused, European integration continues to be viewed ―as the only available 
means of reaching France‘s primary foreign policy objective, i.e. grandeur on the 
international scene‖ (Sauger, in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008:62). The means to 
achieve these aims would change under his successors, more eager to pursue concrete 
advances in the European project, which could bolster European unity internally and 
externally, than to pursue a particular ‗Grand Design‘ along the lines of de Gaulle, yet 
essentially the General‘s ―ambition to use Europe as a multiplier of French power and to 
develop a bloc that would match US power was shared by his successors‖ (Kassim, in Cole, 
Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008:260, see also Giauque 2002:233). For decades, France 
remained the politically most important power in the European Community and was, thanks 
to the close relationship with Germany established under de Gaulle, able to ―shape the 
trajectory, scope and form of integration‖ (Kassim, in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 
2008:261). Georges Pompidou, under whose presidency Britain was finally welcomed as a 
new member of the EEC along with Denmark and Ireland, championed European political 
cooperation, while Valéry Giscard d‘Estaing took further steps toward greater foreign policy 
coordination and became a key factor in establishing first the Economic Monetary System and 
later the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (Kassim, in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 
2008). Though both presidents talked enthusiastically of Europe and the need for greater 
European unity, it was only under the presidency of François Mitterrand that France again 
started to seriously present Europe as a potential power in the making and claiming a 
―significant world role‖ for the continent (Meunier 2000). Mitterrand was, for sure, helped by 
circumstances. As noted above, he had proved a relatively loyal ally to the United States with 
regard to stressing France‘s position as firmly committed to the Atlantic alliance during the 
period of renewed superpower tension characterizing the 1980s, thereby assuaging possible 
American fears of France‘s allegiances. With the unexpected fall of the Berlin Wall, he seized 
– although after some hesitation (Kassim, in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008:262) – the 
opportunity offered by the possibility of German reunification to advance the notion of 
European cooperation to new dimensions. The prospect of German reunification had ever 
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since the end of the Second World War featured amongst the worst nightmares of French 
political leaders, though they were loath to admit it. Mitterrand was no exception, yet wisely 
realizing that the tides could hardly be turned, he instead set out to contain German 
reunification within the European structures (ibid.). For decades, French politicians had been 
fond of recalling former Chancellor Willy Brandt‘s characteristic of Federal Germany as ―an 
economic giant, but a political dwarf‖ (Trouille, in Ingham and Ingham (eds) 2002:59, James 
(ed.) 1998:x), a characteristic, which has since been bestowed on the EU (Allen 1992, Edinger 
and Nacos 1998). With German reunification looming over the horizon, it was only a matter 
of time, before the economic giant would turn into a political ditto. Mitterrand, refraining 
from the cajoling methods employed by de Gaulle a quarter of a century before, convinced the 
Kohl government that it was necessary to renegotiate the European structures in order to 
accommodate an enlarged Germany (Bell 2005:138-142). The price paid by Germany was 
chiefly to give up the Deutschmark in favour of the Euro, but the designs proposed by 
Mitterrand and largely carried out by his compatriot, President of the European Commission 
Jacques Delors, was for Europe to advance from a Common Market with limited cooperation 
in other spheres, such as foreign policy, into a fully fledged European Union with the 
potential to act as an unavoidable world power, including in the domains of foreign and 
security policy. Though historically a main opponent of de Gaulle, Mitterrand had taken up 
―virtually the entire body of Gaullist theory and practice‖ (Giauque 2002:233), and as such it 
is no surprise that his late 1980s designs for Europe bear a substantial resemblance to de 
Gaulle‘s ill-fated Fouchet Plans. With admittedly more modesty than de Gaulle, Mitterrand 
nevertheless had as one of his ambitions to refashion Europe so that it under Franco-German 
leadership could present itself as a world power capable of achieving parity with the 
remaining American superpower. Though Mitterrand did not present the project for a 
European Union as opposed to the United States, it clearly was meant as an indication that 
Europe had come of age as a nascent world power for the first time since the end of the 
Second World War. Under Chirac, the security and defence dimension inscribed in the 
Maastricht Treaty establishing the European Union, but never properly realized, received a 
further boost with the bilateral Saint-Malo agreement with Britain, which represented ―a 
major milestone in the development of the EU‘s military capacity‖ (Kassim, in Cole, Le Galès 
and Levy (eds) 2008:269). Similarly and characteristically, Sarkozy made advancement on the 
EU‘s security and defence policies one of the major themes of France‘s presidency of the EU 
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in 2008, the fulfilment of which he made conditional upon his eventual move toward full 
French reintegration into NATO‘s military structures in 2009. 
With respect to the four dimensions, on which de Gaulle altered France‘s 
European policies half a century ago, they remain fundamentally in place as underlying 
premises for French actions, although they have lost much of their lustre over the years. In 
reverse order, there is no doubting that even after the departure of de Gaulle, France has 
consistently and successfully favoured a ―strong Community with weak institutions‖ (Menon 
1996). This was evident in Pompidou‘s preference for summitry, in Giscard d‘Estaing‘s 
support for the institutionalization of the European Council, in Mitterrand‘s commitment to 
preserving intergovernmental decision-making in the second and third pillars of the 
Maastricht Treaty (foreign policy and home affairs), and in Chirac‘s negotiation of the Nice 
Treaty, which strengthened the role of the Council largely at the expense of the Commission 
(Kassim, in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008:261). Yet during the early 1990s, ―the 
constraints imposed by the EU became increasingly visible, and it became ever more apparent 
that the Union was not an intergovernmental system‖ in spite of French reservations 
(ibid:265). Though France accepted Britain‘s accession to the EEC in 1973, it continues to 
take ―advantage of British hesitations, [as for example] its refusal to participate in the 
common European currency, to ensure that all real initiative in the community remains in the 
hands of the Franco-German tandem‖ (Giauque 2002:233). With regard to France‘s ambitions 
to turn Europe into a potential counter power to the United States, there is no doubt that 
―French efforts to organize Europe remain at least implicitly aimed at reducing U.S. influence 
over the long term, although they have generally been much less stridently anti-American 
than under de Gaulle‖ (ibid.). In spite of the advances made under Mitterrand toward turning 
Europe into a political force of the first order, ―France‘s long-standing policy of building up 
Europe as a counterbalance to American power had no more success under Mitterrand than 
under previous presidents‖ (Bell 2005:147). His successor Jacques Chirac would in his 
hapless attempt at ensuring a ―yes‖ during the French referendum on the project for a 
European Constitution, characteristically insist as one of his main arguments that the 
Constitution would enable ―France, through Europe, to counterbalance American power and 
stand up more forcefully to the US when needed‖ (Meunier, in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 
2008:248). Similarly, French leaders have ―shown considerable ingenuity in developing 
mechanisms that are designed to combat the perceived excesses of Anglo-Saxon liberalism, 
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which Brussels is spreading‖ (Kassim, in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008:273), while 
simultaneously attempting to present the EU as a bulwark against the forces of globalization 
(ibid:265-266). The anti-globalization discourse may have ―renewed the old rhetoric of anti-
capitalism‖ (Sauger, in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008:63), yet the primary target of 
attacks remains the same: the United States. Finally, as regards the consistent French attempts 
at presenting France as the primary spokesman for Europe, these have prevailed throughout, 
though with diminishing success over the last few decades. French influence on the European 
integration process has historically been paramount from its early beginnings over de Gaulle‘s 
towering posture to Mitterrand‘s and Delors‘ Maastricht edifice. As such, France has 
undoubtedly bolstered and fashioned ‗Europe‘ more than any other power, and Europe has 
presented France with the most potent outlet for its zeal towards achieving international 
grandeur. ―Until the early 1990s, rhetoric that presented ‗Europe‘ as a vehicle for French 
ambitions and the interests of the two as the same seemed plausible‖ (Kassim, in Cole, Le 
Galès and Levy (eds) 2008:265). Yet France‘s predominance within Europe culminated at the 
exact time when its construction efforts reached their apogee. The signing of the Maastricht 
Treaty, intended in great parts to contain a reunified Germany and thus to buttress France‘s 
role within the EU, coincided with the reunification of Europe as the Union began slowly to 
enlarge to the north and east. After almost half a century, history seemed to have vindicated 
de Gaulle when he called for a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals: the enlargement process 
has entailed that the European Union now spans virtually the whole continent, from the 
Atlantic including Britain and Ireland and well into the borders of the former Soviet Union 
(with the Baltic states). Ironically it has been France, which among the western European 
nations has been the most hesitant to embrace this enlargement, rightly fearing that it would 
lead to loss of influence (Trouille, in Ingham and Ingham (eds) 2002:54-55 and 59-63). A 
more assertive Germany and the shift in the political and geographical centre of gravity away 
from Paris occurring in the 1990s has undermined ―France‘s privileged status and its 
influence‖ over Europe (Kassim, in Cole, Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008:262). As a 
consequence, Europe has now finally acquired the size and influence rendering it capable of 
presenting itself as a rival superpower to the American hegemon in all aspects save the 
military one, yet this superpower status so dearly coveted by France throughout half a century 
may not necessarily lead to increased independence from the United States, as the expanded 
Europe has become almost entirely dominated by ‗Atlanticist‘ nations.  
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6.1.5 Conclusion 
There is little doubt that the French emphasis on independence in foreign policy and security 
matters has been a source of frustration in Washington. Yet the nation that once shunned 
‗entangling alliances‘ should be better placed than most to appreciate the need for national 
independence and autonomy in these matters. It is a political imperative that the United States 
itself has maintained throughout its history. When in 1918 French Maréchal Ferdinand Foch 
was named supreme commander of the Allied forces – ―pour ainsi dire le premier SACEUR‖ 
–  U.S. General Pershing insisted that he would only receive advice, not orders, from the 
French general (Cogan, in Melandri and Ricard (eds) 2003:26). Following the terrorist attacks 
of 9-11, America‘s NATO allies invoked the Treaty‘s article 5, which stipulates that an attack 
on one member state is an attack against the Alliance. The irony that this article, known also 
as the Musketeer oath (one for all and all for one), originally intended to reassure the 
European allies, should first be invoked after an attack on the American homeland, did not go 
amiss among Europeans (Gordon and Shapiro 2004). Yet when it came to retaliation against 
the Taliban, the United States preferred initially to act independently of NATO (Clark 
2005:232), declining French offers as well as those of other NATO allies, to deploy troops in 
Afghanistan. Only a British contingent was at first accepted by Washington (Cogan, in 
Melandri and Ricard (eds) 2003:31), even though France had enthusiastically backed the U.S. 
led operation (Meunier, in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007:132). America‘s propensity 
toward unilateralism and independence has, as was shown in chapter 3, been an important part 
of America‘s foreign policy tradition. The continued American opposition to becoming 
subjected to decisions made by such multilateral bodies as the International Criminal Court is 
as much an example of a zealous commitment to retain a high degree of independence and 
freedom of action in foreign affairs as any French preference toward conducting military 
operations primarily under national control and command. In this respect, the quest for 
foreign policy independence is far from a uniquely French aspiration. The real difference is 
that the United States has never had to submit its independence to any institution it could not 
dominate, even if it has frequently accommodated the views of its allies to ensure alliance 
cohesion (Gordon and Shapiro 2004). This being said, there is no doubt that among its 
European allies, France continues to be the nation which most strongly resists ―the US-
centered imperial order‖ (Wæver, in Le Gloannec and Smolar (eds) 2003:159), a position 
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typically attributed to the Gaullist heritage. As a result, this heritage has largely become 
associated with political anti-Americanism, given that both de Gaulle and his successors have 
on several occasions taken the role as the outspoken critic of the United States in matters of 
foreign policy. The label ―Gaullist‖ in particular has come to epitomize French (and by 
extension European) rejection of American power (Ash 2004:64-68), yet there has no doubt 
been a tendency to oversimplify what ―Gaullist‖ or ―post-Gaullist‖ foreign and security policy 
is all about:  
In particular, it leads to a cartoon-like creation, ‗Vulgar Gaullism‘, which is no 
more than a policy of gratuitously insulting NATO and the United States, of 
being different from these parties for the sake of it, and pursuing a narrow-
minded and warped policy of extreme nationalism. By this interpretation, of 
course, friendly references to the United States, good-tempered behaviour at 
NATO summits, or support for integration in Europe can be labelled 
‗Atlanticist‘, ‗post-Gaullist‘ or ‗European‘ respectively, when they usually 
represent either a small modification to rhetoric or a reaction to a completely 
changed situation. Similarly, there is an excessive tendency to see every detail of 
French defence policy as part of a specifically ‗Gaullist‘ design. (Chuter 
1996:328) 
 
As such, there is good reason to question the notion of whether de Gaulle‘s Fifth Republic can 
be characterized as inherently anti-American. There is no doubt that under de Gaulle, the Fifth 
Republic proved to be a uniquely outspoken critic of the United States and its policies 
compared with all America‘s other allies. On the basis of the character, the frequency, and the 
magnitude of de Gaulle‘s rejection of what he perceived as America‘s attempt at imposing 
hegemony, it is difficult to outright dismiss the impression of the Fifth Republic, not least in 
the most problematic years from 1963 to 1968, as an anti-American Republic. No other U.S. 
ally has so persistently or so outspokenly objected to American power, neither then nor since. 
If the actions of an ally can be described as anti-American, surely no one fits the bill better 
than de Gaulle? Yet there are good reasons to question whether the driving force of French 
foreign policy in those years was essentially anti-Americanism. Is the wish for independence 
a sign of anti-Americanism? Not necessarily, although France‘s quest for independence was 
in essence as much a rejection of dependence, in this respect dependence on what de Gaulle 
perceived as American domination. Under the first formative years of the Fifth Republic, 
independence acquired ―almost a mythical value‖; indeed there were times when it seemed 
―that the mere existence of American power [was] perceived as a constraint on French 
independence‖ (Grosser 1980:328-329). French wishes for increased independence were thus 
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bound to run counter to American interests in preserving the Western Alliance as a solid block 
under American leadership. To the Americans, France‘s posturing was weakening the 
Alliance. To France, American unwillingness to relinquish its leadership monopoly was 
making it impossible to retain the Alliance as a coherent unit. The opposition against 
American hegemony was by most accounts not motivated by anti-Americanism as such, but 
by a fervent desire for independence and freedom of action befitting a great nation. Had the 
roles been inversed, it is highly likely that the United States would have acted in a highly 
similar way, albeit probably with a less Gallic – or indeed Gaullian – rhetoric.  
The anti-American image of de Gaulle‘s Fifth Republic is not just confined to its 
foreign policy actions. De Gaulle himself has frequently been portrayed as harboring a 
disproportionate resentment toward the United States and its leaders, typically attributed to 
his wartime experiences with Roosevelt mentioned above. Yet upon Roosevelt‘s death, de 
Gaulle, who always preserved the signed photo he had received by the American president 
prominently on display in his private home, wrote to President Truman that France ―loved and 
admired‖ the late president (Béziat, in Mathé (ed.) 2000:81). De Gaulle respected President 
Truman for his efficiency (Frémy 1987:44), and though he at one point characterized him as 
―le marchand des bretelles‖, it was Truman, who by far was the most acerbic in his 
declarations regarding the other (Wall, in Paxton and Wahl (eds) 1994:118-119). Conversely, 
de Gaulle enjoyed close and cordial relations with President Eisenhower, whose visit to 
France shortly after de Gaulle‘s return to power ―was a meeting of long-lost friends‖ (Grosser 
1980:186). President Kennedy, while favoring relations with especially Britain‘s Harold 
Macmillan, found it much easier to establish good relations with de Gaulle than with 
Germany‘s Konrad Adenauer (Grosser 1980:192-199), and even, according to his biographer, 
considered him one of his ―heroes‖, independently of the fact that Kennedy frequently failed 
to understand the motives driving the French President (Schlesinger 1966:194). Even 
President Johnson, much more than any of his predecessors or his successor on the receiving 
end of opposition from de Gaulle, who once characterized him as a ―cowboy-radical‖ 
(Peyrefitte 1997:48), showed more understanding for de Gaulle‘s motives than his advisors 
and proved a rather deft manager of the difficult Franco-American relations (Schwartz, in 
Melandri and Ricard (eds) 2003:139-167). President Nixon, who arguably took office at a 
time when Franco-American relations had somewhat improved, professed that he had much 
sympathy toward de Gaulle (Ferro 1973:441). Charles Bohlen, well placed to judge in the 
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matter, as he served as U.S. ambassador to France during the most troublesome years in the 
mid-1960s, did not think that de Gaulle was ―anti-American at all‖ (quoted by Hess 1968:2). 
It nonetheless remains that de Gaulle‘s declarations, frequently strikingly ambiguous, have 
contributed to foster the impression of his ill-will toward the United States. In his War 
Memoirs, he described how ―The United States brings to great affairs elementary feelings and 
a complicated policy‖ (quoted by Grosser 1980:24). Compared with the virulent attacks on 
America expounded by the French intellectuals at the time, such a statement borders on the 
benign. David Chuter for one asserts that if anti-Americanism 
means a gut dislike of American politics, society, and culture, then de Gaulle 
can, with confidence, be pronounced not guilty. Like many men of progressive 
opinions at the time, he was, if anything, rather favourable: he saw in America 
desirable features of modernism, individual freedom, a working political system 
and an activist government. By contrast, Vichy tended to identify America with 
the worst aspects of progress, democracy, individualism and modern popular 
music. It is true, on the other hand, that de Gaulle sometimes perceived the 
Americans to be doing things that were wrong, or misguided, or things that 
threatened what he saw as French interests, and he spoke or acted accordingly. 
But presumably this is in any case a right – or even a duty – of any national 
leader in such a situation. (1996:207) 
 
The outline of Gaullist foreign policy given in this chapter may seem somewhat apologetic 
toward the General and his legacy. There is no doubt that de Gaulle‘s abrasive style must have 
led many of his contemporaries to wonder whether the confrontations he engaged in were not 
rooted in more than the pursuit of a wish for French independence. Kissinger, who like Chuter 
asserts that de Gaulle ―was not anti-American in principle‖ (1994:605), qualifies this by 
describing how, in the 1960s,  
at the height of his running controversy with the United States, it became 
fashionable to accuse the French President of suffering from delusions of 
grandeur. His problem was in fact the precise opposite: how to restore identity to 
a country suffused with a sense of failure and vulnerability. (ibid:602) 
 
To Stanley Hoffmann, Franco-American relations under the early years of the Fifth Republic 
present ―a fascinating example of the importance of perceptions in foreign policy‖ 
(1974:332). He adds that ―Perceptions are more than a part of political reality: they mold it, 
they are the springs and fuel of action. And, of course, they are themselves shaped by reality‖ 
(ibid.). Kissinger would seem to concur. He describes how the ―conflict between France and 
the United States became all the more bitter because the two sides, profoundly 
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misunderstanding each other‖, had fundamentally different positions in the international 
system and not least different styles of negotiation: ―The interaction of the American 
leadership‘s personal humility and historical arrogance, and de Gaulle‘s personal arrogance 
and historical humility, defined the psychological gulf between America and France‖ 
(1994:603). The essence of de Gaulle‘s rejection of American domination was in this respect 
not just a rejection of America‘s hard power nor even a rejection of its soft power as such, but 
rather an attempt at bolstering France‘s own power vis-à-vis America. De Gaulle‘s France 
knew that it could not achieve parity with the United States, but it was felt as essential that it 
could present itself as independent from American tutelage. As Alfred Grosser notes, 
Domination refers to having and doing but also to being which is so closely tied 
to seeming. The weak may desire what the strong considers good for him. 
Perhaps the strong takes nothing from the weak. But when the strong does not 
respect the dignity of the weak, what he has and what he does nourish 
resentment of his domination. From Roosevelt to Johnson, only a few American 
leaders have understood in their confrontation with de Gaulle that prestige can 
be as tangible, as respectable a goal of policy, as power or wealth. (1980:328) 
 
It may thus be that de Gaulle‘s Fifth Republic was not anti-American as such and that de 
Gaulle himself was not manifestly motivated by anti-Americanism in his conduct of foreign 
policy. According to Serge Bernstein, de Gaulle himself denied any allegation of anti-
Americanism, claiming that ―his only objective was to defend the national interest by 
stopping France from resembling a mere American colony‖ (1993:167). This does not mean 
that de Gaulle by his actions and statements did not promote anti-Americanism in France. On 
the contrary, his legacy carries a heavy anti-American imprint. First of all, his fervent 
assertion of France‘s independence was primarily directed against the United States. Even if 
the motivations driving these policies may not have been anti-American, that is how they 
frequently appeared, not least as seen from Washington (Hess 1968:1-2). That is also how 
they appeared to the political circles most supportive of de Gaulle‘s actions. The fact that 
most serious studies of de Gaulle‘s foreign policy raise the question of whether it was 
motivated by anti-Americanism or not (most of those referred to in the present study conclude 
that it was not) is a testimony to the fact that it was and remains an issue frequently raised. 
Second, his rhetoric borrowed from some of the imaginary often associated with French anti-
Americanism, such as the rejection of the Anglo-Saxon, thus adding impetus to the general 
anti-American discourse in France at the time. Among Western European leaders, de Gaulle 
easily acquired a singular position as the most outspoken critic of the United States, a fact 
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which caused much frustration in Washington (Schlesinger 1966:188-207). Yet as Stanley 
Hoffmann notes, 
More serious, because more lasting, were the illusions de Gaulle may have 
created among the French. His message bred its own misunderstandings. It was 
pride that he wanted to restore in the French, but it was vanity that he may have 
encouraged. (1974:242) 
 
As such, assertions of independence vis-à-vis the threat of hegemonic dominance from across 
the Atlantic and the growing impression of the desirability of a French sonderweg in foreign 
policy often became translated into a rejection of the American Other by a large proportion of 
the political and cultural elites, possibly oblivious to the finer nuances of de Gaulle‘s real 
intentions. It is most likely an exaggeration to argue, as McMillan does, that de Gaulle‘s 
politics of grandeur, and ―in particular his symbolic anti-Americanism‖, was designed 
primarily for domestic purposes (1992:167), but there is no doubt that it had and was meant to 
have an important impact on the French population. The culturally based anti-Americanism of 
the times, which will be discussed further below, was already strong and seemed under de 
Gaulle to acquire an almost official approbation from the highest political office of the nation. 
This had the strange side-effect of forging a bond between the presidency and some of the 
cultural elites supposedly in opposition to the policies of de Gaulle and his successors, 
irrespective of their political affiliations. Furthermore, the General‘s policies and declarations 
in relation to the United States were massively approved by the French public, where clear 
majorities in polls carried out in 1964 and 1965 responded that de Gaulle‘s American policy 
was neither too harsh nor too conciliatory, but correct (Bernstein 1993:167; Kuisel, in Paxton 
and Wahl (eds) 1994:197). To Richard Kuisel, these polls reflect the fact that ―If America was 
generally liked, it was the president who shaped and mobilized opinion to adopt a more anti-
American stance in the mid-1960s‖ (in Paxton and Wahl (eds) 1994:197). As we shall see 
below, other agents of anti-Americanism however contributed as much, if not more, to 
mobilize public opinion, yet Kuisel undoubtedly has a point. Raymond Aron has passed a 
similarly harsh judgment on the consequences of de Gaulle‘s rhetoric: 
It was General de Gaulle who legitimated anti-Americanism. In moments of 
crisis, he demonstrated his solidarity with the West, but more often than not he 
represented France to be threatened equally by the two Great Powers. [..] He 
gave the French the habit of seeing the wrong enemy, of taking the Soviet Union 
as an ally and the American Republic as a Great Power threatening French 
independence. Today [..] French diplomacy remains partially paralyzed by this 
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inversion of roles, by a vision of the world that I consider contrary to reality. 
(1990:289) 
 
Third, de Gaulle‘s legacy would prove so immense, not least with respect to foreign affairs 
(Soutou, in Andrews (ed.) 2005:103), that his successors were more or less forced to follow 
suit, albeit largely without the Gaullian panache:  
De Gaulle‘s images of international relations, alliance and defense matters, and 
France‘s prescribed role in international politics take on additional importance 
because his ideas and policies seem to have established a standard, or model, 
that constrains his successors and has proven irresistible even for leftist 
opponents of the Gaullist regime‘s domestic policies. The emergence of a broad 
consensus on security policy has been possible because de Gaulle was able to 
synthesize the often incoherent goals of the Fourth Republic and organize them 
into a compelling vision of strategy and status that has a wide appeal in France. 
(Harrison 1981:49) 
 
Most importantly, Gaullism remained a powerful political force in French politics for 
decades, and successive Gaullist parties did little to eradicate the impression of anti-
Americanism associated with them. Already in 1958, Alfred Grosser noted that during the 
past decade, anti-Americanism in France had ―passed from the Left to the Right‖ (quoted by 
Furniss 1960:301), as the yearning for more independence, primarily a right-wing issue, 
―commingled with a more general sentiment of anti-Americanism‖ (ibid:302). De Gaulle‘s 
prominent opposition to aspects of United States foreign policy in this respect had the effect 
of cementing political anti-Americanism as primarily a right-wing phenomenon, if not in 
virulence (the French Communist Party, very loyal to Moscow, missed few opportunities to 
denounce the great exemplar of capitalism), then undoubtedly in importance, as the right wing 
in France has traditionally been the most powerful.  
To the extent that the Fifth Republic can be termed the anti-American Republic 
– and, as was noted above, this can only be done by stretching the notion of anti-Americanism 
rather far – it is largely due to the ingrained perception at home and abroad that de Gaulle‘s 
policies were to some extent directed against the United States. It might not have been his 
intent, but it was an impression widely shared. The element of anti-Americanism associated 
with the foreign policies of the Fifth Republic became much more subdued after the General‘s 
departure from power, yet it did not disappear. Georges-Henri Soutou remarks that there has 
been ―a widespread view that Franco-American relations have been consistently difficult at 
least since the presidency of Charles de Gaulle‖, yet he rightly asserts that the ―reality is more 
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complex: the state of relations between France and the United States has not been a stable 
quantity but has instead oscillated over time, with a series of rifts and reconciliations‖ (in 
Andrews (ed.) 2005:102). Franco-American relations certainly improved after de Gaulle‘s 
departure, but the image of France as a rather reluctant ally largely remained. 
Even after de Gaulle‘s departure from power, Franco-American relations 
remained characterized by friction, regardless of the numerous attempts at reconciliation 
initiated from both sides. This is especially the case as regards the contentious issue of the 
role of the Atlantic Alliance in Europe and not least the role of France within the Alliance. 
This has prompted some to conclude that the Franco-American rift has become ―a structural 
rather than a cyclical problem within French politics‖ (Soutou, in Andrews (ed.) 2005:123), 
yet there is reason to be cautious as regards the degree to which this should be interpreted as 
driven by political motives as such. First of all, the allegation that the political heirs of 
Charles de Gaulle are particularly prone to anti-Americanism clearly needs to be qualified. 
Though there is no doubt that as opposed to the majority of other European nations, political 
anti-Americanism can be found as easily on the Right as on the Left in France, the history of 
the Fifth Republic shows that, at least as far as Alliance policy is concerned, positions have 
shifted markedly between the two camps in terms of whether to strengthen transatlantic bonds 
or not. The Gaullist heritage – which itself built, as was shown above, on a long tradition of 
balancing independence with security – has certainly left its deep mark on all successive 
presidencies and governments. Yet when it comes to determining how this heritage has been 
administered, it seems that the Left has at times been more Gaullist in their approach than the 
Gaullists themselves – hence the term ―Gaullo-Mitterrandism‖ (Boniface 1998:10). This was 
witnessed during especially Mitterrand‘s last years in office as well as under Chirac‘s 
cohabitation with the Jospin Government in 1997-2002. Conversely, the pro-American 
Giscard d‘Estaing could not prevent relations from souring in the late 1970s (Soutou, in 
Andrews (ed.) 2005:107), as indeed could not Jacques Chirac in the early 2000s in spite of the 
fact that he had previously attempted to bridge the transatlantic gap more forcefully than any 
of his predecessors. As was noted above, it is doubtful whether de Gaulle‘s policies could be 
described as inherently anti-American, at least in their intent. Analyzing the policies of his 
successors, it becomes even more difficult to pass such a judgement. All of his successors 
attempted to improve transatlantic relations when they first came to power. Though relations 
have improved, at times even substantially, one is left with the impression that they all failed 
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in the end. Mitterrand might be the one of de Gaulle‘s successors, who most adroitly 
succeeded in durably improving relations, yet he never seriously diverged from Gaullist 
orthodoxy; his rapprochement with America was primarily dictated by circumstances, and 
after de Gaulle he was the one French president, who most successfully sought to erect 
Europe as a potential counter-power to the United States. Chirac‘s open rupture with the 
Gaullo-Mitterrandist heritage and his attempts at reintegrating France in NATO ended in 
acrimony and charges of anti-Americanism. Sarkozy, another supposedly pro-American 
president, has no doubt contributed to improving transatlantic relations not least by his 
decision to reintegrate France fully in NATO, yet he shows strong signs of the same kind of 
pragmatism characteristic of de Gaulle and Mitterrand (Vaisse 2008). Which of these 
presidents can best be characterized as bearers of Gaullism‘s torch? In style, Mitterrand is 
without doubt the strongest contender, but in substance, the picture becomes more muddled. 
Though there is no doubt that the Gaullist heritage remains present in French foreign policy, it 
would seem that it has largely come to transcend the political factions.  
Second, improvement of Franco-American relations cannot be regarded as solely 
the responsibility of the representatives of France. Also American leaders bear their share of 
the responsibility for the state of relations between the two nations. The reading of the history 
of Franco-American relations since the Second World War might at first suggest that 
Republican presidents have overall been more successful in dealing with their opposite 
numbers in Paris than presidents from the Democratic Party: Eisenhower, Nixon, Ford, 
Reagan and George H.W. Bush seem to have had better success in this respect than 
Roosevelt, Johnson or Carter. Yet as the presidencies of Truman, Kennedy and Clinton were 
marked by relatively good relations and the two-term presidency of George W. Bush by 
disastrous relations, such a reading is rather inconclusive. That the election of Barack Obama 
has been enthusiastically greeted in France as elsewhere in Europe is probably more due to 
the fact that he represents a radical change from the Bush-years than him being a Democrat, 
although the Democratic Party usually receives better media treatment in Europe than the 
Republican. A better suggestion is probably that those presidents who have showed 
understanding of the motives and aspirations driving French foreign policy have had an easier 
time treating with their French counterparts. Yet, though Johnson showed a rather good 
understanding of French motives (Schwartz, in Melandri and Ricard (eds) 2003:139-167), he 
endured more opposition than most from the Élysée, and while nothing suggests that Reagan 
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showed any special comprehension of French foreign policy traditions, he nevertheless 
presided over an America, which could count on France as a reliable ally in virtually all the 
major crises characterizing the 1980s. Though it seems obvious to conclude that the inter-
personal dimension plays an important role in the bilateral relations between the two nations, 
the personal dimension probably has more of a multiplication effect, helping to improve or 
conversely contributing to worsen these relations, which remain primarily characterized by 
the degree of mutuality or complementarity of the two nations‘ national interests. This does 
not mean that the personal style of conducting foreign policy cannot have serious 
repercussions. Gordon and Shapiro have noted that though there were ―clearly powerful 
structural, cultural, and historical factors that led America to launch a war on Iraq while most 
of Europe opposed it‖, it was ―the philosophies, personalities, decisions, and mistakes of the 
leaders who happened to be in office in 2001-2003 that led to the depth of the transatlantic 
clash over Iraq‖ (2004:11). This is undoubtedly true, yet the first part of the statement is 
essentially as important as the second: Irrespective of personal styles, party affiliations etc., 
what seriously risks impairing a bilateral relationship is first and foremost the perception that 
the other part is engaged in policies which are regarded as misguided, dangerous, or contrary 
to one‘s own national interests. With respect to the Iraq war, it is clear that France and the 
United States were profoundly divided over the path to follow. As France‘s then Foreign 
Minister, Dominique de Villepin, put it, the difference over Iraq was a struggle between ―two 
visions of the world‖, and as such not only about policy, but also about first principles (Kagan 
2004:1). Poor statesmanship, however, led this to develop into a serious strain in the bilateral 
relations.  
Third, the very notion of French political anti-Americanism at times seems to 
have become the essential prism through which Franco-American relations are viewed. The 
advent of any new president in France immediately prompts the question of whether he is 
essentially Atlanticist or Gaullist, pro- or anti-American. This is a question rarely asked, at 
least not with the same natural ease, regarding other allied leaders. This suggests that from the 
onset, there is an expectation of difficult transatlantic times ahead – or the reverse, an 
optimism regarding the possibility of a ‗normalization‘ of Franco-American relations, 
whatever that might entail. There is a risk that this apprehension may become a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, if expectations are not met. Throughout the last two decades, the question of 
France‘s position within the Atlantic Alliance has almost become a symbol of the current state 
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of Franco-American relations. Though no doubt fed by the at times rather shifting messages 
originating from Paris, it has become almost a kind of litmus test for how Atlanticist, and 
therefore pro-American, any new French administration could be regarded. Yet there are good 
reasons to question whether the issue of France‘s role within the Atlantic Alliance can be 
related to notions of French anti-Americanism. Georges-Henri Soutou has correctly argued 
that ―the lack of a real solution to deep-seated Franco-American differences, including 
coming to grips with the relationship between NATO and a European foreign policy and 
defense identity, greatly contributed to the transatlantic break over Iraq in 2002-3‖ (in 
Andrews (ed.) 2005:112). Nevertheless, a strong political heritage of national independence 
and a wish for France to play a leading role in Europe and the wider world does not equal 
anti-American as such. Pascal Boniface has described the ―Gaullo-Mitterrandist‖ heritage as 
reposant sur la vision d‘une France présente et active dans le monde, membre 
non soumis à un leader dans le camp occidental, indépendante grâce à sa 
puissance nucléaire et dont les nombreux atouts, le poids de l‘histoire et son 
génie propre permettent de jouer un rôle important et original dans la gestion des 
affaires mondiales. (1998:10-11) 
 
To the extent that the United States is seen as an obstacle toward achieving these goals, 
French foreign policy is bound to clash with America‘s designs. These goals, building on the 
central tenets of French national identity as it has developed over the last centuries, are not 
inherently motivated by anti-Americanism, though as was shown in chapter 5, they may 
certainly have contributed to a predisposition toward political (and cultural) anti-
Americanism. Yet because these goals lead to a rejection of American dominance or tutelage, 
they are often perceived as directed against the United States. In terms of the strategic 
transatlantic relationship, the French policy of independence has in reality been a default 
position adopted gradually following the post-war realization that the United States was 
reluctant to treat France as an equal partner. Similarly, the French attempts at promoting a 
united Europe as a potential counter power to the United States essentially originated as a 
default position in order to achieve recognition of France‘s international role. At times the 
rhetoric surrounding this policy of relative independence has led to charges of anti-
Americanism, just as the foreign policy actions of France, most notably the retreat from 
NATO‘s integrated structures in 1966 and the opposition to the Iraq War in 2003, have been 
interpreted as directed against the United States. With regard to the latter, there is no doubt, as 
Sophie Meunier notes, that ―the escalating war of words with the United States triggered 
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atavistic reflexes of distrust‖ (in Katzenstein and Keohane 2007:133). Yet it would be an 
exaggeration to view France‘s alliance policies primarily through the lenses of anti-
Americanism. France has certainly been a difficult, at times even a reluctant, ally to the 
United States, but it has throughout remained an ally, steadfast in its commitment toward their 
common cause.  
As was noted at the beginning of this chapter, the ambition of the Fifth Republic 
has been throughout not so much to rival the United States, but rather to present France as a 
power of the first order; i.e. to achieve a degree of parity with America rather than to oppose 
it as such. Once it became clear that this parity could not be attained through the transatlantic 
cooperation within NATO, France attempted to use its influence in Africa and Europe to 
present itself as both an important political force on the international stage and a potential 
counter force to the United States. In this respect, there is a degree of rivalry, which can be 
seen especially in France‘s African policies, but it is far from rivalry between equal 
opponents. Rather, while it is undoubtedly a rivalry born also naturally out of the two nations‘ 
competing universalist ambitions, it is a rivalry, which has as its core a huge disparity of 
power. As such, French foreign policy under the Fifth Republic can be regarded in terms of 
rejection of the notion of American hegemony rather than as a serious aspiration toward 
erecting a new hegemony. In this respect, French efforts to present not least Europe as a 
potential counter power to the United States should be translated as an ardent desire for 
recognition of both France‘s and by extension Europe‘s will to influence world affairs as an 
(almost) equal to the United States. These efforts, however, have frequently been presented as 
rejection of not just American hegemony, but at times even of American power as such. 
Successive French presidents and governments may have attempted to resist American power, 
yet this can, as was argued above, only be partly explained in terms of political anti-
Americanism. Though the actions and statements of successive political leaders make it 
difficult to altogether reject the frequently levelled charges of political anti-Americanism, it 
would appear that another dimension of anti-Americanism plays a much more important role 
within French society, namely cultural anti-Americanism. While it thus seems somewhat of 
an exaggeration to portray the Fifth Republic as the anti-American Republic at least in terms 
of political anti-Americanism, there may be better grounds to do so when we turn our 
attention to the cultural dimension of French anti-Americanism.  
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6.2 The Cultural Front 
While the political anti-Americanism of the Fifth Republic can largely, as was seen above, be 
traced to specific divergences between France and the United States and to a political rivalry 
between two nations eager to present themselves as leaders of the world or parts thereof, the 
cultural dimension of French anti-Americanism presents some features, which set it apart 
from the political dimension. As will be shown, cultural anti-Americanism can be described 
as much as political anti-Americanism in terms of rejection of American power. As de 
Gaulle‘s policies regarding security and economic affairs where to a large degree motivated 
by a wish to escape being subordinated to American power, so has French cultural anti-
Americanism throughout set out to contest America‘s (soft) power, both its power of 
attraction and its cultural and linguistic pre-eminence. There is, however, another side to 
French cultural anti-Americanism, one which is largely absent from the political ditto: the 
complete rejection of the most prominent examples of American culture. Richard Kuisel has 
noted how America in the interwar years was frequently denied a civilization at all (1993). 
With respect to cultural anti-Americanism, this is still often the case. As opposed to politically 
motivated anti-Americanism, which more often than not can be traced to a set of foreign 
policy attitudes which, while hardly subscribed to by France‘s allies, not least on the other 
side of the Atlantic, present a relatively coherent world view, cultural anti-Americanism also 
displays some baffling features, which border on the grotesque. When for example Alain de 
Benoist asserts that ―Je préférerais encore être sous le joug de l‘Armée Rouge que d‘avoir à 
manger des hamburgers‖ (quoted by Bruckner 2002:82), one is inclined to agree with Paul 
Hollander and Charles Krauthammer (see chapter 2) that much anti-Americanism is indeed 
utterly irrational. Apart from the obvious fact that nobody forces the French to eat hamburgers 
(as we shall see below, they do it quite voluntarily – and in great numbers), the sense of 
disproportion displayed in the utterance is simply mind-blowing. Nevertheless, it is an 
utterance, which well captures the essence of the most virulent cultural anti-Americanism in 
France, in which the rejection of American culture is linked to the perception of the 
hegemony of American power, both hard and soft. Alfred Grosser has noted how the French 
denigration of American culture inherently contains a strong political dimension, as ―la 
supériorité culturelle supposée doit compenser l‘infériorité économique pour rétablir l‘égalité‖ 
(1989:222). This explains why French cultural anti-Americanism at times seems stronger and 
more deeply embedded than the political ditto, and there is no doubt, as Pierre Guerlain 
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reminds us, that France more than any other country has come to be associated with a 
culturally based opposition to America (in Fender (ed.) 1996:135).  
It was noted above how the leaders of the Fifth Republic, realizing that they 
could not achieve political power parity with the United States, instead attempted to design 
policies, which could enable France to achieve the maximum degree of independence possible 
in order to reduce the hegemonic influence of the United States. It was also suggested that the 
French leaders increasingly came to the realization that they were essentially fighting a 
loosing battle, although they were mostly loath to admit so in public. As such, they have been 
forced toward a gradual reappraisal if not of the central tenets of their policies, which have 
remained largely unchanged, then of the means to accommodate them to the realities of power 
in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. On the cultural front, however, such a 
reappraisal, although present among some, does not seem to have acquired the same degree of 
unavoidability. Therefore, as political anti-Americanism in France has, bar sporadic 
resurgences due largely to situational factors, diminished over the years, cultural anti-
Americanism has acquired the resemblance of the last stronghold against American power. 
Cultural anti-Americanism in France builds largely on the same central tenets of 
French national identity identified in chapter 5, which also provide a base for French political 
anti-Americanism, and it often takes its cue from the standard stock of anti-American 
narratives delineated in 5.1.1. The remainder of this chapter will seek to explore how this 
cultural anti-Americanism has developed into what can almost be described as a stand off 
between the Republic of High Culture versus the Republic of Mass Culture and how, by 
extension, the agents of cultural anti-Americanism in France have attempted to depict this 
battle in terms of a defence of European cultural, moral, political, and economical values 
confronted by the threat of encroachment from across the Atlantic. But whereas the agents of 
political anti-Americanism in France have mostly, though not exclusively, been the leading 
political forces, and under the Fifth Republic especially the presidents, enjoying wide powers 
to formulate and conduct foreign policy, a prominent shaper of cultural anti-Americanism has 
been the relatively small group of intellectuels, who have been eager to balance France‘s 
decline in terms of power with an affirmation of the uniqueness of French culture. In truth, 
both the political and the intellectual elites have frequently found common cause in their 
rejection of American power and have thus acted as the primary agents of anti-Americanism 
in France. As Grosser notes as regards French attitudes toward the United States, ―Il est 
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difficile de déceler les attitudes des Français autres que ceux qui composent le milieu 
politique et intellectuel‖ (1978:403). Max Weber has eminently described the agenda-setting 
role played by the intellectuals within the sphere of culture by characterizing them as ―a group 
of men who by virtue of their peculiarity have special access to certain achievements 
considered to be ‗cultural values,‘ and who therefore usurp the leadership of a ‗culture 
community‘‖ (in Hutchinson and Smith (eds) 1994:25). As we shall see below, there is no 
doubt that Weber‘s characteristic holds particularly true for the role played by the intellectuals 
in France. Before progressing with an analysis of the phenomenon of French cultural anti-
Americanism, we therefore need to take a closer look at the primary agents of cultural 
Ameriphobia in France: the intellectuals. 
 
6.2.1 The agents of cultural anti-Americanism 
A singular specificity of French anti-Americanism is the role played by the intellectuals. 
Raymond Aron has noted that ―In most countries, the intellectuals are even more anti-
American than the man in the street‖ ( [1955] 2001:224), yet it would seem that this is 
particularly the case in France, where the intellectual enjoys a privileged position. In her 
short, but highly informative study of French anti-Americanism, Sophie Meunier argues that 
―France has the deepest reservoir of intellectual argumentation against America of any 
country in Europe‖ (in Katzenstein and Keohane 2007:140). Her analysis leads Katzenstein 
and Keohane to include elitist anti-Americanism as one of two particularistic types of anti-
Americanism in their broad typology of the varieties of anti-Americanism (in Katzenstein and 
Keohane (eds) 2007:35-36). Though, as was discussed in chapter 2, I am convinced that this 
variety of anti-Americanism can be explained also in terms of rejection of American power, 
Sophie Meunier is right in drawing our attention to the specific, elitist nature of much French 
anti-Americanism. As was shown in chapter 5, the long tradition of anti-Americanism in 
France began with the attacks of philosophers such as Georges de Buffon and the Abbé 
Raynal on the New World and later developed into critiques of the ‗American civilization‘ – 
to the extent of course that the existence of any such civilization was acknowledged at all 
(Kuisel 1993:11). As France came increasingly to see America as a rival to their own mission 
civilisatrice, anti-Americanism came to the forefront of the preoccupations of France‘s 
cultural elites and not least what came to be known in the dawning century as les intellectuels.  
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Although one can trace their antecedents to (at least) the philosophers of the 
Enlightenment, there is a ―general consent‖ that the French intellectual as such was born out 
of the Dreyfus case that started in 1898 (Kelly, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:198, see also 
Rebérioux, in Burguière (ed.) 1993:397, Julliard 2008:225, and Sartre 1972:25). Though the 
noun ‘intellectual‘ can be found sporadically in earlier writings such as those by for example 
Saint-Simon, Balzac or Renan (Julliard and Winock 1996:14), it was popularized during the 
vehement polemics surrounding the trial and imprisonment of Alfred Dreyfus on charges of 
spying (Kelly, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:198-199). The Jewish Captain Dreyfus had 
been framed in an attempt to cover up for the real culprit, the nobleman Colonel Esterhazy, an 
attempt that had the support and backing of the more traditional sectors of the French society, 
while a group of prominent writers such as for example Emile Zola rose in defense of the 
wrongly accused Dreyfus ([1896-1901] 1969). The Dreyfus case was not so much about the 
fate of one man but represented a battle between two visions of France: one traditional, 
supported by powerful institutions such as the military command and the clergy, and one 
eager to expound the values on which the republic was formally built. As such, it was a 
successor battle to the battle which had decades earlier been waged between supporters and 
opponents of laïcité (see chapter 5), and in finis to the struggle between the opposing forces of 
the Revolution, where the Tiers État had been pitted against the traditional pillars of pre-
revolutionary French society. In the minds of these new intellectuals, it was a battle between 
the old conformist practices of yesterday, complete with bigotry and anti-Semitism, and the 
promise of a new century in which the constraints of the old order were discarded for good 
(Winock 1990:161-168). Though the Dreyfus case gave rise to the intellectual as a prominent 
voice in society, it was by no means a uniform group sharing the same opinions, but rather 
akin to a new caste of the highest order, consisting primarily of writers and philosophers – a 
caste, which felt that it had a natural and evident role in forming public opinion on moral, 
social, political, and cultural issues. Raymond Aron has described the intellectual as ―the man 
of ideas and the man of science: He subscribes to a belief in Man and in Reason‖ ([1955] 
2001:210). Perhaps this explains the fondness for intellectuals in ―this Cartesian country 
which likes clarity of thought‖ (Imbert 1989:60): Rather than relying on the analyses provided 
by social experts or the declarations of politicians, the French have taken a fondness toward 
having the big debates eschewed by ―a man of the cultural sphere, a creator and mediator, put 
in the position of the man of politics, a producer or consumer of ideology‖ (Ory and Sirinelli 
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quoted by Kelly, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:197). To Sartre, the intellectual was a 
―technicien du savoir pratique‖ or even a ―technicien de l‘universel‖ (1972:20 and 49). 
Though all societies can present a body of people specialising in defining norms and 
producing values (Julliard and Winock 1996:13), France can, as Aron noted already in 1955, 
easily be considered ―the paradise of the intellectuals‖128, in which ―Writers with no authority 
whatsoever can obtain large audiences even when they treat of subjects about which they 
quite openly boast of knowing nothing‖ ([1955] 2001:218 and 220). Jean-Paul Sartre, more 
than any other French intellectual at the receiving end of Aron‘s sarcastic remark, actually 
seems to concur, as he himself has characterized the intellectual as someone who meddles in 
what does not concern him, namely politics (1972:12). To him, however, this was clearly a 
badge of honour. 
Though the advent of the intellectual as a prominent group coincided with the 
Spanish-American war of 1898, which according to Roger gave French political anti-
Americanism its ―baptismal certificate‖ (2005:130), the heterogeneity of this new group 
meant that they frequently divided into several camps, either defending or vilifying the 
modernity, which America seemed to augur (Johnson 1996:143). And though this new caste 
of intellectuals participated toward the promotion of anti-American ideas at the dawn of the 
twentieth century (Roger 2005:130), it would be in the interwar years that the intellectual 
assault on America reached its apogee. At that time, according to Philippe Roger, ―French 
anti-Americanism produced a decisive reference base: the intellectual Americanophobia of 
the 1920s and 1930s remains, even now, the unsurpassed crest of French anti-Americanism‖ 
(ibid:273). Building on the ideas expounded in works such as those by Baudelaire and 
Stendhal in the nineteenth century (see chapter 5), the primary line of assault on America 
would come not so much from the progressive intellectual forces, who had defended Dreyfus 
a quarter of a century before, but essentially from a new group of intellectuals, prominent in 
the interwar years: the traditionalists. They were ―usually staunch French nationalists who 
believed in republican institutions [and were] drawn to the debate on American civilization by 
their concern for the future of Europe‖ (Strauss 1978:66). According to Stanley Hoffmann, an 
important source of the intellectuals‘ protest [had] been the decline of France‘s 
role in the world since the turn of the century and particularly since the 1930s. 
To men who believed with almost equal fervor in the universality of France and 
civilization, who thought, with Durkheim, that French culture was the culture of 
civilized man everywhere and that France‘s conception of patriotism reconciled 
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the nation with mankind, this decline could not but provoke new drives into 
utopias, in an attempt to regain lost universality. (1974:131) 
 
Raymond Aron has similarly described the ―attitude of the French intellectuals [as] 
determined by national pride and nostalgia for a universal idea‖ (2001:318). As such, it is not 
surprising that the ―re-emergence of ‗intellectuals‘ as an acknowledged category dates from 
the mid-1930s, when organisations of the left and right intensified their campaigning around 
the issues of war and peace‖ (Kelly, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:200). Neither is it 
surprising that the focus of attention among some of them should turn toward the rising 
American power. As such, envy of American power and not least its successful universalism 
soon became what Fouad Ajami would later describe as ―the ruling passion of French 
intellectual life‖ (2003:57). David Strauss has traced the modern origins of the traditionalist 
intellectual version of anti-Americanism to ―the publication in 1927 of three major studies of 
the United States by André Siegfried, André Tardieu, and Lucien Romier‖ (1978:67). To 
Strauss, these works presented relatively ―sober accounts‖ (ibid.) of the differences between 
French and American societies, whereas to Philippe Roger, they contributed to prejudice the 
French mind against America (2005:270-276). Roger nevertheless seems to agree (ibid.) with 
Strauss‘ statement that the ideas of these writers ―were disseminated in a somewhat more 
colourful and emphatic manner by other French intellectuals‖, such as Georges Duhamel, Luc 
Durtain, and Paul Morand (Strauss 1978:67). What unites these writers and sets them apart 
from earlier contributors on life in the United States is essentially, reflecting Raymond Aron‘s 
remarks reproduced above, the politicizing nature of their work: ―The organizers of American 
imagery were no longer (or not principally, in any case) experts from all disciplines: the 
economists, political scientists, psychologists, or protosociologists whose views had 
overwhelmingly directed the late-nineteenth-century French gaze‖, writes Roger (2005:270). 
Instead, the ―great French purveyors of American images were now writers or 
―philosopher/writers‖ and were the most famous of them‖ (ibid:270). As such, ―The 
triumphant anti-American discourse was no longer in need of expert authority‖ (ibid:271). 
This underlines the important role, which the intellectuals in France acquired with regard to 
the dissemination of images from America while reflecting their influence on French public 
opinion as such. Especially Georges Duhamel‘s 1930 Scènes de la vie future, depicting ―the 
horrendous transatlantic way of life as France‘s ‗future‘‖ (ibid:275), would prove influential as 
one of the most widely quoted works on whether American civilization threatened France 
322 
 
(Strauss 1978:69, Gordon and Meunier 2002:80) and bestow on its author the position ―as the 
key anti-American spokesman of his generation‖ (Strauss 1978:70). Strauss further notes how 
the impact of these intellectual ―authorities‖ was immense: ―By 1931, it was virtually 
impossible for a French traveller or commentator to think about the United States without 
reference to one or more of the six authorities who had emerged in the period between 1927 
and 1930‖ (ibid:69). The same year witnessed another publication, Le Cancer américain, 
whose title alone speaks for its content, ending with a portrait of the French as ―prostitutes to 
the new Rome‖, which America represented: ―Submission, humiliation, assimilation: such 
was the plan for enslavement that the French anti-Americans would now unflaggingly 
denounce‖ (Roger 2005:274). To its authors, it almost seemed as if the plan had already been 
fulfilled. Le Cancer américain, ―probably the most violent tract of the period, was also the 
most defeatist, the one that stated the most brutally that the American enemy had already won 
the fight, that the world already was his‖ (ibid:275). As can be seen, these works propagated 
the same cultural and socio-economic narratives (see 5.1.1), which would later constitute the 
essence of French cultural anti-Americanism. As the early establishment of anti-Americans 
was soon joined by writers and novelists such as Céline, whose 1932 Voyage au bout de la 
nuit would lend further credence to the anti-American discourse of the 1930s (ibid:184), the 
notion of an antithesis between France and America became so well entrenched in the French 
mind that it remained highly present even after the American participation in the liberation of 
France a decade later (Strauss 1978:269). 
Though the 1930s marked the apogee of French cultural anti-Americanism in 
terms of virulence, it was arguably following the Second World War that the world began to 
take notice of the intellectual assault on America. The virulent anti-American attacks of 
prominent French writers in the interwar years were mostly for domestic consumption and 
rarely gave cause for much attention abroad. They were to a large extent one among many 
expressions of a bitter internal debate characterizing a deeply divided society in an age of 
extremes (to borrow Eric Hobsbawm‘s phrase) in which conflicting ideologies based on 
notions of hate and superiority had captured the imagination of many leading thinkers. The 
situation following the liberation was very different indeed. The fascist ideology had been 
discredited in a France eager to erase the stain of the Vichy-years as much as possible, and 
open supporters or sympathizers such as Céline had been ostracized from all prominent 
intellectual circles, and with them had the most staunchly nationalist attitudes displayed by 
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the earlier traditionalist thinkers fallen into disrepute. This, however, by no means meant that 
the status of the intellectuals in France had been tarnished. Quite the contrary. In the period 
following the Second World War, the legend arose ―that France has always been the 
privileged homeland of the intellectual‖ (Kelly, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:193), and the 
postwar intellectual came to acquire a near-mythical status in France, giving them ―a 
privileged role in articulating national identity‖ (ibid:205). This national identity was, as was 
illustrated above, beset by la hantise du déclin, especially vis-à-vis the rising American 
hegemony over the Western world, both politically and socially. The warnings against the 
Americanization of Europe issued in the 1930s seemed to have been confirmed by the 
postwar situation, where America set the standard in political, economic, social, scientific, 
and, increasingly, cultural matters. In this respect, as Alfred Grosser has noted, ―Il n‘y a ainsi 
rien de paradoxal dans la simultanéité de l‘ « américanisation » et de l‘antiaméricanisme‖ 
(1989:220). These anxieties were widely shared by the French public, and 
Anti-Americans spoke for a large audience when they addressed three concerns. 
Injured national pride was one root of popular, but not necessarily visceral, anti-
Americanism. [..] Second, American economic success inevitably attracted 
jealousy and resistance. [..] Third, at least for the elite, was the danger that 
America would export its mass culture, threatening the French conception of 
humanistic and high culture with adulteration by the technical values and 
products of mass culture. (Kuisel 1993:16-17) 
 
Whereas the intellectual assault on America in the 1930s had been led by the traditionalists, 
the post-war elitist anti-Americanism united virtually all segments of the French literati, 
irrespective of their political affiliations (Roger 2005). On the eve of President Eisenhower‘s 
visit to Paris in September 1959, a politically rather sympathetic observer as François Mauriac 
wrote of his admiration for the American President, ―although nothing in me responds to the 
civilization he represents, against which I struggle, although it invades my own life and 
although each day I depend a little more on its techniques‖ (quoted by Newhouse 1970:7). 
Yet in the first decade following the liberation, the main criticisms against America would 
come from leftist writers. As Georges Duhamel had been the standard-bearer of his generation 
of anti-Americans, Jean-Paul Sartre would be the standard-bearer of his. To Sartre, the 
American man was ―a man devoid of individuality who has risen to a universal 
impersonality‖ (quoted by Strauss 1978:261). In a diatribe against the new intellectual elites, 
Raymond Aron described early on how ―No intelligentsia suffers as much as the French from 
the loss of universality, none clings so obstinately to its illusions, none would gain more from 
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recognising its country‘s true problems‖ ([1955] 2001:316). Among the illusions was the 
existence of an alternative to American hegemony. This alternative was not just a French or 
European counter model, although the notion of an antithesis between the New and the Old 
World continued to exist (Strauss 1978), but also the Communist experiment, which to some 
seemed well placed to combat the excessive materialism promoted by the United States (Wall 
1983). The unfolding Cold War marked a clear ideological divide between left and right, 
between communism and capitalism, which led many intellectuals throughout Europe to 
sympathize with the Soviet Union and the emerging Eastern Bloc. The communist regimes 
were inherently anti-American by nature: they seemed to negate everything that characterized 
the United States, namely political, economic, intellectual, and spiritual freedom. Yet the 
intellectuals, always ready to decry any abuse of power in America vis-à-vis minority groups 
such as the Black communities in America, mostly failed to criticize any similar tendencies in 
communist countries, although they were plainly there to see. This was noted even by 
contemporary observers such as Raymond Aron, who decried the tendency of his fellow 
intellectuals of being ―merciless toward the failings of the democracies but ready to tolerate 
the worst crimes so long as they are committed in the name of the proper doctrines‖ (quoted 
by Lieber 2005:194). Perhaps the postwar intellectuals found justification for their pro-
communist stance in Sartre‘s denounciation of the false intellectuals, who did not side 
sufficiently with the real intellectuals in their defence of the oppressed of the world: As 
opposed to the ―faux intellectuel‖, the real intellectual has ―qu‘un moyen de comprendre la 
société où il vit: c‘est de prendre sur elle le point de vue des plus défavorisés‖ (1972:61). 
Thus,  
Le véritable intellectuel, étant radical, ne se trouve, par là, ni moraliste ni 
idéaliste : il sait que la seule paix valable au Viêt-nam coûtera des larmes et du 
sang, il sait qu‘elle commence par le retrait des troupes américaines et la 
cessation des bombardements donc par la défaite des Etats-Unis. En d‘autres 
mots, la nature de sa contradiction l‘oblige à s‟engager dans tous les conflits de 
notre temps parce qu‘ils sont tous – conflits de classes, de nations ou de races – 
des effets particuliers de l‘oppression des défavorisés par la classe dominante et 
qu‘il se retrouve, en chacun, lui, l‘opprimé conscient de l‘être, du côté des 
opprimés. (ibid:58) 
 
The postwar leftwing intellectual, engaged in a struggle against the oppressive nature of the 
dominant class, namely the bourgeoisie with its ―inhuman‖ goal of profit (ibid:59), was 
apparently prepared to side with, and thereby legitimize, a violent and repressive regime, 
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believing quite literally that the means justified the ends
129
. Sartre attempted early on to 
justify this in a particularly twisted piece of rhetoric: Both the deportation of millions by the 
Russians and the lynching of a Black man in Alabama were ―blâmable‖, but the former was 
―un moyen d‘arriver à une fin‖, which, while not excusing it, nevertheless explained it, 
whereas the latter was a clear example of oppression, and thus much more objectionable 
([1946] 1998:54-56). America naturally became the preferred enemy in this combat against 
oppression, and the leftwing intellectuals were helped by the rise of McCarthyism in America 
and the subsequent trial and execution of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg in 1953. These events 
played directly into the hands of the French communists, who as a result attracted such a 
growing number of intellectuals that the PCF came to think of itself as the ―parti de 
l‘intelligence‖ (Kuisel 1993:40). Conversely, America was represented as a ―conspiracy 
against intelligence‖ in cultural terms as much as in political terms (Roger 2005:431). It was 
in those years that Sartre became the most prominent ―compagnon de route of the PCF‖ 
(Kuisel 1993:50), and in a response to what he termed the ―legal lynching‖ of the Rosenbergs, 
he declared in a notorious attack on the United States: ―Watch out, America has rabies! We 
must cut all ties with it or else we shall be bitten and infected next‖ (quoted by Kuisel ibid.). 
Though McCarthyism and the Rosenberg trial provided an opportunity for the intellectuals to 
take to the polemic barricades in much the same way as their spiritual predecessors had done 
during the Dreyfus affair, there was a deeper, more structural logic behind the leftwing 
intellectual assault on America in the first years of the Cold War. First, it should be noted that 
at the time, much of the intellectual opposition to America was frequently coordinated by 
communist bodies such as the French Communist Party (PCF) and syndicates such as the 
CGT (Kuisel 1993), and as such the left wing literati let themselves become part of 
campaigns, which had clear political motives, as when the Marshall Plan was denounced as ―a 
Trojan horse for French economic vassalization and above all as the first stage of a total war 
operation against the USSR‖ (Roger 2005:321). Second, by coining ―such phrases as 
marshallisation or coca-colonisation to suggest the United States was trying to colonize 
France‖ (Kuisel 1993:38, see also below), communist propaganda successfully revived the 
interwar fears of American economic, political, and especially cultural domination of France. 
―The Communist use of the cultural self-defense discourse recycled, on the Left, an 
argumentative arsenal that had been stockpiled mostly on the Right before the war: cultural 
anti-Americanism became a patriotic duty‖ (Roger 2005:432). Borrowing from the anti-
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American narratives which now became part of the standard repertory, French intellectuals, 
whether of the left or the right, voiced their opposition against this mounting threat. Sartre 
depicted the ―oppressive character of modern America‖ as ―due not only to the rise of mass 
society, but also to the persistence of Anglo-Saxon, Puritan hegemony‖ (Strauss 1978:261). In 
a piece called Defending French Culture by Defending European Culture, Sartre invited 
―France to abstain from all cultural relations with a country that has potential ‗superior‘ to its 
own: namely America‖ (Roger 2005:440). To Roger, Sartre‘s ―anti-Americanism sprang from 
the affirmation of a now irremediable inequality between France and the United States‖ 
(ibid.), and the retaliation he proposed was retreat and abstention. This, according to Roger, 
―made Sartre a systematic anti-American, rather than an emotional one, and even more than 
he was a political one‖ (ibid.).  
While the solution proposed by Sartre was more extreme than the one ascribed 
to by the majority of his fellow intellectuals, there is no doubt that the theme of cultural 
colonization, whether termed cultural imperialism or cultural Americanization, would prove 
the enduring core of the intellectual anti-American narrative throughout the twentieth century. 
At times, circumstances would dictate that other issues would come to the forefront, such as 
the denunciation of the American practices of segregation or the War in Vietnam, much as 
was the case with the earlier diatribes against McCarthyism. Sometimes, an intellectual work 
would prove agenda-setting as Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber‘s bestseller, Le Défi américain, 
which warned that American business in Europe was emerging as a new economic power, 
seriously threatening the independence of Europe‘s economic and social systems (1967). The 
recurrent notion of the threat of the ―American model‖ would frequently lead a number of 
French intellectuals to decry America as a ―social dystopia‖, fearing that this ―American 
model‖ with its ―predatory economy‖ was encroaching on the French society (Wacquant, in 
Bourdieu et al 1999:130-139). Nevertheless, the most enduring and most tenacious rejection 
of America would remain the rejection of its cultural impact in France. As we shall see below, 
the narratives typically centred on a denunciation of America as the Republic of Mass 
Culture, allegedly corrupting the mind of the masses. Seen from the viewpoint of the 
intellectuals, this was perfectly logical. The intellectual sees himself as a defender of cultural 
and political virtues. Politically, there has always been an intellectual inclination to take side 
in favour of the have-nots against the haves, as the former have typically been regarded as the 
oppressed and the latter as the oppressors (cf. Sartre op. cit.). As capitalist America clearly 
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represented the haves, the intellectual preference for supporting the political left and even the 
Communist Party had a certain logic, irrespective of the fact that by extension, they were 
supporting a political system, which seemed to negate everything else they stood for. 
Culturally, given the intellectuals‘ self-proclaimed role as ―gatekeepers of culture‖, they were 
bound to react to ―the vulgarities and excesses of mass culture [by contrasting] them with the 
moderation, good taste, and aesthetic values of civilisation‖ (Kuisel 1993:120-121). Even 
when intellectuals actually seemed to enjoy some of the cultural outputs from America, such 
as jazz music, ―Validating these forms in France [was] inseparably linked to the fact that they 
[..] appeared [..] dissident or subversive within American culture‖ (Roger 2005, 443). Ludovic 
Tournès convincingly explains how jazz, massively adopted by the French in the wave of 
Americanophilia, which briefly swept the country following the liberation, increasingly came 
to be regarded as expounding counter-Americanism: 
L‘implantation du jazz en France s‘accompagne en effet d‘une réinterprétation 
de ce phénomène musical dont les qualités soulignées par la critique française 
vont se révéler autant d‘arguments pour dénoncer les carences de la culture 
américaine. Cette réinterprétation se manifeste sur deux plans : l‘un esthétique, 
qui consiste à opposer le jazz, forme d‘art originale créée par la minorité noire, 
aux produits de la culture de masse américaine ; l‘autre politique, l‘affirmation 
de la négritude du jazz débouchant naturellement sur une dénonciation virulente 
du racisme et de la ségrégation en vigueur aux Etats-Unis. (in Mathé (ed.) 
2000:170) 
  
For Roger, this ―taste for the American counterculture [became] anti-Americanism carried on 
by other means‖ (Roger 2005, 443). As one chronicler remarked in 1948: ―ne confondons pas 
le Reader‟s Digest et Duke Ellington‖ (quoted by Tournès, in Mathé (ed.) 2000:171). An 
American institution such as Reader‟s Digest was bound to be rejected by the literati, as it 
constituted the perfect example of the vulgarization of culture, whereas jazz became 
interpreted, especially by communist circles in France, as ―la résistance d‘une minorité 
opprimée face à l‘Amérique impérialiste aussi bien à l‘intérieur de ses propres frontières 
qu‘au-delà des océans‖ (ibid:180). Clearly, certain forms of American culture were more 
oppressive than others. Yet, as Kuisel has argued, ―Setting humanistic civilisation against 
Americanization was an implicitly elitist defense‖ (Kuisel 1993:121). The same can be said 
for the rejection of mass culture; a culture which, as its name indicates, after all had wide 
appeal on the masses in France as elsewhere. This early on led Aron to question 
why do the intellectuals not admit to themselves that they are less interested in 
the standard of living of the working class than in the refinements of art and life? 
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Why do they cling to democratic jargon when in fact they are trying to defend 
authentically aristocratic values against the invasion of mass-produced human 
beings and mass-produced commodities? ([1955] 2001:228) 
 
In order to overcome this conundrum, some intellectuals took to evoking ―the France of 
artisans, bistros, and flânerie to broaden their appeal and conceal their elitist self-interest‖ 
(Kuisel 1993:121). This provided the intellectuals with an alibi in their rejection of American 
mass culture: While advocating the virtues of both High Culture and the more traditional, 
national culture, they could repudiate the Americanization of culture as a threat toward French 
culture and French national identity as a whole. 
In this, they found common cause with the political establishment. It may be, as 
Aron has noted, that the intellectuals often displayed despise for official France ([1955] 
2001:229), yet as the years progressed, the bonds between the political elites and the 
intellectuals seem to have grown stronger. This was most likely due to the political changes 
taking place at the time both internationally and domestically, and it is especially clear that 
the two elites increasingly found common ground with respect to their rejection of American 
power. The year 1956 provided, as was noted above, a renewal of political anti-Americanism 
as a result of the Suez debacle, yet the Soviet repression of the Hungarian uprisings the same 
year also discredited the communist regimes in the eyes of many French intellectuals, 
including Sartre, who pronounced ―a plague on both houses‖ (Wall 1983:214). As a result, 
while rightwing anti-Americanism rose once again, leftwing anti-Americanism became 
somewhat more subdued, as the attraction of the communist alternative became tarnished by 
the political realities. In its manifestations, rightwing and leftwing elitist anti-Americanism 
increasingly merged into one, as the typical anti-American discourses came to acquire an air 
of mainstream, non-partisan denunciation of the American Other, especially with regard to its 
cultural impact (Roger 2005). Following de Gaulle‘s return to power in 1958, the recurrent 
official displays of vocal or tacit opposition to the American hegemon gave French presidents 
a particular resonance among the influential cultural elites, seemingly legitimizing a discourse 
which they had pursued for years. The strong Fifth Republic also gave the French presidents a 
higher power of patronage over the intellectuals who, while as keen as ever to present 
themselves as independent of political power, nevertheless enjoyed the privileges extended to 
them by official France, who often mobilised them for external representation as ―cultural 
ambassadors‖ (Kelly, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:201). During the following decades, 
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their ―dissident stance [..] did not prevent them from being national treasures‖ (ibid:204), and 
though some of their declarations may at times have been inconvenient for any particular 
government, there was underpinning all their controversies with official France ―a prior 
commitment to the primacy of the French nation, as incarnated by the state‖ (ibid:204-205). 
In many cases, this led to a close cooperation between the intellectuals and the political elites. 
Mahoney has described how de Gaulle and his minister for culture, the novelist André 
Malraux, ―had a reciprocal need for each other‖, with Malraux providing de Gaulle ―with the 
opportunity for genuine intellectual dialogue about his reflection on his ‗certain idea of 
France‘‖ (1996:52). There is another dimension to the close connection between the 
intellectuals and the political elites in France: Just as the intellectuals have consistently sought 
to influence politics, so have leading French politicians been keen to present themselves as 
men of literature as well as homo politicus. Already in 1955, Raymond Aron noted that ―The 
political ambitions of successful French novelists collide with the literary ambitions of French 
statesmen, who dream of writing novels just as the others dream of becoming Ministers‖ 
([1955] 2001:219). Just as writers and intellectuals such as André Malraux, Maurice Druon, 
or Luc Ferry have found it natural to move into the ministerial offices of the Fifth Republic, 
so do French political leaders seem to have a natural inclination toward presenting themselves 
not just as avid consumers of literature, as when President Mitterrand at one point ―declined 
to see Reagan on the pretext that he was re-reading Lamartine‖ (Bell 2005:180), but even as 
producers of literature in their own right. The high literary quality of de Gaulle‘s memoirs has 
frequently been mentioned by his biographers (e.g. by Hoffmann 1974), yet it is even more 
interesting to note the penchant of several of his successors toward publishing not just 
political writings, but also historical or literary novels. There is no doubt that the 
―bookishness‖ of especially François Mitterrand served to give an added impression to his 
reign, namely that he was ―the President of the Republic of Letters‖ as well as of the Fifth 
Republic (Bell 2005:180), thus incarnating both worlds. Even more telling are perhaps the 
great efforts undertaken by Valéry Giscard d‘Estaing in order to become elected as a member 
of the Académie Française following the publication of his romantic novel Le passage. 
Though it caused much furor among literary circles, who felt that the former president had not 
given proof of the necessary literary qualities for him to become one of the immortels, it 
underlined the strong link between the political and intellectual circles, both within in literary 
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society as such and within the Académie, which had on other occasions shown a penchant 
toward electing prominent politicians to its vacant seats. 
Not only have the intellectuals and the political elites shared many of the same 
passions and ambitions; their displays of anti-Americanism seem to have been mutually 
nourishing. As such, there has been an evident link between political and cultural anti-
Americanism, especially in the first decades of the Fifth Republic. The postwar intellectual 
onslaught on America reached is apogee at the height of the Vietnam War (Roger 2005), 
which also saw the culmination of the intellectuals‘ influence on French society. By the mid 
1970s, however, ―there was a noticeable increase in anti-intellectualism in France, reflected in 
prolonged bouts of self-questioning among the intellectuals themselves‖ (Kelly, in Godin and 
Chafer (eds) 2004:205, see also Pinto, in Lacorne, Rupnik, and Toinet (eds) 1990). The 
gradual political rapprochement with the United States combined with the declining role of 
the intellectuals as the privileged articulators of France‘s national identity (ibid.) meant that 
elitist anti-Americanism lost much of its bite in the following decade. Meanwhile, the leftist 
cultural and intellectual drift, overwhelmingly strong in the decades leading to May 1968, had 
since then witnessed a sustained period of deceleration (Crozier, in Hoffmann and 
Kitromilides (eds) 1981:106). Kristin Ross asserts that ―to be called anti-American in France 
in the 1980s was tantamount to being accused of fascist tendencies, Stalinist tendencies, or 
both at the same time – a kind of post Arendtian red-brown fusion‖ (in Ross and Ross 
2004:150). That clearly is an overstatement, though it is true that during the decade marked in 
France by the political triumph of socialism, French anti-Americanism, both political and 
cultural, seemed to be on the decline. This was to a large extent due to an increasing 
―normalization‖ of the French political landscape in the 1980s (Collard, in Godin and Chafer 
(eds) 2004:30-43): The communist party, historically strong by Western standards as well as 
uniquely faithful to Moscow (Wall 1983), had drawn successfully on the French 
Revolutionary past. Yet over the decades leading up to the 1980s, it had been steadily loosing 
in support. Paradoxically, its entry into the socialist-led government in 1981, the first time it 
partook in government since the first years of the Fourth Republic (Chevallier and Conac 
1991), accelerated its demise as a political factor of the first order. Governmental 
responsibility greatly hampered its ability to project itself as a moral and political, and even 
more so a revolutionary, counterforce to the mainstream political establishment at home at a 
time when the succession of ailing leaders in Moscow undermined the luster of its closest ally 
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abroad. As such, the advent of the Mitterrand presidency ―demobilized many left-wing 
intellectuals‖ at a time when leading intellectual figures such as Sartre, Beauvoir, or Foucault 
disappeared (Kelly, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:206). Meanwhile, the French Right, 
historically strong in France, found itself engaged in rivalry both between the Gaullist party of 
Jacques Chirac and the more centrist party of Valéry Giscard d‘Estaing, and frequently also 
within the parties, while a growing ultranationalist and xenophobic Front National gathered 
the votes of the discontents (Chevallier and Conac 1991). Most importantly, the General‘s 
political heirs turned out to be less Gaullist and more traditionally conservative than their 
mentor (Godin and Chafer, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:xvii), although the Gaullist 
heritage still left its mark on the party as well as indeed on the French society as a whole. 
Until the 1980s, anti-Americanism had been a common feature both of the Communist Left 
(Bell, in Godin and Chafer 2004:47-60) and of the nationally oriented Gaullist Right, whose 
principal rallying call had been to recreate France‘s grandeur in a world increasingly 
dominated by the rivaling superpowers. In the political climate of the 1980s, virulent anti-
Americanism seemed to belong more and more to a different age (Hollander 1995:384), 
although more subtle critiques of America‘s influence on the French society continued 
unabashed. Simultaneously, a new wave of French philosophers and opinion-makers, hitherto 
more or less a bastion of intellectual anti-Americanism, began to applaud the nation that had 
so long been presented as France‘s bête noire (Lawday 2003:33). Among these ―philo-
Américains‖, as Serge Halimi has called them (Halimi 2000a:10), we find such men as André 
Glucksmann, Bernard-Henri Lévy and Pascal Bruckner (ibid, and Ross, in Ross and Ross 
2004:145 and 150) keen to present themselves as defenders of Western, and as such also 
American, values at the moment when the Cold War was drawing to a close. The following 
decades would see a growing focus of French intellectuals on their nation‘s animosity toward 
the American other. Jean Baudrillard, described by Paul Hollander as ―one of the most 
extreme examples of a Western anti-Americanism‖ (2007), or by Lacorne and Judt as ―so 
extreme that it does not lend itself to rational interrogation‖ (in Judt and Lacorne (eds) 
2005:2), did in fact deliver a much more nuanced picture of America in his Amérique (1988) 
than in his previous writings (Østergård 1989). Jean-François Revel would deliver a 
resounding critique of the ―anti-American obsession‖ (Revel 2002), while Philippe Roger 
would present the most comprehensive account to this day of France‘s long tradition of 
denigrating its ―American Enemy‖ (Roger [2002] 2005). Bernard-Henri Lévy would travel to 
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America attempting to retract Tocqueville‘s footsteps, resulting in his American Vertigo 
(2006), like Baudrillard‘s Amérique a relatively positive, though not uncritical portrait of a 
nation that had caught the fascination this new generation of intellectuals. The reading of 
early pro-American thinkers, like Raymond Aron, belatedly came back in fashion (Bruckner 
2002:45). Although Aron was far from being apologetic toward the United States and its 
influence on the West, his resoundingly liberal approach to philosophy and politics had for 
long rendered him unpalatable to the mainstream intellectual circles, where the fashionable 
dictum was well into the 1970s that it was better ―to be wrong with Sartre than right with 
Aron‖ (Østergård 1989:6 and 1992:169). As France was celebrating the bicentennial of its 
revolution in 1989, Claude Imbert predicted the end of French exceptionalism, ―the 
particularly French passion which leads intellectuals and politicians to want to build society 
according to theoretical constructs‖ (1989:48). To Imbert, this exceptionalism was ―born from 
a revolutionary mythology and it is dying at a time when that mythology is fading away‖ 
(ibid.). As the twentieth century was drawing to a close, there appears to have been other, 
more prosaic reasons for the declining position of the intellectuals in France. According to 
Michael Kelly, it would seem that they had become the victims of the mass culture they so 
fervently rejected: The growth of the mass media, with its insatiable demand for celebrities, 
would, while giving them access to voicing their opinions to larger audiences, at the same 
time contribute to their demise, as they now became ―just another group of talking heads‖ (in 
Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:206).  
There is no doubt, however, that as agents of anti-Americanism, the intellectuals 
have left a deep imprint on the French society. The intellectuals‘ part in ―constituting and 
transmitting‖ anti-American discourses has, as Philippe Roger notes, been ―eminent but not 
exclusive. [..] But the intellectuals‘ greatest success was the wide spread of their discourse. 
The French public gradually adopted the polemical argumentation and the negative 
stereotyping produced by the intelligentsia‖ (2005:449-450). In this, they were largely joined 
by the political establishment, as keen as the intellectuals to promote the primacy of culture as 
one of the main attributes of French national identity. During the first three decades of the 
Fifth Republic, anti-Americanism had been largely the project of the elites. As the political 
and intellectual elites gradually lost their monopoly of shaping public imagination in the late 
1980s and early 1990‘s, new and more popular voices rose in rejection of America. While 
building on the same discourses, which the intellectuals had used to ―conceal their elitist self-
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interest‖ (Kuisel 1993:121), these voices would originate from the deeper roots of eternal 
France, fighting to uphold traditional values in an increasingly Americanized world. In the 
battle between the Republic of High Culture versus the Republic of Mass Culture, intellectual, 
political, and popular forces would join hands in defence of the last vestige of perceived 
French superiority: culture. 
 
6.2.2 The Republic of High Culture versus the Republic of Mass Culture 
As was seen in chapter 5, the importance put on culture – and not least the way in which 
France has typically portrayed itself as the Republic of High Culture as a further affirmation 
of its mission civilisatrice – has had a profound influence on the French national habitus. The 
end of the Second World War saw the unwelcome confirmation that France‘s political 
primacy was irredeemably a thing of the past. As the political elites were slowly coming to 
terms with navigating in an international setting, in which France‘s hard power was relatively 
limited, the cultural and intellectual elites were becoming increasingly alarmed by the 
growing impact of America‘s soft power and not least of the power of attraction of America‘s 
mass culture, already a threatening specter in the interwar years, but one which now seemed 
poised to make an even more substantial foray into the hearts and minds of liberated Europe. 
Zeldin has described how 
reflexion on the American experience, which was so different to that of France, 
caused many Frenchmen to redefine their own culture, to stress its originality 
and to defend it more self-consciously in the face of the power which by 1940 
was clearly surpassing it in an increasing number of fields. (1977:126) 
 
Throughout the remainder of the twentieth century, intellectuals, artists, practitioners, and 
political circles would unite it an almost uniform rejection of the Republic of Mass Culture. 
This rejection would essentially centre around three dimensions: First the cultural dimension 
itself, which often became translated into a rejection of the nature of the cultural outputs 
originating from the United States. Rejection of these cultural outputs largely followed the 
same discourses, which had been formulated throughout more than a century in France, 
depicting America as culturally sterile and devoid of artistic originality. The second 
dimension was associated with the global spread of America‘s culture, which seemed to 
validate latent and present fears of an increasing Americanization of French culture, thus 
raising the spectre of a new cultural imperialism. Already present in the interwar years, this 
dimension would prove one of the most enduring bases for the rejection of American culture 
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in France following the Second World War, as France‘s own cultural impact abroad seemed 
to be fading, at least when compared to that of the United States. Charges of America‘s 
cultural imperialism or cultural domination of other societies became a permanent feature of 
the rejection of American culture in France. This was hardly surprising, as ―claims about 
cultural domination are frequently made [by] nations which have historically been colonisers 
rather than colonised‖ (Tomlinson 1991:19). As such, America‘s ability to export its cultural 
products and values were a further testimony to its successful universalism in an area, where 
French cultural elites had long enjoyed primogeniture. Furthermore, it added an economic 
dimension to the culturally based anti-American discourses, which would become fully 
operational by the 1990s as the fight against globalization became the rallying call of great 
parts of the French elites, thus accentuating the considerable overlap between soft power and 
hard power. The third dimension centers on issues of national identity and typically acquired 
the form of a linguistic dimension, whereby culture became seen largely in national terms and 
where the rejection of foreign encroachment on France‘s cultural turf became essentially 
viewed through the prism of the mounting threat of linguistic domination. Just as resistance 
against any erosion of the influence of the French language abroad, and especially in the 
spheres of influence offered by the system of la Francophonie, became an important feature of 
French foreign policy, so did the rejection of American culture come to acquire clear 
overtones of the mounting threat of linguistic domination, both at home and abroad. It was 
first and foremost the encroachment of English on the French language, which was targeted, 
but as the effects of globalization on culture became a prominent theme among cultural circles 
in France, the fight for cultural diversity became a thinly veiled attack on what was perceived 
as a process of global Anglicization, spearheaded by such American cultural powerhouses as 
Hollywood. 
These dimensions were highly interlinked and have remained so until this day. It 
is no accident that the discourses surrounding French perceptions toward the Republic of 
Mass Culture typically appear interwoven into a monolithic rejection of cultural America: as 
we shall see below, some of the most illustrative examples of French resistance toward the 
Republic of Mass Culture incorporates all three dimensions so forcefully that they appear 
almost as one. While some of the examples of France‘s rejection of American culture may 
approach parody, as with the denunciations of EuroDisney as a ―cultural Chernobyl‖ (Lieber 
2005:99, Gordon and Meunier 2002:85, see also below), there is no doubt that a large number 
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of the French, and especially among the intellectuals, are seriously worried about what they 
perceive as a process of degeneration of French culture, and one which is largely driven by 
American style products of mass culture, whether originating from the United States as such 
or whether copied from the American example. At the same time, it is a fact – rarely 
mentioned by the defenders of France‘s rich tradition of regarding itself as the Republic of 
High Culture – that the products of mass culture are consumed in great numbers by the 
French. It would thus be wrong to characterize the majority of the French as opposed to 
American or American-style products of mass culture, since they appear, as we shall see 
below, to be avid consumers of these products. Nevertheless, there is strong opposition to the 
perceived Americanization of French culture among the cultural and political elites, and as 
they enjoy privileged access to the agenda setting medias, they have succeeded in presenting 
this opposition as a ‗French‘ opposition against the American cultural steamroller. 
There are numerous examples of clashes between what one might call the 
Republic of High Culture versus the Republic of Mass Culture. This section will focus on 
four, which are indicative of both the tone of cultural anti-Americanism in the post-war period 
and the extent to which cultural anti-Americanism has transcended into political anti-
Americanism: First the affair of Coca-Cola in the late 1940s and early1950s, second the 
campaign against le franglais in the 1960s, third the cinematographic ―culture wars‖ of the 
early 1990s, and fourth the fight against la malbouffe later in the same decade. All four 
examples show the connection between cultural, economical, social and political anti-
Americanism building on the three dimensions of cultural rejection delineated above; in all 
four instances, political and intellectual forces have joined hands in rejecting the supposedly 
opprobrious attributes of American power; in all four cases, they have mobilized significant 
proportions of the French to take a stance in rejecting U.S. power; and in all four instances, 
this has been presented in terms of a protection of the French national identity in the face of 
American hegemony. All four examples demonstrate how rejection of ‗cultural 
Americanization‘ has been presented in terms of defence of France‘s national identity and that 
in essence, this has taken the form of a consistent rejection of America‘s soft power. The first 
two examples may appear somewhat dated today, but nevertheless contributed to set the tone 
for the later two, which have substantially influenced French attitudes vis-à-vis the United 
States in the later years.  
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The Coca-Cola affair 
An early warning of what was in waiting on the cultural front came with the Coca-Cola affair 
of the late 1940s and early 1950s. Though the incident is today largely forgotten, it 
nevertheless provides a good example of not just the type of denigration which a 
quintessentially American product such as Coca-Cola was subjected to in France, but also of 
the interplay between political, industrial and cultural forces in their combined attempt at 
combating the perceived Americanization of the French society. Though Coca-Cola had been 
introduced to a European public already in the interwar years, it was the Second World War, 
which ―transformed Coca-Cola into a truly international beverage and a global American 
icon‖ (Pells 1997:199). At the end of the war, the Coca-Cola Company was able to 
substantially enlarge its operations throughout Western Europe, yet in several European 
countries, it met with opposition from not least local producers of rival beverages, who feared 
that the growing popularity of Coca-Cola would jeopardize their industries (ibid:200). The 
opposition was, as Richard Pells notes, ―fiercest in France‖ (ibid.), and it was not confined to 
commercial rivals fearing for their livelihood. As Richard Kuisel notes in his detailed study of 
the affair
130
, the disturbances encountered by the Atlanta firm elsewhere in Europe ―were 
trivial compared to the controversy that erupted when Coca-Cola arrived after 1945 in 
France‖ (1991:100). A massive campaign against the American soft drink was mounted in an 
unholy alliance between the French Communist Party, lobbyists from the beverage industries, 
influential medias such as Le Monde and more centrist catholic newspapers, officials in 
government agencies, and even prominent members of the government of the young Fourth 
Republic. The allegations were not only that Coca-Cola threatened the sale and consumption 
of local beverages, or even that it threatened the nation‘s balance of payments with the United 
States, but also that it was addictive or even potentially toxic due to the presence of caffeine, 
phosphoric acid, and not least the mysterious trace ingredient, the secret formula called ―7X‖, 
which had to be imported from the United States (Kuisel 1991, Wall 1991). From 1948 to 
1953, attempts were made to outright ban ―the sale of Coca-Cola for reasons of public health 
and on economic grounds, that is, to protect domestic [..] interests from the unfair competition 
of the ‗American trust‘‖ (Kuisel 1991:106-107). Though some of the charges levelled against 
the Atlanta firm were echoed throughout much of Western Europe, what gave the affair a 
singularly Gallic twist was the fierceness of the opposition as well as the blatantly anti-
American discourse surrounding the rejection of Coca-Cola in France. It was a characteristic 
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discourse, and one which while building on the anti-American indictment from the interwar 
years, would set the tone for much of the rejection of American culture in the decades to 
follow. The communist daily, L‟Humanité predicted that the invasion of Coca-Cola was ―part 
of the Marshall Plan‘s strategy of colonizing France‖ (ibid:101). Communist propaganda 
―coined such phrases as marshallisation and cocacolonisation to expose the United States‘ 
colonizing strategy‖, and even ―charged that the Coca-Cola distribution system would double 
as an American espionage network‖ (ibid., see also Wall 1991:123). Though the fight against 
Coca-Cola was driven largely by the Communists and their allies, it ―exploited [a] deepening 
anxiety among the French about the United States‖, invoking ―the alleged submissiveness of 
the Fourth Republic toward its Atlantic ally, and the threat of American economic and cultural 
domination‖ (Kuisel 1991:102). 
The choice of Coca-Cola as an object of rejection was hardly accidental: As 
Richard Kuisel notes, ―Perhaps no commercial product is more thoroughly identified with 
America than Coca-Cola‖ (ibid:97). Neither was it surprising that the Communist Party 
should lead the charge against the American soft drink. In 1948, the Coca-Cola company 
itself described its product as the ―Essence of capitalism‖ (Chuter 1996:214), and no product 
could better epitomize the Republic of Mass Culture than this soft drink, which one company 
official once called ―the most American thing in America‖ (Kuisel 1991:97). In a major essay 
on the affair, Le Monde described how Coca-Cola represented the coming cultural invasion 
from America: ―What the French criticize is less Coca-Cola than its orchestration, less the 
drink itself, than the civilization – or as they like to say, the style of life – of which it is the 
symbol‖ (quoted by Kuisel ibid:113). Even if the opposition against Coca-Cola ―comportait 
un élément de pur protectionnisme économique‖ (Gordon and Meunier 2002:82), the greatest 
challenge posed by Coca-Cola was not perceived to be toward the livelihoods of French 
beverage producers, but toward French, and by extension, European culture (ibid.). In a later 
article, Le Monde described Coca-Cola as ―the Danzig of European culture‖ (quoted by 
Kuisel 1991:113). Richard Kuisel has described ―the war over Coca-Cola‖ as ―a symbolic 
controversy between France and America‖ (ibid:116), in which ―resisting Coca-Cola was a 
way of expressing latent French uneasiness about American domination‖ (ibid:108). Irwin 
Wall concurs, describing Coca-Cola as well as Hollywood imports as  
symbols of something much deeper, a penetration of America into the national 
psyche, [which prompted] an awakening to the new reality of French weakness 
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and American power, and a resentment against the brutal ways in which the 
United States often appeared to want to use its power. (1991:126) 
 
Though the Coca-Cola affair subsided in 1953, it left its clear mark on France: Well into the 
1990s, the French would drink significantly less Coca-Cola than other Western Europeans 
(Kuisel 1993:68, Kuisel in Beck, Sznaider and Winter (eds) 2003:109, and Hays 2004:269) 
and, more importantly for the purposes of this study, it signaled the rise of a new type of anti-
American argumentary, in which diatribes against the marshallization and cocacolonization of 
France would soon become replenished with a rejection of the hollywoodization, 
disneyfication, and mcdonaldization of European societies (Ritzer 2000). And as with the 
diatribes against the latter, it was a perfect example of an anti-American discourse, which 
might have purported to present itself as an advocate of the consumer, but which 
fundamentally had other interests at heart. As the affair was drawing to an end, the leaders of 
the Fourth Republic having succumbed to substantial political pressure from Washington to 
end the charade, the daily Témoignage Chrétien concluded that Coca-Cola was neither a 
poison nor more dangerous than Pernod. Nevertheless, ―we must call a spade a spade and 
label Coca-Cola for what it is – the avant-garde of an offensive aimed at economic 
colonization against which we feel it‘s our duty to struggle‖ (quoted by Kuisel 1991:112). A 
few years later, as Charles de Gaulle returned to power, the offensive against cultural and 
economic colonization would be rejoined by a struggle against political and military 
colonization, and a decade later these discourses would find a potent unifying rallying call in 
the campaign against le franglais, which under the banner of linguistic self-defense 
represented a broad campaign to reverse the perceived erosion of France‘s national identity, 
which was uniformly depicted as a result of the Americanization of French society. 
 
The campaign against le franglais 
At the same time as anti-Americanism seemed to have received the political approbation from 
the highest office of the Fifth Republic (see above), René Étiemble, a linguist and prominent 
sinologist who had lived and worked several years in Chicago, published his Parlez-vous 
franglais? ([1964] 1991). Étiemble‘s book was an instant success, and it would set the tone 
for the linguistic rejection of America for generations to come. Apart from his popularizing 
the term ‗franglais‘, commonly attributed to Max Rat (Zevaco and de Saint Robert 1999:61), 
and soon to enter the French vocabulary as a standard reference to the colonization of French 
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by the encroaching English language, he became the most prominent source of inspiration for 
a subsequent campaign to cleanse the French language from the invasion of English and 
American idioms and loan words. Étiemble‘s book was a visceral tract against not just the 
growing spread of the English language among the French, complete with the well known 
fears of a degeneration of the French language, but also a forceful rejection of the invasion of 
American ideas, fashions, and cultural products, all of it huddled together in a scathing attack 
on the ―false friends‖ from across the Atlantic (Étiemble [1964] 1991:416). Written in a rather 
rambling style, which is not without humor, it nevertheless clearly set out to warn against 
both the spreading epidemic of le franglais and of the growing cultural Americanization. The 
following passage is illustrative of the tone: 
On ne nous l‘envoie pas dire : nous devons parler anglais, ou mieux américain, 
afin de penser comme des Yanquis, et de nous laisser évaporer sans rechigner 
par « la manière américaine de vivre », the best in the world. Et si, moi, j‘ai 
horreur de voir des vaches sacrées mâchonner du chewing-gum, et même du 
chouine gomme, et même de la gomme à mâcher ? Et si, moi, j‘ai horreur du Ku 
Klux Klan et de la « ségrégation » ? Et si on m‘a foutu à la porte d‘un restaurant, 
près de Chicago, parce que je m‘y trouvais en compagnie d‘une belle juive, mais 
au visage un peu marqué ? Et si j‘ai failli me faire foutre à la porte de mon 
appartement, en plein Chicago, parce que j‘avais exigé d‘y recevoir une fois un 
de mes camarades français, professeur comme moi, mais Antillais ? Et si vingt 
autres valeurs de « la manière américaine » de penser me révoltent, [..] me 
jettera-t-[on] au trou, en tant que je refuse de devenir buveur de Coca-Cola ou de 
Pepsi-Cola [..] ? Et si j‘ai horreur des civilisations de l‘argent, moi ? Pour servir 
proprement les desseins du S.H.A.P.E., faut il donc que les Français 
commencent par avaler, langage compris, la civilisation cocalcoolique ? La 
vérité, c‘est qu‘on nous fait jargonner américain afin de nous conduire à 
l‘abattoir les yeux bandés. (ibid:272-273) 
 
The anti-American tone is palpable. The references to the Ku Klux Klan or the policies of 
segregation are testimonies to the fact that Étiemble has not just embarked on a crusade to 
save the French language from degeneration; his diatribes against America clearly take the 
form of a rejection of America‘s cultural, economic, political, and not least racial practices. 
The reference to SHAPE, NATO‘s Supreme Headquarter of the Allied Powers in Europe, 
then located in France, highlights that the rejection of France‘s perceived military dependence 
on its American ally was not just confined to the political circles, though Étiemble gives it a 
nice linguistic twist: ―si l‘on a fait l‘effort de traduire en sigle français O.T.A.N. le sigle anglo-
saxon du Pacte atlantique, N.A.T.O., on n‘a pas jugé nécessaire, ou poli, de nous gratifier d‘un 
S.H.A.P.E. à la française‖ (ibid:270). At the time when de Gaulle forcefully moved toward 
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reducing French political and military dependence of the United States, Étiemble judged that 
France had already paid too high a price for its alliance with the Anglo-Saxons:  
Deux guerres en trente ans, où nous fûmes alliés des Anglo-Saxons, précipitent 
notre asservissement. Pour triompher de l‘Allemagne, s‘il faut que la France 
abandonne sur les champs de bataille, outre des millions de cadavres, le cadavre 
de sa langue, à quoi bon tant de sang, tant de ruines, tant de bêtise ? (ibid:269) 
 
For Étiemble, the French language was the most sacred of France‘s patrimony, and defense of 
the French language was thus a moral, cultural, and political imperative: ―Détruisez la langue 
française [et] il ne nous reste plus que le patois d‘une chétive colonie de l‘impérialisme 
yanqui‖ (ibid:386).  As noted in chapter 5, the debates surrounding the use of English terms 
and loan words go back at least to the eighteenth century (see also Hagège 1987:17-23), yet it 
was the publication of Parlez-vous franglais?, which ―brought the issue to the attention of a 
wider public and away from the relatively narrow circle of academicians and literary critics 
where it had been discussed until then‖ (Thody 1995:15). As Philippe Roger notes, 
Étiemble‘s work largely build on the legacy of anti-American rhetoric, which had been used 
in the interwar years in such works as Le Cancer américain, going so far as to describe the 
colonizing effects of le franglais as ―le cancer yanqui‖ (2005:274-275). To Étiemble, the 
expression ―cancer‖ was to be taken quite literally: ―Pour que vive le franglais, sachons-le, il 
faut que crève la France: ce peu qui nous reste‖ ([1964] 1991:420), are the concluding 
remarks of his book. As Claude Hagège, one of the most distinguished French linguists has 
noted, there was a clear chronological link between the rise of linguistic purism and mounting 
political ―Americanophobia‖ in the early 1960s: ―L‘harmonie, sinon la relation osmotique, est 
éclatante entre la foi gaullienne en une mission civilisatrice de la France et le chauvinisme 
linguistique qui inspire la conception du français comme bien inaltérable de la nation et 
précieux héritage culturel‖ (1987:111). Hagège further notes that in this respect, the fight 
against le franglais builds largely on the sense of national  decline, which manifested itself 
throughout the 1950s: ―L‘anti-américanisme comme réaction passionnelle d‘une nation 
dépossédée de son ancienne puissance et supplantée par les États-Unis, soit d‘une manière 
occulte, soit d‘une manière qu‘elle juge ouvertement humiliante [..] se saisit de l‘alibi 
linguistique‖ (ibid:111). Yet according to Hagège, it was an alibi, which was not funded in 
any stringent linguistic analysis of the impact of English on the French language. While the 
period since the end of the Second World War had clearly seen an important rise in the use of 
English and American idioms and loan words, Hagège demonstrates convincingly that seen 
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from a linguistic perspective, this had little if any impact on the fundamental structures and 
mechanisms of the French language (ibid:24-74). Hagège even states that ―rien n‘indique que 
la langue française soit aujourd‘hui submergée par un raz-de-marée d‘anglicismes‖ (ibid:71), 
concluding that ―Ainsi, la condamnation des emprunts américains, loin d‘être fondée sur la 
réalité d‘une menace, n‘est que l‘expression détournée d‘un anti-américanisme nourri par la 
nostalgie du prestige d‘autrefois‖ (ibid:113). And unable to alter the global redistribution of 
forces, which had relegated France to second position in the international system, ―les 
nostalgiques de la puissance française s‘emparent de ce domaine innocent de représentations 
du monde, la langue, toute docile et toute prête à servir comme enjeu‖ (ibid:109). 
Though Étiemble‘s book today ―comes across as stupefyingly brutal‖ (Roger 
2005:333), it had a huge impact and set much of the tone of cultural anti-Americanism not 
just in the 1960s, but also in the following decades, as can be witnessed by its being reissued 
in an impressive number of editions and by its style being copied by others, as in Daniel 
Schneidermann‘s denounciation of the ―nouvel espéranto américano-mondial‖ (1995:44). Not 
only did Étiemble‘s book prove an instant success among its readers, it also provoked 
successive governments to take action against the perceived encroachment of English on the 
French language. In the preface to the tenth anniversary edition, Étiemble applauded that 
since the first publication of his book, ―le gouvernement a pris plusieurs des mesures que je 
préconisais pour lutter contre un fléau qui nous livre à l‘impérialisme yanqui‖ ([1964] 
1991:21). These measures were followed by the Bas-Lauriol law (loi no 75-1349 du 31 
décembre 1975 relative à l'emploi de la langue française), which in December 1975 was 
unanimously approved in the National Assembly, stipulating that French must be used 
whenever describing, offering or presenting goods or services for sale, thus restricting the 
commercial freedom to use foreign loan words (Thody 1995:10-11). The best known attempt 
at curbing the spread of English words in the French language is probably the Toubon law of 
1994 (loi nº 94-665 du 4 août 1994 relative à l'emploi de la langue française), which sought to 
update the Bas-Lauriol law by ensuring that all official communication or any texts with legal 
force should be in French. Punishments, ranging from fines to imprisonment, were to be 
levied on those contravening the law (Ager 1997), and the Toubon legislation even ―took the 
precaution of sounding out the Commission first and using the 1992 Constitutional 
amendment and the GATT negotiations on the cultural exclusion concession [see below] to 
get the Act through and make sure it could be presented as part of anti-American, pro-
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European legislation rather than simply anti-English‖ (ibid:41). During the debates over the 
Toubon law, it became clear that the major threat against the French language was perceived 
as originating from the other side of the Atlantic rather than from across the Channel. Bruno 
Bourg-Broc, a member of the Gaullist RPR, remarked in the National Assembly that France 
should ―Lutter contre l‘hégémonie linguistique, fer de lance d‘une hégémonie culturelle et 
économique‖ (quoted by Thody 1995:36), and the opposition Communist Party could not 
agree more, declaring its full support to the Toubon law, which after all had as its aim to 
defend French culture against ―l‘impérialisme culturel américain‖ (ibid:37). Defenders of the 
law continuously reiterated that French was threatened by the encroaching English, remarking 
among other that 
it was wrong to see the preference of the young for American culture and 
American expressions as the result of a free choice. They had simply been 
brainwashed by the media, and consequently needed the protection of the state 
against an insidious and powerful take-over bid by the worst aspects of 
transatlantic culture. (ibid:14) 
 
Under the impression of the Toubon law and in the attempt to offer linguistic alternatives to 
stem the tide of franglais, a substantial body of civil servants, each representing all the 
various ministries, compiled a dictionnaire des termes officiels de la langue française (since 
then jovially referred to as le Toubon by the French). Nevertheless, the Toubon law met with 
two serious obstacles. First, a ruling by the French Conseil Constitutionnel stipulated that 
parts of the law were contrary to the principle of freedom of expression (Décision du Conseil 
Constitutionnel sur les articles attaqués de la loi Toubon), second – and more importantly – 
though a 1994 poll revealed that 80 percent of those questioned supported the attempt by 
Toubon to limit the use of franglais by law, the predominant reaction was nevertheless to 
make fun of it (Thody 1995:3). This is probably largely due to the fact that the franglais was 
and remains the result of the attraction, which American idioms and cultural images have 
projected on especially younger generations of Frenchmen, who borrow from the English 
language either because it is agenda setting in a number of domains, not least within business 
and information techniques, or simply because it is considered cool.  
The obsession as regards the impact of franglais does not today cause the same 
stir as previously, and the French public has been reluctant to adopt some of the most 
artificial-sounding French translations of English words, although others seem to have found 
a permanent and natural place in the French language (Thody 1995, Meunier 2000). There are 
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still occasional attempts at reinforcing the Toubon law by new measures
131
, yet the 
predominant fear seems no longer to be so much about the contamination of the French 
language by Anglicisms as the waning global influence of the French language. It is no doubt 
true that it is ―the awareness of how much the French language has declined from its earlier 
predominance that makes the French so sensitive to the use of English or American terms by 
native speakers of their language‖ (Thody 1995:27), but with time, the resistance against the 
encroachment of English has been carried out under the banners of la francophonie or 
diversité culturelle rather than the purely national banner (Meunier 2000). Though a respected 
linguist such as Claude Hagège has rejected that le franglais poses a threat to the French 
language as such, this does not mean that he and large segments of the French literati do not 
see the French language as threatened. The threat, however, comes from the spread of English 
at the detriment of French much more than from any supposed degeneration of the French 
language. Hagège reminds us that 
le rayonnement de la langue française [..] s‘est accompagné d‘une puissance de 
l‘État s‘illustrant par les armes comme par la culture. Cette situation a produit le 
sentiment d‘une primauté, dont la revendication maladroite donne parfois à 
l‘étranger, quand on ne fait pas l‘effort d‘aller au-delà des apparences, 
l‘impression d‘une certaine arrogance française. [..] On peut comprendre que, 
par rapport à ce rayonnement, celui d‘autres cultures, et singulièrement, 
aujourd‘hui, celui de la culture américaine, produise, parmi les élites françaises, 
le sentiment d‘une dépossession. (2006:199-200) 
 
Hagège here seems to echo Grosser‘s assessment that ―l‘ambition mondiale de la France est 
prioritairement culturelle, la langue devant constituer le support indispensable de la culture‖ 
(1989:221), yet he nevertheless agrees that it is vital that France continues its combat, not for 
the purity of the language, but for its promotion world wide. This is a combat, which, 
according to Hagège, should be fought under the banner of ―diversité culturelle‖, and he finds 
that ―La France est à l‘avant-garde de ce combat, et ses traditions culturelles l‘expliquent 
largement‖ (2006:26). These traditions are, apparently, not just the traditions associated with 
the Republic of High Culture, but as much the socio-economic traditions, which seem to be an 
integrated part of the French national habitus. As such, the combat for cultural diversity, 
whether in the cultural or the linguistic sphere, acquires distinctly anti-capitalistic and anti-
globalization, if not anti-American, overtones. Hagège notes that there is ―une solidarité 
naturelle [qui] unit l‘idéologie libre-échangiste et la langue anglaise‖ (ibid:61), and he sees 
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the growing impact of global English as the result of a concerted Anglo-Saxon pressure, 
which  
tire sa force non d‘un plébiscite populaire, mais du fait que, non contents d‘avoir 
imposé leurs produits, les producteurs sont, dans une certaine mesure, parvenus 
à donner aux consommateurs, en particulier les plus crédules, issus des dernières 
générations, l‘illusion que le dynamisme, la liberté, l‘ouverture à l‘autre, la haute 
technique, sont associés à l‘anglais, d‘où le déferlement de termes de cette 
langue qui sont les supports des talismans dont on s‘éprend. (ibid:74) 
 
It would seem that Claude Hagège, who so efficiently demonstrated in the 1980s that le 
franglais presented few risks to the French language, has some two decades later had a 
change of heart. Apparently, although the franglais does not, according to Hagège, threaten 
the linguistic structure of the French language, the use of English nevertheless remains the 
vehicle of an ideology, which one must assume is contrary to the French mindset: 
Car l‘idéologie dont une langue est le support est un ensemble d‘informations. Si 
ces dernières ne sont pas équilibrées par d‘autres, issues des pays occupés par 
ces schémas de pensée importés, et si les pouvoirs politiques desdits pays ne 
s‘efforcent pas de répandre puissamment leurs propres schémas de pensée, alors 
le sort de la guerre de l‘information peut devenir favorable à la langue du pays le 
plus offensif. C‘est ce qui pourrait accroître encore l‘hégémonie de l‘anglais 
dans le monde. (ibid:83) 
 
These are not just the words of the detached linguist, analyzing the developments of 
contemporary English and French. Without resorting to openly anti-American statements, 
Hagège nevertheless contributes to frame the defense of the French language in terms, which 
carry an inherent anti-American bias, as when he concludes by linking the erosion of the 
impact of French with the rise of English as a result of the success of liberal capitalism and 
calls for concerted political action against this development: ―Le français ne peut attendre son 
salut, comme les autres langues menacées par l‘anglais, langue des marchés néo-libéraux, que 
de cet affrontement entre l‘implacable expansion capitaliste et les corrections et régulations 
qui lui sont opposées‖ (ibid:232). This is a plea, which seems to have found massive 
resonance among the French political elites. When former French Prime Minister Lionel 
Jospin remarked that ―Le français n‘est plus une langue de pouvoir mais il pourrait être une 
langue de contrepouvoir‖ (quoted by Asselin and Mastron 2005:215), this was in essence a 
validation of the fact that in France, language is and remains ―une affaire politique‖ (Hagège 
2006:191). In his analysis of the impact of franglais, Claude Hagège noted more than two 
decades ago that 
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La contestation de ce que l‘on aperçoit au-delà de la langue, c‘est à dire la 
culture de masse américaine, ou ce que l‘on identifie ainsi, a cette vertu rare de 
rallier la plupart des opinions, en traversant les clivages idéologiques. Car elle 
est elle-même une idéologie. (1987:110). 
 
It would seem that large segments of the French, Hagège included, have succumbed to this 
ideology as part of their national habitus. As we shall see below, it would find an important 
echo in the ‗culture wars‘ which opposed France and the United States in the 1990s. 
 
The cinematographic „culture wars‟ and the promotion of cultural exceptionalism 
Whereas the 1980s had seen a relative decline in anti-American rhetoric, both political and 
(although in lesser measure) cultural, the 1990s would see a renewed opposition to the 
Republic of Mass Culture. This time, rejection of American culture would be spearheaded as 
much by practitioners as by the political and intellectual elites, giving it a somewhat less 
elitist dimension, seemingly validating a concerted French opposition toward the American 
cultural juggernaut. The foremost arena of opposition was against America‘s dominant 
position within the audiovisual spheres, i.e. cinema and television. The triggering event came 
in 1993 as the negotiations over the Uruguay Round of the GATT were finally nudging 
toward a conclusion. It was not unusual for trade and tariff negotiations to give rise to Franco-
American disagreements, but with the Uruguay Round, these became more acute than usual, 
as they this time included two new domains, both particularly sensitive to France: agriculture 
and intellectual services. The former led France and the United States to clash violently and 
publicly, primarily over the question of subsidies. Though the French agricultural and 
political circles enjoyed broad domestic support for their stance, agriculture nevertheless 
accounted for barely 3 percent of the French GDP, and though economic arguments were 
increasingly coupled with cultural arguments about French agricultural traditions, the issue 
remained marginal to most of the public (Leblond, in Melandri and Richard (eds) 2003:225-
227). This was probably also due largely to the fact that the second issue managed to attract 
much more media attention, as it was portrayed as concerning nothing less than the future of 
French culture (Meunier 2000). During the negotiations, the United States had demanded that 
intellectual services should cover also audiovisual goods such as films and television 
programs. This predictably gave rise to what later became known in some quarters as the 
Franco-American ―culture wars‖ (Grantham 2000), in which France vehemently insisted that 
cultural exports should be treated differently than other goods, as they were expressions of 
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cultural identity and therefore had the right to be protected if nations so wished (Rollet, in 
Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004, Gordon and Meunier 2002). In President Mitterrand‘s words, 
―aucun pays ne doit être autorisé à contrôler les images du monde entier‖ (quoted by Gordon 
and Meunier 2002:87). The United States, by far the world‘s largest exporter of such 
products, naturally derided this stance as clear evidence of protectionism, and disagreements 
over the issue contributed to prolong negotiations on the final accord, which took seven and a 
half years, almost twice the original schedule. The American wish for including cultural 
goods had come in response to a French sponsored 1989 EU directive termed ―Télévision 
sans Frontières‖, which stipulated that when possible, the majority of the scheduled airtime 
should be devoted to programs originating from Europe. As Gordon and Meunier note, the 
title of this directive was ―cocasse, car d‘un point de vue non européen, il s‘agit au contraire 
de télévision avec frontières‖ (ibid. 2002:93). The American reaction to France‘s – and by 
extension Europe‘s – displays of cultural protectionism met with fierce rejection in the 
cultural milieus in France. Film producers, directors, and actors were soon joined by the 
political and intellectual elites in a uniform defence of France‘s cultural identity, which in the 
media hype surrounding the controversy seemed to have as one of its primary modes of 
identification the national cinematographic outputs (Grantham 2000).  
In reality, it should come as no surprise that film should prove an eminently 
contentious issue in Franco-American trade relations. The production and distribution of films 
represents one of the most pervasive features of America‘s global cultural impact, and 
Hollywood productions have largely succeeded in dominating European markets since the 
interwar years (Lieber 2005:103-104). This alone should warrant strong French reactions 
against American cultural imperialism. But as important was probably the impression that this 
was once again an example of American encroachment on a domain, where France had 
previously reigned supreme, and – more importantly – in a field closely connected with 
French national identity. When the Lumière brothers put on the world‘s first public film show 
in the basement of the Grand Café in Paris in December 1895 (Zeldin 1977:388), few could 
have predicted that cinema would a century later become one of the major sources of quarrel 
between France and America. American observers such as William Marling may think that 
―Despite its highbrow pretensions, film is basically entertainment‖ (2006:19), and thus a 
commodity like any other, seemingly validating a typical French lamentation: ―La stratégie 
américaine d‘encerclement culturel procède du fait que ses protagonistes sont des acteurs de 
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l‘économie et, le plus souvent, uniquement cela. Leur ignorance des civilisations, des cultures, 
des nations et de leur histoire atteint parfois l‘invraisemblable‖ (Harbulot and Pichot-Duclos 
1999:61). For many French, nationally produced films represent much more than mere 
distraction; they represent an image of the nation (Rollet, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 
2004:170), and as such a cultural manifestation of the inner workings of society. Or rather, 
that is an opinion frequently voiced by the literati. In a 1954 survey, nine out of ten French 
respondents answered that their main motive for attending movies was in fact ―distraction‖ 
(Gaston-Mathé, quoted by Kuisel 2000). Nevertheless, among the agenda setting segments of 
French cultural society, cinematography is without any doubt considered culture, sometimes 
high culture, and is frequently referred to as ‗le sixème art‘. The importance attributed to films 
by these segments was stressed by Le Monde‟s film critic Jean-Michel Frodon a few years 
after the culture wars had ended: 
Enough futile controversy: France invented the cinema. Because it was its role 
or, if you prefer, because it needed it to accomplish what it considered to be its 
role, i.e., to enlighten the peoples of the world and lead them on the paths of 
freedom and equality, no less. If France had thought that it had accomplished its 
task in the nineteenth century, it would not have needed to invent cinema. 
(quoted by Rollet, in Godin and Chafer (eds) 2004:169-170) 
 
He continues with a wonderful play on words: ―If les Lumières (the Enlightenment) had 
triumphed, les Lumière (the brothers, Louis and Auguste) [..] might even have been 
unnecessary‖ (ibid:170). Clearly, cinema is no laughing matter in France. In fact, not only had 
France invented cinema; in the early 1900s, the French controlled the world film market, and 
even dominated the American market, where the Pathé Frères released 50 to 70 percent of all 
new films (Marling 2006:19). In 1906, ―Pathé produced a film a day [..], dwarfing the 
combined output of all U.S. competition‖, and by 1908, ―Pathé‘s domination of world cinema 
was complete‖ (ibid.). However the First World War disrupted the powerful French film 
industry, destroying the ability of French cinema to compete economically with Hollywood, 
while leaving the American producers and the substantial Anglo-American audience 
relatively unscathed (Pells 1997:15, Marling 2006:20-21). After the war, as film production 
costs rose, American film makers easily acquired the upper hand (Marling 2006:21) and in the 
1920s, Hollywood produced ―extravaganzas with which Europeans could not compete‖ 
(Costigliola 1984:176). Thus by 1925, American films made up 70 percent of the total shown 
in France, while Americans owned three-fourths of all the movie theatres in France (ibid, 
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Pells 1997:15-16). This led one French critic to lament that ―America has colonized us 
through the cinema‖, while a member of the National Assembly remarked that Europeans had 
become ―galley-slaves‖ to American finance and culture (quoted by Costigliola 1984:177). 
There is no doubt that a major change had occurred in the cinematographic world in the 
1920s: ―It was in this decade that cinema became synonymous with Hollywood. The United 
States dominated every facet of popular filmmaking, and with it the power to ―Americanize‖ 
the imaginations, if not the behavior, of audiences throughout the world‖ (Pells 1997:14). The 
reaction of the French government was to enact measures to ―limit the number of imported 
Hollywood films and encourage domestic production‖ (Costigliola 1984:177), but the success 
was limited, as the American studios circumvented such laws by investing in inexpensive 
local films called ―quota quickies‖ (Pells 1997:17). French hopes that the introduction of 
sound films would result in the French audiences returning to domestic productions were 
largely unfulfilled: ―If anything, the heightened cost of producing a sound film forced 
Hollywood to rely even more heavily on the international, and especially the European, 
market to ensure its profits‖ (ibid:18), thereby cementing the dominant American position in 
the cinematographic world. In the years leading to the Second World War, Hollywood came 
to represent in the minds of French and also many other European intellectuals  
everything they dreaded and despised about American mass culture. To these 
intellectuals, their governments‘ inability in the 1920s and 1930s to diminish the 
popularity of American films was an instance of Europe‘s greater failure to 
preserve its economic and cultural distinctiveness. (ibid:19) 
 
Whereas Hollywood had been shut out of most of the European market during the Second 
World War, the end of the war saw a craze for American productions, due both to the 
Americanophilia sweeping the liberated continent and the substantial supply offered as a 
result of the Marshall Plan, in which film exports were an important part of the distributed aid 
(Marling 2006:22-23, Hagège 2006:29). The 1946 Blum-Byrnes agreement opened France to 
Hollywood, but met with fierce opposition in France, where the leader of the Communist 
Party, Maurice Thorez, accused the government of letting American films ―empoisonne[r] 
littéralement l‘âme de nos enfants‖ (Gordon and Meunier 2002:81, see also Roger 2005:435-
437). Following orchestrated street manifestations and other forms of pressure, the agreement 
was renegotiated in 1948 in order to curb Hollywood imports (Kuisel 2000:123-125, Wall 
1991:113-121). Throughout the 1950s, France would come to represent an exception when 
compared to other Western European nations, whose cinemas would remain dominated by 
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American productions: In France, domestic filmmakers succeeded in withstanding 
Hollywood‘s invasion of the French market, attracting about 50 percent of the audience while 
the viewers of Hollywood‘s production dropped to about 30 percent (Kuisel 2000:120). 
According to Kuisel, this was due less to the reintroduced quota system or a tariff system, 
whose revenues were largely redirected as subsidies to domestic film production, than to what 
he terms the ―Fernandel factor‖, namely that the French audiences preferred their own cinema 
and especially the most popular of their domestic actors (2000). This did not prevent many of 
the period‘s French films from having a distinctive American ‗look‘: the hugely popular 
Lemmy films, staring the American-born Eddie Constantine in the role of an American 
troubleshooter in Paris, was evidence to the fact that even in the golden age of France‘s 
postwar cinema, America acted as a powerful source of inspiration, regardless of the fact that 
France was one of its least lucrative Western European markets. At times, Hollywood did not 
even fill its quota due to lack of interest among the French audiences (ibid:123). This did not 
prevent ―the French intellectual community, which was in one of its more anti-American 
moods in the early 1950s‖ from staging vivid attacks on the  
products of American junk culture that accompanied American political and 
economic domination. A combination of cultural snobbery toward mass culture, 
an aversion for capitalism, stereotypes of America and Americans, and anxiety 
about American hegemony and French decline, led many prominent intellectuals 
as well as influential newspapers and reviews to attack the American cultural 
menace – especially Hollywood. (ibid:125) 
 
Diatribes build on this argumentative would prove a recurrent theme among the intellectuals 
and cinematographic critics throughout the following decades, in spite of the fact that French 
film producers succeeded in retaining roughly half the domestic market ―until the early 1980s 
when the full-scale American conquest occurred‖ (ibid:133). It was under the impression of 
Hollywood‘s increasing stronghold on French audiences that in the early 1980s, Mitterrand‘s 
Minister of Culture, Jack Lang  
boycottait le festival du film américain de Deauville et se plaignait de 
l‘«invasion» et de la «subversion» d‘images fabriquées à l‘extérieur et de 
musiques standardisées [..] qui rabotent les cultures et véhiculent un mode de vie 
uniformisé que l‘on voudrait imposer à la planète entière. (Gordon and Meunier 
2002:84) 
 
Though the 1980s were, as has been noted above, characterized by a notable improvement in 
Franco-American relations, which also extended somewhat to the cultural front (ibid:85), 
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Lang‘s complaints are significant both because they so clearly were in prolongation of the by 
then ingrained French tradition of denigrating American mass culture, and because they show 
that the highest political offices had no scruples in validating such discourses by adding to 
them what seemed as the official approbation of the State. Similarly, the French State 
apparently saw no dichotomy in on the one hand forcefully lobbying the Disney Cooperation 
in order for its Euro-Disney theme park to be located in France, while on the other hand 
tacitly encouraging allegations that this Euro-Disney (today renamed Disneyland-Paris) 
represented a ―cultural Chernobyl‖, in the words of theatre director Ariane Mnouchkine, or a 
―terrifying giant‘s step toward world homogenization‖ as stipulated by philosopher Alain 
Finkielkraut (Pells 1997:309). A politician remarked that it would ―bombard France with 
uprooted creations that are to culture what fast food is to gastronomy‖ (quoted by Ritzer 
2000:17). Such judgements were repeated albeit in somewhat subdued ways by none other 
than Jack Lang, minister of the same government which had supplied the Disney Cooperation 
with thousands of acres of prime real estate at below-market prices, arranged for low interest 
loans, and seriously upgraded its infrastructures, all in order to close a deal, which they 
expected would result in the creation of a substantial number of new jobs as well as providing 
a much needed economic boost as a result of a projected increase in tourist revenues (Pells 
1997:308-310). The furore surrounding the opening of Euro-Disney in 1992, where French 
writers and intellectuals ―competed with one another to see whose denunciations were the 
most hyperbolic‖ (ibid:309) probably contributed to giving the culture wars over the 
audiovisual dossier the following year an accrued character of rejection of the Republic of 
Mass Culture: The intellectual indictment had been prepared over decades, the public had 
been groomed by the constant warnings against the cultural Americanization of the French 
society, the intellectual elites had found common cause with the cultural practitioners, and the 
political elites had shown that they were eager to reap both the rewards offered by the 
prospects of increased exports of its domestic cultural exports (though without wanting to 
alienate American investments too much), and not least the support of the powerful cultural 
agenda setters. Resisting Hollywood apparently provided the ideal opportunity.  
After prolonged negotiations and under the close scrutiny of the French media, 
the ‗culture wars‘ resulted in a compromise, in which France, having secured the lukewarm 
support of the rest of the European Union, obtained that nations could retain the right to 
subsidize their cultural goods (a practice which, contrary to standard impressions was anyway 
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shared on both sides of the Atlantic) and, more significantly, to protect them with quotas. This 
compromise, frequently referred to as enshrining the right to ―cultural exception‖ or ―cultural 
diversity‖132, basically meant that cultural products became de facto excluded from the 
accords (Gordon and Meunier 2002:87). This, however, did not signal an end to the culture 
wars. The Uruguay Round had laid the foundations for the establishment of a proper 
organization to succeed the somewhat looser GATT negotiating system, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). The WTO would soon become the bête noire of the rising anti-
globalization movement in France alongside the globalizing power par excellence, the United 
States, and the organization would be ―portrayed in France as a Trojan horse that forces on 
others the low-brow uniformity of the American lifestyle – fast food, bad clothing, and even 
worse sitcoms‖ (Meunier 2000:107), in contrast naturally, as Meunier further notes, to ―the 
French cultural model [..] portrayed as a ‗high‘ culture of philosophers, fine dining, and 
intellectual films‖ (ibid.). In the years to come, the culture wars would see new combatants 
joining the veterans from the early 1990s in a renewed fight against economic and cultural 
Americanization. The question of cultural exceptions resurfaced during the OECD‘s 
negotiations over the Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI), and as was the case 
during the GATT negotiations in 1993, it was the practitioners of French cinema, who led the 
opposition against the agreement, which in view of its aim at liberalizing the participating 
nations‘ investment conditions they considered specifically threatening to the still highly 
protected audiovisual sector (Agrikoliansky, Fillieule, and Mayer 2005:317-318). The protests 
quickly gathered in momentum, and soon managed to attract a large following of protesters 
against the increasing globalization. The organizers succeeded in portraying the MAI as the 
―symbole de la menace néolibérale‖ (ibid:317), and in 1998, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin 
declared that France refused to sign the accord (ibid:321, Harbulot and Pichot-Duclos 
1999:45). This was a great triumph for the nascent French anti-globalization movement, and 
the aborted WTO meeting in Seattle the following year ―gave France further opportunities to 
reassert what it saw as its basic democratic and sovereign principles – and teach the world a 
lesson‖ (Meunier 2000:110). The culture wars had demonstrated that French principles of 
sovereignty and independence were to remain the guiding principles also within the cultural 
sphere, and the momentum gained contributed to forge an alliance between the hitherto rather 
disparate groupings working to combat globalization, liberalism, capitalism, and – of course – 
the ever threatening Americanization. The successful opposition to the MAI would prove the 
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triggering factor, which prompted these protesters to coordinate their efforts and establish a 
common anti-globalization movement – ATTAC (Agrikoliansky, Fillieule, and Mayer 
2005:13-14, Gordon and Meunier 2002:131, Birchfield and Freyberg-Inan, in Eschle and 
Maiguashca (eds) 2005:160). Supported and actively promoted by Le Monde Diplomatique, 
which described globalization as tantamount to a ―rape of the popular will‖ (quoted by 
Meunier 2000:110), this movement would prove an instant and resounding success, 
mobilizing tens of thousands of ―militants‖ against the dual forces of global economic 
liberalism and cultural Americanization (Agrikoliansky, Fillieule, and Mayer 2005:13-14 and 
317-337). Before long, the new organization had  
drawn support from all parts of civil society: farmers, labor groups, 
environmentalists, journalists, academics, and film-makers. Even soccer players 
and coaches [..] demonstrated against the WTO and globalization to protest the 
advent of capitalism in sports management. Given such breadth of popular 
sentiment, French politicians [were] forced to follow. The extremist parties [..] 
seized on the antiglobalization cause as the logical continuation of their 
traditional combat against free trade. And the mainstream parties [were] unable 
to withstand the extraordinary appeal of this movement in public opinion. 
(Meunier 2000:111) 
 
The culture wars are not just highly illustrative of the French rejection of the Republic of 
Mass Culture, they are also an important reminder that the high politics of international trade 
relations can be seriously affected by the supposedly low politics of culture. Lieber has noted 
that in ―an increasingly globalized world, culture has emerged as a central arena of conflict‖ 
(2005:120; see also the discussion in relation to American soft power in chapter 3). The 
Franco-American culture wars certainly seem to validate this assessment, which also raises 
the question of the perceived excessiveness of America‘s soft power. Quoting former French 
Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine‘s lamentations that Americans are powerful because they 
can ―inspire the dreams and desires of others, thanks to the mastery of global images through 
film and television‖, Joseph S. Nye remarks that this is the essence of soft power (2002:9). It 
clearly is the essence of soft power, but does this not underline that a preponderant amount of 
soft power in the hands of one lone superpower can be a double-edged sword? According to 
Sophie Meunier, ―the clash between French and American cultures was probably inevitable 
given the universalist vocation that both nations claim‖, and as such, the reaction against 
globalization was due to the impression that it ―threatens the very foundations of French 
greatness: France‘s unique culture‖ (2000:107). Yet it was not only the Republic of High 
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Culture, which felt threatened by the Republic of Mass Culture. The culture wars had given 
rise to a concerted campaign against first cultural Americanization and later cultural and 
economical globalization. At the dawn of a new millennium, this campaign would find an 
echo far away from the cultural circles in Paris, as la France profonde joined in opposition 
against what they perceived to be the greater challenge: the American malbouffe and its 
impact on the French palates as well as the livelihood of French farmers – both clearly 
eminently cultural issues.  
 
The fight against the malbouffe  
Whereas the fight for cultural exception in the early 1990s had been led by the political elites 
and supported by the intellectuals in an early rejection of cultural globalization, the late 1990s 
would see a full scale French campaign against globalization originating from both the 
cultural elites and a rising popular counterforce of grass roots, which felt abandoned by the 
established political elites. The campaign was largely the result of the prolonged Franco-
American trade discords during the 1990s and could as such be interpreted in terms of a 
continuation of the culture wars, albeit on a new cultural turf. In 1999, in retaliation to an EU 
decision to uphold its ban on the import of hormone beef, a decision which violated a WTO 
ruling on the matter, the United States decided to impose an extra 100% tariff on certain 
European imports, notably Roquefort cheese from France (Gordon and Meunier 2002:133). 
This prompted a small group of protesters, led by José Bové, a charismatic goat farmer from 
the rural department of Aveyron, to ―dismantle‖ a McDonald‘s under construction in the 
village of Millau in Southern France (Kincheloe 2002:1-2). What originated as a relatively 
minor protest, consistent with the French farming lobby‘s long tradition of relatively 
‗muscled‘ demonstrations whenever they have felt their livelihoods threatened, quickly 
escalated into a large-scale and concerted action against the McDonaldization of food 
consumption and food production. Charged with vandalism, José Bové and his fellow 
demonstrators were imprisoned by the authorities, and the image of the Asterix-looking goat 
farmer, defiantly raising his hand-cuffed hands in the air, made headlines, propelling Bové to 
instant national fame, where he easily became the year‘s ―biggest celebrity in France‖ 
(Meunier 2000:104). The choice of McDonald‘s as an object of protest was not accidental. In 
anticipation of the American decision to retaliate against the EU-ban, the local farmers had 
already decided that they would take a stand against McDonald‘s, which to them represented 
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the symbol of industrial agriculture and (mal)nutrition as well as of globalization (Bové and 
Dufour 2000:14-15). Hardly an original statement, as the same observation had been 
advanced both by scholars and anti-globalization protesters throughout most of the 1990s (see 
for example Ritzer 2000). Though Bové has later emphasized that his action against 
McDonald should be seen as a stance against globalization and not as an expression of anti-
Americanism, likening it to the 1773 Boston Tea Party, which sparked the rebellion of the 
American colonists against the British (Bové and Dufour 2000:206), it nevertheless gave rise 
to substantial anti-American rhetoric, as it consistently proved impossible to dissociate the 
image of McDonald‘s from the image of America and the impact of globalization from the 
forces of Americanization. At his trial, Bové was supported by ―45,000 anti-McDonald‘s and 
anti-American demonstrators‖ (Kincheloe 2002:4). Gordon and Meunier have explained the 
massive French opposition to globalization by the fact that ―les Français sont extrêmement 
attachés à leur culture et à leur identité, et [..] beaucoup ont le sentiment que celles-ci sont 
aujourd‘hui menacées par une mondialisation qu‘ils assimilent à une américanisation‖ 
(2002:26-27), adding that ―Ce n‘est pas un hasard si José Bové, avec son sens de la publicité, 
a choisi McDonald‘s comme cible de sa contestation‖ (ibid:27). Just as was the case with 
Coca-Cola half a century ago, McDonald‘s has for many become the quintessential symbol of 
Americanization. Sardar and Davies have described how,  
The hamburger is a particular source of hatred of America. It is the single most 
concentrated [..] symbol of the entire complex that is America. [..] As a way of 
life, the hamburger is a seductive novelty with discernible, and deleterious, 
consequences. Not just because it is an omnipresent con-trick, but also because 
the consumerism it embodies is seen as a clear cultural threat. It personifies the 
way in which America is taking over the lives of ordinary people in the rest of 
the world and shrinking their cultural space – their space to be themselves, to be 
different, to be other than America. (2002:103-105)  
 
This point of view was clearly shared by Alain Rollat of Le Monde, who in an editorial 
entitled ―Vive le roquefort libre!‖ remarked that ―La résistance aux prétentions hégémoniques 
du hamburger est, avant tout, un impératif culturel‖ (quoted by Gordon and Meunier 2002:96-
97). Clearly, fast-food franchises like McDonald‘s were seen as symbols of the American way 
of life, substituting the traditional local businesses and threatening French gastronomic 
traditions. Sophie Meunier has given a good explanation of why it was the fight against la 
malbouffe staged by Bové, which succeeded in rallying large segments of the French public 
behind the cause of anti-globalization:  
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Focusing the cultural arguments on food has proven a particularly fruitful 
strategy for globalization‘s adversaries. Food is one of the most universally 
recognized components of French culture – and remains one of the greatest 
sources of domestic pride. As Le Monde noted, ―McDonald‘s red and yellow 
ensign is the new version of America‘s star-spangled banner, whose commercial 
hegemony threatens agriculture and whose cultural hegemony insidiously ruins 
alimentary behavior – sacred reflections of French identity.‖ By painting 
globalization as a direct attack on French food, its opponents received national 
approbation for a collective struggle against la mal-bouffe, or ―lousy food.‖ 
Bové and his followers threw into the same bag the issues of American trade 
imperialism, genetically modified food, and the fatty American nutritional 
model. Since nothing that French politicians say on behalf of French culinary 
traditions can backfire, they have now entered a free-for-all battle of wits in 
which they try to outdo each other with catch phrases and solemn declarations 
on hamburgers. The winner in this category may be France‘s agriculture 
minister, who recently declared that the United States ―has the worst food in the 
world‖ and publicly announced [..] that he had never eaten at McDonald‘s and 
disliked hamburgers. (2000:107-108). 
 
The French insurrection against American culture is clearly not limited to products that would 
normally be characterized as ‗cultural‘ in the strictest sense of the word. Compared with the 
other examples of France‘s opposition to the Republic of Mass Culture given above, the 
McDonald‘s brouhaha at first seems to resemble the Coca-Cola affair of the 1940s and 1950s 
more than the fight against the franglais or even the related culture wars earlier in the 1990s, 
which after all raised real questions about an Americanization of the hearts and minds, and 
not just of the stomachs and bowels. Compared with the onslaughts on commercial products 
such as Coca-Cola and Big Macs, the campaign to preserve the French language from 
degeneration and the importance placed on the need to support the national production of 
films after all seem somewhat validated by the fact that without state sponsoring or 
interference, France‘s high culture might indeed be worse off – that is of course if one accepts 
the premise that purity of the language and the production of (potentially non-commercial) 
films are important elements of national culture. But economic considerations apart, it is hard 
to see how Coca-Cola or fast food chains such as McDonald‘s can seriously threaten French 
culture. A chosen alternative to Coca-Cola would most likely be (and frequently is) a glass of 
Orangina or a Perrier, but hardly one of France‘s fine wines or spirits, which might better pass 
as examples of France‘s traditional culture. And given the unavailability of a nearby 
McDonald‘s, the customer avid for a quick snack would not seek out a temple of gastronomy 
as an alternative, but rather a crêpe on a street corner, a croque monsieur on the counter of the 
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local café or – much more likely – a hamburger from the French-owned Quick chain, which 
covers roughly one quarter of the French fast-food market, leaving the rest to McDonald‘s. 
Regardless of the fact that José Bové‘s campaign against McDonald‘s acquired the public 
approbation of the French and for a while made him something of a national hero, it remains a 
fact that ―France is McDonald‘s most profitable market after the United States‖ (Meunier 
2007:82), with McDonald‘s France serving on average more than one and a half million 
customers every day
133
. The McDonald‘s restaurant located on the Champs-Elysées is the 
restaurant in France which attracts the most customers, ―et la foule qui s‘y presse chaque jour 
est loin d‘être uniquement composée d‘étrangers‖ (Gordon and Meunier 2002:98-99). This 
would seem to indicate that not all French find la malbouffe so bad after all. 
Part of the success of the fight against la malbouffe and, in a wider context, the 
perceived McDonaldization of societies, is – apart from its association with the threat of 
Americanization – that the hamburger conjures images of obesity and malnutrition, as was 
witnessed in the 2004 film Supersize me; an American-made production, which played 
directly into the hands of cultural anti-Americans worldwide. Though the nutritional argument 
is inherent in the term malbouffe itself, there is more to the fight against McDonald‘s than to 
protect especially youngsters from developing bad eating habits, a recurrent preoccupation 
throughout generations, and one which would hardly cease even with the disappearance of all 
fast-food outlets in the world. More important is probably the resentment spurned by the fact 
that McDonald‘s has succeeded spectacularly well on the French market, a clear indicator that 
it has been able to offer products, which are in high demand, thus cornering a lucrative 
market. This, however, does not necessarily mean that Franco-American trade exchanges in 
the fast-food domain are loop-sided when seen from France. Contrary to common belief, 
McDonald‘s is actually not the world‘s largest fast-food company, an honor which goes to the 
British Compass Group, owners of among other Burger King. Though McDonald‘s is second, 
it is closely followed by the French Sodexho firm, which employs 110.000 Americans as 
opposed to the 35.000 French employed by McDonald‘s (Marling 2006:59). McDonald‘s 
recognizable logo and the hype surrounding the emerging McWorld has nevertheless 
succeeded in blurring the fact that other multinational firms, including French-owned firms, 
are as much as McDonald‘s representatives of the economic globalization of the world, 
although they clearly have not acquired the same symbolic stature as the American-based 
company. It is this, which has contributed to popularize the term McDonaldization to denote 
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the ultimate example of cultural and economic globalization. One of the scholars to have 
written most extensively on the concept of McDonaldization, George Ritzer, notes that it is 
the global consequences of McDonaldization much more than the iconic product itself, which 
should cause alarm: 
McDonald‘s and McDonaldization represent a unique threat to other cultures. 
First, unlike previous American exports they have an impact on both the way 
business is organized and on the way people live on a day-to-day basis. Second, 
they represent a set of principles that can be completely disengaged from their 
original source [..]. Once these principles have been dis-embedded from their 
original source and then re-embedded in indigenous structures, identifying them 
as originating in McDonald‘s or in the United States will eventually become 
difficult or impossible. As a result, opposing McDonaldization as some foreign 
import will become more difficult, as will mounting anti-American sentiment 
against its various manifestations. (2000:178) 
 
Most French anti-globalists would probably subscribe to this view, rejecting McDonald‘s 
practice of altering its menus to suit local tastes or the fact that the practices of McDonald‘s 
are copied by domestic firms as further evidence to the fact that McDonaldization is 
encroaching on local customs (Marling 2006:56). But is this not the essence of globalization? 
Reading Ritzer, it is difficult to escape the feeling that he is writing about globalization rather 
than McDonaldization; after all, given the fact that probably no other product is associated 
more with America than McDonald‘s, save perhaps Coca-Cola, it is highly inconceivable that 
the second part of his statement holds true, especially as regards the feeling in France, where 
there is still very much an impression that McDonald‘s not only originates in the United 
States, but is a quintessentially American phenomenon. To the extent that the term 
McDonaldization gives any meaning at all, it should read as synonymous with 
Americanization rather than with globalization, though some features of globalization clearly 
seem imbued, especially when viewed from France, with the undesirable features of 
Americanization and thus by extension of McDonaldization. The French have a long tradition 
of rejecting these examples of ‗machine civilization‘, and they massively associate them with 
America. Irrespective of legitimate worries over nutritional values or the impact of 
globalization, there is no doubt that in France, the attacks against McDonald‘s and 
McDonaldization have come to form part of a wider cultural anti-American narrative. As 
Sophie Meunier rightly notes, 
Thanks to Bové‘s deliberate attack against McDonald‘s and politicians‘ 
denunciation of ―Anglo-Saxon imperialism,‖ the United States has become the 
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scapegoat for all social groups hurt by globalization. Above all, globalization has 
been vilified because it threatens the very foundation of French greatness: 
France‘s unique culture. (2000:106-107) 
 
The fight against the malbouffe was, much more than any of the other examples of cultural 
anti-Americanism given above, driven or supported by broad segments of the French 
population, and it continues to form an important part of today‘s anti-American narrative. 
Meanwhile, McDonald‘s France has registered record sales in the first decade of the new 
millennium
134
 indicating that the campaign has had little effect on the consumer habits of the 
French. The attacks did however contribute to substantially strengthening the French anti-
globalization movement, and as its most emblematic spokesman, José Bové would later travel 
the world, attending ‗altermondialiste‘ meetings in an attempt at presenting the rejection of 
the Anglo-Saxon liberal model as a universal priority rather than a French exception.  
  
6.2.3 Conclusion  
A common nineteenth century French criticism of America was that it lacked culture (Roger 
2005). As noted in chapter 3, the same criticism is advanced today, albeit in almost the 
opposite meaning: that though America is arguably the world‘s largest exporter of cultural 
products, it is the wrong kind of culture that they promote. Their perceived lack of culture is 
no longer a lack of cultural products, but a lack of culture in the products that they export. 
Much of the politically based resistance to American cultural products is naturally dictated by 
economic fears of lagging too far behind the United States in the trade exchanges between the 
two countries. But there is much more to it than that. In the minds of many French, Baudelaire 
was not far off when he described the future to come: the Americanization of society is a fact, 
visible on virtually every street corner as well as audible in the airwaves. This not only 
diminishes France‘s possibilities of exporting their own cultural values (and products) but 
also, or so it seems to many, threatens to undermine the unique French values at home. As 
was seen above, some of the main agents of cultural anti-Americanism in France have 
throughout been the influential intellectuels. Since the interwar years, they have promoted the 
view that America represented a degeneration of culture, an argument, which has gained in 
momentum as American soft power increased substantially after the Second World War. As 
France‘s political influence worldwide seemed in decline, the intellectuals mounted a frontal 
assault on what they frequently perceived as being a concerted American attempt at achieving 
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cultural hegemony in the West. The intellectuals‘ repeated allegations of a looming 
Americanization of the French cultural mind seem to have had a profound impact on French 
discourses surrounding the Republic of Mass Culture. The intellectual and political elites have 
found common cause in their rejection of America‘s soft power; a rejection, which has 
increasingly been echoed by other parts of the French society. The fight against 
cocacolonization, hollywoodization or McDonaldization can largely be seen as synonymous 
with the opposition to Americanization, which has proved a consistent reference base for the 
standard narratives of cultural anti-Americanism in France. In later decades, this opposition 
has been formulated in terms of resistance against globalization, but as it is American 
products and values, which are targeted as representing the opprobrious features of 
globalization, the anti-globalist campaigns have easily acquired anti-American overtones. 
Though most of the protests originate from what one might term the cultural spheres in the 
broad sense of the word, the perceived threat from the process of globalization is, however, 
not exclusively of a cultural nature in its strictest sense. According to Meunier, what explains 
the strong political reactions as well as the enormous popular backlash against globalization is 
that it seems to consecrate ―American individualism and the victory of American-style 
democracy over French-style republicanism and dirigisme. In reacting against globalization, 
the French are reacting to the surrender of their state traditions to a foreign system of political 
values‖ (2000:110). Meunier further notes that with respect to the discourses surrounding the 
anti-globalization protests, these enjoy broad popular support, as 
France feels that nothing short of its national identity is at stake. Rather than 
being framed as a question of free trade versus protectionism, the trade debate 
has been recast as ―Anglo-Saxon globalization‖ versus the preservation of 
France‘s national and cultural values. (ibid:105) 
 
There is no doubt that many people in several countries have qualms about globalization. 
Throughout the world, voices are raised against the economic consequences of globalization, 
which by some are believed to be the cause of widening inequalities, as well as the cultural 
effects, which are frequently portrayed as leading toward a process of cultural 
homogenization, which in essence is tantamount to cultural Americanization. But, as Sophie 
Meunier notes, it is France, which  
has taken the international lead here because its political and cultural identity 
combines all the elements threatened by globalization: a universalist culture, a 
language with international aspirations, a ―superior‖ cuisine, a sensitive view of 
national sovereignty, a strong, centralized state, a need for a world role, a sense 
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of duty toward the poorer nations, and a deeply rooted anti-Americanism. 
(ibid:116) 
 
The French opposition to the Republic of Mass Culture appears less strident today than half a 
century ago, when America was vilified, especially by some of the most prominent 
intellectuals, as an almost unmitigated evil. Except among the few remaining arch-anti-
Americans, it is rare to hear the United States or Americanization referred to today as a 
‗cancer‘, and compared with the tone of the interwar years, the contemporary displays of 
cultural anti-Americanism may appear almost benign. Such impressions, however, have to be 
qualified by the realization that anti-Americanism, cultural as well as political, has moved 
beyond the realm of the elites and has become part of a standard rhetorical culture, which 
seems to have become almost systematically embedded in the French doxa. The Republic of 
Mass Culture is still largely scorned by the Republic of High Culture, which in line with its 
universalist traditions has attempted to project the resistance against cultural Americanization 
both to a European and a global level. 
A common feature of the French rejection of America‘s soft power is that it is 
perceived as threatening not just French, but also European cultural values and habits. This 
has been a standard argument, which has been put forth since the nineteenth century, where 
lamentations about the invasion of ―American ideas‖ in Europe where a common refrain 
among prominent French writers (Zeldin 1977:127, see also Roger 2005). As Markovits has 
noted (2007), such assessments where made in several European countries, yet the French 
literati seem to have been particularly vocal in their rejection of the Americanization of 
Europe. In the interwar years, ―All the efforts of the French anti-Americans [..] went into 
affirming the spiritual and cultural precedence of Europe – and preferably a French or French-
oriented Europe – over America‖ (Roger 2005:444). These efforts were largely carried on 
after the liberation, and as the European integration process gathered in momentum, new 
venues seemed open in the combat against the cultural steamroller from across the Atlantic. 
Just as there has been, as was seen above, a consistent French effort to depict European 
political unity at least partly in terms of a defense of European political values vis-à-vis the 
threat of American political and economic hegemony, so has there been a marked tendency 
toward portraying the resistance against American cultural domination as a common fight for 
European culture. Furthermore, this is a resistance, which both official France and the France 
of the cultural elites feel uniquely well placed to lead. Claude Hagège, echoing a sentiment 
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shared by large proportions of the French elites, remarks that ―les expériences les plus 
authentiques de construction d‘une unité européenne ont été [..] d‘abord culturelles, bien que 
s‘appuyant aussi sur une primauté politique et économique‖ (2006:37). Since these impulses 
are perceived as originating primarily from France, many consider it only natural that she 
should be at the vanguard of the defense of European culture. As such, many French 
intellectuals have proclaimed that they were engaged in a quest to defend not just French, but 
also European culture (Roger 2005), just as French governments have presented themselves as 
spokesmen for Europe in matters relating to culture, as could be witnessed under the ‗culture 
wars‘, in which France claimed to represent a concerted ‗European‘ opposition to trade 
liberalization in the audiovisual sphere – much to the annoyance of several of its European 
partners, who felt that the French government had applied undue pressure in order to impose 
its views in this matter on the more reluctant EU-partners. It is certainly true, as Hagège notes, 
that ―la France possède en Europe une vocation particulière de défense du culturel, même si 
les adversaires internes du français n‘en sont pas convaincus‖ (2006:37), and in a speech to 
the Council of Europe, President Mitterrand characteristically described ―L‘Europe de la 
Culture‖ as ―un élément de résistance à tous les alibis commerciaux de la culture‖, warning 
that Europe risked being ―frappée de polution sonore et visuelle‖ (Mitterrand 1986:256-257). 
Even in the institutional workings of the European Union, France has attempted to resist what 
it perceives as a growing Anglo-Saxon orientation, both politically and linguistically. 
Politically and economically, it has long attempted to impose its tradition of dirigisme and 
protectionism, rejecting the more pro-market postures of countries such as Britain (Meunier 
2000). Linguistically, France has attempted to use its former quasi-leadership position within 
the Union to promote French as ―une langue de contrepouvoir‖, to use Lionel Jospin‘s phrase 
(see above). As late as in 1986, the former vice-president of the High Committee for the 
French Language, Gabriel de Broglie, argued that Europe would be stronger if it spoke with 
one – French – voice (1986). That was, and clearly remains, a mirage. Formerly a bastion of 
France‘s linguistic influence, French has long ago lost ground to English within the EU 
(Phillipson 2003). As a language spoken by citizens of the Union, French is by far relegated 
to second position by English and its tied second place is in the process of being overtaken by 
German
135
. Though there has no doubt over the years been attempts at Europeanizing 
France‘s mission civilisatrice, notably through the policies of francophonie, these attempts 
have proved only partly successful, and instead, the principle of cultural diversity has been 
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promoted forcefully. While the issue of cultural diversity was originally presented in France 
as not least a means toward protecting European culture from American domination, it has 
increasingly acquired a global dimension. As such, France has spearheaded the efforts to have 
the protection of cultural diversity acknowledged in a host of different international forums. 
Significantly, it was France and Canada who sponsored UNESCO‘s Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, which enshrines cultural 
diversity as a method of protecting local cultures. The convention was passed in 2005 against 
the lone opposition of the United States and Israel (Wolton 2006:9). In theory, the principle of 
cultural diversity is a laudable attempt at safeguarding the unique cultures of the world, which 
also explains why it has received near-unanimous backing – with the notable exceptions 
mentioned above – among all nations. Yet there are two main observations, which should be 
made when addressing France‘s role in promoting cultural diversity. First, that France‘s 
advocacy of this issue is of relatively new date. When France was the world‘s preeminent 
cultural nation, there was no talk of cultural diversity. France‘s civilizational role was to 
export its values, political as well as cultural, for the benefit of mankind. For long, France 
actively opposed cultural and linguistic diversity on the French territory, as was noted in 
chapter 5, and cultural diversity is still rarely promoted domestically (Meunier 2007). As 
such, it is tempting to conclude that the French focus on cultural diversity reflects an implicit 
admission that the rayonnement of French culture is in decline, and that cultural diversity 
represents a means to protect (and promote) French culture. Second and imminently related to 
this, it is noteworthy that the French emphasis on cultural diversity seems to specifically 
target the massive influence of American culture on other societies. The notion of cultural 
diversity is used by French elites only in two respects: either as a general concept, or in 
relation to the rejection of cultural domination by a uniform culture, namely that of America, 
which through the process of globalization is perceived as threatening to invade and supplant 
local cultures. What is noteworthy is that with respect to cultural diversity, nobody has better 
disproved the apparent dichotomy between the Republic of High Culture versus the Republic 
of Mass Culture than a former French cultural attaché, Frédéric Martel, who has written an 
impressive treatise on culture in America, which reveals that as opposed to contrary belief (in 
France), America presents an eminently rich, varied and diversified culture, whereas culture 
in France by comparison remains uniform and elitist and as such does not propagate any 
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image of diversity (2006). It would seem that to the French elites, cultural diversity is after all 
more about protection than promotion. 
When speaking about the ‗French rejection of American culture‘, there is good 
reason to question how ‗French‘ this rejection is, i.e. to what extent this rejection is shared by 
a majority of the French. A common perception among most scholars of anti-Americanism is 
that anti-Americanism in Europe, and especially in France, ―has not been, generally speaking, 
the attitude of majorities but rather of substantial minorities and especially of important elite 
groups‖ (Hollander 1995:369). When analyzing the French rejection of the Republic of Mass 
Culture, this at first seems a valid assessment. There is no doubt that there exists an important 
segment, whether termed elitist or not, which forcefully advocates that French culture and by 
extension French national identity is threatened by the Republic of Mass Culture, and who 
reclaim what André Malraux termed every nation‘s right to ―cultural self-determination‖ 
(quoted by Forbes, in Forbes and Kelly (eds) 1995:259). Yet figures show unambiguously 
that the French are avid consumers of American cultural products – Hollywood blockbusters, 
Big Macs and all – and that especially younger generations have a penchant toward 
embracing for example American idioms. Nevertheless, the assessment that cultural anti-
Americanism is largely an elitist phenomenon needs to be somewhat qualified: though the 
proportion of the French, which consistently shun American culture is rather limited, the 
rhetoric against American mass culture seems to appeal to a much wider audience than the 
one confined to the intellectual and political elites. Part of the reason for this can undoubtedly 
be attributed to the influence of the media, largely sharing the values and habits of the elites, 
to which they by and large belong as co-shapers of the public social imaginary. Yet this 
cannot be the sole explanation. As was seen above, the anti-globalization movement at the 
turn of the millennium undoubtedly attracted much popular support and was largely driven by 
grass roots rather than by the elites (although these were quick to bandwagon with this 
popular issue, see Meunier 2000:105); furthermore, the anti-globalization movement was as 
much about defending cultural values and traditions as it was an anti-liberal or anti-capitalist 
movement. Clearly, the ‗French‘ rejection of the Republic of Mass Culture covers more than 
the agenda setting elites and less than the French public at large. Just as it would be wrong to 
take the elitist claims that America is colonizing French society and culture at face value as 
expressions of the views of France as such, these lamentations cannot be dismissed as just the 
standard refrain emanating from a non-representative chorus of disgruntled anti-American 
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intellectuals. There exists a substantial number of French who consume American cultural 
products while fearing that American culture is nonetheless somewhat of a threat toward the 
world‘s cultural diversity. Though the impact of American culture in France is considerable, 
at least when measured in terms of box office revenues or fast food and beverage sales, there 
is good reason to assume that the rejection of American cultural values is common to a 
substantial proportion of the French public. This might in fact disprove the charges of 
‗cultural colonization of the mind‘ frequently leveled against American mass culture: though 
American cultural products are obviously consumed in large quantities by the French, they do 
not seem to have adopted American cultural values to nearly the same extent. For some, quite 
the contrary has happened: while few probably subscribe to the most strident vilifications of 
the American Republic of Mass Culture, many share the unease associated with its seemingly 
dominating nature. As such, there is no necessary antagonism between deploring the 
McDonaldization of societies while occasionally enjoying a Big Mac: it is its perceived 
impact on society rather than the cultural product as such, which is rejected. Even the French 
appear to agree with Richard Pells that sometimes, ―a movie is just a movie and a 
cheeseburger is just a cheeseburger‖ (1997:282), but this does not prevent them from 
harboring a deep-set distrust of the American cultural juggernaut. Though the French public 
remains an avid consumer of American cultural products, the fight against ‗cultural 
Americanization‘ or American cultural contamination seems to have become an integral part 
of France‘s cultural and thus national identity. Sophie Meunier has described anti-
Americanism as a ―well-known peculiarity of French cultural identity‖ (2000:106). One might 
even say that as the threat posed by the Republic of Mass Culture has progressively become 
firmly enshrined as a central part of the French doxa, cultural anti-Americanism seems to 
have become a quasi-permanent component of the French national habitus, perhaps even to a 
larger extent than political anti-Americanism.  
 
6.3 Conclusion: The Limits of Anti-Americanism 
It was argued in chapter 3 that anti-Americanism can be analyzed in terms of rejection of 
American power. This chapter has attempted to present an analysis of French anti-
Americanism in the postwar era as a rejection of both American hard power and soft power; 
the underlying premise being, as was showed in chapter 5, that there are strong currents in the 
French national identity, which can be said to constitute a (more or less latent) anti-American 
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predisposition. The present chapter has focused on both the political actions of French 
governments, especially under the Fifth Republic, and the efforts displayed by the primary 
shapers of cultural anti-Americanism in France. There is no doubt that it is to a large extent a 
rather artificial distinction, at least when regarding France, to divide anti-American narratives 
and actions into political or cultural anti-Americanism: the two feed on each other and are 
frequently merged into the same discourses, as was eminently proved by Étiembles Parlez-
vous franglais?. Furthermore, it should be noted that while the French rejection of American 
power appears to constitute the basis for most French anti-Americanism, the distinction 
between hard power and soft power is largely an academic tool, which can help to identify the 
structural causes of French anti-Americanism while giving indications as to how the many 
varied displays of anti-Americanism can be conceptualized within such structures. This said, 
one should be careful not to assume that various displays can easily be categorized as fitting 
neatly into corresponding boxes: the politics of anti-Americanism discussed in 6.1 are as 
much if not more due to a rejection of the attributes of America‘s soft power, namely its 
ability to act as a global political and institutional agenda-setter, than to the existence of its 
hard power as such, although its impressive hard power arsenal contributes enormously to 
bolster its political soft power. Likewise, the rejection of cultural America is clearly also 
tainted with a rejection of America‘s hard power, not least within the economic field. 
Nevertheless, it appears useful to apply the distinction between the French rejection of 
America‘s hard and soft power to show that the two kinds of rejection represent, at least when 
it comes to France, two sides of the same coin. Katzenstein and Keohane‘s study on anti-
Americanism is highly useful in identifying different types of anti-Americanism, and they 
identify several types of anti-Americanism, which in various degrees seem to fit the French 
example, such as elitist or nationalist anti-Americanism. Yet it is the contention of this study 
that at least regarding France, it is possible to regard anti-Americanism largely in terms of a 
rejection of American power, whether hard or soft, and that the power dimension largely 
accounts for the various displays falling into Katzenstein and Keohane‘s typology.  
It has been alleged that the Fifth Republic could be regarded as more or less 
inherently anti-American (Kuisel 1993). The question is in this respect whether modern 
France rejects American power. Based on the political history of the Fifth Republic, it is 
doubtful whether it can be described as rejecting American power as such. In reality, the 
policies have been much more characterized by attempts at balancing American power. It has 
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consistently been American hegemony, which has been rejected, rather than American power 
as such, although such a distinction is probably a matter of nuances. Yet when we turn our 
attention to the cultural dimension, there are clear elements of rejection – even when the need 
to balance America‘s cultural influence is put forward. A preliminary conclusion must 
therefore be that there are clear grounds to analyze large parts of the French anti-American 
narratives in terms of a rejection of American power, and especially America‘s soft power. 
The question remains whether France can be described as inherently anti-American. It has 
been argued above that France due to its national identity is inherently predisposed to anti-
Americanism, not necessarily because of animosity toward America as such, but because the 
values on which modern France is built are rivaled by those of a buoyant America, eminently 
better placed to fulfil its universal ambitions than France. French policies and especially 
French foreign policies have frequently been described as anti-American, especially those 
pursued under the Fifth Republic. Yet the policies pursued by de Gaulle and his successors 
have had one clear and permeating goal: to redetermine a role for France consistent with its 
values and universal aspirations yet conscious of the realities and constraints of the power 
configuration of the postwar international system (Cerny 1980). In these endeavors, France 
has felt constricted by the United States and has consequently operated in such a way as to 
diminish this constriction as much as possible. France‘s policies in this respect have thus 
acquired an aura of anti-Americanism, but opposition to America does not seem to have been 
the primary target. France has consistently sought to challenge American hegemony whenever 
it was felt to threaten France‘s liberty of action. The most important imperative for France has 
ever since the defeat to Germany in 1870 been to assure its security. The actions of successive 
American governments since 1918 did not quell French fears of an attack against its territory. 
If the policies of France seemed blatantly anti-American, it was primarily because the 
strategic imperatives driving French policy were not understood. During the Cold War, the 
American commitment to the defense of Europe was not always regarded as sufficient, and 
means were taken by France to enhance its own security, the attainment of nuclear arms being 
the most potent evidence. A second imperative, bar the security of France, has been its 
independence and its ability to project itself unto the world as not just an important player in 
terms of hard power (which has become increasingly difficult), but also in terms of soft 
power. There is political anti-Americanism in France, and perhaps there has historically been 
more political anti-Americanism in France than in most other European nations. Yet France 
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can hardly be considered an anti-American republic in political terms. The key to 
understanding French anti-Americanism today is probably that French opposition to 
American hard power has been not so much linked to its hard power as such, but as much to 
the radiance of its hard power on its soft power. It is not America‘s status as preeminent 
military or even economic power, which is resented; it is the spill-over effect this has on 
America‘s soft power, which has been envied. The last resistance of French anti-Americanism 
is towards American soft power, not just in terms of culture, but the totality of America‘s soft 
power arsenal beginning with its political influence and culminating with its ability to win the 
hearts and minds of the global public. To the extent that France can be termed the anti-
American Republic today, it is primarily in relation to culture. Yet given that culture is in 
France very much une affaire d‟État, it should be borne in mind that cultural anti-
Americanism can also be regarded as embued with highly political overtones. The anti-
Americanism that can be termed culturally-based is a reminder that any eventual foreign 
policy realignment across the Atlantic will not be sufficient to bridge the differences between 
France and the United States. Though U.S. foreign policy is undoubtedly a major cause of the 
recent European disenchantment with America, there remain reel differences between the 
American model and what could be termed the European model, a concept which might not 
span the European continent as such, but which is frequently highlighted in France as an 
alternative, albeit an alternative under pressure. This ‗European model‘ is frequently 
presented as the result of a more ‗mature‘ society than the American; one where Europeans 
have put their ―trust in the civilizing power of the state, and [..] its capacity to correct ‗market 
failures‘‖ and thus struggle for ―more social justice‖ (Habermas and Derrida, in Levy, Pensky, 
and Torpey (eds) 2005:11), in short, as a countermodel to the American ditto. Yet it is also a 
model perceived to be under threat by the forces of globalization. And as Levy, Pensky, and 
Torpey noted in the aftermath of the transatlantic rift over the course to follow in Iraq:  
Culturally speaking the United States seems to function as a substitute for the 
negative effects of a globalizing world. Globalization is frequently perceived as 
Americanization. References to the US often seem to serve the role of Europe‘s 
new constitutive other. On a deeper, cultural level, the transatlantic tensions are 
also a function of competing conceptions of universalism. The European 
insistence on being a particular project based on a collective memory of 
universalist values clashes with the universal mission of the US (in Levy, 
Pensky, and Torpey (eds) 2005:xxiv).  
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This is especially the case in France, which more forcefully than any other European nation 
opposes a globalization, which is clearly perceived as a threat to the national cultural identity, 
as exemplified here by Baudrillard: 
Our European culture is one that has staked its all on the universal and the 
danger menacing it is that of perishing by the universal… This includes not only 
the extension of the concepts of market, monetary exchange, or production 
goods, but also the imperialism of the idea of culture. We should be wary of this 
idea, which [..] devours singularity just as rapidly as revolution devours its 
children. (1988:83) 
 
Robert Kagan has famously asserted that ―Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from 
Venus: They agree on little and understand one another less and less‖ (2003:3); an 
assessment, which has been derided as ―buttressed by a naive, or disingenuous, set of beliefs 
about how the United States, given its preponderance, has ‗no choice‘ but to act in certain 
ways, as do also the Europeans‖ (Clark 2005:236, see also Lindberg (ed.) 2005). Though the 
present study largely concurs with Clark‘s criticism, one is left with the impression that the 
statement, when transposed on the Franco-American relationship, might, after all, contain a 
grain of truth. Not so much with respect to foreign and security matters, where the French can 
hardly be accused of having bowed to the Kantian logic of ‗perpetual peace‘, but rather when 
applied to the realm of culture, where it can be difficult to escape the impression that 
significant parts of the inhabitants in both countries feel that they live on different planets: the 
civilized homeland of the Republic of High Culture versus the barbarious Republic of Mass 
Culture.  It is an impression frequently propagated by the media, but it is a stereotype 
nonetheless: What the media often overlook is that French anti-American rhetoric in this 
domain as in others ―is often accompanied by blatantly Americanophile rhetoric‖ (Lacorne, in 
Judt and Lacorne (eds) 2005:42). How could it be different in two nations, which are divided 
by common values? Yet though anti-Americanism in France may seem to have become today 
first and foremost centered on its cultural dimension, this is still a part of a larger ideational 
narrative. Marcus Cunliffe describes how: 
Displaced industrially and imperially by the United States, Europe as a whole 
has, according to the French journalist André Visson, fallen victim to the 
―Athenian complex‖ – seeing itself, that is, as the older and finer culture ousted 
by the new ―Roman‖ one. (1991:400) 
 
Cunliffe further notes that when seen in this context as a reaction to the power of the United 
States, ―European anti-Americanism comes to look much less puzzling and pernicious‖ 
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(ibid.), an assessment which the present study fully shares. It is certainly an assessment that 
would seem to befit the French variety of anti-Americanism. This also entails that we should 
not expect French anti-Americanism to fade away anytime soon; on the contrary, it has, as 
Lacorne notes, ―a bright future‖ (Lacorne, in Judt and Lacorne (eds) 2005:42). And, 
irrespective of the fact that the French by and large are rather attracted to American culture, 
this future will, most likely, primarily be acted out within the domain of culture, which still 
provides an essential reference point for French national identity. 
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7 Conclusion 
 
Anti-Americanism is a subject that has attracted a lot of attention over the past decade. At 
times, it has seemed as if no analysis of American foreign policy at the dawn of the twenty-
first century was complete without a chapter devoted to the issue. To many, and perhaps 
especially to many Europeans, former President Bush embodied all the negative stereotypes 
commonly associated with America: the evangelical Christian, the inarticulate ignoramus, the 
Republican unilateralist, the Texan cowboy etc.; all images eminently suited to confirm pre-
existing prejudices about the worst America had to offer as seen from the other side of the 
Atlantic (O‘Connor, in O‘Connor and Griffiths (eds) 2007:1-18). Similar images of the 
French penchant toward denigrating America have been abundant for years, seemingly 
validating the impression that though anti-Americanism might be a universal phenomenon; it 
finds particular favor among the French. The typical image of the arrogant French intellectual, 
complete with shoulder-long hair and a standard set of preconceived ideas about the United 
States, its inhabitants and its policies is as much a stereotype as that of the Bible-bashing 
American, cowboy-hat and all. Taken at face value, such stereotypes seem to confirm beliefs 
held by some that the French and Americans are each other‘s cultural antipodes. Yet as this 
study has argued, France and the United States are far from being either political or cultural 
antipodes; had they been, French anti-Americanism would arguably have been much less 
worthy of interest. What separates France and America is in fact the opposite: that both 
nations are imbued with a universal creed, and that this creed has if not common origins, then 
at least origins which are comparable. France and America are in fact two nations divided by 
common values.  
Anti-Americanism breeds on stereotypes, yet these stereotypes may sometimes 
overshadow the more fundamental causes, which prompt resentment against the United 
States. This has partly to do with basic psychology: it is much easier to ridicule what is 
considered offensive rather than to engage in what might be a painful cognitive process in 
order to ascertain why particular elements of one‘s national psyche are especially prone to 
rejecting another nation. Conversely, a common refrain among those who attempt to 
‗demonize the demonizers‘ is to reduce displays of anti-Americanism to notions of petty 
envy. Many displays of anti-Americanism feature that too, yet the persistence with which 
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anti-American narratives are rejected on the other side of the Atlantic as largely irrational is 
problematic, given that the magnitude and pervasiveness of American power, whether hard or 
soft, entails that every nation is forced to relate to the nation, which has long acted as the 
defining power of the world: the United States. It has been noted by many observers of anti-
Americanism that the phenomenon should be analyzed in terms of prejudice. But such 
prejudices have some fundamental causes, whether they are accepted as rational or rejected as 
irrational. The present study set out to analyze the fundamental causes most likely to prompt 
displays of anti-Americanism, both as a general phenomenon and in its particular French 
version.  
 
7.1 A Brief Summary 
The study has aimed at presenting an alternative interpretation of French anti-Americanism, 
the overall ambition being to present a structural analysis of a cultural phenomenon. In the 
introduction, it was argued that anti-Americanism is usually depicted as a prejudice or 
predisposition, which is typically related to issues of culture and identity. It was further 
argued that in order to present a structural analysis of the phenomenon, both a general and a 
particularistic approach was necessary. The first part of the study proceeded to present an 
interpretation of anti-Americanism as a general, indeed universal, phenomenon, whereas the 
second part of the study set out to explore the constitutive factors most likely to prompt anti-
American predispositions in France and to analyze how these predispositions could be said to 
influence the actions and policies of contemporary France. 
Chapter 2 explored the most common definitions and explanations of anti-
Americanism and argued that these to a large extent fail to account for the fundamental causes 
most likely to promote anti-American prejudices. It was argued that as a universal anti-ism, 
anti-Americanism presents some unique features, which entail that the phenomenon cannot be 
analyzed as just any other anti-ism. Furthermore, it was argued that the widespread tendency 
to focus on the irrational elements of anti-Americanism risks diverting our attention from the 
more explicable causes, which might be at play regarding the global rejection of America. 
Finally, it was noted that though anti-Americanism presents some unique features depending 
on both the countries analyzed and the different social segments within these countries, the 
great variety in the different anti-American attitudes which can be observed, does not, 
however, mean that the phenomenon is so complex that more fundamental causes for the 
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rejection of America cannot be identified. It was proposed that the defining characteristic, 
which sets anti-Americanism apart from other anti-isms, and which contributes to give the 
phenomenon a certain dimension of explicability, was the dimension of power. 
Chapter 3 proceeded to present an alternative interpretation of anti-Americanism 
as a global phenomenon, arguing that this could best be described in terms of a rejection of 
American power. First, a number of surveys were presented, which rather conclusively 
indicated both that there is a global impression of disproportionate American power, and that 
this impression contributes to foster sentiments, which can well be described in terms of anti-
Americanism. Second, building on the notions of hard power and soft power introduced by 
Joseph S. Nye, it was outlined how in terms of hard power, America could be described as 
having achieved near-hegemonic power in an international system, which today can best be 
described as primopolar, with the United States occupying the position as its preponderant 
pole. Daunting as the attributes of America‘s hard power may be, it was further argued that in 
certain respects, its attributes of soft power may appear even more impressive, since the 
United States much more than any other nation has been capable of both fashioning the rules 
governing global interaction and of promoting its values around the world. There is little 
doubt that America‘s political values and cultural norms have had a tremendous impact on 
other nations, and these values have come to acquire a dimension of universality. Yet at the 
same time, the practice of American exceptionalism over the years, and especially during the 
presidency of George W. Bush, has contributed to foster the impression that these values are 
undermined by an American penchant toward unilateralism; an impression, which seriously 
mitigates the United States‘ power of attraction in the eyes of the world. 
While the power dimension seems to provide the best explanation for the 
fundamental causes of anti-Americanism as a universal, indeed almost systemic phenomenon, 
the cultural and ideational nature of anti-Americanism entails that it manifests itself 
differently depending on the society in question. Chapter 4 outlined a conceptual and 
methodological framework, within which a particularistic analysis of anti-Americanism in one 
country could be carried out. The chapter argued that country-specific attributes of anti-
Americanism could be related to questions of national identity, and it proposed a number of 
conceptual tools, which could be used for the particularistic analysis of anti-Americanism in 
one country. Starting from the assumption that national identity evolves around four major 
vectors, it was argued first that narratives surrounding national identity could be traced 
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somewhere along these vectors, and second that such narratives were bound to be dialectical 
in nature, on the one hand promoting a sense of national self-identification and on the other 
hand providing a contrast to the perceived Other(s). Finally, it was argued that these 
narratives of national identity affected the behavior of citizens, as they were imbedded in their 
national habitus, and that this notion of a national habitus, building on a shared national doxa, 
could be transposed also at the level of the polity, predisposing the nation in question, through 
the workings of the state or its defining elites, toward certain forms of behavior.  
Chapter 5 gave a brief introduction to the most common anti-American 
narratives in France, and proceeded to demonstrate that these in large parts build on an older 
aversion, namely the historic enmity against England. It was argued that in several respects, 
anti-Americanism could be regarded as a successor-phobia to the Anglophobia, which was 
cultivated by the French for centuries, and which still finds an echo in the rejection of the 
mythical ‗Anglo-Saxon‘, thereby joining opposition against England and America into one 
common anti-ism. Taking the values inherited from the Revolution of 1789 as laying the 
foundations for the modern French national identity, its central tenets were identified as 
republicanism, civilization, and laïcité, all values which are imbued with universalistic 
overtones. It was argued that not only does the French national identity revolve around these 
tenets, which correspond to three of the four major vectors of national identity identified in 
chapter 4, namely the political, cultural, and religious vectors, but also that America stands 
out in all three domains as both a likeminded nation and a challenger to the French aspirations 
of offering the world a model to follow. Based on this analysis, it was concluded that France 
and America could in fact be characterized as being ‗divided by common values‘. 
Chapter 6 turned to the more contemporary subject of anti-Americanism under 
the Fifth Republic. Starting from the contention that political and cultural anti-Americanism 
should be regarded as two sides of the same coin, it proceeded to present first a detailed 
analysis of political anti-Americanism under the Fifth Republic. Here, the numerous 
difficulties characterizing the Franco-American relationship in the period were evaluated, and 
it was argued that though these were frequently caused (also) by an official French revulsion 
against the perceived hegemonic aspirations of the United States, the policies followed by de 
Gaulle and his successors should not be described in terms of a rejection of American power 
as such, but rather in terms of a strong wish to balance American power, the imperative 
motive driving French foreign policy being to present France as a nation of the first order, 
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capable of influencing world affairs at par with the United States. In order to achieve this 
position, France undertook to enhance its national independence from American, while it 
simultaneously sought to maintain and expand its influence on the two continents, where it 
could best rival the United States as a point of reference: Africa and Europe. Though these 
actions were not necessarily motivated by anti-Americanism, they have frequently been 
presented as such, which has contributed to the impression that the Fifth Republic could be 
characterized as inherently anti-American. And there is little doubt that the French tendency 
to portray America as having hegemonic aspirations has contributed to engendering a 
narrative among the French political elites, which has distinctly anti-American overtones, 
even if, as time has progressed, the displays of political anti-Americanism seem to have 
abated somewhat. In the second part of the chapter, it was argued that as opposed to the 
political dimension of French anti-Americanism, its cultural dimension presents evidence of a 
clear rejection of American (soft) power. As is the case for political anti-Americanism, 
cultural anti-Americanism is in France the project of the elites, and French intellectuals have 
for a century succeeded in establishing themselves as the primary agents of resistance against 
American culture. In the post-war period, the intellectuals have risen in defense of the 
Republic of High Culture in a battle against the influence and spread of the Republic of Mass 
Culture; a defense, which was exemplified by four characteristic reactions against America‘s 
cultural juggernaut: the Coca-Cola affair, the campaign against le franglais, the ‗culture wars‘ 
of the 1990s, and the fight against la malbouffe. These examples gives a good impression of 
both the breadth and the intensity of the cultural rejection of America, and especially the latter 
two demonstrate that this rejection has with time become incorporated in an anti-globalization 
rhetoric, which has clear anti-American overtones. Finally, it was argued that though virtually 
all of the attributes of French anti-Americanism, whether political or cultural, could be related 
to the French national habitus, the culturally based anti-Americanism might today be more 
firmly entrenched in the French national psyche than the political ditto. 
 
7.2 Answering to the Research Question 
The research question posed in the introduction was: What elements of the French national 
identity are particularly conducive toward promoting anti-American sentiments among the 
French elites, and to what extent can Franco-American relations under the Fifth Republic be 
regarded as influenced by these elements? Furthermore, it was stated that the overall ambition 
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was to present a structural analysis of a cultural phenomenon. The structural nature of the 
analysis has rested on two assumptions: First that as a general phenomenon, anti-
Americanism could largely be interpreted in terms of a rejection of American power, the 
contention being that the power dimension offers the best structural explanation of why anti-
Americanism has become a universal anti-ism; second that as a particularistic phenomenon, 
anti-Americanism could best be explained when viewed through the lenses of national 
identity, the contention being that at the heart of particularistic varieties of anti-Americanism 
lie national predispositions, which partake in coloring the impressions entertained toward the 
United States to such an extent that they have become structurally entrenched.  
As regards anti-Americanism as a general phenomenon, a number of surveys 
reproduced in the present study seem to validate the claim that anti-Americanism is indeed 
either caused or magnified by an impression of excessive American power. The notions of 
hard and soft power were used to describe how even rather disparate examples of anti-
Americanism could also be interpreted in terms of a rejection of American power. A thorough 
reading of the literature on both anti-Americanism and contemporary American power 
prompts one major observation of importance in this respect: that while there is a notable 
reluctance among the scholars who study the subject of anti-Americanism to relate it to 
notions of power, it seems that most scholars studying American power at the dawn of the 
twenty-first century concur that the overwhelming nature of American power repels other 
nations and their inhabitants. In the concluding remarks to his The American Era, Robert 
Lieber asserts that ―America can do more to win ‗hearts and minds,‘ but the beginning of 
wisdom is to know that [..] anti-Americanism [is] inevitable as long as the United States 
exists as a great power‖ (2005:202). The present study draws essentially the same conclusion, 
as it has attempted to demonstrate that American power remains the most structural cause of 
anti-Americanism. Yet it should be stressed that fluctuations in anti-American sentiments do 
not necessarily correspond with fluctuations in American power, since opposition to 
American power is as much opposition to the manner in which power is wielded as to the 
magnitude of this power. This study has in that respect argued that the notion of soft power 
offers a particularly relevant prism through which anti-Americanism can be viewed, as it 
allows us to escape simplistic caricatures equating anti-Americanism with opposition to the 
‗Mr. Big‘ of the international system. Although the study uses the notion of soft power in a 
way, which somewhat departs from the way it was introduced by Joseph Nye, the concept has 
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shown useful as a corrective to standard definitions of power, which focus essentially on the 
economic and military dimensions of power, and it has allowed the study to present an 
alternative interpretation of anti-Americanism as largely a rejection of American power. 
Given that this assessment runs counter to what is typically advanced by scholars studying 
anti-Americanism, I find it important to qualify this interpretation in a number of ways: First, 
though the study has implied that there is a causal relationship between American power and 
the rejection of America, it should be stressed that this causal relationship is not so easily 
measured. While the polls reproduced in chapter 3 conclusively show that there is a 
widespread impression that the United States wields disproportionate power, the same surveys 
indicate that repulsion can quickly turn to attraction, once America regains its power of 
attraction, as was the case following the election of Barack Obama as the 44
th
 President of the 
United States. This leads to the rather banal observation that the perception of how American 
presidents wield power (or are expected to wield power) has a significant impact on how 
intimidating American power is perceived to be. In essence this could be described in terms of 
the ‗promise of soft power‘, confirming the impression that America still wields a 
considerable power of attraction, whenever the White House is considered (at least by its 
allies) to act multilaterally or to be willing to do so. Second, it should be noted that even when 
public opinion abroad is relatively sympathetic to the incumbent in the White House, 
American power may still cause resentment. Though President Clinton was viewed favorably 
by a majority of the European populations, several European countries, chief among them 
France, witnessed a massive rejection of America‘s cultural and economic power in the late 
1990s, when anti-globalization movements protested against the supposed Americanization of 
other societies and their cultural traditions in ways, which had distinctly anti-American 
overtones. This essentially validates the impression that anti-Americanism builds, at least in 
part, on a rejection of American power, yet it also underlines that anti-Americanism is 
extremely difficult to measure using polls and surveys, given that these more often than not 
have a tendency to focus on the political dimension of the global perception regarding the 
United States. Third, it should be stressed that this study has attempted to present an 
alternative interpretation of anti-Americanism as a rejection of American power rather than an 
in-depth analysis of the different power dimensions and how they influence on the perception 
of the United States throughout the world, the intention having primarily been to provide a 
necessary linchpin for the more particularistic analysis of anti-Americanism in France. It is 
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nevertheless my hope that I have convincingly illustrated how such an interpretation can be 
used to account also for the numerous aspects of anti-Americanism, which cannot be related 
to standard notions of power. I still consider the study of anti-Americanism to be in its 
infancy, given that there have so far been formulated very few structural analyses of the 
phenomenon. This study has advanced its interpretation, but there remains a void in the study 
of the structural causes of anti-Americanism, which the study has only partly been able to fill. 
In order to provide a structural analysis of the French variety of anti-
Americanism, this study has argued that its constitutive, or structural, causes are best explored 
through an analysis of the central tenets of the French national identity. Many accounts of 
French anti-Americanism have a tendency to focus on what separates the two nations, 
frequently leaving the reader with impressive overviews of the many interstate or intercultural 
differences seemingly characterizing the relationship; an approach which contributes to give 
the impression that there is more than an ocean separating France and America. This study 
has taken a different approach: it has attempted to identify the similarities characterizing the 
two nations in order to better explain the reservations, which the French entertain against their 
‗significant Other‘. It has proposed that the central tenets of French national identity could be 
described in terms of republicanism, civilization, and laïcité. The study has furthermore 
argued that these tenets are deeply imbued with universalist aspirations and that the structural 
cause of French anti-Americanism might be due to the fact that the American example poses a 
unique challenge to France‘s value-born universalist ambitions. The literature on national 
identity constructs and processes of othering concur that there is a need for any nation to 
measure itself against others, and that the ‗chosen enemy‘ is frequently one, with which there 
is a significant resemblance (e.g. Volkan 1988). The findings of this study seem to validate 
that at least as concerns the Franco-American relationship, this is most likely the case, and it 
has demonstrated that the political and cultural elites have been instrumental in both shaping 
the French national identity and in promoting the impression of America as a threat to its most 
fundamental values. This has had important implications for Franco-American relations under 
the Fifth Republic, both on a political and on a cultural level. The values on which the French 
national identity is built are echoed by the actions pursued by the political and intellectual 
elites, and these have frequently had distinctively anti-American overtones. Politically, France 
has consistently sought to assert its national independence in ways, which have taken the form 
of a rejection of American tutelage, and France‘s universalist ambitions led during the Cold 
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War to attempts to promote France as a ‗third force‘ between the two superpowers; a 
testimony to the willful aspirations of de Gaulle‘s France of offering itself to the world as a 
competing point of reference. Though it has been argued that all three central tenets of the 
French national identity both unite and divide France from the United States, it seems to be 
the notion of civilization, which is today the most contentious, given that it finds a clear echo 
both in the political and especially in the cultural rejection of America. The idea of a great 
civilizational schism between France and America is as old as the two republics themselves, 
and it has colored the negative stereotypes regarding the ‗New World‘ for centuries. While the 
political dimension of France‘s mission civilisatrice has somewhat abated, as de Gaulle‘s 
successors have increasingly come to terms with France‘s position as a great, but not 
preeminent power in the international system, the perception that France and America stand 
fundamentally opposed on the civilizational lever is still entertained by some within the 
French cultural elite, validating both the proposition that at the core of French displays of 
anti-Americanism we find values, on which the French national identity rests, and the 
assessment that the cultural dimension of French anti-Americanism might prove to be more 
deeply entrenched than the political dimension.  
 
7.3 Implications for Future Research 
This study has made two fundamental propositions regarding the study of anti-Americanism: 
that anti-Americanism can be interpreted in terms of a rejection of American power, and that 
French anti-Americanism can be related to the central tenets of French national identity. As 
noted above, this study has provided a detailed argumentation for, why these propositions 
should be accepted, and it is my hope that I have succeeded in arguing convincingly that at 
the very least, these propositions are plausible and merit further attention. Furthermore, the 
study has advanced a number of propositions which, while being framed within the study of 
anti-Americanism, have implications within other areas of study as well.  
First of all, by attempting to present a structural analysis of a cultural 
phenomenon, framed within the overall theoretical approach of constructivism, it has 
contributed with another piece, however small, to the gigantic puzzle, which is the 
relationship between national identities and behavior. It has developed a methodology, 
through which ideational factors can be interpreted in relation to national identity constructs. 
More specifically, it has identified four vectors of national identity which, it was argued, 
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appear particularly well adapted to the study of ideational narratives concerning the nation. 
Building on the well-established tradition of relating notions of the national self with 
conceptions regarding the Other, it has formulated the proposition that the dialectical interplay 
between self and Other can be identified as taking place on three levels, namely 
differentiation, preservation, and denigration. Borrowing from the sociological ‗toolbox‘ of 
Bourdieu and especially Elias, it has proposed that the concept of national habitus offers some 
promising perspectives for the study of the relationship between national identity and 
behavior. As opposed to the notion of habitus, which seems to have become an almost 
inevitable companion of every sociological reflection published since the 1980s, the term 
‗national habitus‘ has received very limited attention so far. Yet it strikes me as a concept 
eminently well suited to overcome the supposed dichotomy between culture/identity and 
behavior, and one which should not be confined to the analysis of the sociology of sport (the 
main area, where it seems so far to have made some serious headway, e.g. Tuck 2003, 
Maguire & Poulton 1999), but one, which merits attention also within the study of 
international relations, as it provides a more dynamic interpretation of the ideational forces, 
which partake in shaping foreign policies. 
Second, the study has introduced the notion of successor-phobias. There is in the 
literature on anti-Americanism a tendency to see the phenomenon either in exclusive terms, as 
if the United States is the only victim of a national anti-ism, or in relation to such anti-isms as 
racism or anti-semitism rather that to other national anti-isms. This study has argued that there 
is a certain explicability to the phenomenon of anti-Americanism, not only because it can be 
interpreted in terms of anti-hegemonism (if the interpretation of anti-Americanism as a 
rejection of American power is accepted), but also because it is a natural, even inescapable, 
impulse to construct the national self in opposition to perceived Others. With regard to the 
French variety of anti-Americanism, this study has argued that the phenomenon could largely 
be regarded as a successor-phobia to Anglophobia, and it was further noted that America 
came to be vilified for many of the same reasons that England has long been regarded 
France‘s significant Other. For the study of anti-Americanism, this entails that in order to get 
a proper impression of the phenomenon in a particular country, it might be relevant to look at 
the previous anti-isms, which have characterized the nation in question, so that it can be 
assessed whether there are identifiable consistencies regarding the features, which promote 
otherness towards a particular nation. In short, while anti-Americanism might be a relatively 
380 
 
recent phenomenon when inspected through the lenses of history, nation-specific anti-ism is 
not. 
Third, though this arguably represents one of the more marginal findings of the 
study, there seems to be today a conceptual vagueness as regards the proper characteristic of 
the contemporary international system. This study has offered the notion of primopolarity to 
characterize the current international system, and though, as has been argued by for example 
Nye (2009), the question of polarity is less easily determined today, where for example the 
rise of China‘s economic power and the presence of an increasingly integrated Europe entail 
that America‘s economic dominance is less pervasive than it was just a decade ago, the fact 
remains that the United States can still be described as the defining power in all the major 
dimensions of power, whether hard or soft: military, economic, political, and cultural. The 
notion of primopolarity seems particularly well suited to characterize the nature of the 
international system in the first decade of the twenty-first century, as it captures its essence: 
the days of bipolarity are unequivocally over, the promise of multipolarity still seems a distant 
mirage, and while the limits of unipolarity have been seriously exposed, the United States 
remains more capable than any other power of defining the international system. Hyphenated 
notions merely succeed in blurring the nature of the power distribution in today‘s 
international system, as do the many attempts at rejecting that polarity is still relevant, either 
by their refusal to acknowledge that there is still a global distribution of power in which a 
select few nations can shape the characteristics of the system, or by devising notions such as 
nonpolarity. If anything, the reactions and events following the election of President Obama 
have strengthened the impression that there is – even in the midst of a global financial crisis – 
only one nation, which has not just the potential, but also the ability to act as primus inter 
pares in the international system: the United States. There is still a long way to go before we 
enter a ―post-American world‖ (Zakaria 2008). 
 
7.4 Concluding Remarks 
Though this study has argued that anti-Americanism could largely be interpreted in terms of a 
rejection of American power, there is no doubt that the United States still retains a 
tremendous power of attraction abroad, as has been reaffirmed since the election of Barack 
Obama to the Presidency of the United States. Nonetheless, there is good reason to caution 
the 44
th
 President as well as his successors to come that though anti-Americanism may be on 
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the decline for the moment, American power remains viewed with apprehension around the 
world. Dominique Moïsi has noted that whereas ―Kennedy, for all his limitations, made the 
world dream, George W. Bush‘s America has tended to scare the world, even if some of the 
fear it has generated is excessive and unfair‖ (2009:121-122). The warm reception greeting 
the election of Barack Obama, especially in Europe, is a testimony to the fact that even 
despite a global financial crisis, largely perceived as the result of irresponsible economic 
policies and practices originating from the United States, an American president can once 
again, like Kennedy did in his time, inspire hope throughout the world. Global political anti-
Americanism will, as a result, most likely see a decline in the coming years, especially among 
America‘s allies. Yet the deeper causes of anti-Americanism are bound to linger on, causing 
the occasional bouts of resentment or displays of rejection even among America‘s traditional 
friends and allies. Anti-Americanism might flare up or decrease in intensity given situational 
circumstances, yet it remains a permanent and ineradicable feature of international politics, 
given the preponderance of American power. The Iraq War caused a noticeable increase in 
anti-American outbursts reminiscent of the global reactions to the Vietnam War conducted by 
that other Texan ―gun-slinging know-nothing‖ Lyndon B. Johnson (O‘Connor, in O‘Connor 
and Griffiths (eds) 2007:3). But anti-Americanism did not die out after the Vietnam War had 
been brought to its acrimonious end (Heineman, in O‘Connor (ed.) 2007b); its proponents just 
found other sides of America to denigrate while still sporting ‗Vietnam‘ as a rallying call 
against the perceived imperialist tendencies of the United States. The same is most likely to 
happen in the years to come, partly because many of the impressions associated abroad with 
American military and political unilateralism have, after all, not been confined to the policies 
pursued under the Bush administration (Tourreille and Vallet, in David and Grondin (eds) 
2006), but especially because the images associated with the War Against Terror (such as the 
treatment of prisoners or ‗illegal combatants‘ in the Abu Graib or Guantánamo prisons) have 
given rise to substantial anti-American feelings, which are bound to linger on (McCormick 
2007:141, Cesarini, in O‘Connor and Griffiths (eds) 2007:162-165). Former National Security 
Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski has remarked that the Bush years have undermined not just the 
worldwide credibility of the American presidency, but also tarnished the moral standing of 
America for years to come (2007), and if this observation holds true, it would be a delusion to 
expect that the effects of the animosity leveled against George W. Bush‘s America can be 
easily eradicated just because there has been a change in the White House. There is, however, 
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no doubt that a more inclusive approach toward the conduct of foreign policy can contribute 
significantly to diminish anti-American sentiments around the world, and there seems to be a 
growing realization in Washington that American power can indeed repel large segments of 
the global opinion. During her confirmation hearings in the U.S. Senate, Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton advanced the notion of ―smart power‖ as a corrective to the way American 
power was wielded by the Bush Administration (Clinton 2009). Joseph S. Nye, who has 
staked claim to the concept
136
, has defined it as the ―ability to combine hard and soft power 
into a winning strategy‖ (2006). The term ‗smart power‘ has been derided as belonging to the 
world of ―catchphrase diplomacy‖ (Beehner 2009), and may as such be considered a new 
‗smart slogan‘ rather than a new power dimension. Nevertheless, it is a telling slogan. In 
essence, ‗smart power‘ entails wielding power with a higher regard to the sensitivities of those 
who are subjected to the effects of this power, and though it might just as well be regarded in 
terms of soft power, which features diplomacy among its attributes, it does promise another 
way of wielding power than the one characterizing the Bush-years. Regardless of the merits of 
this new term, the attention given by the Obama Administration to the way American power 
is perceived abroad can thus be interpreted as a validation, at least in some political circles, of 
the impression that American power can repel large segments of the global population as well 
as several foreign governments. This new rhetoric from Washington can of course not serve 
as validation of the contention made in this study that American power can be considered the 
structural or even permissive cause of anti-Americanism. Nevertheless, it highlights that there 
is a widespread impression that the way American power is wielded is bound to influence 
how America is viewed. This impression received a further boost with the surprise 
announcement that the Nobel committee had decided to award the 2009 peace prize to 
President Obama just nine months after his taking office. As Michael Hirsh notes, the 
decision ―shows two things: one, the prize committee wishes to express the world‘s delight at 
being rid of George W. Bush; and two, there is still a yearning out there to have the ‗old 
America‘ back‖ (2009). As such, the 2009 Nobel peace prize is a telling and highly symbolic 
illustration of both the repulsion that the unilateral use of American power can engender and 
the sense of attraction, which the United States still commands, whenever it is perceived as 
willing to wield its considerable power with a certain regard also to the sensitivities of other 
nations. In other words, though American power might given its preponderant nature cause 
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resentment, American power can also attract – whenever the United States takes its leadership 
role seriously and shows a proper regard for the world, which it alone has the capacity to lead. 
This, however, does not mean that by pursuing clever and inclusive policies, 
whether under the label of ‗smart power‘ or any other label, Washington can reduce anti-
Americanism among its allies to a wholly negligible level. First, while the policies carried out 
by American administrations are bound to have a significant impact on the levels of anti-
Americanism around the world, they will, regardless of how much consideration they show 
for other nations and their inhabitants, not be able to fully overcome the impression that the 
United States wields disproportionate power. It may be that countries such as France have 
gradually come to accept their role as secondary powers when compared with the United 
States, yet within their societies, there is a lingering impression that especially America‘s soft 
power remains a potential threat to their identity. The French example is illustrative of the 
impression that while America‘s global preeminence might now be so entrenched that it no 
longer leads to attempts at pursuing ―a global revisionism of a special kind‖ (cf. chapter 6.1), 
at least among its allies, the attributes of American soft power continue to cause widespread 
rejection. Second, while situational factors may from time to time contribute to sour the 
transatlantic relationship and lead to charges of (political) anti-Americanism, anti-American 
predispositions have deeper ideational origins, which are not so easily overcome by a change 
of administration, neither in Paris, nor in Washington DC. In the introduction to his updated 
reference work of anti-Americanism, Paul Hollander noted in 1995 that since the first 
publication, ―The decline of anti-Americanism in Western Europe is perhaps best exemplified 
by the case of France‖ (1995:xxxix)137. Borrowing largely from Kuisel‘s study (1993), 
Hollander concluded that the decline of the French left, and notably of the fortunes of the 
French Communist Party, have ―put a major dent into the political and anticapitalist version 
of anti-Americanism‖ (1995:xxxix). Clearly, these assessments show that one should be 
cautious when judging an anti-ism to be on the decline
138
. As was seen in chapter 6, it would 
not last long before political anti-Americanism was perceived as being once again on the rise 
in France, as disagreements over the course to follow in Iraq led to the otherwise rather 
Atlanticist President Chirac being castigated as having ―no rivals as global spokesman on 
anti-Americanism‖ (the Economist, op. cit.). Similarly, Hollander‘s prediction that the 
―anticapitalist version of anti-Americanism‖ was in decline was clearly premature. As the 
fortunes of the Communist Party dwindled to a trickle, others stood ready to continue where 
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the communists had left, now under a new banner: anti-globalization. To a large extent, anti-
globalization carries the mark of anti-capitalism and can in several respects be depicted in 
terms of anti-Americanism by another name. And there is little doubt that among Western 
Europeans, the anti-globalization rhetoric finds no greater echo than among the French public. 
Finally, it should be borne in mind that though national identities are neither fixed nor 
impervious to impulses from abroad, they change only very slowly. To the extent that the 
contention made in this study that there is within the French national habitus a predisposition 
towards anti-Americanism is accepted, it follows that this predisposition will continue to exist 
for a substantial period of time, even if by some accounts French anti-Americanism might 
now seem to be on the decline. Antoine Compagnon has described French anti-Americanism 
as endemic (Ngi 2008), and this assessment both captures the essence of the phenomenon and 
underlines the fact that regardless of the fluctuations in their bilateral relationship, we have 
every reason to expect that France and America will, for a long time to come, remain divided 
by common values. 
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Notes to chapter 1: 
1
 See the introduction to the bibliography provided at the end for an outline of the literature on the subject. 
2
 There are relatively few exceptions to this. Kristin Ross has offered a neo-Marxist analysis of the phenomenon, 
well-researched but biased, given that it reads throughout as an apologetic argumentative, in which examples of 
French anti-Americanism become justified by the oppressive nature of the United States (in Ross and Ross (eds) 
2004). This kind of representation in the serious literature on the subject is, however, rare. 
3
 Herder felt it would be more accurate to speak of specific cultures—in the plural—rather than of culture in 
general. According to Herder, each culture carries within itself its own immanent validity, and hence we have to 
think of the world as being composed of uniquely different socio-cultural entities, each with its own pattern of 
development, its own inner dynamic growth. Of particular concern to Herder were culture determinants that help 
to produce a sense of collective identity, and these he identified chiefly with language, shared symbols and 
values, customs and norms (Gilbert 2000, Reeves 2004, Walker, in Walker (ed.) 1984:182-216, Calleo, in 
Kupchan (ed.) 1995:17-19). 
4
 More than any other study, Huntington‘s work brought culture back into the study of international relations, 
albeit in a very different form than the ones previously adopted. Viewing culture in terms of civilizations and 
placing religion at the forefront of cultures, Huntington argues that the international system is characterized as 
much by cultural differences as it is by anarchy. In this way, while retaining an overall systemic approach to the 
study of international relations, he effectively challenges the primacy of ‗rational‘ balance of power 
considerations. One could say that Huntington superimposes a balance of cultures or balance of civilizations to 
the traditional realist balance of power. Irrespective of the criticisms, which have been leveled against his work 
(e.g. by Rubinstein and Crocker 1994), Huntington has done us a great favor by providing a culturalist 
alternative to the standard systemic theories. 
 
Notes to chapter 2: 
5
 The term ‗Americanization‘ should in this sense be understood in the opprobrious way that is frequently used 
mainly in Europe to denote a process, whereby society or elements of society develop itself in ways that can be 
said to be reminiscent of the ‗American model‘. The standard American use of the term is quite different. Here it 
is used to denote the act of Americanizing, i.e. of naturalizing somebody as an American and thereby as a citizen 
of the United States. 
6
 America, in this respect, must clearly be the United States. Though ‗America‘ linguistically covers both 
American continents, anti-Americanism is associated almost exclusively with North America and indeed the 
United States. As Sardar and Davies point out, the unconscious and indiscriminate usage of the word America as 
synonymous with the United States ―is a testimony to power founded on a wealth of resources, economic 
strength and its application to an idea of nationhood that is unique‖ (2002:8). Braudel has termed the United  
States ―America par excellence‖ (1994:458). 
7
 The only possible exception is anti-Zionism, which in its nature is also decidedly anti-Israeli. The parallel, 
however, should not be overemphasized for three reasons: First, though anti-Zionism is not merely confined to 
the Middle East or to Muslims around the globe, it is doubtful whether it can be said to have a truly universal 
dimension, covering every single country in the world. Second, anti-Zionism is not so much a rejection of Jewish 
or Israeli values or policies as it is the – arguably worse – rejection of Israel‘s right to exist. Third, while anti-
Zionism contains an element of hatred towards the state of Israel, the same can not necessarily be said to be the 
case for anti-Americanism, though extreme displays of anti-Americanism have that too. It should however be 
noted that scholars writing on anti-Americanism frequently regard anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism as 
―Twin Brothers‖, to use Markovits‘ phrase (2007:150-200). Hollander similarly regards anti-Americanism akin 
to other ―hostile predispositions such as racism, sexism, or antisemitism‖ (1992:viii). Though there are both 
similarities and examples of clear overlap, anti-Americanism nevertheless differs too much in its origins to be 
treated similar to anti-Semitism or anti-Zionism, as will be shown below.  
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8
 Most articles on the subject do not contain definitions of anti-Americanism. The same applies to a number of 
scholarly works as well. Both Russell Berman (2004) and Andrew Ross and Kristin Ross (2004) have for 
example presented serious studies on anti-Americanism without presenting clear definitions of the phenomenon. 
9
 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye were the authors of one of the most quoted books on international 
relations in the late 1970s, namely Power and Interdependence (1977), and much of their current work can be 
traced back to the themes they raised in 1977.  
10
 Paul Hollander makes a useful distinction between domestic and non-domestic variants of anti-Americanism., 
arguing that anti-Americanism exists at home as well as abroad (1992 and 1995). Indeed, both his original study 
(1992) and the revised ―Transaction edition‖ (1995, reprinted in 2003) contain six chapters devoted to the 
domestic and only three to the global variety (see also Ward, in O‘Connor (ed.) 2007b, for an alternative account 
of anti-Americanism in America). This study is however purely about anti-Americanism abroad, and specifically 
in France, and the domestic variants of anti-Americanism will receive no further attention here. The definition of 
anti-Americanism offered here thus only applies to anti-Americanism abroad; whether it could be applied as well 
to anti-Americanism at home is doubtful. 
 
Notes to chapter 3: 
11
 See for example polls carried out by The German Marshall Fund, Pew Research Center, Harris Interactive, 
International Herald Tribune, BBC etc.  
12
 The Pew Global Attitudes Project is co-chaired by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright. It 
provides information on the issues, attitudes and trends shaping America and the world. One of its aims is to 
―deeply probe attitudes toward the United States in all countries‖ (see http://pewglobal.org/about/). 
13
 It should be noted that the 2009 Pew survey does not contain any polling regarding the latter. 
14
 Nevertheless, to my mind, Nye himself has contributed to give the meaning and exact scope of ‗soft power‘ a 
certain degree of vagueness. Commenting on Leslie Gelb‘s Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue 
American Foreign Policy, in which Gelb argues that ―soft power now seems to mean almost everything‖ (2009), 
Nye claims that ―Gelb confuses the actions of a state seeking to achieve desired outcomes with the resources 
used to produce those outcomes. Military and economic resources can sometimes be used to attract as well as 
coerce‖ (Nye 2009). Given that Nye has delineated a number of soft power resources, it would be inconsistent, if 
the same observation could not be applied to the use of the notion of soft power. 
15
 Machiavelli, much less ‗Machiavellian‘ than typically assumed, actually agrees. Contrary to common belief, 
he does not preach power just for power‘s sake, but rather analyzes its uses. In The Prince, he states that ―it 
would be best both to be feared and loved; but as it may be difficult to obtain both, it is safer to be feared than to 
be loved, should one have to renounce one of the two‖ ([1513] 1942:74). He furthermore cautions princes 
against becoming hated: ―A prince, who wants to be feared, must avoid, if he cannot be loved, to be hated‖ 
(ibid:75). 
16
 Sheehan notes that ―the balance of power principle has been central to both the study and practice of 
international politics for three centuries‖ (1996:ix). M.S. Anderson has noted that one of the first clear references 
to a balance of power in terms of international relations ―appears to come in 1439 from the Venetian Francesco 
Barbaro, who claimed that his own state was the main force working for the maintenance of such a balance‖ 
(Anderson 1993:151). He further remarks that from the first decades of the seventeenth century, ―there was now 
visible a tendency not merely to describe a balance of power between the states of Europe as a political and 
military fact but to justify it as inevitable and indeed as desirable, even essential‖ (1993:153). It has even been 
argued that balance of power theory can be traced back to the Greek City-states. However, the evidence on 
which this view is based is slender. It is probably more correct to say as Sheehan that from Thucydides wrote his 
History of the Peloponnesian War onwards, there is evidence of ―balance of power thinking‖ (Sheehan 1996:25). 
17
 It should however be noted that the Founding Fathers originally showed less reluctance towards terming the 
newly independent United States an empire. Already in 1783, George Washington spoke of an ―emerging 
empire‖, and in a 1809 letter to James Madison, Thomas Jefferson coined the term ‖Empire of Freedom‖ to 
describe his vision of America (Pedersen 2006:30-31). Herein lies naturally the assumption that the United 
States would develop a different kind of empire to those hitherto known. 
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18
 Ernest May‘s epigram derives from Shakespeare‘s Twelfth Night, act II, scene V, where Malvolio remarks that 
while the stars have favored him, there is no need to fear his greatness: ―Some are born great, some achieve 
greatness, and some have greatness thrust upon them‖. In the case of the straitlaced Malvolio, it is evidently the 
latter. It is uncertain whether it was May‘s intention or not to compare the United States to the puritan character 
of Malvolio.  
19
 The foreign policy related aspects associated with how America acts as an empire (and perhaps even in neo-
imperialist ways) will be treated more thoroughly in chapter 2.3.2, which deals with anti-Americanism as the 
rejection of the attributes of America‘s soft power, including diplomacy. 
20
 It should be noted that the figures for countries such as China and Russia are the official budget figues 
measured in terms of market exchange rates. Older reports from the IISS using other ways to assess the figures 
rate China as the second biggest spender, though it is still dwarfed by the USA (IISS 2007:406-411). 
21
 In order of decreasing levels of military expenditures, these are Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, South 
Korea, Australia, Canada, Spain, Turkey, Israel, Netherlands, and Taiwan (IISS 2009:447-452). 
22
 ―To be a Great Power – by definition, a state capable of holding its own against any other nation – demands a 
flourishing economic base‖ (Kennedy 1988:697). 
23
 President George H.W. Bush in a speech to Congress, March 6
th
 2001: ―Now, we can see a New World 
coming into view. A world in which there is the very real prospect of a New World order. In the words of 
Winston Churchill, a ‗world order‘ in which ‗the principles of justice and fair play [..] protect the weak against 
the strong [..]‘ A world where the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfil the historic 
vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations.‖ 
(Retrieved from http://www.c-span.org/executive/transcript.asp?cat=current_event&code=bush_admin&year= 
0391). 
24
 When Otto von Bismarck was asked in 1864 whether he did not fear British intervention in support for 
Denmark, which was fighting a loosing battle against an Austro-Prussian alliance, he reportedly answered that if 
Lord Palmerston were to send the British army to Germany, Bismarck would have the police arrest them. The 
witty remark shows that British military might was not something that was overly feared in Berlin. Without an 
alliance with either France or Russia (or preferably both), Britain simply would not have the necessary military 
means to intervene forcefully in a continental war against Prussia and Austria (Taylor 1954:142-156). 
25
 In the nineteenth century, European power struggles were characterized by five great powers of roughly 
comparable strength fighting for mastery of the continent‘s fate: Great Britain, France, Prussia, Austria and 
Russia (Taylor 1954:xxiv-xxxvi). Since these five nations more or less embodied the leadership of the 
international system at the time, one can quite clearly state that it was multipolar precisely because of the 
comparability of these five great powers. This is yet another reason why Hulsman, Polansky and Prager‘s claim 
that the system post 1815 can be characterized as uni-multipolar should be taken lightly. 
26
 Measured in terms of total GDP in 2007 (OECD 2009:34). It should be noted that in terms of purchasing 
power parities (PPP), France is overtaken by China, India, and Russia and relegated to eight position (ibid:35). 
27
 Measured in terms of defense expenditures in 2007 (IISS 2009:447-452). 
28
 At least measured in terms of continuity. There have been other, more temporary attempts to seek democratic 
legitimacy in several European nations that have had a larger electoral base than in Britain. As Churchill noted 
regarding the fifteen hundred deputies of the French States-General assembled in May 1789, they represented 
―the broadest franchise yet enjoyed by any European country‖, as they were elected by five million voters 
(Churchill 1957:223). 
29
 On the relationship between policies of exclusion and America‘s world identity, see Renwick 2000:1-21. 
30
 The words are from Emma Lazarus‘ poem ―The New Colossus‖ inscribed on the interior of the pedestal. The 
statue itself was originally named ―Liberty Enlightening the World‖ (French: La liberté éclairant le monde). 
31
 The reference to a land of milk and honey originates from the Bible, Exodus 3:8, in which the Lord promises 
to bring the Israelites out of Egypt and into a land flowing with milk and honey. This reference is another 
powerful testimony to the Puritans‘ legacy in shaping popular imaginary in relation to America as a nation 
‗blessed by God‘.  
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32
 David Calleo has described the impeachment against President Clinton as the ―most savage constitutional 
attack since Nixon‘s time‖ (2000:72). 
33
 Zakaria bases this argument on the fact that ―Every state sends two senators to Washington regardless of its 
population – California‘s 30 million people have as many votes in the Senate as Arizona‘s 3.7 million – which 
means that senators representing about 16 percent of the country can block any proposed law‖ (1997:149). 
34
 These are some of the most common adjectives, which have been used to describe the American foreign policy 
throughout time, and will for the sake of clarity be employed in this study. Walter Russell Mead has offered an 
alternative and very compelling description of the four foreign policy traditions in America, which he labels 
Hamiltonian, Wilsonian, Jeffersonian, and Jacksonian (2001). He asserts that especially the Jacksonian tradition 
has been overlooked by observers of America‘s history of foreign relations (ibid:174-176 and 259-263), and 
further notes that ―when Jacksonian sentiment favors a given course of action, the United States will move too 
far, too fast, and too unilaterally in pursuit of its goals‖ (ibid:260); a characteristic, which many, not least on the 
other side of the Atlantic, would probably see as a befitting description of the way American foreign policy was 
conducted under the presidency of George W. Bush. 
35
 The Marshall Plan was presented first in a 1947 speech at Harvard given by U.S. Secretary of State George 
Marshall and lasted from 1948 to 1952. By mid-1951, it had allocated 12 billion USD in various forms of aid to 
Western Europe (Hogan 1989:103 and 414). 
36
 Crockatt notes that Fukuyama‘s notion of the ―end of history‖ was greeted by academics with ―derision or 
incomprehension‖ (in Frabbrini (ed.) 2006:75) and further asserts that ―Although in Fukuyama‘s scheme the US 
does not claim direct responsibility for bringing about the end of history, the association of liberal democracy 
with ‗the West‘ and the association of the United States with both is enough to make clear the assumption about 
American leadership in these transformations‖ (ibid.). 
37
 The quotation is often cited from a speech made by Theodore Roosevelt in Chicago in 1903: ―There is a 
homely old adage, which runs: Speak softly and carry a big stick: you will go far. If the American nation will 
speak softly, and yet build, and keep at a pitch of the highest training a thoroughly efficient navy, the Monroe 
Doctrine will go far‖ (quoted by Morris 2001:215). The impression that Roosevelt‘s foreign policy was later 
associated primarily with ‗big stick diplomacy‘ rather than with soft language, does not render the adage less 
poignant. 
38
 This title is borrowed from James L. Baughman‘s book, 1997. 
39
 Many contend that the market for films and television programs is an uneven playing field; for instance, 
foreign movies are less frequently imported into the U.S. for show in major theatre circuits than imports are 
shown in other Western countries. It is a fact that Americans are not overwhelmingly interested in seeing 
unknown foreign actors in movies or to watch movies in a foreign language. This would explain the vast number 
of American films that are actually remakes of European productions. In Europe, this is often considered a sign 
of arrogance and provincialism on the part of the United States. Furthermore, the United States has a history of 
using free trade negotiations to open up foreign markets to its cultural products. The implicit argument being that 
culture is a commodity to be freely traded just like any other. This is rejected in certain other countries, and as 
will be shown below especially in France, where culture is seen as essential for the moral cohesion of the nation.  
40
 Bollywood is an informal term popularly used for the Mumbai-based Hindi-language film industry in India. 
Unlike Hollywood, it does not exist as a physical place. A 2002 Businessweek comparison of Bollywood vs. 
Hollywood shows that in 2001, Bollywood produced 1,013 films, while Hollywood produced 739. Bollywood 
films sold approximately 3.6 billion tickets worldwide, while Hollywood productions sold 2.6 billion. In terms 
of revenues however, Hollywood drew 51 billion USD as opposed to a meagre 1.3 billion USD to Bollywood 
(2002-estimates). (see http://www.businessweek.com//magazine/content/02_48/art02_48/a48tab37.gif) 
41
 As Benjamin Barber notes, Henry Ford‘s commitment to the mass production of cars ―has come to be 
associated with many of the virtues of American lifestyle and not a few of its vices‖ (Barber 1995:25). See also 
Ritzer 2000, for an account of how Ray Kroc, the founder of McDonald‘s, applied the principles developed by 
Henry Ford to the preparation and serving of fast-food. 
42
 Lary May for example locates it to between 1911 and 1929; Michael Kammen finds that it did not come 
properly of age before the late 1950s (May 1983, Kammen 1999). 
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43
 Michael Kammen makes a useful distinction between the terms mass culture and popular culture, which he 
finds are habitually, but wrongly, used interchangeably (1999:162-176).  
44
 A vehicular language is used as a second language for communication between communities not sharing the 
same vernacular language. The original Italian meaning of lingua franca was Frankish language (composed 
mostly of Italian with a broad vocabulary drawn from French, Greek, Persian, and Arabic), but was later 
associated to any language widely used beyond the population of its native speakers. The term has increasingly 
come to denote the internationally most influencial language at any given time. 
45
 ATTAC (Association pour la taxation des transactions pour l'aide aux citoyennes et citoyens or Association 
for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens) is an activist organization established in 
France since 1998, and which is now operating in more than forty countries. ATTAC originally advocated the 
establishment of a tax on foreign exchange transactions, but has since been a strong critic of the functioning of 
global economics (Birchfeld and Freyberg-Inan, in Eschle and Maiguashca (eds) 2005). While the organization 
claims not to be opponents of globalization, they are among the most vociferous advocates of opposition to a 
number of the features associated with globalization, arguing that ―the World is not for sale‖ (see 
www.attac.org).   
46
 Critics of the American social model hardly need to substantiate their charges. They can point to the ongoing 
American debate concerning the very same issues that has been shaped by films such as Michael Moore‘s 
blockbuster Sicko (2007) or books such as Barbara Ehrenreich‘s Nickel and Dimed: Undercover in Low-wage 
USA (2002). 
47
 It is noteworthy that ATTAC has no affiliated association in the United States. Furthermore, in the list of 
―countries‖ in the Americas with affiliated associations, Quebec is mentioned, whereas Canada as such is not. 
See www.attac.org. 
48
 By infantilism, Barber means ―a relationship between infantilism understood in classical developmental 
psychology as a pathologically arrested stage of emotional development and infantilism understood in cultural 
psychology as a pathologically regressive stage of consumer market development – the two together comprising 
what Freud spoke of as ‗a pathology of cultural communities‘‖ (2007:34). 
 
Notes to chapter 4: 
49
 Just as is the case with the study of anti-Americanism, national identity is an area of study that spans several 
academic disciplines, as can be witnessed by the backgrounds of the four scholars to have dominated the field 
over the last decades: Ernest Gellner (philosophy and social anthropology), Eric Hobsbawm (history), Benedict 
Anderson (international relations), and Anthony D. Smith (sociology). 
50
 Alternatively described in terms of constructivism or functionalism (see for example Østergård, in Andersen 
and Kaspersen (eds) 2000). 
51
 Hobsbawm defines invented traditions as ―A set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted 
rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by 
repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past‖ (in Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds) 1983:1). 
52
 Many Germans would probably agree with the German historian Walther Schmidt, who begins his analysis of 
The Nation in German History by emphasizing that ―Nations are distinguished by ethnic characteristics‖ (in 
Teich and Porter (eds) 1993:151). Others may find this emphasis on ethnicity somewhat paradoxical given, as 
Uffe Østergård convincingly argues, that Germany can, much more than any of the other great European powers, 
be considered an ―invented nation‖ (Østergård, 1992:293-298). See also Eriksen (1993:113-116) for an 
anthropological discussion of German identity, which he considers as ―characterised by anomalies, fuzzy 
boundaries and ambiguous criteria for belongingness‖ (ibid:113). See Miller 2000, for a discussion of the 
German model of citizenship, built largely on the notion of ethnicity. 
53
 For an introduction to the different conceptual ways, in which ethnicity can be related to national identity, see 
Østergård, in Andersen and Kaspersen (eds) 2000:449. 
54
 Not all modernists would agree. Liah Greenfeld for example has provided us with an interesting semantic 
reading of the origins of the idea of the nation (as opposed to the noun itself), arguing that though the 
―association between the nationality of a community and its uniqueness represents the [..] last transformation in 
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the meaning of ‗nation‘‖(1992:8), older meanings have previously been held; an observation, which leads him to 
declare that the first nation could, if the idea of nation is viewed in terms of the sovereignty of a people, be 
considered to be England (ibid:8-87).  
55
 I do not want to imply that Smith ignores the religious dimension; rather he treats this dimension as a 
subcomponent to the other components and especially to the ethnic component (1991:33-37), an approach 
which, however, I find problematic given the considerable number of nations, where there is no observable 
correspondence between the two. 
56
 The notions of ‗the Other‘, ‗Otherness‘, or ‗Othering‘ have received much attention over the past decades, 
both within sociology and numerous other disciplines. Indeed, as Kendall and Wickham remark, ―the ‗other‘, 
once revealed, proved to be everywhere‖ (2001:23). Neumann finds that the Other is ―an epistemological as well 
as an ontological necessity, without which there can be no thinking self‖ (1996:48). 
57
 This fourth type has, notes Triandafyllidou, recently ―emerged as a new type of external Significant Other‖ 
(2002:41), and essentially relates to the European Union. As it falls outside of the scope of the present study, it 
will receive no further attention here. It should also be noted that Tiandafyllidou makes a useful distinction 
between internal and external Others. Obviously, it is only the latter, which is of interest for the purposes of this 
study. 
58
 The term can be traced as far back as Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. As a philosophical term, habitus 
originates in Aristotle‘s notion of hexis elaborated in his doctrine of virtue, meaning an acquired yet entrenched 
state of moral character that orients our feelings and desires in a situation, and therefore our conduct (Aristotles, 
Ethics, Book II, Chapter 4). Hexis thus does not denote an innate characteristic or quality. The word is derived 
from the Greek verb ―to have‖ or ―hold as a possession‖, and therefore hexis is something that is a firmly fixed 
possession established by habitual and continual effort or action. It is more typically translated in modern texts 
as state, characteristic, and habit, but disposition is perhaps the least controversial choice. Taking his cue from 
Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas translated the term into Latin as habitus (past-participle of the verb habere, to have or 
to hold) in the thirteenth century in his Summa Theologiae. Here, it received the added sense of aptitude for 
growth through activity, or durable disposition suspended half-way between potency and purposeful action 
(Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, part II).  
59
 Some have argued that the use of a concept such as habitus in a context of national identity is problematic 
given that the nation as a group is too large and diverse to be said to have anything resembling a national habitus. 
This is an argument put forward by for example Prieur (in Prieur and Sestoft 2006:45), and it is probably a 
reflection of the widespread tendency to link Bourdieu‘s concept of habitus rather inextricably to (physically) 
embodied dispositions (Robbins 2000:28). Yet apart from the fact that the notion of national habitus has been 
used by a number of scholars, who have influenced Bourdieu (such as Elias, who also, as will be seen below, 
uses habitus in a national sense), the concept of habitus has already proved so flexible that it arguably has 
evolved in meaning from any ‗original‘ use it might have had (whether you date it from Aristotle, Aquinas, 
Bourdieu or any other). Habitus is, like virtually all other components of Bourdieu‘s terminology, an open, 
abstract concept, whose meaning is determined by its empirical use (Prieur and Sestoft 2006:214). Indeed, 
Bourdieu himself sees the applicability of theory only in relation to empirical research (Prieur and Sestoft 
2006:215). While paraphrasing Kant in writing that ―theory without empirical research is empty, empirical 
research without theory is blind‖ (1988:774-775), Bourdieu has called for heterodoxy in social science. Given 
that he sees philosophical and scientific traditions as an ―almost inexhaustible toolbox‖ (Bourdieu 1987:41) from 
which the scholar can find inspiration and indeed tools to tackle scientific problems, the use of his terminology 
in other contexts should be permissible. 
60
 Like the notion of habitus, the term doxa has a long pedigree. It originates from Parmenides, one of the most 
significant of the pre-Socratic philosophers, and refers in his philosophy to erroneous perceptions of others or of 
aspects of reality. Doxa originates not from reality, but from for example myths, misconceptions or what one 
might today call socially constructed preconceptions of reality. When Roland Barthes in his work on myths and 
mythologies refers to collective representations as ―des siècles en arrière, maintenues stagnantes dans l‘erreur par 
le pouvoir, la grande presse et les valeurs d‘ordre‖ (Barthes 1957:72-73), it is in fact doxa that he describes. 
Doxa can be related to, but is not identical to ‗world outlook‘ or Weltanschauung in the Hegelian sense, as doxa 
denotes a stronger and broader system of perceptions, or rather a codex of ‗approved‘ perceptions to which 
group members submit. Though the term originates from Parmenides, Bourdieu is inspired primarily by Edmund 
Husserl‘s use of the concept, although he uses the term in a less complex interpretation (John Myles has for 
example argued that Bourdieu overpolarizes doxa and reflexivity; 2004:91-107).  
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Notes to chapter 5: 
61
 It is more difficult to identify a similar value situated along the fourth, ethnic vector. However, much of the 
French rejection of the ‗Anglo-Saxon‘ can be seen as evolving at least in part around a narrative built on 
perceptions of ethnic demarcation, as will be seen especially in 5.2. 
62
 Although France was among the first nations to colonize parts of the New World (first in Acadia and later, 
after having been expelled by the British in 1755, in Louisiana), the pattern of emigration was very different 
from the one characterizing especially the British Isles. Here, colonists fled from religious persecution and/or the 
lack of available cultivable land, which was mostly in the hands of large landowners, a situation which did not 
characterize France to the same extent. Furthermore, the British colonists were better at establishing democratic 
institutions in the New World than the French, which in turn attracted new waves of immigrants. As such, both 
the push and the pull factors worked in favor of the emigrants of British origin. The result was that although 
France had colonized huge territories in America, they were populated by very few French (Glebe-Møller 1981). 
63
 When discussing Anglo-French relations, there is, as Bell has noted, ―a pervasive problem of nomenclature‖ 
between when to speak of the English or the British (1996:5). He adds that ―The French usually tend to deal with 
these problems by ignoring them, referring indiscriminately to England and the English, even when they mean 
Britain and the British‖ (ibid.). However, as France has historically perceived Scotland as an ally, the French 
way of ‗dealing with the problem‘ of nomenclature is perhaps not as unfounded as Bell seems to think: For 
France, England was the hereditary enemy, not Britain. For the French, the English were the antipodes, while the 
Scots were a kindred people, subjugated by the English. Indeed, Scotland and the Scots have historically been 
regarded as allies of France rather than as enemies: The series of Franco-Scottish treaties known as the Auld 
Alliance was intermittently in force between 1295 and 1560, and it was aimed specifically against the mutual 
―Auld Enemy‖, England (Macdougall 2001). In his study, which focuses mostly on Anglo-French relations from 
1900 onwards, Bell solves the problem of nomenclature by referring to Britain and the British (1996:5). In this 
study, focusing less on the political and military aspects of Anglo-French cooperation and more on the historical 
attributes of Anglophobia in France, Britain will mostly be referred to as England and the British as English 
when referred to in relation to French perceptions, reflecting that the animosity is directed against a national 
culture and its representatives rather than against the formal conglomeration of British nations united in a single 
entity. 
64
 Although the battle of Waterloo marks the end of a long series of wars opposing France and Britain, and 
indeed also the moment when French aspirations for military domination of Europe were effectively defeated, 
political rivalry would continue well into the next century. The 1904 Entente Cordiale may have marked the 
beginning of a liberal alliance in Europe keen to defend itself against armed onslaughts on their democratic 
societies, yet the Royal Navy‘s pre-emptive attack on the French fleet at Mers-el Kébir in 1940, also known as 
Operation Catapult, briefly reinvigorated armed hostilities between the two nations (Masson 1991:164). In spite 
of the twentieth century being predominantly a history of alliance between the two countries, political rivalries 
have lingered on, as can be witnessed not least by Britain‘s thorny road towards membership of the European 
Economic Community, which was twice vetoed by de Gaulle (see chapter 6).  
65
 In her intriguing analysis of the ―incredible lovestory between French and English‖, Henriette Walter suggests 
that by paving the way for a French victory in the Hundred Years War, Joan of Arc actually may have done the 
French language a disservice. Since the Norman invasion in 1066, French had been the language of the English 
court. By setting about to oust the English king from French soil, Joan of Arc was simultaneously instrumental in 
seriously limiting the chances of a worldwide expansion of the French language (Walter 2001:12). Regardless, 
English sovereigns continued to ―go to war under a standard emblazoned in French: Dieu et Mon Droit‖ 
(Rosenblum 1988:87). 
66
 Robert and Isabelle Tombs note that ―Symbols of France become not merely allegorically female, but 
alluringly feminine, compared with frigid Britannia or butch Germania‖ (2006:450). They further remark that the 
―importance of women as symbols of civilization explains the virulence of French attacks on British women‖ 
(ibid:450). On French stereotypes regarding British women, see also Gibson 1995:314. For a vivid example of 
French denigration of American women as ―frigid, obsessed, and puritan‖, see Étiemble [1963] 1991:378. 
67
 Winock recounts that it was originally the French Left, which appropriated itself of the myth of Joan of Arc, 
but that moderate republicans would later seek to use her as a symbol of consensus and cohesion in a deeply 
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divided society, until she was finally seized by the nationalist Right and used to denounce first Jews during the 
Dreyfus Affair and later immigrants, not least today by Jean-Marie le Pen‘s Front National (1990:145-156). 
68
 This is in many respects still the case. Although most French history writing today attempts to provide a more 
nuanced picture of both his achievements and his shortcomings, Napoleon continues to attract massive interest in 
France and abroad. On the French political Left, he is frequently vilified, and Bonapartism is an accusation 
frequently branded against right-wing politicians keen on the promotion of law and order. On the political Right, 
typically more worried about the Left‘s tendencies toward Jacobinism, he is, if not a source of inspiration, then a 
legitimate object of interest. France‘s former Prime minister, Dominique de Villepin, did not lose in political 
standing after publishing a highly flattering description of Napoleon‘s hundred days following his escape from 
Elba (Villepin 2001). It is noteworthy that one of his most positive biographers, Vincent Cronin, whose account 
of Napoleon‘s life (1971) is almost tantamount to a hagiography, is British. 
69
 These words were dictated to General Bertrand by Napoleon as he surrendered to the English captain of the 
Bellopheron, and they were subsequently sent to the British Prince Regent. The reference to Themistocles refers 
to the commander who had lead the Athenians to victory at the battle of Salamis, but who was nevertheless 
granted sanctuary by his erstwhile enemy, the King of Persia, when he had been ostracized from Athens (Cronin 
1971:506). 
70
 Significant of the importance of the Fashoda incident, Meredith describes how it gave birth to the ―Fashoda 
syndrome‖, according to which the French have subsequently ―been vigilant in guarding against anglophone 
encroachment in what they considered to be their own backyard – le pré carré‖. He further describes how ―In his 
memoirs, General de Gaulle listed the disasters that had afflicted France in his youth and that led him to devote 
himself to upholding France‘s ‗grandeur‘: the first on the list was the Fashoda incident‖ (2006:493). See also 
Bell 1996:3-4, for a similar account. 
71
 The phrase ―a nation of shopkeepers‖ would seem to derive from Adam Smith‘s Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations from 1776, which Napoleon is known to have read. In Book IV, Chapter 7, 
Smith states: ―To found a great empire for the sole purpose of raising up a people of customers, may, at first 
sight, appear a project fit only for a nation of shop-keepers‖. (Smith [1776] 2007:397) 
72
 In The Roads to Modernity, Himmelfarb sets out to reclaim the Enlightenment as a phenomenon largely 
originating in England, a fact that according to her has been overlooked by the importance given to the salons in 
Paris and the fact that it took the noun Enlightenment more than a century to make its appearance in English 
(2008:3-22). Indeed, she notes that the ―decisive advantage of France over Britain and America may have been 
the term ―enlightenment‖ itself. [..] ―Siècle des lumières” was used as early as 1733 by the abbé Dubos, by 
Rousseau in the First Discourse  in 1750, by the co-editor of the Encyclopédie Jean le Rond d‘Alembert the 
following year in his Preliminay Discourse to the Encyclopédie, and by others throughout the century.‖ 
(ibid:11). 
73
 Or rather the succession of Gaullist or neo-Gaullist parties, as its leaders have had a tendency to rename and 
refashion the party (or parties) to provide them with a political platform of which they were in maximum control. 
74
 The origins of the quotation are unclear, and the quote is frequently also attributed to both Oscar Wilde 
(Phillipson 2003:30) and Winston Churchill (Gunn 2003). The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations and the 1951 
Treasury of Humorous Quotations (Esar & Bentley), however, give the attribution to Shaw, but without offering 
a source. In The Canterville Ghost (1887), Wilde wrote: ―We have really everything in common with America 
nowadays except, of course, language‖. 
75
 It should be noted that liberté is also sometimes translated as ‘freedom‘ and fraternité as ‘brotherhood‘. 
76
 In December 1790, revolutionary leader Maximilien de Robespierre suggested that the words ―Le Peuple 
Français‖ (The French People) and ―Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité‖ be stitched onto the uniforms and flags of the 
National Guard. From 1793 onwards, the following words were painted on a number of Parisian facades: ―unité, 
indivisibilité de la République; liberté, égalité ou la mort‖, although the final part of the phrase was soon erased 
as it became too closely associated with the Terreur. See for example the official site of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs: http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/france_829/institutions-vie-politique_19079/symboles-republique-14-
juillet_2615/liberte-egalite-fraternite_5155.html 
77
 The number of different regimes, i.e. constitutions or legal frameworks with constitutional power to have 
succeeded each other since 1789 is usually estimated to be around twenty, the current Fifth Republic being the 
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last of these. This number does not include the many major changes that some of the constitutions have been 
subjected to over the years. See for example Duhamel 1993:15-16 and Chevallier and Conac 1991. 
78
 This is the incident commonly referred to as the ‗official‘ start of the Revolution. Olivier Duhamel asserts that 
the Revolution began in earnest almost a month before, on June 17
th
 1789, when the estates general decided to 
transform themselves into the Constituant National Assembly (1993:15). Yet July 1789 saw an escalation of 
revolutionary activities that not only led to a regime change but indeed resulted in the violent overthrow of the 
Ancien Régime. 
79
 Chevallier notes that no other country, not even Lenin‘s or Stalin‘s Russia, has conferred on itself such a 
radical break with the past as the one that separated the modern France born out of the Revolution from the 
Ancien Régime (in Chevallier and Conac 1991:xix). 
80
 The law regarding the use of the revolutionary calendar did not come in effect before October 24
th
 1793. The 
calendar was used mostly by the administration and never really caught on in other circles and quickly fell into 
desuetude. It was abolished under the Napoleonic Empire on 11
th
 nivôse year XIV (January 1
st
 1806). The 
creation of the calendar itself is often wrongly attributed to the poet Fabre d‘Églantine. Though he named the 
months after the changing seasons in France, the chief architect behind the new calendar was the mathematician 
Charles Gilbert Romme. 
81
 The victory at Yorktown was in military terms as much a French victory as an American victory, 
enthusiastically greeted in both countries. It is by no means certain that Washington‘s Continental Army could 
have defeated the British forces without the help of France. Washington‘s victory came after years of hard-
fought war, where victory long looked far from certain. Only after France entered the war following the 1778 
alliance between the two nations, did the course of war change significantly. Historians generally agree that the 
French alliance proved the turning point of the war (e.g. Duroselle 1978:19). In this respect, the United States of 
America undoubtedly owe part of their very being to the support from France in one of the most crucial periods 
in the nation‘s history. The peace treaty that formally recognized the independence of the United States was 
signed in Paris in 1783 – a further reminder of the French role in the process that lead to independence. Indeed, 
French king Louis XVI has been called America‘s forgotten founding father (Ross 1976). 
82
 There is no firm agreement as to when the nation-state first appeared in Europe. Scholars of International 
Relations often date it to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 that ended the Thirty-year War. Here, the principle of 
cuius regio, euius religio (the ruler determines the religion of his realm) that had been established at the Peace of 
Augsburg in 1555 was reconfirmed, ending the duopoly of dynastic and papal rule that had characterized a 
number of states. Henceforth, the ruler decided the ‗official‘ religion of his territory, effectively ending the long 
period of religious strife between the European states. Within the discipline of International Relations, this 
makes sense, since the states could from then on act as nation-states in international affairs (see for example 
Nexon, in Byrnes and Katzenstein (eds.) 2005:276-281). Yet scholars of Sociology and Political Science 
frequently take the view that the nation-state originated with the ideas of citizenry expounded in the French 
Revolution (Jenkins and Sofos 1996:12-13). This idea of citizenry is linked to the notion of the nation as the 
embodiment of the common aspirations of its citizens (see the discussion of the French Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and of the Citizen below).  
83
 Dated from the advent of Hugues Capet in 987. 
84
 Condorcet, among the leading philosophers of the Enlightenment arguably one of the most favorable toward 
the American experience (see 3.4.1), was also the only one of them still alive to witness the French Revolution. 
He had initially high hopes for it, but to him it proved a disappointment. Forced to flee from the Terror, he died 
in jail in 1794 (Himmelfarb 2008:182). 
85
 Patrick Weil notes that though the revolutionary leaders did originally adopt a universalist conception of 
nationhood, successive regimes were not always as inclined to relinquish the demand of jus sanguinis (2004:30-
32 and 37-52). 
86
 Dale Van Kley further notes that ―not even the American states‘ declarations of rights entirely broke with the 
notions that the rights in question were peculiarly English rights – even if enunciated against the English – or 
that they derived their force in part from their status as property inherited from the past.‖ (In Van Kley (ed.) 
1994:6) 
87
 As such, the Declaration‘s preamble states that the ―simple and incontestable principles‖ to be enunciated 
―may always be directed to the maintenance of the constitution and to the welfare of all‖, while article 3 states 
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that ―The source of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation‖, and article 6 that ―The law is the expression 
of the general will‖ (Keith Michael Bakers translation, in Van Kley (ed.) 1994:1-2). 
88
 Judith Shklar has described the phrase ―general will‖ as ―ineluctably the property of one man, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau‖ (in Wiener 1973:275). Himmelfarb concurs that the concept ―has always, and properly so, been 
identified with Rousseau‘s The Social Contract‖ (2008:167), although she recounts that Rousseau himself, seven 
years prior to the publication of his 1762 work, attributed the phrase to Diderot (ibid.).  
89
 Though Burke is traditionally seen as the philosophical founder of Conservatism, he was also an 
Enlightenment thinker (Møller 1996, Himmelfarb 2008) long associated with liberalism. His vehement critique 
of the French Revolution has become his most well-known legacy, to a large extent obscuring the liberal ideas 
expounded in many of his earlier writings. Himmelfarb has in this respect noted that the French Revolution 
raised ―the specter of the two Burkes, the pro-American and the anti-French Burkes, the first exemplifying the 
―soft virtues‖ of the ―Speech on Conciliation‖ – liberty, compromise, religious toleration; the second the ―hard 
virtues‖ [..] of the Reflections – authority, tradition, religious establishment‖ (2008:84).  
90
 At the time, Burke‘s assessments were denounced as reactionary by the most liberal supporters of the French 
Revolution such as Thomas Paine, who wrote The Rights of Man ([1791-1791] 2003) largely as a response to 
Burke‘s Reflections. In essence, Burke rejected that the populace was properly qualified to govern a society; to 
him, the focus on general will rendered the Revolution not just vulnerable to, but would indeed lead to despotism 
by the excesses of majority rule. His assessment was somewhat vindicated by subsequent events. Burke‘s 
prediction that the chaos engendered by the Revolution would bring about a ―popular general‖ who would 
become ―master of your whole republic‖ ([1790] 1986:342) seemed fulfilled with Napoleon‘s seizure of power 
shortly after the Revolution‘s tenth anniversary.  
91
 Not to be confused with his son, the younger Marquis de Mirabeau, who was later to achieve notoriety for his 
achievements during the French Revolution. 
92
 The myth of the French (and before them the Franks) as the descendants of Hector of Troy can be traced back 
to one of the few written chronicles from the Merovingian epoch, the Historia Francorum, attributed to Fredegar 
(Frédégaire) and written around 660 AD. According to the myth, Hector‘s son Francion escaped a Troy in flames 
and settled in Gaul, where he founded what would later become the Merovingian dynasty. The chronicles of 
Francion can be read as parallel to Virgil‘s Aeneid, and Francion is depicted as a cousin to Aeneas, whose 
descendants, Romus and Remulus, according to mythology founded Rome. The chronicles are evidence to an 
early wish to equal and even surpass Rome, notably by stressing Francion‘s royal lineage (as opposed to that of 
Aeneas, who was a lieutenant of Hector, but not his son). The myth is a.o. described in Ronsard‘s epic poem La 
Franciade (1572), where Francion is renamed Francus. 
93
 This last line stems from the declaration made in 1918 by Georges Clémenceau, leader and defender of France 
during the First World War, in which he stated that ―France, once soldier of God, today soldier of humanity, will 
always be the soldier of the ideal‖ (quoted by Chuter 1996:13. See also de Gaulle 1989). 
94
 Since Sully Prudhomme was awarded the first Nobel Prize in Literature in 1901, fourteen laureates have been 
French. The United States and Britain are tied in second place with ten laureates each.  
95
 At its origins, the role of the Académie, established by Cardinal de Richelieu, was to act more akin to an 
‗official‘ rival to the growing number of private circles and salons. Bluche describes how the Académie, born out 
of ―hazard and creative intuition‖, nevertheless succeeded in acquiring a pre-eminent role as the most important 
institution for the safeguard and promotion of the French language (Bluche 2003:232-235). 
96
 Hagège nevertheless dates the turning point as regards the spread of French as the preeminent language in the 
Western world to the Treaty of Paris in 1763. Though this was not clear at the time, a consequence of France 
loosing most of its territories on the North American continent was both to halt the spread of its language in the 
New World and to lay the foundations for the subsequent preeminence of English (1987:170-172). 
97
 This codification of the role ascribed to the French language has remarkably ancient antecedents. In 1539, 
King François I signed the Ordinance of Villers-Cotterêts, whose articles 110 and 111 prescribed the use of 
French in all judicial acts and official legislation. At that time, the intention was of course not to protect French 
from linguistic incursions from across the Channel, English being in the sixteenth century a language spoken by 
a comparatively small minority in Europe. Rather, the goal was to discontinue the use of Latin in official 
documents as well as to discourage the use of regional dialects (Hagège 2006:213). 
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98
 It was only in July 2008 that the French constitution was revised granting official recognition to regional 
languages, now deemed to ―belong to the patrimony of France‖ (New article 75-1 of the constitution, see Loi 
constitutionnelle du 23 juillet 2008). Yet, though France has signed the Council of Europe‘s Charter for Regional 
or Minority Languages which came into effect in 1998 (Phillipson 2003:92 and 153-154), it has still not ratified 
it. 
99
 See also La documentation Française 2008, for similar claims. 
100
 Milhaud similarly estimates that some 113 million people speak French (Milhaud 2006b). The International 
Organization of Francophonie reaches a figure that is only marginally higher, around 123 million Francophones, 
while estimating that in addition, some 72 million people are ―partial Francophones‖ with limited proficiencies 
(Valentin (ed.) 2007:20). 
101
 The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs make a similar assessment, although they note that this includes 
partial Francophones. Without counting partial Francophones, French is relegated to eleventh position. See 
Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et Européennes (2008). Fiche de synthèse de la Francophonie. Retrieved on 
August 12th, 2008, from www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/article-imprim.php3?id_article=11209. 
102
 This clearly reflects a Eurocentric vision of the world. There are numerous historical examples of civilizations 
that have been more advanced than the European civilizations of the time (see for example Kennedy 1988, and 
Leclerc 2000), yet in the popular European imaginary since at least the Renaissance, such historical facts have 
been largely neglected.  
103
 There is no formally accepted term that accurately denotes the American version of secularism. The term 
religious freedom is widely used to describe this version, for example by Gunn (2004), but does not in itself 
indicate secularism in the meaning separation of church and state, but rather religious tolerance. While American 
secularism is often described in terms of religious freedom, the American society is furthermore characterized by 
having no formal links between state and church, befitting standard definitions of secularism. Indeed, a vast 
number of countries have adopted the principle of religious freedom in the meaning freedom of confession while 
retaining (and frequently subsidizing) an established church. 
104
 Depending on the time from which one dates the separation of church and state in France. Though the 
principle of laïcité was first formally recognized as a cornerstone of the republic in 1905, revolutionary France‘s 
break with the established Catholic Church effectively led to the instauration of a secular state, however briefly it 
lasted. 
105
 The first amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads: ―Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.‖ 
106
 The long history of religious strife in France shows that neither king nor the Catholic Church took kindly to 
the presence of other religious practices in France. The French Wars of Religion, which culminated with the St. 
Bartholomew Day‘s Massacre in 1571, ended with the Edict of Nantes in 1598 that formally conferred certain 
rights to protestants (or huguenots), although Catholicism was reaffirmed as the established religion of France. 
But the Edict of Nantes was revoked in 1685 by King Louis XIV, who declared Protestantism illegal (see for 
example Nexon, in Byrnes and Katzenstein (eds) 2005:272-274). It would not be an exaggeration to state that 
prior to the Revolution of 1789, France had in effect witnessed more than two hundred years of religious strife, 
in which the Catholic Church had secured a stronghold on society. 
107
 In this respect, laïcité can be seen in accordance with the Lockean belief that limits can in certain instances be 
imposed on religious tolerance. Locke admitted that the state had the right to protect itself from religious 
communities who threatened the survival of the State, such as he perceived the Catholic Church to do in England 
in 1688 (Liedman 1989:123). 
108
 The 2004 law (loi du 15 mars 2004) banning all ostentatious religious symbols from state schools came into 
force as a result of a prolonged discussion, which erupted when three Muslim girls were expelled from their 
school in 1989 because they refused to remove their headscarves. It has raised several critiques both inside and 
outside of France. See for example Leveau and Hunter, in Hunter (ed.) 2002:12-13. John Bowen even describes 
how the practice of laïcité with regard to the 2004 law was explicitly contrasted with the ―Anglo-Saxon‖ model 
during the National Assembly debates prior to its adoption (in Katzenstein and Keohane 2007:235). 
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109
 The fact that the religious beliefs of only a select few prominent politicians, such as former Prime Minister 
Lionel Jospin (who adheres to the Protestant faith), or former President of the European Commission, Jacques 
Delors (who is a practicing Catholic) are cited as evidence to the source of their inner ideological commitments, 
is actually a good indication of the relatively limited role of religion in the discussion of politics in France. It 
shows that while religion is not wholly absent from politics, it is relegated to the secondary role of describing the 
possible psychology of the various candidates rather than the ideological foundations of their parties as such. 
110
 Though many opinion makers in other European countries might say the same, they all too often portray their 
national values as originating at least to some degree from their Christian background. In France, the reference to 
Christianity is generally left out – another tribute to the fact that the revolutionary origins of the republic are still 
taken for granted. 
111
 The Abbé Pierre (1912-2007), an abbot who devoted most of his life to helping the poor and homeless, was 
for many years voted France's most popular person and came third in a 2005 television poll to choose Le Plus 
Grand Français (The Greatest Frenchman). 
112
 Loi n°2001-504 du 12 juin 2001 tendant à renforcer la prévention et la répression des mouvements sectaires 
portant atteinte aux droits de l'homme et aux libertés fondamentales. See http://www.antisectes.net/law2001-
texte-officiel.htm 
113
 The reports can be retrieved from http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/004000552/0000.pdf 
and http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/024000086/0000.pdf.  
114
 The quote stems from part I of Paine‘s The Age of Reason (1794). It should be noted that Thomas Paine 
advocated not as much atheism (for which he was wrongly attacked) as deism (while nevertheless rejecting 
revelations as anything but a personal experience) or what has later been termed ‗secular millennialism‘.  
115
 Turkey is probably the only nation that officially operates as strict a version of secularism as France, 
notwithstanding the few remaining communist nations, where religion is banned altogether. See for example 
Zylberberg 1995:49. Indeed, Kemalist Turkey was directly inspired by the French example, going as far as 
adopting the term laïcité itself. See Wievorka 1995:65. 
116
 Interestingly, Feldman traces the origins of American religious fundamentalism to the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century, where it rose in reaction to the strong secularism promoted by liberal Protestants inspired 
precisely by Darwinism (Feldman 2005:12-13). It would seem that while Darwinism gave rise to an 
inflammation in debates regarding science versus religion in both France and the United States (as in many other 
Western nations); the outcome was very different in the two countries. 
117
 As will be seen in 6.2.1, the Dreyfus case also gave birth to the French intellectuels who would prove to be an 
active force of both laïcité and anti-Americanism. 
118
 Previous French natalist policies were motivated much more by geopolitical alarm over France‘s declining 
birthrates rather than by religious arguments, especially when they were contrasted to the rising birthrate in 
France‘s major continental competitor, Germany (Lockhart 2003:110-111 and 119). 
119
 Citron describes how Lavisse, ―avec toute la distance qui sépare la platitude du génie‖ (1991:35) builds on 
Michelet to mould the minds of generations of school children with his very ‗personalized‘ textbook account of 
French history. See also Chuter 1996:24 and Joutard, in Burguière (ed.) 1993:543, for an account of Lavisses‘s 
influence. 
 
Notes to chapter 6: 
120
 Not, as Alfred Grosser notes, ―that anyone wished to revive the inverse precedent of the eighteenth century 
where after the War of Independence Congress had refused to settle the debts owed to the king of France‖ 
(1980:6). 
121
 One of the best-known examples is de Gaulle‘s rejection to meet Roosevelt in Algiers after the Yalta 
conference, which has often been presented as a petty gesture toward an American President battling with the 
last stages of a crippling disease, which would soon after send him to the grave. Yet de Gaulle‘s rejection had its 
own, Gaullian logic, which he explained in his War Memoirs: ―If Roosevelt wanted to see de Gaulle for good 
reasons, why had he not permitted him to come to Crimea? And then, how was the American President qualified 
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to invite the French President to visit him in France? [..] How could I agree to be summoned to a point on the 
national territory by a foreign chief of state?‖ (quoted by Grosser 1980:41. See also Vaïsse 1998:28 and Jouve 
1967:599-600). This was not a matter of mere protocol – it was a matter of first principles, namely that of the 
recognition of France as a sovereign partner as well as of the integrity of the French territory.  
122
 After de Gaulle told U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk that the decision to withdraw from NATO‘s integrated 
structures would entail that every American soldier would have to leave France, Rusk allegedly replied ―Does 
that include the dead Americans in military cemeteries as well?‖ (Schoenbaum 1988:421) 
123
 It is tempting to regard the preeminent role accorded to the president in the constitution of the Fifth Republic 
as inspired by the American example, but there is little evidence to substantiate this. The motive driving de 
Gaulle‘s wish for a strong executive featured prominently in his 1946 Bayeux speech (de Gaulle 1959:647-652) 
and was largely the result of a critical reading of the history of the Third Republic with its tradition of 
governmental instability; a tradition which continued under the Fourth Republic. To the extent that French 
constitutionalists have looked for inspiration from abroad, the main source of inspiration seems to have come 
from Britain with its tradition of stable parlamentary majorities, a system which, however, could not be easily 
transposed on a France characterized by a multiplicity of political parties (Chagnollaud and Quermonne 
1996:56-59). The birth of the Third Republic was the result of bitter constitutional hagglings between radical 
republicans, conservative republicans, royalists, and bonapartists, the former two emerging largely victorious 
(Chevallier and Conac 1991:231-274). But the tensions remained, and accusations of Bonapartism featured 
prominently in the discussions over the Fifth Republic (Lacouture 1985:590, Wahl 1990:42). Michel Debré, the 
main drafter of the text of the 1958 constitution, regarded the absense of a ―monarque républicain‖ as a main 
cause of the deficiencies of the Third Republic (Chevallier and Conac 1991:608), and when article 11 of the 
constitution of the Fifth Republic was amended in 1962 in order to introduce the direct election by universal 
suffrage of the head of state, this was a characteristic which became bestoved on President de Gaulle (ibid:687). 
The 1962 amendment was considered by some as auguring a new era of ―présidentialisme à l‘américaine‖, a 
charge vehemently rejected by de Gaulle, who argued that precisely the fact that the French president, as 
opposed to the American, was not elected simultaneously with the legislative body, permitted him stay above ―la 
lutte directe des parties‖ (ibid:688-689). There is no doubt that in practice, however, the ―monisme présidentiel‖ 
(Lacouture 1985:565) has confered on the office of the French president an authority, which among Western 
democracies finds a parralel only in the United States. With the 2000 constitutional amendment, the mandate of 
the French president was reduced from seven to five years, corresponding with the mandate of the deputés of the 
Assemblée Nationale. Thereby, the Fifth Republic essentially became a ―régime présidentiel intégral‖ (Boutin 
and Rouvillois 2000:93), more comparable with that of the United States. 
124
 This is a result not so much of the wording of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, which is actually rather 
vague on the subject, but essentially of the practice demonstrated under the first cohabitation from 1986-88. See 
for example Bell, 2005:119-127. 
125
 It should be noted that Macridis‘s book appeared just before de Gaulle pronounced his decision to withdraw 
France from NATO‘s military structures. 
126
 North Atlantic Council (1994). Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council/North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council, NATO headquarters, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994. Declaration of the Heads of State and Government. 
Retrieved on January 23, 2009, from http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940111a.htm. 
127
 United Nations Security Council (2002). UN Press Release SC/7564: United Nations Security Council Holds 
Iraq in ―Material Breach‖ of Disarmament Obligations, Offers Final Chance to Comply, Unanimously Adopting 
Resolution 1441 (2002). Retrieved from http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SC7564.doc.htm. 
128
 Aron further notes that ―If Paris of the Left Bank is the writer‘s paradise, the United States might be regarded 
as the writer‘s hell [..] France exalts her intellectuals, who reject and despise her; America makes no concessions 
to hers, who nevertheless adore her.‖ ([1955] 2001:229) 
129
 The irony was that the communist regime in Moscow itself had little respect for the intellectuals as a group. 
When in 1919 Maxim Gorki wrote to Lenin in defence of some members of the intelligentsia, who had been 
arrested and molested by the revolutionary authorities, he argued that intellectuals should be treated with special 
respect, as they represented the ‗brain‘ of the nation. Lenin brutally rejected his plea in favour of ―des petits 
intellectuels minables, laquais du capital, qui se veulent le cerveau de la nation. En réalité, ce n‘est pas un 
cerveau, c‘est de la merde‖ (quoted by Courtois, in Courtois et al 1997:805). 
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130
 The depiction of the Coca-Cola affair given here owes much to Richard Kuisel‘s account (1991, see also 
Kuisel 1993:52-69 for a slightly shorter version). Most other accounts seem to take their cue from Kuisel‘s work 
(see for example Wall 1991, Pells 1997, Gordon and Meunier, 2002), although some, such as David Chuter, 
seem to find the French reactions at least partly justifiable given France‘s precarious economic situation 
following the Liberation (Chuter 1996:243-244). 
131
 E.g. the 2005 proposals by Gaullist Senator Philippe Marini: Proposition de loi no. 59 complétant la loi n° 94-
665 du 4 août 1994 relative à l'emploi de la langue française (http://www.senat.fr/leg/ppl04-059.html). 
132
 French Minister of Culture Catherine Trautmann would later describe the relationship between the two as 
―l‘exception culturelle est le moyen juridique, la diversité culturelle notre objectif‖ (quoted by Gordon and 
Meunier, 2002:96) With time, the expression ―cultural diversity‖ nevertheless seems to have gained the upper 
hand, and references to ―cultural exception‖ have become more rare. 
133
 According to the site of McDonald‘s France: http://www.mcdonalds.fr/#/whoweare/chiffres 
134
 According to the site of McDonald‘s France: http://www.mcdonalds.fr/#/whoweare/chiffres 
135
 A 2006 Eurobarometer survey conclusively shows that not only does English remain the most widely-spoken 
foreign language throughout Europe (38% of EU citizens state that they have sufficient skills in English to have 
a conversation, followed by 14% mastering French or German), but also that France‘s position as the second-
most important language in the Union is seriously challenged. The enlargement of the European Union has 
caused the balance between French and German to shift: More citizens in the new Member States master 
German (23% compared with 12% in the EU15) while their skills in French and Spanish are scarce (3% and 1% 
respectively compared with 16% and 7% among the EU15 group). A further cause of worry may be that English 
is perceived by Europeans to be by far the most useful language to know (68%). French (25%) and German 
(22%) follow next almost side by side, and Spanish ranks fourth with a 16% share. Yet the gap between the 
observed usefulness of French and German is narrowing over time: just four years previously, 40% of 
respondents had rated French as useful. (European Commission 2006:12 and 30). 
 
Notes to chapter 7: 
136
 According to Nye, he developed the term in 2003 ―to counter the misperception that soft power alone can 
produce effective foreign policy‖ (2009). Some, however, attribute it to Suzanne Nossel, who appears to have 
been the first to publish an article calling for ―the smart use of power to promote U.S. interests through a stable 
grid of allies, institutions, and norms‖ (2004). 
137
 The assessment was not altered in the second printing of the book, which appeared in 2003.  
138
 During a seminar on anti-Americanism held in Copenhagen in March 2007, I had the opportunity to ask 
Hollander to what extent he thought this assessment was still valid. He laconically answered that many things 
had changed since his book was first published, and he felt no need to comment further on French anti-
Americanism. 
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Dansk resumé 
 
Antiamerikanisme er et emne, der har tiltrukket sig stigende opmærksomhed gennem det 
seneste årti. Terrorangrebene den 11. september 2001 var udtryk for et ekstremt had mod 
USA, og mange amerikanere følte sig efterfølgende kaldet til at spørge ‖Hvorfor hader de os 
så meget?‖ (Zakaria 2001). Terrorangrebene fik et efterspil, der afslørede, at det kunne være 
nok så væsentligt også at spørge ‖Hvorfor er vi blevet så upopulære, selv blandt vores 
venner?‖ (Moïsi 2009). Forberedelserne til invasionen af Irak i foråret 2003 tydeliggjorde, at 
der var stor uenighed om mål og midler mellem USA og dets europæiske allierede for så vidt 
angår linjen over for Irak. Særlig ét europæisk land blev fremstillet som repræsentant for 
europæisk antiamerikanisme: Frankrig. Frankrig blev i amerikanske medier såvel som af 
ledende amerikanske politikere beskyldt for at agere spydspids for en politisk orkestreret 
modstand mod USA‘s udenrigspolitik, som væsentligst skulle være motiveret af en iboende 
fransk tendens til antiamerikanisme.  
Afhandlingen har som overordnet målsætning at afklare, i hvilket omfang 
Frankrig kan siges at have en sådan iboende tendens til antiamerikanisme. Hensigten er at 
præsentere en fremstilling af fransk antiamerikanisme, der på afgørende punkter afviger fra 
tidligere analyser, idet den søger at præsentere en strukturel analyse af et overvejende 
kulturelt fænomen. Afhandlingen tager udgangspunkt i det forhold, at antiamerikanisme 
typisk beskrives som en fordom eller iboende disposition, som ofte sættes i forhold til 
kulturelle eller identitetsmæssige faktorer, og argumenterer, at kun ved at afdække de 
grundlæggende identitetsrelaterede faktorer, der bidrager til at fremme antiamerikanske 
holdninger i et land, kan fænomenet forstås som andet og mere end løsrevne udtryk for 
frustration og smålig jalousi. Endvidere argumenteres der for, at politisk og kulturel 
antiamerikanisme ikke, som der ellers er tendens til, bør anskues separat, men som to sider af 
samme sag, da de bygger på et fælles identitetsmæssigt grundlag, om end de ofte vil give sig 
udslag på forskellig vis. Der er overvejende konsensus om, at antiamerikanisme i Frankrig 
især er et elitefænomen, og på den baggrund stiller afhandlingens problemformulering 
spørgsmålet Hvilke elementer af den franske nationale identitet bidrager i særlig grad til at 
fremme antiamerikanske følelser blandt de franske eliter, og i hvilket omfang kan fransk-
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amerikanske forhold under den Femte Republik anskues som værende påvirkede af disse 
elementer?  
Afhandlingens målsætning om at ville præsentere en strukturel analyse af et 
kulturelt fænomen medfører også, at antiamerikanisme som et globalt fænomen skal søges 
forklaret strukturelt. I introduktionskapitlet opstilles de metodologiske forudsætninger for, 
hvorledes en sådan analyse kan foretages, og det konkluderes, at den konstruktivistiske IP-
teori udgør et relevant udgangspunkt for, hvorledes kultur kan anskues strukturelt. Endvidere 
opstilles hypotesen, at magtdimensionen udgør det mest vedkommende forklaringselement i 
forhold til studiet af antiamerikanisme som globalt fænomen. På den baggrund definerer 
afhandlingen antiamerikanisme som et globalt fænomen og den mest universelle af alle 
landespecifikke anti-ismer. Antiamerikanisme afspejler en generel disposition mod USA, dets 
samfund og dets politikker. Det er et komplekst fænomen med mange forskellige attributter, 
som afspejler antiamerikanerens egne værdier og opfattelser. Disse attributter skyldes eller 
forstærkes i et vist omfang af opfattelsen af, at USA har en uforholdsmæssig stor magt over 
andre nationer og deres indbyggere. Således kan antiamerikanisme i udstrakt grad tolkes som 
en reaktion mod en forestillet trussel om amerikanisering af andre samfund, både på et lokalt 
og et globalt plan.  
Besvarelsen falder i to hoveddele: en generel, der kort søger at præsentere en 
nyfortolkning af antiamerikanisme som et globalt fænomen, og en landespecifik, der mere 
uddybende søger at analysere den franske variant af fænomenet i forhold til de centrale 
elementer af den franske nationale identitet, som i særlig grad vurderes at fremme 
antiamerikanske dispositioner. Kapitel 2 gennemgår de væsentligste standarddefinitioner af 
antiamerikanisme og argumenterer for, at disse kun delvist kan bidrage til at forklare de 
grundlæggende årsager, der kan give anledning til antiamerikanske fordomme og 
dispositioner. Der argumenteres for det første for, at antiamerikanisme er en universel anti-
isme, der frembyder nogle unikke karakteristika, som gør, at fænomenet ikke blot kan anskues 
som andre anti-ismer. For det andet afvises den udbredte tendens til at betragte fænomenet 
som overvejende irrationelt, idet der argumenteres for, at der kan være en række forklarlige 
grunde til, at dele af verdenen kan tænkes at afvise den amerikaniseringsproces, som 
antiamerikanisme også er en reaktion imod. Endelig fremhæves det, at om end 
antiamerikanisme frembyder mange forskellige og til tider unikke attributter afhængigt af de 
samfund eller sociale segmenter i samfundene, som analyseres, er dette ikke ensbetydende 
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med, at mere strukturelle faktorer ikke også kan være på spil, og det argumenteres, at den 
væsentligste faktor i den forbindelse er magtdimensionen, som er den definerende 
karakteristik, der adskiller antiamerikanisme fra andre anti-ismer. På den baggrund 
præsenterer kapitel 3 en alternativ fortolkning af antiamerikanisme som et globalt fænomen, 
hvori det argumenteres, at dette bedst kan beskrives som en afstandstagen til amerikansk magt 
og indflydelse. Først præsenteres en række meningsmålinger og undersøgelser, som dels 
relativt entydigt viser, at der er en global opfattelse af, at USA har uforholdsmæssig stor magt 
over andre samfund, dels antyder, at dette forhold bidrager til at fremme opfattelser, som til 
en vis grad kan beskrives som udtryk for antiamerikanisme. Dernæst introduceres Joseph S. 
Nyes terminologi om hård versus blød magt (1990), og det fremhæves, at USA‘s magt i dag 
kan beskrives som værende af næsten hegemonisk karakter i et internationalt system, der hvad 
hård magt angår bedst kan betegnes som primopolært, dvs. domineret af ét land, der er i en 
unik position til at udøve rollen som primus inter pares. Om end USA‘s hårde magt er 
overvældende sammenlignet med andre landes, fremstår dets bløde magt på mange måder 
mindst ligeså imponerende, idet USA i højere grad end nogen anden nation har kunnet både 
påvirke og udforme de globale spilleregler og samtidig eksportere sine værdier til resten af 
verden, hvormed disse med tiden har antaget nærmest universel karakter. Samtidig fastslås 
det, at den amerikanske exceptionalisme, som udgør en væsentlig del af den amerikanske 
nationale identitet, i sig indeholder kimen til en unilateralisme, som fra tid til anden, og senest 
under præsident George W. Bushs embedsperiode, seriøst har bidraget til at mindske USA's 
tiltrækningskraft i omverdenens øjne.  
 Afhandlingens anden og væsentligste del retter fokuset mod den landespecifikke 
analyse af antiamerikanisme i Frankrig. Om end magtdimensionen som skitseret ovenfor 
synes egnet til at forklare nogle af de mere strukturelle årsager til antiamerikanisme som et 
globalt fænomen, er det klart, at antiamerikanisme givet sin kulturelle og identitetsmæssige 
natur vil manifestere sig forskelligt fra samfund til samfund. Kapitel 4 præsenterer en 
metodologisk ramme for, hvorledes en landespecifik analyse af antiamerikanisme kan tolkes i 
relation til nationale identitetsspørgsmål, og foreslår en række konceptuelle værktøj, som med 
fordel kan anvendes til en sådan analyse. Kapitlet foreslår, at narrativer om national identitet 
dels kan anskues som udfoldende sig langs fire vektorer, nemlig en politisk, kulturel, religiøs 
og etnisk; dels typisk vil være dialektiske af natur, således at de både bidrager til at fremme en 
national selvidentifikation og til at afgrænse denne fra andre, jf. opfattelsen af ‘andethed‘. 
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Endelig argumenteres der for, at disse narrativer om national identitet indgår i en fælles 
national doxa, der påvirker folks adfærd, da den med tiden bliver forankret i deres nationale 
habitus. Denne forestilling om en national habitus er gældende både på et individuelt og et 
samfundsmæssigt niveau og giver sig for så vidt angår sidstnævnte især udtryk gennem 
statens eller dens definerende eliters handlen. I kapitel 5 gives indledningsvist en kort 
introduktion til de mest gængse antiamerikanske diskurser i Frankrig, hvorefter det påvises, at 
disse i vidt omfang bygger på en række af de samme fordomme, som Frankrig i århundreder 
har dyrket i forhold til arvefjenden England. På den baggrund argumenteres der for, at 
antiamerikanisme i vidt omfang kan beskrives som en efterfølgerfobi til den anglofobi, som 
har været fremherskende i Frankrig i århundreder, og som stadig finder et ekko i den franske 
afvisning af det ‘angelsaksiske‘. Kapitlet argumenterer videre for, at de centrale elementer af 
den franske nationale identitet skal findes med udgangspunkt i de værdier, som det moderne 
Frankrig har arvet fra revolutionen i 1789, nemlig republikanisme, civilisation og sekularisme 
(laïcité); tre værdier, som dels kan henføres til tre af de fire vektorer for national identitet, der 
blev identificeret i kapitel 4, dels har tydelige universalistiske overtoner. Den resterende del af 
kapitlet argumenterer indgående for, at USA i forhold til samtlige tre værdier kan anskues 
som både en beslægtet nation, der i udstrakt grad deler disse værdier, om end de på den anden 
side af Atlanten har fået et anderledes udtryk, og som den nation, der i forhold til disse 
værdiparametre mest konsekvent fremstår som en rival i forhold til franske aspirationer om at 
tilbyde sig selv som en model for andre nationer. På baggrund af denne analyse konkluderes 
det, at Frankrig og USA kan karakteriseres som værende ‘adskilt af fælles værdier‘. Hvor 
kapitel 5 således søger at afdække de grundlæggende identitetsmæssige forhold, der kan 
tænkes at være fremmende for fransk antiamerikanisme gennem de seneste to århundreder, 
vender kapitel 6 opmærksomheden mod det mere nutidige tema om antiamerikanisme under 
den franske Femte Republik. Med udgangspunkt i antagelsen om, at politisk og kulturel 
antiamerikanisme skal anskues som to sider af samme sag, præsenteres en detaljeret analyse 
af først den politisk motiverede antiamerikanisme under den Femte Republik og dernæst den 
kulturelt baserede antiamerikanisme i samme periode. De mange politiske 
uoverensstemmelser, der kendetegner det fransk-amerikanske forhold i perioden, bliver 
evalueret, og der argumenteres for, at om end disse ofte også kan henføres til en fransk 
forestilling om og aversion mod USA's hegemoniske aspirationer, er dette ikke tilstrækkeligt 
til at beskrive dem som værende nødvendigvis drevet af antiamerikanske motiver. De 
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politikker, som præsident de Gaulle og hans efterfølgere har fulgt, har snarere været 
karakteriseret ved et stærkt ønske om at balancere amerikansk magt, hvor det drivende 
leitmotif har været at præsentere Frankrig som en stormagt af første rang, der kunne optræde 
på den internationale scene på (næsten) lige fod med USA. Med henblik på at opnå denne 
position, som Frankrig efter Anden Verdenskrig havde mistet, har Frankrig under den Femte 
Republik målrettet arbejdet for dels at øge sin uafhængighed af Washington, dels at fastholde 
og udbygge sin indflydelse på de to kontinenter, hvor landet bedst kunne præsentere sig som 
et alternativt referencepunkt til USA: Afrika og Europa. Om end disse politikker ikke 
nødvendigvis kan siges at have været motiveret af antiamerikanisme, er de ofte blevet udlagt 
således, hvilket har bidraget til indtrykket af den Femte Republik som værende 
grundlæggende antiamerikansk af natur (jf. Kuisel 1993). Og der er ingen tvivl om, at den 
franske tilbøjelighed til at fremhæve – og advare mod – USA's hegemoniske intentioner har 
bidraget til at fostre en retorik blandt Frankrigs politiske eliter, som har tydelige 
antiamerikanske overtoner, også selvom retorikken med tiden er blevet mere afdæmpet. Hvor 
den politiske antiamerikanisme i Frankrig snarere skal anskues som et retorisk følgeresultat af 
et sæt politikker, der har haft som formål at understrege og underbygge fransk politisk 
grandeur, argumenteres der i kapitlets anden del for, at den kulturelle antiamerikanisme i 
Frankrig indeholder et tydeligt element af afvisning af USA, og ikke mindst af den væsentlige 
del af amerikansk blød magt, som dets kulturelle indflydelse udgør. Som tilfældet er for den 
politiske antiamerikanisme gælder det også for den kulturelle, at den væsentligst er drevet af 
de toneangivende eliter, og ikke mindst de franske intellektuelle har med succes etableret sig 
som de primære aktører i modstanden mod amerikansk kultur. Om end den kulturelt betonede 
antiamerikanisme havde sin storhedstid i mellemkrigstiden, er det frem for alt i 
efterkrigstiden, at omverdenen for alvor er blevet præsenteret for de franske intellektuelles 
opgør med den amerikanske massekultur. Oprøret mod denne massekultur eksemplificeres 
ved fire hændelser: Coca-Cola affæren i 1950erne, kampagnen mod franglais i 1960erne, de 
audiovisuelle ‘kulturkrige‘ i 1990erne og endelig kampagnen mod la malbouffe omkring 
årtusindeskiftet. Disse eksempler tydeliggør ikke blot omfanget og karakteren af den kulturelt 
baserede modstand mod USA, men understreger også, at denne med tiden har indskrevet sig i 
en antiglobaliseringsretorik, som har klare antiamerikanske overtoner. Slutteligt konkluderes 
det, at om end såvel de politiske som de kulturelle antiamerikanske narrativer kan relateres til 
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den franske nationale habitus, fremstår den kulturelt baserede antiamerikanisme i dag mere 
fast forankret i den franske nationale psyke end den politiske ditto. 
 I konklusionen sættes afhandlingens delkonklusioner i perspektiv, og det 
vurderes, at det i forhold til målsætningen om at præsentere en strukturel analyse af et 
kulturelt fænomen er lykkedes at sandsynliggøre, at antiamerikanisme som et globalt 
fænomen kan tolkes strukturelt som overvejende bundende i en modstand mod en amerikansk 
magt, der ofte opfattes som dels havende en uforholdsmæssig stor indflydelse på andre 
nationers mulighed for selvstændig handlen, dels værende potentielt underminerende for 
andre nationers identitetsmæssige egenart. Anvendelsen af begrebet blød magt fremhæves i 
den forbindelse som et nyttigt konceptuelt værktøj, der kan bruges til at illustrere, hvorledes 
denne modstand relaterer sig nok så meget til en opfattelse af en omsiggribende 
amerikaniseringsproces af andre samfund som til mere banale forestillinger om USA's 
magthegemoni. Derved muliggøres det, at man kan undslippe stereotype forestillinger om 
antiamerikanisme som modstand mod det internationale systems ‖Mr. Big‖ (Katzenstein og 
Keohane 1996); forestillinger, som sandsynligvis har bidraget til, at megen forskning inden 
for antiamerikanisme længe har næret et vist forbehold over for at analysere fænomenet i 
forhold til magtdimensionen. Det understreges dog, at samspillet mellem antiamerikanisme og 
amerikansk magt, såvel hård som blød, er vanskeligt at måle kvantitativt, da magtopfattelse 
forbliver en noget diffus størrelse, særligt i forbindelse med spørgsmål om kultur og identitet, 
og at yderligere forskning indenfor området er nødvendig. Ikke desto mindre når afhandlingen 
for så vidt angår antiamerikanisme som et globalt fænomen til samme konklusion som Robert 
Lieber (2005): At antiamerikanisme er uundgåelig, så længe USA eksisterer som en stormagt. 
For så vidt angår afhandlingens hovedanalyse af de strukturelle forhold, der betinger fransk 
antiamerikanisme, noteres det indledningsvis, at der ofte er en tendens til at fokusere på de 
forhold, der adskiller Frankrig fra USA, hvilket bidrager til det indtryk, at fransk 
antiamerikanisme skyldes væsensforskellige karaktertræk og verdensanskuelser mellem 
indbyggerne i de to lande. I modsætning hertil og som svar på problemformuleringen 
fremhæves det, at en analyse, der tager sit udgangspunkt i de centrale elementer af den 
franske nationale identitet afslører, at der på det værdimæssige plan er væsentlige paralleller 
mellem de to nationer. Det er dette forhold der, givet at USA's universalisme har vist sig 
markant mere succesrig end den franske ditto, udgør den væsentligste årsag til, at USA med 
tiden har indlejret sig i den franske nationale habitus som nationens ‘signifikante Anden‘. Der 
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er tale om et grundlæggende identitetsmæssigt forhold, og heri ligger den strukturelle årsag til 
den særlige franske variant af antiamerikanisme. Dermed ikke være sagt, at fransk 
antiamerikanisme er en uforanderlig størrelse, der ikke (også) bliver påvirket af såvel 
forholdet landene imellem som af den udvikling i landets nationale identitet, der naturligt sker 
med tiden. Det fremgår af analysen, at den politisk betonede antiamerikanisme i Frankrig – på 
trods af sporadiske situationsbestemte uoverensstemmelser, som for eksempel over krigen i 
Irak i 2003 – synes at være om ikke nødvendigvis på retur, så dog at være blevet nedtonet til 
et mere afdæmpet leje, i takt med at Frankrig i stigende grad har affundet sig med sin rolle i 
det internationale system. Noget tilsvarende kan ikke i samme grad siges om den kulturelle 
antiamerikanisme. Om end retorikken i dag er mindre skinger end den var i efterkrigstiden, 
for ikke at tale om i mellemkrigstiden, fremstår den kulturelle antiamerikanisme som ganske 
solidt rodfæstet i en fransk (elitær) tradition for at nedgøre amerikanske kulturelle produkter 
og værdier. Hvor kampen tidligere gjaldt den truende amerikanisering at det franske samfund 
og den franske kultur, bliver den nu ført under et nyt banner, nemlig kampen mod 
globalisering. Men modstanderen er reelt den samme: USA og ikke mindst amerikansk kultur.  
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General works on anti-Americanism  
There has been a dramatic increase in the number of works treating the subject of anti-
Americanism over the past two decades. The nature and scope of these works is highly 
heterogeneous, given the breadth and complexity of the topic. There are several ways to 
assess the literature on the phenomenon. One is to divide it into three broad categories: First, 
works, whether of a scholarly or more popular nature, which attempt to vilify America by 
presenting more or less scientific evidence to the opprobrious nature of the United States, 
considering in essence that much anti-Americanism is of the United States‘ own making. 
Sardar and Davies‘ analysis, Why do People Hate America? (2002), can be counted to this 
category, at least partly, given the very negative picture of America that is painted throughout 
the book. This does not entail that the book is without its merits; in some respects it offers 
some very thought-provoking arguments that need to be addressed. However, it requires a 
critical and vigilant approach on behalf of the scholar using their works to analyze the causes 
of anti-Americanism. The second category almost falls into the opposite ditch by describing 
anti-Americanism as a phenomenon bordering on the irrational. This approach can be found 
even in studies of high scholarly integrity, where the irrational elements of anti-Americanism 
are well-documented and presented in a convincing form. Many of the works that can be 
placed in this category are written by American social scientists wishing to come to terms 
with a phenomenon, whose magnitude they clearly find puzzling – and apparently also 
slightly offensive. A commentator like Charles Krauthammer may be regarded as an obvious 
representative of this group, yet his passionate defense of all things American against any 
criticism from the outside borders on the tiresome eulogy of the United States. Others have 
treated the subject in a more subtle manner, yet still with the sometimes unacknowledged 
premise that anti-Americanism is first and foremost a matter of deficiencies on behalf of the 
beholder. Among these I would place the works of Paul Hollander (1992, 1995, 2004), though 
some might disagree with me on this. The virulent attacks against anti-Americans delivered 
by Jean-Francois Revel in his L‟obsession anti-américaine (2002) also easily falls into the 
category of what I have termed the attempt to ―demonize the demonizers‖ (see chapter 2). It is 
furthermore a reminder that this category does not exclusively contain works of American 
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authors. Josef Joffe, although much more nuanced, is another writer, who finds it difficult to 
dissociate anti-Americanism as a phenomenon from its more bizarre manifestations (2001, 
2006a, 2006b), as do Zeldin (in Lacorne, Rupnik, and Toinet (eds) 1990), otherwise a keen 
observer of French sentiments (1973, 1977, 1983). Finally, there exists a third category, 
which places itself more or less between these two extremes. This category is extremely 
broad, as it covers not just the middle ground between the two, often trying to steer clear of 
the worst stereotypes and caricatures, but also acknowledges both the sometimes irrational 
aspects of the phenomenon and the more or less reasonable causes of disenchantment with the 
United States that are manifested throughout the world. Most of the recent serious studies, 
such as the very comprehensive works edited by Katzenstein and Keohane (2007), Higgott 
and Malbašić (2008), Judt and Lacorne (2005), and O‘Connor (2007a-c), and O‘Connor and 
Griffiths (2007) fall into this category. By far the most comprehensive study of anti-
Americanism to this day is without any doubt the one edited mainly by Brendon O‘Connor 
(O‘Connor (ed.) 2007a-c, O‘Connor and Griffiths (eds) 2007); a study which spans four 
volumes, totaling some 1,350 pages. This work is also by its breadth and scope alone a good 
indication that anti-Americanism as a research topic in its own right has come of age since the 
1990s, when it started to gain some headway as more than a marginal academic 
preoccupation. 
Another way to assess the broad spectrum of studies relating to the subject of 
anti-Americanism is to divide them into a number of categories, reflecting neither their bias, 
nor their level of ambition, but rather their methodological approach: First, studies which 
focus essentially on the causes of anti-Americanism, eventually in relation to for example the 
policies and practices of the United States. These studies seek primarily to find the logic in 
much anti-Americanism as originating from the said policies and practices and the way they 
are interpreted abroad (e.g. Crockatt 2003). Second, studies which present an anthology of 
essays on anti-Americanism, the sum of which is meant to illustrate the diversity of the 
phenomenon while (sometimes) offering a framework of analysis based on these diverse 
examples (Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007, Higgott and Malbašić (eds) 2008, O‘Connor 
(ed.) 2007a-c, and O‘Connor and Griffiths (eds) 2007, Judt and Lacorne (eds) 2005, Mathé 
(ed.) 2000). Third, studies which do not have anti-Americanism as their primary focus, but 
which as part of their analysis of for example aspects of U.S. foreign policy or transatlantic 
relations incorporate anti-Americanism as a significant element of their analysis (see for 
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example Fabbrini (ed.) 2006, and David and Grondin (eds) 2006, Lieber 2005). Fourth, the 
numerous studies devoted to analyzing anti-Americanism in relation to a specific country (for 
example Roger 2005, Revel 2002, Kuisel 1993, Meunier 2000, Diner 1996, Shiraev and 
Zubok 2000) or regional entity (Berman 2004, Markovits 2007, McPherson (ed.) 2006), 
whether as anthologies or not, and which typically, though not always exclusively, attach 
more attention to the particularistic nature of displays of anti-Americanism in the said 
countries or regions than to the general characteristics of the phenomenon.  
 
Anti-Americanism treated within the discipline of International Relations 
In spite of the growing attention given to the subject of anti-Americanism over the past 
decade, especially by political scientists and students of international relations, it is 
noteworthy that anti-Americanism as a research topic has rarely been related to mainstream 
theories of International Relations. This might at first seem surprising, given that the global, 
i.e. non-domestic, phenomenon of anti-Americanism is bound to have consequences for the 
relationship between the United States and the rest of the world. There are, however, a 
number of explanations for this. First, though references to anti-Americanism frequently pop 
up in articles on foreign affairs, most serious studies of the phenomenon have been carried out 
by historians, sociologists, or scholars in the tradition of cultural studies rather than by 
scholars of International Relations. There are notable exceptions to this rule, such as Stanley 
Hoffmann, an eminent IR theorist as well as one of the most knowledgeable observers of 
French foreign policy, yet though Hoffmann offers highly valuable insights into some of the 
mechanisms of French political anti-Americanism (see for example Hoffmann 1974), these 
are typically presented as part of the nation-specific study of French foreign policy rather than 
framed within a broader discussion of IR theories. The same largely applies to the works of 
for example Sophie Meunier (2000 and 2007). Among the rare scholars with a background in 
International Relations theory to have studied anti-Americanism in a more comprehensive 
way are Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, who have contributed with a much 
needed general analysis of the phenomenon (2007). Their analysis, which decomposes the 
phenomenon into different types of anti-Americanism, provides us with a good conceptual 
framework for understanding some of the driving forces behind anti-Americanism, yet it does 
not seem particularly linked to IR theory as such. The same applies to the numerous entries in 
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the four-volume study chiefly edited by Brendon O‘Connor (O‘Connor (ed.) 2007a-c, 
O‘Connor and Griffiths (eds) 2007).  
 
On anti-Americanism in France 
French anti-Americanism has been the subject of a substantial amount of study, reflecting the 
commonly held impression that among Western nations, France can be associated with some 
of the most pervasive displays of anti-Americanism. Three of the most important are in my 
opinion Philippe Roger‘s The American Enemy (2005), David Strauss‘ Menace in the West. 
The Rise of French Anti-Americanism in Modern Times (1978), and Richard F. Kuisel‘s 
Seducing the French. The Dilemma of Americanization (1993). Especially Roger‘s work is a 
formidable genealogy of more than two centuries of anti-Americanism in France, recounted 
through the use of testimonies of ill will towards America by various philosophers, diplomats, 
writers and other shapers of public opinion. A better and more elegant description of French 
displays of anti-Americanism will be hard to find. Strauss‘ account treats many of the same 
issues, but has a more limited scope, as it focuses primarily, though not exclusively, on the 
construction of anti-American narratives in the period from 1917 to 1933. Compared with the 
two former, Kuisel‘s study focuses more on the same themes, which are central to the present 
study: anti-Americanism and its relation to both French national identity and France‘s 
attempts to challenge global Americanization. A further contributor on French anti-
Americanism should be highlighted in this respect: Sophie Meunier has in numerous articles 
and contributions to anthologies (2000, in Katzenstein and Keohane (eds) 2007, and in Cole, 
Le Galès and Levy (eds) 2008) presented what I find to be some of the most perspicacious 
analyses on the subject available. Uniquely adroit at mingling the political, historical, and 
cultural factors which promote anti-Americanism in France, I perceive her as one of the 
foremost contemporary authorities in the field. Worth mentioning are also the succinct 
accounts given by for example Arianne Chebel d‘Appollonia (in Higgott and Malbašić (eds) 
2008), Denis Lacorne (in Judt and Lacorne (eds) 2005), and Colin Nettelbeck (in O‘Connor 
(ed.) 2007c). Although it should be noted that I am not altogether convinced by especially 
Nettelbeck‘s conclusions, he has provided a highly recommendable account of anti-
Americanism in France since 1918, which brilliantly covers most of the political, economic, 
and cultural manifestations of the phenomenon during the period. The essays in the anthology 
The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism, A Century of French Perception (Lacorne, Rupnik, 
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and Toinet (eds) 1990) also provide some good insights into the many diverse facets of 
French anti-Americanism, although it comes across today as rather dated in several respects. 
Numerous other scholars have written extensively about Franco-American relations, and 
while their primary subject may not have been French anti-Americanism as such, they have 
contributed massively to the academic writing on the subject and have as such imposed 
themselves as natural references for anybody interested in the subject. Here Stanley Hoffman 
(1974) and Alfred Grosser (1980 and 1989) immediately come to mind as unquestionably 
counting among the leading forces in that respect, and others, such as Michael Harrison 
(1981) and David Chuter (1996) have equally provided excellent accounts of Franco-
American relations, which serve to give good insights into some of the driving forces behind 
much French anti-Americanism. Finally, it should not be forgotten that the topic of Franco-
American relations and passions is far from a new research area and that ground breaking 
work on the subject has been carried out several decades before it gained wider attention as a 
research topic, as can be witnessed most notably by the eminent works presented to us by 
Raymond Aron (1945, 1955, 1969) and especially René Rémond (1958).  
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